January 30,
2002
Soldiers For The Truth
(SFTT) Weekly Newsletter
When we assumed the Soldier, We did not lay aside the Citizen.
General George Washington, to the New York Legislature, 1775
In this week’s Issue of DefenseWatch:
The War Goes On
By Ed Offley
One of the greatest satisfactions I have enjoyed in serving as Editor of DefenseWatch for the past five months has been the steady gain both in readers and reader responses to the newsletter and other SFTT items at this website. After all, it is a fundamental goal of ours not only to bring facts and informed opinions concerning defense and veterans issues to you, our readers, but to create a vibrant venue for discussion, debate and information.
With that in mind, we are inaugurating several new features at SFTT and DefenseWatch this week that are designed to improve the two-way exchange of ideas and commentary and to promote an even more active participation by readers in this endeavor.
First, with the decision to terminate the SFTT bulletin board, we are expanding the reader Feedback section of DefenseWatch to a separate web page accessible through sftt.us. The new section is designed to provide readers who want to add their contribution to an issue to submit letters or commentary articles. You can find the SFTT Feedback window on the right-hand column of the SFTT home page.
Our guidelines are simple and few: Feedback articles can be as brief as several paragraphs or as long as 1,000 words. When submitting a response to a particular article or commentary, please mention the article by headline and date. We allow pen names but require the sender's actual name and contact telephone number for verification purposes. SFTT reserves the right to edit articles, or refuse publication of any submission for libel or inappropriate language.
Send your comments to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
Second, we are pleased to announce the creation of the SFTT Intel Center, a dedicated site where DefenseWatch editors and writers will post specific requests for information that it is hoped our readership can help track down.
Our purpose in creating this site is to provide a reader-friendly venue where we can draw upon the knowledge and expertise of our readers to bring significant issues to bear concerning the U.S. military and veterans' communities, particularly significant policy issues or incidents of wrongdoing that warrant investigation and publicizing.
Third, after many reader requests, we are proud to announce that sftt.us now features the PayPal online payment processing center on our home page by which you can make your tax-deductible contributions using major credit cards. The ultimate success in reviving and expanding SFTT depends on everyone. We need your financial contributions to continue our operation. While any amount is welcome, we suggest a $30 annual contribution from each member will enable us to succeed.
The IRS recognizes SFTT as a 501(c)3 Non-Profit Educational Foundation (IRS EIN 31-1592564). Donations are tax deductible. Send us some moral support and encouragement to help in the struggle to improve combat readiness. You can also still Mail your checks to:
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For The Truth Foundation
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Finally, we are pleased in this issue to introduce Andrea West as a new Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch, specializing in veterans subjects. A U.S. Air Force veteran, Ms. West lives in Helena, Montana, and is active in various veterans organizations. We look forward to her contributions to SFTT and DefenseWatch.
Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at defensewatch@aol.com.
By David H. Hackworth
The brouhaha created by breast-beating human-rights groups over our military's treatment of the terrorist scuzz now vacationing at the Pentagon's recently opened Cuban Club Fed - eagerly aided and abetted by a press too prone to the sensational - is something else. These bleeding hearts claim we're brutalizing the captives by forcing them to wear orange jumpsuits, sleep on mats, exercise daily, shower frequently and eat special food.
My buddy, a Connecticut cop, finds the protests fascinating. He says, "I'm having a lot of trouble concentrating on my job because of the prisoners at Guantanamo."
Then, with a twinkle in his eyes, he adds: "Are they getting enough sleep, the right diet, enough prayer time? We have to keep them happy and healthy. They only want to murder all of us the first chance they get."
Amen. Their perp pal responsible for the first World Trade Center attack jabbed a sharpened comb into a guard's eye while he was in the pokey. This time around, they've already bitten one of the soldiers guarding them and threatened to kill anybody else who gets too close. After all, these are the folks who spent their leisure time back in Afghanistan skinning captives alive - when they weren't playing soccer with their heads.
Think of them as kamikaze killers looking for an edge.
However you want to categorize these creeps - who are living a lot better at Club Fed than they ever did in the caves of Tora Bora - Geneva Convention rules are for uniformed soldiers, not for skyjackers who fly commercial planes filled with moms and dads into office buildings manned by civilians operating computers, or for zealots who kill Arab women because they drive a car or don't cover their faces. Al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization, not a state, and its crazies wear street gear and operate disguised as civilians. Terrorists dressed to pass like these were often shot right on the spot during World War II and the Korean War.
I'm personally offended that none of the whistle-blowers seems to give a damn about the welfare or safety of our sons and daughters guarding these thugs. Have you read any stories about the dangers they face? Have any of our politicians bothered to inspect our kids' living conditions when they've jetted into Gitmo to check out the terrorists' treatment and pick up some tube time?
Had anyone checked, they would have discovered that our U.S. Army Military Police guarding the terrorists think the prisoners are being treated a lot better than they are. They're not pleased that the brass, the lawmakers and the press are more interested in the well-being of the detainees than the soldiers guarding them, and that they might as well be invisible.
