DefenseWatch – Jan. 2, 2002
Soldiers For The Truth (SFTT) Weekly Newsletter
When
we assumed the Soldier, We did not lay aside the Citizen.
General George Washington, to the New York Legislature, 1775
In this
week’s Issue of DefenseWatch: Stay Vigilant in 2002
Ed Offley
Editor, DefenseWatch
Email: defensewatch@aol.com
J. David Galland
Deputy
Editor, DefenseWatch
Email: defensewatch02@yahoo.com
David H. Hackworth
Senior Military Columnist
Email: teagles@hackworth.com
Chris Humphrey
SFTT Webmaster
Email: sysop@sftt.us
EDITOR'S NOTE: Your Support is Important!
EDITOR'S NOTE: Article Submission Procedures/Subject Editors Sought
GLOSSARY
OF MILITARY ACRONYMS
HACK BOOK SALES
I see fewer flags flying these days, and the patriotic flame that burned so brightly after Sept. 11 also seems on the wane. A lot of folks are probably thinking that since what's left of Osama's crazy crew is on the run, the war is over. It's human nature to start taking things for granted again when danger isn't banging loudly on the door.
I hope we don't go back to the fickleness of the Vietnam War.
In 1965, when the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division left Fort Campbell, Ky., it was to ringing endorsements from President Lyndon Johnson, Congress and the people. Eighty-five percent of Americans told the pollsters they were "All the Way With LBJ."
Just a year later, the survivors of that storied fighting unit returned from Vietnam to many of the same folks chanting, "Hey, Hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?"
But this time around, we're in a fight that's as critical as World War II. Because our homeland and very survival are once more at stake, the American people can't afford to treat this new war against terrorism like they did Vietnam.
We must stay the course and support this war from beginning to end, remaining ever aware that the brilliant victory in Afghanistan is simply one battle, with at least 60 more ahead. Fighting terrorism is not unlike fighting a deadly cancer. It can't be treated just where it's visible – every diseased cell in the body must be destroyed. Terrorism, too, must be excised wherever it exists, which will take years, and which can't happen without the total commitment and the everyday involvement of the American people.
Just as during World War II when our block wardens and other sharp-eyed patriots looked out for enemy spies, subs and planes, we today must remain as vigilant as our warriors overseas. Not an easily maintained mind-set for the most laid-back and relaxed citizenry in the world.
But even on the battlefield, a leader's biggest problem has always been alertness. Even with infantry troops, where fast reactions mean the difference between life and death. Grunts on the line, where the enemy wants them dead, still goof off – even knowing that by letting their guard down they might die.
In order to drill into young men the need to stay alert and stay alive, I used to punish offenders with my fists, boots and rifle butt, and with stockade time. I was ruthless. I'd seen too many kids go down because someone was asleep at the switch. There was no technique or punishment I didn't employ except killing the sorry slackers, and I often threatened that.
Fortunately, it worked. In my last combat tour in Vietnam with a mainly draftee battalion (the 4/39th), we didn't lose one soldier because our opponent got the edge. Now it's not uncommon for a 52-year-old former battalion member to thank me for kicking his butt and keeping him alive back when he was 19.
We must all discipline ourselves into becoming super soldier-sensitive to weird, suspicious stuff and reporting same to the FBI or local police. Two years ago, for example, a very alert female customs inspector stopped several major attacks by catching a Middle Eastern tourist as he was entering the USA from Canada. The arrest led to the FBI roll-up of a large terrorist network planning on blistering Los Angeles and New York City. Last month, several tips protected nuclear reactor sites. And last week, two sharp American Airlines crew members nailed another terrorist bent on bringing their plane down with explosive devices secreted in his shoes.
And even though friends in the FBI say some of their best tips are coming from alert citizens, we must still make sure our info gets attention. Remember, the Bureau received advance warning of the 9/11 kamikaze attacks before it got lost in the maze. Since that's the nature of bureaucracies, you-the-citizen must take your wartime home-front responsibilities seriously enough to follow up and make sure that everyone assigned to protect us is as much on the ball as you are.
As I drilled into my troops for more than a quarter of a century in training and battlefields: "Stay Alert, Stay Alive."
And don't forget to make a New Year's resolution that you'll support our troops in this long, hard war until "It's over, over there," and here, too.
http://www.hackworth.com
is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Sign in for the free weekly
Defending America column at his Web site. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich,
CT 06831.
© 2001 David H. Hackworth
By
Matthew Dodd
“Machine-gunners
are criminals. Snipers are just smarter criminals. They’re more stealthy.”
Those words conjure up images of war at the beginning of the 20th century,
right around the time of the “War to End All Wars.” The quote evokes a much
simpler time when many still regarded war as a “gentlemen’s sport,” or a test
of manhood; a time when new weapons and new tactics were forever changing
how wars were fought. And it suggests a time when quotes like the one above
were reserved for scholarly debates and personal memoirs.
Well, let me shatter that image for you: those words are attributed to a “Gung-ho
to the extreme” 38-year-old Marine captain rifle company commander currently
deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan, according to a front-page article in The
Wall Street Journal by reporter Michael M. Phillips on Dec. 21.
Phillips’
article told the story of a dedicated Marine sniper at Kandahar airport, his
personal and professional backgrounds, his intense sniper training, and his
unique warrior skills and perspectives. But that commander’s quote, in my
opinion, seriously detracted from an otherwise positive and motivating article
about one of our unsung heroes deployed far away from home.
