DefenseWatch – 16 January 2002

I come awake in the darkness and my bedside alarm reads 4:00 a.m. The neighborhood outside my window is quiet and still, and for a moment I puzzle over what has brought me suddenly out of sleep.

Then I hear it again: the drone of a turbine jet engine high overhead. It is not the dull, constant murmur of a commercial red-eye flight descending into Dulles International Airport, but rather the ever-changing warble of a fighter jet powerplant as its pilot banks and turns in the sky above me.

Twelve hours later, as I jog through my neighborhood, I hear the sound again, and this time see the sparkle and glint of sunlight reflecting off the canopy of the F-16 Falcon on patrol above northern Virginia and Washington, D.C. Most Americans are witnessing the war against terrorism as a multi-media display on television or the Internet, but this is one constant reminder of our changed, wartime world that comes unfiltered from the sky.

A debate has begun in the Pentagon and throughout the U.S. Air Force over the need to continue the anti-terrorism combat air patrols that were initiated even before the last of the four hijacked airliners fell to earth on Sept. 11. Given that over 250 Air Force and Air National Guard fighters, AWACS airborne control jets and aerial refueling tankers have been involved in over 13,000 homeland defense patrol flights, requiring the work of 11,000 aircrew and support personnel for a cost of $324 million, it is certainly prudent for senior military commanders to review whether or not the mission should continue in its current size and structure.

But one baffling and troubling aspect of the debate caught my eye: News reports by the Associated Press and USA Today this week clearly suggested that the debate is being shaped by "peacetime" issues - operational and maintenance costs, aircraft mechanical fatigue and aging, Pentagon budget constraints - rather than by the "wartime" environment and concerns into which the United States was plunged by the al Qaeda attacks.

Citing the wear and tear on aircraft by constant use, one military source noted that some aerial refueling tankers have suffered mechanical breakdowns requiring intensive maintenance, and warned that if the flights continue unabated, older aircraft - presumably early-generation F-16 and F-15 fighters - may have to be retired before planned replacement aircraft are available.

Pentagon Deputy Operations Director Rear Adm. John D. Stufflebeem cautiously raised the issue of "system stress" on Monday when he told reporters, "If you overuse military equipment, or if you don't give crews time to train, they may not be ready for what next is on either as a requirement that they have to train to or ready for the next mission that they know they're going to rotate to do."

"And so we're watching very carefully to see, are we putting undue stress on a system that can't accept it?" Stufflebeem continued. "And to date, it has been accepted. It's being looked at for how long to sustain it this way."

We have been here before. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91, and later in the 1999 U.S.-led air war over Kosovo, major aircraft mission surges took place that, in one general's apt phrase, led the Air Force "to fly the wings off" its inventory of combat and support aircraft. Kosovo, in particular, turned out to be a major war (rather than a small-scale conflict) in the weary eyes of aircraft mechanics, jet engine technicians and other support personnel.

What comes across as strange - and to be blunt, flatly unacceptable - is to debate a major wartime military operation only in terms of a budget ceiling. Has the U.S. intelligence community concluded that it is safe to reduce the air patrols or even return them to a five-minute ground alert, or not? Is there a presumed chance, however remote, that additional al Qaeda terrorist cells may be lurking inside the United States preparing for further suicidal hijackings?

Is the constant murmur of the F-16 over my neighborhood a concrete response to a real threat, or has it devolved into a political gesture and a psychological placebo?

If the security situation has abated, then bring the aircraft back to earth. But if it requires ongoing combat air patrols over American cities, the Pentagon must address the issue of aircraft "system stress" by requesting - nay, demanding - an emergency congressional appropriation to fast-track the procurement of new fighter aircraft and other military systems that are being rushed into obsolescence by the demands of war.

That is the only acceptable course.

Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at defensewatch@aol.com.

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Hack's Target For The Week: Wanted: A Committee for the Protection of the Grunts

By David H. Hackworth

When the Afghan campaign was red-hot and bombs and missiles were exploding with deadly precision in every direction, all that gee-whiz smart weaponry the military-industrial-congressional complex has been pushing since the Vietnam War was front and center on the tube.

We saw $2 billion B-2 state-of-the-art long-range bombers stay in the air longer than an Irish wake, and saw unmanned aircraft armed with missiles bring death and destruction with the push of a long-distance button to targets as small as individual enemy soldiers on donkeys. Push another button and presto -- there was Gen. Tommy Franks from his Florida command center, courtesy of video conferencing.

No question that smart weapons and systems help win battles. But a critical component of war is still the grunt - and his place in the metaphorical mud seriously sucks. Bush and boys need to begin with the basics and start doing better for our guys out there on the line.

Take the glimpses we caught of our Marines and Army soldiers digging foxholes in Afghanistan. Their entrenching tools were basically the same as that sorry shovel - about the size of a child's beach toy - the grunts used at Normandy and Iwo Jima and in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq.

Having dug more than a few foxholes, I know firsthand the pain and exhaustion of digging in. Which brings to mind a 1932 Fordson tractor I once owned - and treasured - that dug 10 good holes in an hour with its auger. One auger-outfitted Hummer vehicle could dig in a rifle platoon in an hour.

Then there's the CH-46 helicopter, a 40-year-old dinosaur held together by green duct tape, wire and Marine dedication. Not exactly the right stuff for the extreme dust and danger of Afghanistan. Why the Marines don't ground this accident-waiting-to-happen and borrow Blackhawks from non-deployed Army units is another one for the SecDef's list.

The grunt's M-16A2 rifle has also been around since Vietnam, where our troops uniformly damned it. Updated, with most of the bugs ironed out, this 5.56-mm. fly swatter still rates only average in reliability, functioning and grunt confidence. Given a choice, most Special Forces soldiers would go with the upgraded World War II Soviet AK-47. A top SF warrior with whom I shared a foxhole in Desert Storm says, "We have no doubt that come hell or high water, the AK won't let us down." The standard issue Beretta pistol is worse than a Saturday night special, while the "new" machine gun - not much of an improvement on the World War I model that I had in my weapons squad in Korea! - has been in use since 1962.

The Marines have just issued a boot that every leatherneck I've talked to loves, but soldiers call the Army's "lousy." They say it's "too heavy," "soaks up water and takes hours to dry" and has "insoles made of flimsy pieces of material" that most grunts throw away and replace with a self-purchased civilian product. And the "soles chip, clog with mud, wear out quickly and don't absorb much shock," making them bad news during long hikes. No, these beauts aren't made by our enemies, but by Altama Footwear, which has got such a sweet deal with the brass that it's OK for soldiers to display the name tags as if they were Tommy H. The Army, which just spent $35 million on the equally hated black beret, claims it wants to replace this circa 1969 boot, but there's no dough.

The generals and congressional porkers prefer gold-plated stuff like the B-2 - which flew only six missions over Afghanistan because it's not waterproof and needs more maintenance than Joan Collins - to foxhole diggers, rifles, pistol, machine guns and boots. Smart weapons and smarter systems always get priority because porker power bucks are always part of the package. Grunt gear throws off only chump change.

The Senate has three surviving combat grunts - Max Cleland of Georgia, Chuck Hagel of Nebraska and Conrad Burns of Montana. As a legacy, they should form a Committee for the Protection of the Grunts to make sure the folks who pay the high price on our behalf finally get better weapons and tools. There are committees for everything else: birds, trees, whales. Certainly, our Grunts - and we've been burying a lot of these brave warriors lately - are our most precious endangered species. Let's start treating them as such.

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Sign in for the free weekly Defending America column at his Web site. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831.

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ARTICLE 01 - Going Soft in the Head: Beret Day at Last

By J. David Galland

You could almost hear the fanfare of trumpets and bells as the announcement went forth across the U.S. Army, Europe Command late last week. "The day has come that we have all waited for!" proclaimed V Corps Command Sergeant-Major Kenneth O. Preston from corps headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany.

Now, for those unfamiliar with USAREUR and V Corps, this is an outfit literally drenched in the major milestones of 20th century history, spanning more than a half-century from the shores of Normandy in 1944, to the fall of the Iron Curtain 45 years later, and on through the decade of risky peacekeeping missions of the 1990s.

For those who may have forgotten, V Corps boasts the legendary fighting power of "The Big Red 1" (1st Infantry Division) and the Army's premier forward-deployed heavy tank division, "Old Ironsides" (1st Armored Division), both fine warrior units. And they are bolstered by with numerous, independent combat support and combat service support brigades, as well as a German armored division.

So what makes this the day for which we have waited so long? A day in which an entire corps of U. S. Army soldiers numbering about sixty thousand quivers with such exuberant anticipation? What is it that would cause so many soldiers, of all the career fields, of all ranks and backgrounds to literally squirm in their boots with such bubbling enthusiasm?

War and peace? A technological revolution in military affairs? Capture of Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda lieutenants? Nothing so insignificant!

Our new hats have arrived.

The U.S. Army, Europe Command - nearly a year after our comrades in CONUS - is finally going to don the controversial Army black beret.

It seems so long ago, but it was only last spring that USAREUR fired off short-notice taskings left and right. Forget the looming threat of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, or dangerous peacekeeping missions in the back alleys of the Balkans. There was no time to lose with the critically important mission of determining the head size of every single Army soldier in Europe.

Military historians in the future no doubt will write thick volumes of the logistical victory, how thousands of head sizes were determined, compiled, collated, submitted and ultimately recorded at various levels of USAREUR command. Remember Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's "race to the Rhine" River in 1945? That cannot come close to the Army's audacious campaign for all soldiers in Europe to don the new black beret on the occasion of the Army's 226th birthday on June 14, 2001. Pretty catchy, eh?

Plans were made, operations orders written, more taskings leveled, a sense of electrified, command-imposed pride shot through the ranks. Some units even planned mass formations and parades for the occasion. A new chapter in esteemed military tradition was imminent. The big day rapidly drew near.

Oops. Then we missed the deadline.

Something went wrong, seriously wrong! USAREUR did not get the new hats in time after all. Stunned generals and supply clerks asked, How could this have happened? The formations were canceled, the spreadsheets with the head sizes were pigeon-holed, the jubilation and all the anticipation melted away like a bowl of ice cream on an El Paso sidewalk; the flavor was lost forever. But why?

Here investigative reporting comes to the aid of military history. The issue of the Army beret was professionally and accurately reported by many sources, in particular Pentagon correspondent Rowan Scarborough of The Washington Times. His nose for news smelled something foul, and he was not off the mark: The U. S. taxpayers got bilked to the tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars when military procurement officials circumvented the law and the rules and awarded the production contracts to some headgear sweatshop in communist China.

To further muddy the waters on this whole issue, the Chinese at that juncture got rather possessive about one of our EP-3 Aries reconnaissance aircraft, which they detained for 10 days after a Chinese fighter collided with the Navy aircraft and it was forced to land in their country. The resulting surge of patriotism led our virtuous elected officials to declaim, This Chinese beret contract is not going to stand!

So we improvised, raiding the 75th Ranger Regiment supply room of its small inventory of black berets (they don't need them anymore, thanks to the bold command decision to order Rangers to wear mud-brown colors). Slowly but surely, the hats trickled out into the wider ranks of the U.S. Army.