I believe the article contains many media and leadership lessons that apply
to military leaders at all levels.
I was shocked when I first read the quote. How can any leader call his men
‘criminals,’ and how could saying it to a staff reporter from a major international
newspaper be something positive? In peacetime, that quote is at best idiotic.
In war, on the ground in a politically and culturally sensitive region of
the world, that quote is, at worst, strategically devastating as a potentially
lucrative gift of propaganda to the enemy.
They say that loose lips sink ships, and I am afraid of the possibility in
the Muslim world that loose lips may shatter relationships.
My
next thoughts were focused on the families and loved ones of the Marines (especially
of the machine-gunners and snipers) under that captain’s command. As a son
and as a parent, I know my family would be upset to learn in print that I
or my son is considered to be in the company of criminals (or even as a criminal)
according to my or my son’s commander. All it takes is one or two upset parents
or loved ones to call their congressman’s office to set in motion a paperwork
headache that is not needed when we are at war.
In one glib moment, that leader disrespected all (past, present and
future) Marine machine-gunners and snipers. In a military service known for
its cult-like reverence for and remembrance of its wartime heroes, such disrespect
is inconceivable and unacceptable. I am sure that this leader did not intentionally
mean to disrespect heroes like “Manila John” Basilone (World War II Medal
of Honor machine-gunner) and Carlos Hathcock (the ultimate Vietnam Marine
sniper), but the bottom line is that he did reduce them to criminal status
with his flippant comments.
The remaining lessons are best left as questions about how this article made
it to print. Did the captain proofread the article before it was published?
Did the captain know he was going to be quoted, and did he know what quote
was going to be used? What kind of
relationship did the captain have with the reporter, and was it long enough
for them to build up mutual trust and respect? What public affairs training
and guidance were available to this captain before he spoke to the reporter?
Effectively dealing with the media is a leadership responsibility, especially
in times of war when the consequences of unintended second- and third-order
effects of ineffective dealings can
negatively affect so many people and organizations. I believe the media is
a force multiplier when used carefully by qualified individuals.
Unfortunately,
the quoted captain deserves the dubious distinction of delivering the dumbest,
most insensitive, unprofessional, and irresponsible sound bite of the war
in 2001.
I hope that leaders at all levels will take time to reflect on at least some
of these lessons before they discredit or disrespect themselves, their troops,
their organizations, and possibly our nation in our own news media.
Lt.
Col. Matthew Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed
at the Pentagon. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.
By Robert G. Williscroft
In today's post-cold war world, conventional warfare no longer occupies central stage. Enter SIS – the surreptitious importation strike (SIS). It's a phrase coined in the mid-1980s by Charles Harrison, writing in the Mensa Bulletin.
Modern warfare no longer is just large armies facing one another across battle lines, fighting ships in ferocious sea battles, or even exchanging intercontinental ballistic missiles from opposite sides of the Earth. Since September 11, 2001, SIS has become terribly real and immediate. Terrorism has become the biggest threat to life, liberty, and happiness. Its ugly implications are overwhelming: The New York World Trade Center, the Pentagon, Anthrax attacks, the USS Cole, our Embassies around the world, and so on.
Special Atomic Demolition Munitions (SADMs) are so small that they can go anywhere a man can. In the hands of terrorists, Mafia thugs, enemy infiltrators, or even several disgruntled nuclear lab technicians, it is entirely possible to discover one day that major industrial and cultural centers throughout our country have been blanketed with these devices. They would be nearly impossible to locate, would remain potent for years, and can be activated by a simple coded radio command from almost anywhere.
Fortunately, SADM-like devices are very difficult to build. Even with actual plans in hand, most organized groups would not be able to produce the final product. In fact, good evidence indicates that the Communist Chinese government held complete SADM plans for ten years without being able to construct a working model, despite their relatively sophisticated technology. We can, therefore, discount the chance that a terrorist group will be able to build its own SADM devices in the near future.
Realistically, anyone wanting SADM devices must resort to theft. Our defense against SADM attacks, therefore, is absolute control of SADMs in the first place.
We know the location of all our SADMs, and we keep them under strictest possible control, with essentially zero chance that one could fall into enemy hands. We believe the Soviets developed similar devices, but suspect theirs lack our sophisticated miniaturization. Because of the disruption following the demise of the Soviet Union, a terrorist organization might be able to obtain one of the Soviet portable nukes, but it appears unlikely that they could detonate the device-at least, not without outside expertise. The task is formidable, but not impossible.
Chemical and biological weapons, on the other hand, are obvious choices for terrorist strikes. A small group with limited resources has essentially zero chance of obtaining a SADM, but most such groups can set up and operate a modest nerve agent manufacturing facility. A nerve agent can be released in a subway, inside a large building or concert hall with devastating effects.
Chemical weapons fall into four general categories: Choking agents, blistering agents, blood agents, and organophosphate nerve agents.
Choking agents, which were extensively employed during World War I, are gasses like chlorine and phosgene. In today's world, these agents really are no alternative to the nerve agents discussed below. In order to be effective, they can only be used in an enclosed space, and it takes a very large amount of the gas to be anything other than annoying.
Similarly, blistering agents, like mustard gas (which was a frequent World War I weapon), do not have a meaningful place in today's world. The one exception would be a circumstance where a terrorist organization wanted to tie up as much of an area's medical facilities as possible, but without any widespread lethal results. The consequences of a blister gas attack is painful and very disruptive, but not usually fatal.