Who can forget the high-spirited new-hat donning formations that were held in Korea? Gen. Thomas A. Schwartz led, from the front, thousands of soldiers in putting on the new uniform accoutrement. Photos of this event rank right up there with the year's most historically significant Army happenings, and proved to be a morale-boosting event from Camp Bonifas on the Korean DMZ to every Army post back home in the U.S. of A. Today, CENTCOM commander Gen. Tommy Franks seems to be everywhere with his slick black beret and his desert BDU fatigues, and this bold new image in no small way sent the al Qaeda terrorists running for cover in the Hindu Kush.

Never mind that somewhere in a warehouse at a secure, undisclosed location, lie hundreds of thousands of dollars of Chinese-made black berets that will never adorn nor taint the heads of America's soldiers.

But all that is history. Now, the hats we will wear are safely made in Canada, which is better than being made in China. After all, Canada hasn't bunged up any of our reconnaissance aircraft, have they? They do produce some fine maple syrup and maple sugar candy.

But we must return to USAREUR and the common soldier serving in Europe, where a new leadership vision has dictated that the long-awaited "day of the beret" shall come to pass uncomplicated by ceremonies, grand parades or passings in review.

So let's raise our hats, if not our glasses, on Feb. 11, when we soldiers of the European Command quietly enter a new era with our politically-correct headgear firmly and belatedly affixed to our uniform-length haircuts.

The West is safe.

J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is the pen name of a career U.S. Army senior Non-Commissioned Officer currently serving in Germany. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.

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ARTICLE 02 - Poor Military Weapons Training a Threat to All

By John M. Szelog

Two weeks ago, a California National Guardsman shot himself when he went to withdraw the pistol from his holster at the end of a security watch shift at San Francisco International Airport.

Based on the details in the report, determining the cause of the Dec. 28 incident was simple: He had his finger on the trigger when he was removing the pistol, gave it a good tug along the way, and - bang - he shot himself in the hip, and the bullet exited his buttocks. Now to my prime question: What does this have to do with the U.S. military being a menace to society?

Since I personally know the U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard best, I will cite these two service branches as my example.

The Air Force has this idea that support personnel don't need to be well-trained in the use of weapons. Part of that idea stems from the popular notion that the Army and the Marines will protect us if the USAF Security Police can't handle the situation (tell that to anybody in the Army or Marines, and you'll get a puzzled look, or maybe a laugh in return.) Money, as usual, is the biggest factor, exacerbated by two other trends: the overall military force drawdowns, and the combined attitude of Air Force leaders towards their own personnel, and of many personnel towards being required to carry and use weapons.

Normally, many Air Force people would have a hard time remembering the difference between the muzzle and the butt of a rifle, let alone how to safely handle the weapon. In peacetime, this doesn't present a problem, because who needs rifles when we have the Security Police? But this gets sticky when you throw in deployments to overseas locations where there aren't a lot of reliable or friendly military units around, or the current use of military personnel as domestic security forces.

When a unit arrives at an overseas site, all of a sudden there is a need for a lot of people to carry weapons to guard aircraft, equipment and the airfield itself - but the higher-ups are stuck. There aren't enough Security Police to do the job, so commanders are forced to issue support personnel rifles and pistols, even though very few of them are actually proficient in handling their weapons safely and effectively.

The logical compromise between the two unacceptable extremes - either having nobody trained at all, or having the entire Air Force armed to the teeth - is to encourage personnel to volunteer for weapons proficiency. But this is where the other problem - an attitude problem - comes into play. (The Army and Marine Corps get around this attitude problem, in part, by requiring everyone to stay trained and proficient.)

Many Air Force people will tell you to your face that they didn't join the service to carry a rifle. They'll also tell you that unless the Air Force orders them to carry a rifle, they will refuse to do so. That's not all: Not only do they not want to carry a weapon, but they get very jittery and suspicious when somebody else volunteers to carry a weapon, or even wants to get fully-trained and qualified in case the need ever arises. The logic of this attitude, if you can call it logic, goes like this: If you don't think about situations where you might need a weapon, then those situations won't happen. Likewise, somebody else carrying a weapon is an invitation for a situation where you will need to use a weapon, so don't let anybody else carry a weapon.

From a distance, it's difficult to assign blame in the San Francisco incident, although an honest investigation will most likely find flaws in the Guardsman's training that does not fall solely on the individual soldier. But, had that Guardsman been properly trained, he would have known that you never put your finger on the trigger unless you are prepared to shoot.

Apply this situation to the other services to a greater or lesser extent, and you begin to see how the military can become a menace, not only to itself, but also to the country it is supposed to protect. Inadequate training, and a lack of interest by military personnel, creates a greater risk of dangerous mistakes with loaded weapons.

With part-time National Guard personnel on armed patrol in the nation's airports, and thousands of other reservists called up to active duty for the war against terrorism, it is not a reach to ask: How long before there will be a serious or even deadly incident that directly stems from insufficient weapons training?

For a related article, see Article 07 - Feedback: Raise Army Priority for Marksmanship, by William Sauerwein

Editor's Note: We wish to welcome John M. Szelog to the roster of DefenseWatch Contributing Editors. He is a staff sergeant in the California Air National Guard where he is an electronic warfare systems technician. In civilian life, Szelog works as a Senior Science and Technology Associate/Electronics, at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center. Szelog served on active duty for 6½ years, including a total of three years in Korea, and worked for almost five years in support of the U-2 program. His interests include military history, intelligence, strategy, tactics and equipment. He can be reached at streetgang52@hotmail.com.

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ARTICLE 03 - Shrinking Aerospace Industry Threatens Aircraft Fleet

By Paul Connors

Flanked by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the military service chiefs at a Pentagon ceremony, President George W. Bush on Jan. 10 signed this year's defense appropriation authorization, which funds the operations of the U.S. armed forces and the added burden of the war against terrorism for the current fiscal year.

The ceremony came at a critical moment for the U.S. military. With active combat in Afghanistan winding down after nearly three months, it is imperative that the Bush administration and Pentagon leaders address the long-overlooked issue of our growing military obsolescence.