Most blood agents are based on cyanide, and are toxic when blood levels reach lethal amounts. Since lethal cyanide blood levels are similar to lethal levels of phosgene, there really is little difference between blood agents and lethal choking gases. Both require enclosed spaces to be effective, and neither are as effective as nerve agents.
Organophosphates originally were developed as insecticides. In the early part of the twentieth century there was even limited production and use of early versions of what are now called nerve agents-before their lethal effect on animals was fully understood. Currently, four substances occupy the nerve agent platform. Their ease of manufacture, their volatility, and their lethality all affect which of these are more suited to terrorist activities.
VX nerve agent is very lethal. Six to ten milligrams of this substance absorbed through the skin or ten milligrams breathed into the lungs as an aerosol will kill. For reference, a grain of rice weighs about ten milligrams. VX is stable; it sticks to things as a slightly sticky, oily film. Its high toxicity and ability to remain on surfaces for a long time make this agent an excellent killing weapon. Fortunately, it is very difficult to manufacture, so VX is unlikely to appear as the next terrorist weapon of choice.
A Soman nerve agent dose is three to five times the size of a lethal VX dose. Soman is more volatile than VX, so it dissipates more quickly; but its main use still is to coat surfaces rather than as a gas. Furthermore, it is just as difficult to manufacture as VX, so given a choice between Soman and VX, a terrorist will probably choose VX.
Both Sarin and Tabun are considerably less lethal, requiring about fifteen times the breathing dose and 200 times the skin dose of VX to be lethal. Sarin is very volatile so that it is most effective as a gas. This makes it excellent for use in enclosed areas like a large building or a subway. Because of restricted access to intermediate substances required in its manufacture, however, it is difficult to make. Tabun, the oldest nerve agent, while more volatile than VX and Soman, is significantly less volatile than Sarin, and it is very easy to manufacture. It is probable, therefore, that most terrorist nerve gas SIS operations will use Tabun.
Following World War II, the Allies seized over twelve thousand tons of Tabun. Much of this was subsequently destroyed, but there may still be large quantities stashed in some forgotten warehouse. Given the worldwide presence of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, it is distinctly possible that World War II vintage Tabun nerve agent forms a significant part of the arsenals of these organizations.
On a scale of cost for the number of civilian casualties accomplished, nothing holds a candle to biological agents. Conventional weapons will cost approximately $2,000 per square kilometer of civilian casualties for a large-scale operation against a civilian population. The same damage over the same area using nuclear weapons will cost less than half – $800. Using nerve agents reduces the cost to $600. But if you apply biological weapons, the cost is a paltry $1.
What is an effective biological agent? In the aftermath of the New York Trade Center attack, the United States experienced a series of anthrax incidents. As of this writing their source remains unknown. What is known, however, is that handling anthrax is not particularly difficult. It is not contagious, so to become infected requires direct contact with the spores.
Furthermore, most infections are of the skin variety, that-while annoying-are not fatal. Even the inhaled variety is completely reversible if it is treated right away, and Anthrax is responsive to a variety of antibiotics. Its singular advantage is that it is easy to manufacture. Anthrax, therefore, can be effective in tying up medical facilities and generating widespread panic and disruption, but it is not very effective as a lethal biological agent.
Smallpox is another frequently mentioned biological agent. Smallpox is deadly, very contagious in the pox stage, and the only real treatment is inoculation either before or within three or four days after infection. Fortunately, despite these facts, smallpox is not really an effective biological agent for two simple reasons. The first is that there are only two known supplies of the virus, in the United States and in Russia.
We know where both are located, where they are kept under maximum security. There is very little chance that any more exists.
The second reason is that the infectious phase of the illness is also the phase where the victim is seriously stressed by the virus. A patient flat on his or her back is unlikely to infect other people.
Botulism is the organism responsible for food poisoning. It certainly can be spread by infecting food across the country at supermarkets and in buffets, but even more than Anthrax, botulism is rarely deadly, and less likely to cause panic.
Ricin is a very toxic white powder extracted from castor beans. While it certainly is dangerous when ingested, it is not a very practical weapon. In London in 1978, the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markow was killed by injecting this poison into him from the tip of an umbrella while he was waiting for a bus. One-on-one Ricin is an effective weapon, but as a biological weapon of mass terror it is ineffective.
Bubonic Plague killed millions in past centuries. Its effectiveness, however, was in large measure the result of cleanliness and life style. It is very unlikely that plague would propagate very far in modern America.
Tularemia is similar to anthrax in nearly every aspect, including its symptoms and treatment. And like anthrax, while it can instill panic and disruption, it will not be very effective as a weapon.
Ebola hemorrhagic fever can kill in just a few hours. It is highly contagious. There is no known cure, and no prophylactic vaccination. In the hands of a very sophisticated enemy, ebola can be a highly effective biological weapon. The need for sophistication arises from the extreme difficulty in maintaining the viability of the ebola virus. It takes the infrastructure of a major biochemical laboratory to manufacture and transport viable ebola. This generally is beyond the capability of a terrorist organization.