Prior to 9/11, the U.S. armed forces were in need of major financial resuscitation. From substandard housing and junior enlisted troops on food stamps to lack of range time for infantrymen, tankers and cannoneers, the services were becoming a hollow shell of what they had been just ten years earlier. In addition to the various social engineering debacles endured by military professionals, the drawdown in weapons and systems procurements that began under President Bush's father and were accelerated under the Clinton regime have contributed to a fighting organization seriously depleted in capability.

The state of U.S. tactical aviation is one good example.

To be sure, the expenditures in ordnance by Navy and Air Force fighters and bombers in Afghanistan all but ensure that those stockpiles will be rebuilt. But an equally serious issue concerns the materiel condition of the aircraft that delivered those munitions - their current state of readiness and repair.

At this time, the average Air Force fighter is over 15 years of age. That figure worsens if the F-16 statistics are removed from the equation. F-15Cs and the F-15E Strike Eagle are no longer manufactured for the United States Air Force. Early model F-16s, especially those used by various Air National Guard air defense units, have shown exceptionally high levels of wear and tear, metal fatigue and systems problems that have compelled the Air Force to declare almost all F-16As as unworthy for combat. Obviously, these aircraft will need to be replaced.

Several weeks ago, the Air Force announced that it planned to retire up to one-third of the B-1B bomber force as a cost-savings measure. The bomb wings selected to lose those aircraft both happen to be in the Air National Guard. The Air Force and the Air National Guard have not publicly announced what mission these two wings will receive should they retire their currently assigned aircraft. And yet, the Air Force will maintain two wings of B-52H bombers as the service's primary long-range bomber; those aircraft are now almost all 40 years old.

The Air Force selected the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor as the replacement fighter for the F-15 Eagle and most of the F-16s in its inventory. However, the first operational F-22 squadron will not be available for combat service until at least 2008. More and more of the fatigue plagued F-15s and F-16s will have to be retired before their replacements arrive for service.

Last fall, the Defense Department announced that Lockheed Martin's design for the Joint Strike Fighter had been selected in the winner-takes-all competition with Boeing. That announcement made Lockheed Martin the nation's primary builder of fighter aircraft. The Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps will all have their own version of the fighter and Britain's Royal Air Force and Royal Navy will also procure versions of the airplane.

The competition means that Lockheed Martin stands to reap a windfall of at least 3,500 to 4,000 airframes. Several large systems subcontractors will also do well with this program. British aerospace and electronic companies will also benefit as they seek input on equipment systems for the RAF and Royal Navy versions of the aircraft. But the net result will be that Boeing, which acquired McDonnell Douglas in 1997, will probably leave the fighter building business and a once large and diverse American aerospace industry will see further reduction and consolidation.

The Defense Department, in what its leaders see as an attempt to control costs, has further reduced manufacturing infrastructure and has placed itself in the position of having to deal with a sole-source supplier of fighter aircraft. This is a position no buyer wants to find himself in (i.e. dealing with the only game in town).

While there was widespread neglect of defense procurement under President Clinton, there is no excuse for the destruction of defense manufacturing capabilities and expertise based on simple cost considerations. In less than 10 years, the federal government has allowed defense industry mergers that diminished competition, while weakening our ability to field superior fighter aircraft. If you doubt this claim, look what happened to Grumman Aerospace after it merged with Northrop. How about McDonnell-Douglas after its acquisition by Boeing?

While it is true that both Grumman and McDonnell-Douglas both found themselves competing for a shrinking portion of the defense pie, and then realized they couldn't compete alone, the companies they merged with have not been able to sustain their presence in the military aircraft business either.

The DoD announcement that Lockheed Martin will be the lead contractor for the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter means that Boeing will almost certainly leave the fighter aircraft business. The U.S. government has made its choice and capabilities will be lost. Foreign buyers of U.S. military aircraft will also have fewer choices. Private venture developments of fighter aircraft in the U.S. have shown notoriously poor results for the companies that offered their designs.

The last attempt by Northrop, with its F-20 Tigershark, was a dismal failure. Northrop offered the aircraft as a less expensive, more reliable alternative to the then new General Dynamics F-16. The U.S. Air Force declined to even consider the Northrop proposal and not one foreign government purchased the airplane for their air forces. The reason was simple, foreign countries did not want aircraft that weren't part of the American inventory.

Recent procurement decisions, as well as well as equipment retirement announcements, leave the U.S. military woefully short of equipment and will do nothing but cost America its technological lead as fewer and fewer companies maintain their expertise in airframe manufacture, electronic warfare and systems integration. The decisions made on high could well have disastrous consequences as we further consolidate the defense industrial base.

The waste in defense procurement is no longer about $900 hammers; it's about the incredibly stupid and short-sighted decisions made by politicians, administration officials and uniformed acquisition officers. And the Air Force isn't alone in all this.

Defense industry consolidation also affects naval shipbuilding, the production and delivery of Army artillery and the selection of future battlefield small arms. The net result will be that the real losers will be America's soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. They're at the pointed end of the spear and they're the ones who will live or die because some faceless bureaucrat made a decision based purely on cost.

Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. He can be reached at paulconnors@hotmail.com.

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ARTICLE 04 - Reflections on a Pentagon Mural

By Matthew Dodd

High up on the wall in a small, inconspicuous office next to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conference room in the Pentagon hangs an old, simple, faded mural. The painting appears to be nothing special, but upon closer inspection, there is much more to the image than initially meets the eye.

Many folks have seen the mural since it was first displayed sometime in the 1970s. The one common denominator among those who see it is that the mural never seems to fail to stir their emotions based on their vastly different interpretations of the events and characters depicted - an interpretation largely defined where they themselves reside in the chain of command.

The mural shows a formal military parade, complete with flags, banners and formations. At the head of the parade is a one-passenger presidential car followed by a horse-mounted armored knight holding a banner labeled "CJCS," for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Immediately behind the banner-bearing knight is a four-passenger executive car followed by a horse-mounted knight holding a "JCS" banner, depicting the four military service chiefs who comprise the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Next in succession is a line of mounted knights followed by a horse-mounted banner identifying them as "JS," for the Joint Staff. After the JS banner horseman comes a group of mounted knights identified by their elephant-mounted banner, "OPDEPS," for operations deputies. The last two groups of horse-mounted knights, according to their mounted banners, are "Planners," then "Div[ision] Chiefs."

At the parade's tail end are two walking, common men shoveling the animals' feces into a donkey-drawn wooden cart that flies the banner, "AOs," for action officers.

My interpretation of the mural is like the yin and yang of Chinese dualistic philosophy where each element enables, complements and reinforces the other.

My 'yin' interpretation is one of disgust and frustration. The images and the implied messages suggest a stereotypical, hierarchical chain of command structure that supports the old adage of "RHIP," for "Rank Has Its Privileges." The mural seems to glorify the seniors being able to ride while the juniors must walk. The fact that this mural hangs in an office right next to the JCS conference room - affectionately known as "The Tank" - where our most senior military leadership regularly meets to discuss issues that ultimately affect everyone in uniform (and their families), is especially troubling.

I see the focus and distance of the parade participants moving farther and farther away from the unseen and what should be the vast majority of the parade - the troops.

The mural's banners clearly show a logical progression of billets and responsibilities for field-grade to general and flag officers. I am deeply disturbed by the obvious lack of concern and respect for the action officers by their senior leadership as depicted in the painting. Any representation of officers (whether they be non-commissioned, staff non-commissioned, warrant, or commissioned) shoveling feces is disgraceful and totally inappropriate.

The mural's progressive theme sparks a number of questions and issues. It suggests that those to the right were once on the left. I am sure the senior officers on the mural did not like and did not think it was right for them to shovel feces when they were action officers. What happened to them as they moved to the right? Did they lose touch with those who followed in their footsteps? Did they somehow justify the action officers' indignities by reasoning, "If it was good enough for me, then it's good enough for them," or did they simply enjoy knowing that others are suffering the same way they suffered?

My 'yang' interpretation of the mural images is not as long or detailed as my 'yin' interpretation.

While our chain of command structure is certainly not perfect, it has served us well and brought about many great victories. Any depiction of a military parade is a celebration in honor of our warriors and our leaders responsible for those victories. The mural pays homage to our senior leaders and implies "special trust and confidence" in their abilities to achieve those victories.

The mural celebrates the progression of officers to the highest ranks and levels of responsibility. If one were to continue the mural to the right, I can see scenes of a quiet, respectful, and well-deserved retirement with our aging leaders surrounded by family. I can clearly see images of those warriors slowly riding (or driving) off into the fading sunset.

Bearing in mind how successful our military has been and continues to be, the mural above all is a tribute to the heroics of the action officers. For anyone who has ever been an action officer, or seen one at work, that part of the mural is pregnant with meaning.

Action officers, despite the often less-than-ideal conditions in which they must work, are the people who routinely do the nasty and absolutely necessary things to keep our senior military leadership looking ahead. No parade can move forward if its head has to keep looking back wondering if everything is being done at the tail end. Action officers clean things up long after the seniors have gone.

Finally, this mural always makes me think of the closing scene of one of my favorite movies, "Patton." As the movie fades, actor George C. Scott's voice tells how Caesar's triumphant return to Rome is marked by a slave reminding him, "All glory is fleeting."

That slave's advice still rings true today - he must have been an action officer.

Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.

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ARTICLE 05 - Special Report - Chernobyl: Reality and Myth

Second of three parts

By Robert G. Williscroft

What really happened at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station on April 26, 1986?

Located on the banks of the Pripyat River, sixty miles north of the Ukraine capital of Kiev, Chernobyl was a major civilian nuclear power station for the Soviet Union. The Soviets designed the Chernobyl reactors according to the RMBK model, which included natural uranium reactor fuel, a water-based cooling system and control rods and a reactor core casing made of graphite.

This reactor model had one significant advantage over other models: It produced on average ten percent more power. Unfortunately, it had one significant disadvantage: On failure the reactor core would go "supercritical." In event of a mishap involving the control system, the reactor would heat up to the point where its fuel would melt down into a heap of slag.

Unrelated to the basic design problem, these reactors had no containment buildings. Although they were shielded by heavy, reinforced concrete, the units were not surrounded by buildings designed to withstand a reactor core explosion.

So why did the Soviets employ this risky design? In the old Soviet Union, like everywhere else it was all about money. To the managers of their centrally-controlled economy, the ten percent additional power production glittered brightly against a backdrop of what turned out to be inferior Soviet technology and engineering. They took a chance, a calculated risk.

Sure it was a stupid thing to do, but they did it. I met with three of the investigating Hanford engineers after they returned from Chernobyl.

They told of a Deputy Chief Engineer who had the previous year convinced Moscow to let him run an experiment that had the potential for allowing power to be drawn from the spinning turbine of a reactor that had just shut down, emergency power that could be used to run emergency coolant pumps during the interim while the emergency diesel generators were coming on line.

Although this engineer was not nuclear trained and really knew nothing about nuclear reactors, the idea seemed to have merit, and a successful prosecution of this concept would elevate this Deputy Chief Engineer to the top of his peer group. He eventually received permission and some time before the accident attempted to run the experiment. Unexpected problems caused the reactor safety systems to shut it down before he could run the experiment. Although red-faced with embarrassment, he petitioned for, and eventually received a second chance, but apparently was also told about dire consequences should he fail again.

When the time came, and in order to prevent the reactor from shutting down during the second run, he ordered all five safety systems bypassed, and he also had all the backup electrical systems shut down, including the emergency diesel generators that could have powered the reactor controls in an emergency.