There is one other way to infect a target nation with Ebola: Assemble a sufficiently large number of simians so that you can sustain a loss of six or seven creatures daily. Isolate a simian infected with ebola, keeping in mind that it will die within three to four hours. Before the infected animal dies, pass the infection to the next creature, and so on, while transporting the entire batch to the target country. With a bit of luck, you should be able to pass the infection directly into the population. Once the infection gains a foothold, only the most draconian measures will bring it to a halt. Considering the logistics for pulling something like this off, however, it is very unlikely that an unsophisticated terrorist organization will be able to use ebola hemorrhagic fever as an effective biological weapon.
That pretty much covers the field of potential SIS weapons. While any disease can potentially be used as a weapon, realistically, anthrax and tularemia can cause significant panic and disruption, but only ebola will cause any widespread casualties. Since ebola requires greater sophistication than normally available to typical terrorists, biological attacks do not pose a meaningful threat.
The Cold War is behind us. Nevertheless, we still need a strong military and weapons that deter, precisely in order to deter what might otherwise happen. The real threat today, however, is the surreptitious importation strike – SIS. We need to retain all our options, including nuclear weapons, to combat this threat. We must be prepared to defend ourselves against the nerve agents sarin and tabun, and our general population should be educated regarding the limited threat posed by anthrax and tularemia.
The bottom line is that a free nation of individuals willing to defend itself decisively will maintain a viable presence in the world long after terrorist opposition has been relegated to an historical footnote.
Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.
By Patrick Hayes
Wide-eyed fanatics have been biting at the heels of history since scribes first scratched their observations into stone. Fanatics have murdered and tried to destroy what they feared or did not understand. In the 21st century, little has changed. The West has been at war with Islamic fanatics for a millennium. Yet now, we are told our enemy is not Islam per se, but terrorists of an Islamic persuasion.
Since Sept. 11, the Bush administration has downplayed the role of “Islam” in the attacks. We are told there are good Muslims and there are fanatics, yet what the world saw on Sept. 11 were Muslims dancing in the streets following the cowardly attacks, showing glee at the acts and unrestrained venom towards the West.
On one hand, trying to appease Muslims for atrocities committed by Muslims is political correctness gone awry. On the other, the United States and other western alliance members are conducting a war against terror’s current home base, al Queda, in Afghanistan. To do so, and to downplay bin Laden’s fanatical screams that “the Crusaders are coming,” Muslim nations have had to be appeased – which is both realpolitik and a geopolitical necessity.
However, historical reality rather than political correctness must come into play in the war against terror, which increasingly projects the face of Islam. In 1996, author S. P. Huntington wrote, “Some Westerners, including President Bill Clinton, have argued that the West does not have problems with Islam but only with violent Islamic extremists. Fourteen hundred years of history demonstrate otherwise.”
Coming as no surprise to anyone who has studied Islamic radicalism, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheik Ekrima Sobri, voiced the following in his mosque two weeks before the Sept. 11 attacks:
“Allah,
there is no strength but your strength. Destroy, therefore, the Zionist occupation
and its helpers and its agents. Destroy the U.S. and its helpers and its agents.
Destroy Britain and its helpers and its agents. Prepare those who will soon
unite the Muslims of the world and march in the footsteps of Saladin. Allah,
we ask you for forgiveness, forgiveness before death, and mercy and forgiveness
after death. Allah, grant victory to Islam and the Muslims in the coming war.”
What Freud might have described as “self-hating,” Muslims commit overt and bloody atrocities against non-Muslims (but other Muslim sects will suffice if there are no Jewish or Christian targets in the vicinity), and then claim innocence – that they are being discriminated against, or that there is a vast anti-Islamic conspiracy. Bin Laden and other Muslim terrorists could have given German Nazi propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels lessons about the “big lie.”
The terror attack on Sept. 11 is an obvious case in point, where Muslims screamed that “Jews” were behind the attacks to defame Islam. A short time later, Muslim gunmen from the “Army of Omar” shot and killed 16 innocent Christians who were praying in their church in Bahawalpur, Pakistan. Pakistani officials (our “allies”) claimed it was the work of Western influence in an attempt to defame Muslims. They attack and murder those who do not accept their narrow view of the world, but when called to account for their crimes, they claim it is plot to defame Islam! This goes beyond craven cowardice.
There is no way to know how many people the Taliban murdered in the Kabul soccer stadium, and elsewhere in Afghanistan, in the name of Islam.
Thousands of Christians have been brutally murdered in Nigeria in the name of Islam. One man, a 26 year-old former Muslim who had not only had the audacity to convert to Christianity, but had become an ordained Catholic priest, was attacked, had his eyes gouged out and was left on the road to die. Nigerian journalist Ulanugu Eneh wrote, “The greatest threat to Nigeria as a nation as presently constituted is Islamic extremism.”
The Sudan has seen war and famine for generations, but in the past 20 years, almost 2 million Christians and Animists have been murdered in the name of Islam. In Algeria, some 100,000 people have died in the name of Islam, including the murder of Bishop Clavier and the beheading of seven Trappist monks. In Yemen, Catholic nuns were murdered, in the name of Islam. In Egypt, the recipient of a billion U.S. tax dollars every year, a reign of terror exists against Coptic Christians and other non-Muslims – again in the name of Islam.
Saudi Arabia, another supposed Arab ally, is listed by the U.S. State Department as not allowing religious freedom. Christians there are flogged, imprisoned and executed by a government that prevents non-Muslim worship, even in the privacy of a home – also in the name of Islam. In the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf organization, with ties to bin Laden’s Al Queda network, have tortured and murdered priests and other Christians, have taken hostages and defaced churches, all in the name of Islam.