He probably felt safe doing this because he did not intend on running the reactor for more than a few minutes under load. After all, what could possibly happen in a few short minutes? And, not being nuclear-trained, he had no idea of what unintended consequences could result from disconnecting these systems. Although we will never know for sure, he may have been thinking that the worst-case scenario would be a complete shutdown of the reactor as would happen if the fuel supply were cut off from a conventional boiler.

As luck would have it, unexpected power demand that afternoon delayed the onset of the experiment until late in the evening. In order to get the experiment underway, the engineers needed to reduce reactor power to minimum, and because they were behind schedule, they reduced the power level more rapidly than this reactor design could handle. This caused a buildup of neutron-absorbing fission byproducts which poisoned the reaction process and threatened to shut it down altogether.

Since that would have spoiled the experiment a second time (Hello Siberia), to compensate, they withdrew most of the control rods. Because of the poisoning, this allowed a power increase to barely 30 megawatts, which was just sufficient to bring the reactor into its most unstable range. Something had to be done immediately.

There were only two choices: do absolutely nothing, and wait twenty-four hours for the poisoning to dissipate, or increase the power immediately.

With the threat of exile to Siberia in the wings, we know what choice they made.

The engineers finally marginally stabilized reactor power at 200 megawatts - one fifth of the unit's design power. But because the reaction was still poisoned, they had pulled all but six control rods from the core. The absolute design minimum for this reactor was thirty rods kept in the core at all times, so the immediate situation was dire.

About a half hour later they decided to commence the actual experiment and shut down the turbine generator. Their intent was to see if the turbine could still supply coolant pump power even though it was only coasting - no longer being driven by the reactor. A successful outcome would prove that they did not need to obtain outside power to maintain proper cooling levels when they decoupled a reactor and its turbine. An engineer with nuclear training could have told them the answer without conducting the experiment. But these guys weren't nukes. With reduced electrical power, the pumps slowed, reducing the flow of cooling water.

Modern nuclear reactors used in the United States and the rest of the world control neutron level by absorbing them with Boron or Cadmium control rods. The primary coolant acts as a moderator by slowing the neutrons. The RMBK model, however, works in reverse, using graphite rods to moderate the neutrons, and the primary coolant to absorb them.

At this critical juncture on April 26, 1986, we had a reactor operating at a significant power level with almost all the moderating control rods pulled out. The reactor was still stable - although barely - because the primary coolant was absorbing neutrons as fast as they were being produced. At this point, disaster struck: The coolant pumps slowed as a result of reduced electrical power from the shut down turbine, so the cooling water moved more slowly through the system. It stayed in the reactor core longer, getting hotter, and finally began to boil. But steam cannot absorb neutrons: Suddenly the neutron flux - the total emission of neutrons from the reactor fuel skyrocketed.

The reactor operators immediately hit the emergency button designed to drive all the control rods back into the fuel core, but since all backup power had been shut down, even the emergency diesel generators, the only available electrical power came from the slowing turbine. This meant that the already slow primary coolant pumps had even less power, and so the skyrocketing neutron flux increased even more.

This is when another design problem of the RMBK became evident. The control rods had graphite tips followed by a one meter hollow segment (I don't know why, they just did), followed by a five-meter graphite section. As soon as the rods penetrated the core, they displaced more coolant without themselves absorbing any neutrons, because of the hollow section.

The already skyrocketing neutron flux went ballistic and all hell broke loose. The reactor container exploded - not a nuclear explosion, just a plain, old-fashioned steam boiler explosion. But it was a doozy: Red-hot chunks of highly radioactive reactor fuel and graphite fell everywhere. Fifty tons of nuclear fuel evaporated in the blast and were ejected high into the atmosphere. Another seventy tons of fuel were ejected sideways into the surrounding area. An additional fifty tons of fuel and eight hundred tons of graphite remained in the reactor vault smoldering for days. Experts have placed the release of radioactivity at about ten times the amount generated by the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

A plume of radioactive fallout swept across Europe, leaving measurable contamination as far away as Finland. There was a veritable continent-wide panic reminiscent of the response to the Three Mile Island incident seven years earlier.

In the final analysis, however, the health consequences were relatively small. According to the Nuclear Energy Agency (a specialized agency within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, an intergovernmental organization of industrialized countries based in Paris) only 31 persons as of April 2001 had died as a direct consequence of the accident. They were all either plant personnel or directly involved in fighting the fire following the explosion. Another 140 individuals from these same groups suffered varying degrees of radiation sickness and health impairment, but all had recovered fully with no permanent consequences. During the period between 1990 and 1998, in the regions affected by the explosion and subsequent fallout, officials diagnosed 1,791 cases of thyroid cancer that were assumed to have been caused by the radiation release.

The deaths and the injuries are tragic, of course. But this is a far cry from the misinformation contained in a Greenpeace website commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, where they state flatly that 2,500 people were killed, millions were affected, and hundreds of thousands displaced.

A careful examination of the Chernobyl incident reveals that it was a stupid, completely unnecessary accident resulting from gross criminal negligence and total managerial incompetence. This problem could only have happened within a political system that was completely out of contact with the real world. Moreover, the entire tragedy stemmed from what experts call a unique "accident chain" - a series of missteps that as a whole led to a particular breakdown. Chernobyl hinged upon the reactor becoming unstable when the coolant flow slowed, but this can only happen in the RMBK reactor design. All other reactors in use would have shut themselves down.

Those who have waved the banner of Chernobyl in a campaign to ban nuclear power worldwide have ignored the facts of this incident, in particular the reality that such an explosion is impossible in other reactor designs.