In a recent article, British journalist Paul Johnson argued the West has evolved because it has grown and learned from mistakes, based on the secular rule of law, which has allowed society to grow and in which democracy and liberty take root, therefore wealth flourishes. He argues, “All the systems of the world, notably the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Indian, have learned much from the West in turn, and benefited thereby. The Islamic world has been the least willing to adopt the West’s fundamental excellences. This is why it remains poor (despite its wealth of raw materials), unfree, and unhappy.”
Again, as Freud might point out, based on this have-not mentality, Islamic fundamentalism is bent on destroying, rather than learning from, the West. However, before the Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran and initiated the Islamic revolution, Middle Eastern terrorists were politically motivated by Marxist-Leninist ideology, rather than Jihad. Arab/Muslim terrorists have attacked Western infrastructure since the 1960s, when Yasir Arafat was still identified as a terrorist with the Fatah organization and Arab terrorists were hijacking and blowing up planes to achieve their objectives.
As Islam is more a way of life than a religion, however, the fervor of the Islamic revolution has replaced stale Marxist-Leninist ideology. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism captured the existing fervor and convinced many Muslims that secular revolution was passé, while becoming martyrs for Islam carries with it much more value for self and family. Also, as a matter of practicality, those holding the power over these “martyrs,” like bin Laden, are assured that the death toll among “infidels” is much greater when a martyr blows himself up amid a group of unsuspecting civilians, than a Marxist-Leninist who wants to live and fight again.
Given this bleak picture of a worldwide religion that refuses to learn from the West, but rather wishes to destroy it, a major concern is the ongoing migration of millions of Muslims westward, outwardly seeking a better life for themselves and their families – but is that their only motive?
When loyalty is first and foremost to their religion, just how loyal are Muslims to their adopted countries when a Jihad is called? A poll conducted in Britain showed that over two thirds of Muslims there said their Muslim faith was more important to them than their British citizenship. As a country with a large number of Muslim residents, and the victim and target of Muslim terror, the United States needs to take note.
In a country based on laws, equality and social justice, there is no room for blind bigotry and prejudice against Muslims living here. However, as has been identified many times since 9-11, most of the 19 Muslim hijackers were either legally living in, or had legally entered, the United States. Until loyalty is established, there needs to be greater security, scrutiny and vigilance, particularly while we are engaged in a war against Muslim terrorists who may use dirty nuclear, biological and chemical weapons without concern for innocent lives.
If saving American lives and infrastructure means covert surveillance, profiling and questioning, so be it. Until otherwise shown, Americans need to be on guard and aware of the potential of terrorists in their midst. And Muslims in this country need to be on notice that their loyalty is in question until proven otherwise. The risks are too high to have it any other way.
Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at Gyrene65@netscape.net.
By David Warren
In a sense, Afghanistan has been a "classic" colonial war. The United States has been sparing of its own troops, instead taking sides and choosing local allies as its proxies, while using its own incontestable technological superiority to help them quickly win.
The resemblance to the way the British took India in the 18th and 19th centuries – one tribal patch or princely state at a time – ends there. The Americans have no long-term plans to rule the place, and are happy to let anyone else send “peacekeepers."
This is what the Europeans and Canadians turn out to be good for, this time around. We have the equipment, the manpower, and the budgets, to do sentry duties. (As a retired Canadian officer told me after the federal budget was tabled on Dec. 10, "It's all very well for the Americans to spend a fortune on defence, they have to defend the free world from terrorism. We only have to defend our own smugness.")
Except for the most elite British special forces – a small handful of men – help would just get in the Yankees' way.
Moreover, the two percent or less of the West's Afghan campaign that was offloaded on the British (and a few French special forces, too), was essentially unnecessary. The help was accepted as a political favor, in answer to British and French supplications.
This was probably made clear when the British defence secretary, the aptly-named Geoff Hoon, told BBC breakfast television Dec. 9 that if Osama bin Laden fell into British hands, he would not be turned over to the U.S. for trial – unless the U.K. first received assurances that Osama would not face the death penalty. I would have liked to be a fly on the line when George Bush called Tony Blair about that one. I doubt we'll be hearing anything so unctuous from Mr. Hoon again.
Offers of British and other NATO aircraft were politely declined. They have inferior equipment and pilots, and as the U.S. learned over Serbia, you can't really fight a war while waiting for 19 different defense ministers to sign off on each target.
What has changed, in the last decade, and especially in the last two years (the technological developments since the Balkan campaign in 1999 were greater than those between that and Desert Storm in 1991), is the status of the United States as a military power.
At the beginning of the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. emerged as the world's only superpower. Now it has become what the French call a “hyperpower". It is not only at the top of the international "top ten" in military spending. It outspends the other nine, combined, and can afford to, given the present scale of the U.S. economy. Not the British, at the height of their empire, nor even the Romans, contesting with distant Medes and Parthians, enjoyed such military predominance.
And yet, this quantitative comparison actually understates the U.S. advantage. For there is a real qualitative difference, not only in American equipment, but in the skills of its troops. The Pentagon made use of the contractions in general manpower through the 1990s, and applied the "peace dividend" to hone a much more skilled and variously specialized fighting force. The U.S. does not employ "grunts" anymore, only soldiers who call themselves "grunts" with a certain droll pride.
At the officer level, Europeans visiting the American military academies have been tremendously impressed by what they have seen, over the last decade. And one may see this for oneself by visiting the various institutions on the Internet. Unlike his European or Canadian opposite number, the contemporary West Point or Naval War College graduate is familiar with Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Fuller, Liddell Hart – and with Sun Tzu and Mao-tse Tung for that matter.
Nor is it just a showy "book-learning," for the courses are designed to make the students apply what they study, consistently and imaginatively, to the circumstances the U.S. might face today. I have myself been tremendously impressed to read theses posted here and there on the net, by young cadets who could obviously skate rings around your average "politically correct" humanities professor.
On the ground level, in Afghanistan, it has become increasingly evident that the U.S. was able to parachute troops who could speak Pashto, Persian, Arabic, Urdu. They needed these both for making contacts with potential allies, and for interrogating prisoners who fell into their hands. They could also use translators effectively (this is actually a skill), as well as ride fast horses and put pack mules to work carrying high-tech gear.
A remarkable interview which The Washington Post obtained with Capt. Jason Amerine, an injured member of the U.S. Army's 5th Special Forces Group on his sickbed in Landstuhl, Germany – gives some hint of the ground capabilities. This was the unit that went into the mountains of Oruzgan to rendezvous with Hamid Karzai, now Afghanistan's prime minister-designate. (They didn't need Pashto because he speaks fluent English.)
In five short weeks, this little vanguard of less than a dozen men, mostly in their mid-twenties, were able to recruit and organize and (through air drops) equip an Afghan fighting force that liberated the provincial capital, then marched on Kandahar. They also ordered and set up distribution for emergency food and medical supplies for the civilian population, while calling down airstrikes on a Taliban convoy and other positions, almost in their spare time.
"We could go in there naked with flip-flops, and as long as we have good radios we could do our job," Capt. Amerine said of their survival training. His unit made up for unfamiliarity with the local physical and cultural landscape with a crash course in Pashtun anthropology in the days before going in.
Hunks, yes, but these are nothing like Europe's idea of "GIs." Indeed, the U.S. Marine Corps general force now camping in the Rigestan desert are probably up
to the special forces calibre of a generation ago.
Technology plays no small part. Some 91 per cent of munitions the U.S. has dropped in Afghanistan have been pinpoint targeted – compared with six percent on Iraq. Even gravity bombs dropped from B-52s can now be placed within a few meters of the crosshair, thanks to advances in computer calculation. And yet the "garage workshop" spirit is kept alive with the invention of weapons like the "Daisy Cutter" – hand-made with old-fashioned welding tools, and perhaps the most awkward-looking 15,000-pound explosive we shall ever see (it resembles the water-tanks on the roofs of old New York City apartment buildings).
The U.S. armed forces are thus not only strong, but extremely adaptable. Yet even this is to understate the U.S. advantage, for it is likely to grow in the coming years.
Prior to Sept. 11, the U.S. defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, was fighting a nearly impossible uphill battle against Congress to transform the whole organizational structure of the U.S. military. His goals are to eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy, replace surviving conventional with many more special forces, and vastly increase the capacity of the military to respond to unexpected threats, or recover quickly from unexpected hits. The terrorist strikes on New York and Washington, and his performance since, have vindicated his position, and the overhaul is now proceeding.
The French may have to invent a word for what comes after a "hyperpower."
© 2001 Ottawa Citizen, reprinted with permission. Other articles by David Warren can be read at his website, www.davidwarrenonline.com.
By J. David Galland
It is a complicated and time-consuming process to recruit foreign intelligence sources. During a period of personal cultivation by U.S. intelligence (USI), the potential source is assessed as to his or her interest in being recruited, as well as access to both established and future intelligence interests.
One exception to the long-proven rule of pursuing and following a protracted recruitment process of a potential source, is the "walk-in." This is a person who suddenly presents himself, usually to an American embassy or consulate overseas. In most cases, the person is seeking reward for information that he believes is valuable to the United States.
In my professional experience, walk-ins frequently overestimate the value of the information they claim to possess or have access to. In addition, many walk-ins have been found to fabricate purported intelligence information altogether.
Once it has been determined that a walk-in is not a fabricator or mentally unstable, and that he or she may indeed be of value to USI, then the potential source must be cultivated accordingly. The first task is to confirm the potential source's actual identity, to determine his or her true motivation for volunteering as an intelligence source, and to confirm the actual access to critical information the potential source
actually has. From this point on, all subsequent meetings with this intelligence source must be conducted in a fully secure and clandestine fashion and normally he or she will never see their initial point of contact again.
As with any other potential intelligence source, the walk-in source must be subjected to a long process of extended cultivation and assessment by skilled USI operatives. This process will usually begin with an initial chance or contrived encounter, often one at a diplomatic reception. It is at this meeting that the case officer's highly developed interpersonal skills must immediately be brought into play. The goal at this encounter is to foster an aura of trust and common ground that will set the stage for subsequent meetings. The level of personal rapport and cordiality, that could lead to productive follow-up meetings, must be very carefully employed. It is imperative to avoid embarrassment for both parties if the source should decline recruitment.
Not all walk-ins who are determined to be potential intelligence sources ultimately accept recruitment. In many instances, this is because they do not agree on the focus of the recruitment effort by USI case officers.