Next week: An examination of the politics of nuclear waste.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

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ARTICLE 06 - Feedback: Missile Defense is Not a Maginot Line

By Richard T. Boverie

I disagree with Gary Stalhut's argument that we should not build a missile defense system which, he alleges, would have the same conceptual weakness as the Maginot Line ("National Missile Defense and the Warrior Spirit," DefenseWatch, Jan. 9). A key implication of Stalhut's asserted Maginot Line analogy is that if we build a missile defense, adversaries would simply step around it with terrorist-type attacks, like the Germans stepped around France's Maginot Line.

However, there is no parallel between the Maginot Line and national missile defense. The French did not have a serious defense in place against a German march around the Maginot Line. However, we have in place major counter-terrorism efforts which are being accelerated and deepened and will not be abandoned, and which will not permit a free-ride step-around of a missile defense system.

It would be rash and unwise to defend against one threat but not the other. We need to defend against both. Vulnerability is not a virtue.

Ballistic missiles have been around more than a half-century. There is nothing mysterious about acquiring or building ballistic missiles or extending their range. The Sept. 11 attacks confirm that extremists who wish us ill would not hesitate to use missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction against us if and when they have such missiles, resulting in the death of many millions of Americans.

Stalhut alleged: "The more our military comes to believe in a false sense of security centered around our advanced technology, the more our troops will lose their warrior spirit." The inference seems to be that the United States should deliberately remain vulnerable to attack by missiles with weapons of mass destruction lest we lose our warrior spirit. In my view, that is neither logical nor responsible. It does not make sense to intentionally remain vulnerable in a major way and it does not automatically follow that a missile defense will diminish the warrior spirit.

In every war we have fought, we have used the most advanced technology available at the time, and our warrior spirit has not been diminished because of it. To the extent that there might be future degradation of the warrior spirit, I personally believe the principal problem is posed by cultural matters, not technology. But that, of course, is a separate subject.

Boverie is a retired U.S. Air Force officer.

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ARTICLE 07 - Feedback: Raise Army Priority for Marksmanship

By William F. Sauerwein

I would like to add my two cents worth to Col. Hackworth's column on the Army marksmanship problem ("Let's Lock and Load Now," DefenseWatch, Oct. 17). The reason for this problem is very simple: Nobody gives a damn.

All the officers throughout the chain of command are focused on maneuvering their units across the field. They are further obsessed with developing the detailed plans that support these highly complicated maneuvers. As such, we have the best-trained commanders and staffs in the world, according to BCTP standards. But whether they can actually kill the enemy after performing these maneuvers is another story.

These commanders are greatly concerned about the effectiveness of their main gun systems, like the M1A1 Abrams tank and the M3 Bradley IFV. Great pains are taken to ensure the correct bore-sighting of these systems before they fire one live round. These heavy units all have master gunners, whose main job is ensuring the qualification of their units.

But marksmanship with individual weapons is not given the same emphasis, even in combat infantry units. First, sending troops to the range does not require the sophisticated planning of battalion maneuvers, and is not "sexy." Second, some bean counter - probably in the Pentagon - determined how many rounds a unit is allowed for marksmanship training.

A soldier goes to the zero range where he/she is given nine rounds to zero. Then that soldier is shuttled to the qualification range and given 40 rounds to qualify. The emphasis is on speed, not accuracy, and getting the soldier zeroed and qualified as soon as possible.

Another problem is a "train the trainer" problem because a majority of NCOs do not know marksmanship training techniques. They do not know how to watch their soldiers for the old "eight steady hold factors" for improving marksmanship. The only school that trains NCOs in these shooting techniques is the drill sergeant school. Senior NCOs with drill sergeant badges could be a great tool in creating unit marksmanship programs. But since everything else has priority over individual marksmanship, do not look for any changes.

In basic training, it is assumed that the trainees do not know how to shoot. Basic training units have a week of firing their weapons before they qualify, which enhances their familiarity with the weapon. This length of time allows you to identify the weak shooters, and give them remedial training. Competitions are established at platoon, company and even battalion level for high marksmanship scores.

If a TOE unit has not live fired for six months, we must assume they do not know how to shoot. They need time for reinforcing the shooting techniques, and becoming comfortable with firing live ammunition. You cannot identify weak shooters, or improve their marksmanship capabilities, in one day.

Since minimal emphasis is placed on marksmanship, the soldier feels it is unimportant. Since no effort is made to improve the marksmanship of weak shooters, the trend continues.

The marksmanship problem is intensified with combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Many of these soldiers feel that going to the range hinders the performance of their "real job." My question is, do they worry about their "real job" when they take leaves and passes? Adequately training these support troops presents a special leadership challenge, but meeting challenges is what leaders get paid for.

One answer is, every combat unit deploys with a CS and CSS "slice." Why not have these troops "piggy-back" off the combat unit for marksmanship training?

We can debate all the problems and propose solutions for the Army's marksmanship training, but will it change? The answer is no, unless the perfumed princes who populate the Pentagon puzzle palace admit a problem exists. Anyone down the chain of command, officer or NCO, who disagrees with the party line is branded a troublemaker. But something must be done to correct this problem before we encounter our next "Task Force Smith" combat disaster.

The choice is between paying for bullets for improving training - or SGLI payments for widows and orphans.

Sauerwein is a retired U.S. Army 1st sergeant.

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ARTICLE 08 - Feedback to Hack

Expose National Guard Waste

With all of the talk about the back-filling of the active-duty forces with the Reserves such as the National Guard, why hasn't anyone (other than Col. Hackworth) raised any issues about the political nature of the Guard's organization and its generally abysmal levels of training?

Billions of dollars have been flushed down the Guard "commode" since World War II with little apparent use of the force. As a former Guardsman and active-duty soldier, I was dismayed more with the levels of incompetence of so many of the senior officers (most of whom joined in the mid-1960s) and the senior NCOs (same lack of training and BPED) than the lower ranks, which of course at least have to have some exposure to the active Army. In Texas, the Guard talks about its stint in Bosnia like they just won World War II, rather than enjoying an opportunity for so many unemployed getting a nine-month federal government employment contract.

Thanks for your good work! No one else seems to have the moxie to point out the issues that you do.

--Mike D

Thanks from a Marine

A Marine friend of mine just forwarded David Hackworth's article ("The Marines Have Landed - Again," DefenseWatch, Nov. 28), and as a retired Marine it is nice to know we haven't lost focus. I agree 100 percent with his evaluation of the problem. I was privileged to serve with Army Rangers in Grenada. They liked riding our helos for some reason. The problem doesn't rest with the troops but with the leadership. The troops are smarter, fitter, and have more common sense and soldering smarts then ever.

The Army needs to get rid of some generals and let the captains and lieutenant colonels run their companies and battalions. Thanks again for the kind remarks and I Always look forward to Col. Hackworth's appearances on TV, as some of these other guys don't have a clue (the kindest way I could phrase it).

--Ron Garnes, 1st Sergeant, USMC (Ret.)

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ARTICLE 09 - Medal of Honor Recipient - URBAN, MATT, Capt. USA

Rank and organization: Lieutenant Colonel (then Captain), 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, World War II.

Place and date: Renouf, France, 14 June to 3 September 1944.

Entered service at: Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 2 July 1941. Date and place of birth: 25 August 1919, Buffalo, New York.

Lieutenant Colonel (then Captain) Matt Urban, United States Army, who distinguished himself by a series of bold, heroic actions, exemplified by singularly outstanding combat leadership, personal bravery, and tenacious devotion to duty, during the period 14 June to 3 September 1944 while assigned to the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division.

On 14 June, Captain Urban's company, attacking at Renouf, France, encountered heavy enemy small arms and tank fire. The enemy tanks were unmercifully raking his unit's positions and inflicting heavy casualties. Captain Urban, realizing that his company was in imminent danger of being decimated, armed himself with a bazooka. He worked his way with an ammo carrier through hedgerows, under a continuing barrage of fire, to a point near the tanks. He brazenly exposed himself to the enemy fire and, firing the bazooka, destroyed both tanks.

Responding to Captain Urban's action, his company moved forward and routed the enemy. Later that same day, still in the attack near Orglandes, Captain Urban was wounded in the leg by direct fire from a 37mm tank-gun. He refused evacuation and continued to lead his company until they moved into defensive positions for the night.

At 0500 hours the next day, still in the attack near Orglandes, Captain Urban, though badly wounded, directed his company in another attack. One hour later he was again wounded. Suffering from two wounds, one serious, he was evacuated to England. In mid-July, while recovering from his wounds, he learned of his unit's severe losses in the hedgerows of Normandy. Realizing his unit's need for battle-tested leaders, he voluntarily left the hospital and hitchhiked his way back to his unit hear St. Lo, France.

Arriving at the 2d Battalion Command Post at 1130 hours, 25 July, he found that his unit had jumped-off at 1100 hours in the first attack of Operation Cobra. Still limping from his leg wound, Captain Urban made his way forward to retake command of his company. He found his company held up by strong enemy opposition. Two supporting tanks had been destroyed and another, intact but with no tank commander or gunner, was not moving. He located a lieutenant in charge of the support tanks and directed a plan of attack to eliminate the enemy strong-point. The lieutenant and a sergeant were immediately killed by the heavy enemy fire when they tried to mount the tank.

Captain Urban, though physically hampered by his leg wound and knowing quick action had to be taken, dashed through the scathing fire and mounted the tank. With enemy bullets ricocheting from the tank, Captain Urban ordered the tank forward and, completely exposed to the enemy fire, manned the machine gun and placed devastating fire on the enemy. His action, in the face of enemy fire, galvanized the battalion into action and they attacked and destroyed the enemy position.

On 2 August, Captain Urban was wounded in the chest by shell fragments and, disregarding the recommendation of the Battalion Surgeon, again refused evacuation. On 6 August, Captain Urban became the commander of the 2d Battalion. On 15 August, he was again wounded but remained with his unit. On 3 September, the 2d Battalion was given the mission of establishing a crossing-point on the Meuse River near Heer, Belgium. The enemy planned to stop the advance of the allied Army by concentrating heavy forces at the Meuse. The 2d Battalion, attacking toward the crossing-point, encountered fierce enemy artillery, small arms and mortar fire which stopped the attack.

Captain Urban quickly moved from his command post to the lead position of the battalion. Reorganizing the attacking elements, he personally led a charge toward the enemy's strong-point. As the charge moved across the open terrain, Captain Urban was seriously wounded in the neck. Although unable to talk above a whisper from the paralyzing neck wound, and in danger of losing his life, he refused to be evacuated until the enemy was routed and his battalion had secured the crossing-point on the Meuse River.

Captain Urban's personal leadership, limitless bravery, and repeated extraordinary exposure to enemy fire served as an inspiration to his entire battalion. His valorous and intrepid actions reflect the utmost credit on him and uphold the noble traditions of the United States.

Editor's Note: If you know of any MOH recipient who is hospitalized or has passed away recently, please email DefenseWatch MOH Editor Jim H. at bulldogleader@mindspring.com.

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GLOSSARY OF MILITARY ACRONYMS:

We've had numerous requests from troops in different branches of the military to establish this link so that we will all know how "all you others" talk that talk. The DoD site is not working but the nonprofit Federation of American Scientists has an excellent online acronym roster. Please see below:

http://www.fas.org/news/reference/lexicon/acronym.htm

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HACK BOOK SALES

Hack's books, About Face, Hazardous Duty, The Price of Honor and The Vietnam Primer can be found at www.hackworth.com. They make a great addition to any library. Hack is offering them at a special SFTT price.

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