A designated case officer is responsible for setting and planning any subsequent meetings agreed to by the source. Normally, only one case officer initially manages the source, but an exception to this rule occurs if the source has numerous areas of intelligence potential requiring several specialists (e.g. experts in nuclear weapons or secure communications) to handle the information.
Normally, face-to-face contact between the case officer and his source is held to a minimum. In the event a personal meeting (PM) is required, anywhere between two and five other case officers - not known by the source - are employed for security monitoring and counter-surveillance duties. The latter tasking is critically responsible since effective counter-surveillance and surveillance detection can make or break an
intelligence operation.
Whether the newly-acquired source is the product of cultivation which leads to successful recruitment, or an effectively validated walk-in, he or she will require training and vetting from the very beginning. Very few sources normally possess the knowledge of how to effectively protect their own security. And often to the chagrin of both case officers and their superiors (operations officers), many new sources show surprisingly little concern for the security demands of their new activity.
If a source is already "street-smart" and has some knowledge of these intelligence related protective measures, it constitutes an obvious area of concern.
Initial training must focus on sharpening the source's sense of security and the security means by which the operation must establish and sustain its clandestine nature. This specifically refers to his or her role as a source, as well as the acquisition, temporary storage, and ultimate transmittal of sensitive intelligence information to the case officer.
The source's success in training and the level of achieved skill is often the key factor in defining the success of the intelligence collection mission. Nothing will be achieved if the intelligence source is not skilled at conducting his or her movement to and from meetings with the case officer. Another critical factor is the source's ability to manage and conceal any clandestine gear used in the collection process, such
as photographic equipment, communications gear or actual concealment devices cleverly designed to hide other items.
The source's training must also explore, in depth, the vital matter of his precise access to intelligence information. This is essentially where the rubber meets the road in this business. The case officer must ensure that the source is able to exploit access to intelligence material without drawing undesirable attention to himself.
Expanded and enhanced training may become necessary based on the unique characteristics of each mission. This may include one-way covert communications, emplacing and recovering dead-drops, microdot secret writing, coding and decoding messages, and clandestine photography.
Throughout the life of any clandestine intelligence-collecting operation, there must be a thorough and ongoing review of training and operational aspects. In long-term intelligence operations, sources will often slip and be prone to grow careless, cut corners in the area of personal security and the professional use of intelligence tradecraft. This can be a costly and deadly mistake. Small failures can be exploited and easily become intelligence bonanzas for hostile intelligence services (HOIS).
These ongoing re-evaluations must address the source's continuing motivation to serve as a clandestine source - because motivations can change over time. This is quite unique to the highly complicated nature of human intelligence collection.
A few of the most common motivational factors include personal family situations, worldwide political changes, and the potential loss of a source's access to bona-fide intelligence information. All of these factors can lead a source to begin fabricating information in order for him to retain the income and rewards he has become used to receiving. In the worst case scenario, motivational changes can be a clear indicator that the source has been discovered, is being controlled by a third party, or is in willful collaboration with another intelligence service - and has been doubled.
These are the main challenges facing those who operate in the nether world of the second-oldest profession on earth - human intelligence collection.
J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is the pen name of a career U.S. Army senior Non-Commissioned Officer currently serving in Germany. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.
Reserves and Guard Defended
It goes without saying that reserve units will not be as well trained as active units. In the course of our work with active units, someone observed that the greatest problem we encountered was the active component's irrational belief that there were 30 days in a month instead of two! Yet reserve units have a longer unit memory. It is not unusual to find reserve units where 80 percent of the senior NCOs have spent over ten years in the unit, while most of the lower enlisted grades have been there throughout their military service. They don't need to be trained as frequently as a[n active] unit which will experience an 80+ percent turnover in personnel every three years.
These units will also possess a cohesion (well illustrated by my Operations Sergeant in the 19th [Special Forces] Group who, when the unit went through Airborne School,
made his fifth jump with a broken ankle rather than leave the unit) which is difficult to obtain in active units, and which will stand them in good stead when things go to hell in a handbasket …. I also remarked, in response to some comments by my classmates at the Battle Staff Course about the reserve components, that the willingness of people to accept military discipline and the hardships and inconveniences that service inevitably entails when they're not doing it for a living implies a substantially greater commitment than that shown by someone who accepts it because it is his living.
Today, nobody joins the Reserves or the National Guard to get out of the draft. Nobody joins them to avoid participation in a conflict. They join because they want to serve their country, and they (and their families) give up one weekend a month and two weeks a year to do so. If members of the active component flatter themselves that they are good enough to be in the regulars, Reservists can point out that they are people who want to serve their country and are able to hold down jobs in the civilian sector. Both are shortsighted views.
We have enough enemies (foreign and domestic) to satisfy the most pugnacious battler without picking fights among ourselves. Active personnel who bemoan the state of the reserves should ask for a tour with one of those units and help get it straightened out! I think they'll have more than a few surprises.
--James M. Crain, Lt. Col. USAR (Ret.)
Poor Recruiting Example
I'm a former 11-B-10 and I'm trying to reenlist back into the Army or Marines. My age may be a problem, but I have my local congressmen helping me out with that. Soon after 9-11, I went to my local Army recruiting office to see what my options are. There are six recruiters working in this office, and out of the six, four were fat and out of shape. One E-5 was eating a sausage egg and cheese sandwich on a long hoagie roll, and the E-6 – the sergeant in charge – was playing games on the computer in plain sight of anybody walking into the office.
Two of the recruiters, an E-5 and E-4, were looking lean and mean and both from the 82nd Airborne, and if it were not for these two recruiters, the office would not have a hint of being an Army recruiting station.
Next door down was a different story altogether. At the Marine Corps recruiting
Station, two E-5 and one E-4 looked just like the sign says above the door: Marines. I know that the Army is trying to change its image, and it should start with the
recruiting stations because the first impression is most important.
--Thomas
Hospitality for the Military
While traveling through Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta, I came across a
Military Lounge set up by Delta Airlines Employees for all active duty and retired military people to stop and visit.
This was not a USO lounge, but set up by Delta Airlines to show appreciation for our military folks. I stepped into the lounge to find food, drinks and a large screen TV, Christmas decorations, magazines and much more. I made a promise to the Delta staff there who made me feel at home while waiting for my connecting flight to pass the word to all military personnel about the lounge.
It is located at Concourse B right across from Gate B33, and is open from 0700-2300 seven days a week until Jan. 7.
Please help me spread the word for any of our military travelers going
through Atlanta during the remainder of this holiday season.
--A Military Traveler
I would like to forward you some information about the reintroduction of the Blue Star Service Banner displayed by families with a member serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. I personally pitched this idea back in the spring, and it ultimately became a resolution at the American Legion National Convention in San Antonio last August. After Sept. 11, the decision was made to reintroduce the banner as soon as possible.
Despite the Legion promoting this on a national level via www.legion.org, this is still very much a grassroots effort, and mentioning this program in DefenseWatch would help significantly to communicate this to our military. I want to emphasize that we are not trying to sell banners; in fact, many flag manufacturers are offering them free of charge. The American Legion's role is merely to facilitate the introduction of the banners to the families so that they can show their pride and support of their loved one. National Commander Richard J. Santos has challenged local Posts to provide them to the families for free; and, if that is not feasible, then to seek sponsorships to allow them to be gifted to the families. Anyone can go to
http://www.legion.org, where they can print off a copy free of charge for themselves.
Army Capt. Robert L. Queissner of the 5th Ohio Infantry created the Blue
Star Service Banner during World War I when two of his sons were serving on
the front lines. The banner quickly became the unofficial symbol of a relative
in military service.
--Todd
Editor’s Note: The American Legion is offering several versions of the Blue Star Service Banner for between $2.95 and $6.95. They include static banners, static cling window decals for homes and cars, banner posters and lapel pins.
Place and date: Ky Phu in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam, 18 December 1965.
Entered service at: Cheshire, Conn. Born: 21 July 1940, Cheshire, Conn.
Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. When the company was suddenly pinned down by a hail of extremely accurate enemy fire and was quickly separated from the remainder of the battalion by over 500 meters of open and fire-swept ground, and casualties mounted rapidly, Lt. Barnum quickly made a hazardous reconnaissance of the area, seeking targets for his artillery.
Finding the rifle company commander mortally wounded and the radio operator killed, he, with complete disregard for his safety, gave aid to the dying commander, then removed the radio from the dead operator and strapped it to himself. He immediately assumed command of the rifle company, and moving at once into the midst of the heavy fire, rallying and giving encouragement to all units, reorganized them to replace the loss of key personnel and led their attack on enemy positions from which deadly fire continued to come.
His sound and swift decisions and his obvious calm served to stabilize the badly decimated units and his gallant example as he stood exposed repeatedly to point out targets served as an inspiration to all. Provided with two armed helicopters, he moved fearlessly through enemy fire to control the air attack against the firmly entrenched enemy while skillfully directing one platoon in a successful counterattack on the key enemy positions. Having thus cleared a small area, he requested and directed the landing of two transport helicopters for the evacuation of the dead and wounded.
He then assisted in the mopping up and final seizure of the battalion's objective. His gallant initiative and heroic conduct reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the U.S. Naval Service.
Editor’s Note: If you know of any MOH recipient who is hospitalized or has passed away recently, please email DefenseWatch MOH Editor Jim H. at bulldogleader@mindspring.com.
The IRS recognizes SFTT as a 501(c)3 Non-Profit Educational Foundation (IRS EIN 31-1592564).
Donations are tax deductible. Send us some moral support and encouragement to help in the struggle to improve combat readiness. Every little contribution helps. Mail your checks to:
Soldiers For The Truth Foundation
P.O. Box 11179
Greenwich CT 06831
1. Try
to keep articles to 750 words or less. SUBMIT IN MS WORD FORMAT, if possible!
2. Submit your piece to one of the following editors:
Ed Offley, Editor
J. David Galland, Deputy Editor
DefenseWatch is looking for volunteer subject editors willing to assist in screening and editing article submissions. We are looking for experts in the following areas: U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, Special Operations forces/counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and veterans affairs. If interested in joining the DefenseWatch team, please contact Ed Offley at defensewatch@aol.com.
We've had numerous requests from troops in different branches of the military to establish this link so that we will all know how "all you others" talk that talk. The DoD site is not working but the nonprofit Federation of American Scientists has an excellent online acronym roster. Please see below:
http://www.fas.org/news/reference/lexicon/acronym.htm
Hack's
books, About Face, Hazardous Duty, The Price of Honor and The
Vietnam Primer can be found at www.hackworth.com. They make a great
addition
to any library. Hack is offering them at a special SFTT price.