Here's what our soldiers from the Army's 401st MP Company out of Fort Hood, Texas, who are the main monster-watchers, are saying:
"We live like crap down here with no extra pay or tax break, and we feel that no one up above gives a rat's ass about us," a sergeant says. "Our officers are more concerned with doing Pentagon damage control concerning the detainees than looking after the troops."
"The detainees sleep on soft mats on a nice surfaced floor while we sleep on cots inside tents with dirt floors. They get four hot meals a day, fresh fruit, regular issues of snacks such as sunflower seeds, regular clean clothes laundered by the Marine supply system," says another soldier. "We get canned food and MREs, canned fruit. We buy our own snacks and do our own laundry."
"The Marine general here says we can have a beer when off duty, but our Army leadership is running so scared that it set a no-drinking policy," says another troop. "We are responsible enough to secure the prisoners, but not enough to have a beer."
"The Red Cross put us in a very dangerous situation with their demands, and sadly our leadership went along with it," a soldier said. "We've been told to lie to Marine inspectors over standards and requirements. The Marines are right, the Army's wrong, and we're stuck in the middle."
Maybe someday, do-gooders, editors, lawmakers and senior Army leaders will remember our soldiers are human beings with human rights, too, and get their side of the story. Charity should begin at home.
http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Sign in for the free weekly Defending America column at his Web site. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831.
© 2001 David H. Hackworth
By Gary R. Stalhut
Last year, a fine young Captain who worked for me resigned his commission.
I did my best to convince him not to resign, but he was adamant. John was a stellar West Point graduate, an officer who truly believed in his personal integrity and the integrity of the Army. His reason for resigning still troubles me today: John told me he lost confidence in the leadership of the Army.
John explained that he did not wish to become a sycophant. My answer was simple, "We need officers like you, if you leave how will it ever change?" Unfortunately, John is not an anomaly; too many of our bright company grade officers make the same choice and more significantly, give the same reasons.
I am both disturbed and embarrassed about what John and other fine officers have described to me prior to resigning. They did not complain about lower pay than their civilian counterparts, too many days in the field, or the lure of a 9-5 civilian job. The gist of what these fine idealistic young officers tell me, is that they lost faith in the Army. They lost confidence in their superiors being willing to do the right thing.
Over the past ten years the Army has conducted numerous studies to find out why these juniors officers are leaving in such high numbers. Climate surveys, sensing sessions and polls were conducted. The conclusions included a robust economy, increased operations tempo, and even denial that it was really happening. Yet, we cannot deny that real issues are still driving many of our idealistic young officers out of the Army.
The nation expects its military leaders to show moral courage in times of war and it as important that we must also muster up our moral courage in times of peace.
Which begs the question: What kind of moral courage are we displaying in the Army of 2002? Principles such as duty, honor, selfless service, and integrity come to mind. Displaying moral courage is not something we can do by consensus; it must not be subject to political winds, or relative to what society finds fashionable at any given time. As a private, I looked up to my NCOs and officers who did what was right for their troops and units first, and what was good for their careers, second. My mentoring as a lieutenant taught me that moral courage meant standing up for what is right, standing your ground when you know you are right and doing what is good for your soldiers first. I was taught that not doing it right gets soldiers killed.
When gender integrated basic training was being forced on the Army and the Marine Corps, the leadership of the Marine Corps showed great moral courage when they stopped a program they knew was not good for the young men and women of the Marine Corps. The Marine Generals stood their ground knowing their careers were on the line. These brave men know that moral courage is not for the feint of heart.
The U.S. Army today is truly at a crossroads. We, as leaders and mentors, can step up to the plate and show the same moral courage in peace as we do at war, or we will lose more and more of our good men and women. The challenge is not insurmountable; it starts with each one of us. These young idealistic officers are the future of our Army; they are counting on us to lead the way.
Contributing Editor Gary R. Stalhut is an Army Reserve officer and combat veteran with 26 years of active and reserve duty. He can be reached at Gary.R.Stahlhut@eudoramail.com
By Jon Barrett
The U.S. military has distinguished itself in Afghanistan - that much is certain. We went into an area in which everyone in the world was singing the praises of the Afghani/Taliban soldier and his staying power (remember Iraq's Republican Guard?).
Common Opinion held that we would suffer the same fate the Soviet Union did (I guess they thought we would be fighting against ourselves, as the Soviets did). But, lo and behold, our military made quick, orderly, efficient work of removing the Taliban and disrupting Al Qaeda.
I seem
to recall that this was declared by the President to be a "war against
terror." I also seem to remember, somewhere in the deep dark recesses
of my muddled mind, that our military has an anti-terrorist capability on
which we spend millions annually. So the question in my mind is this: If we
have dedicated anti-terrorist forces, why are we using non-classified Special
Forces, Air Force and Marines to combat terrorism? Not that they can't do
the job. They have done a beautiful job.
Without giving away any classified information, let me say that I am sure
we have such an anti-terrorist capability. So after numerous terrorist attacks
against the United States and our facilities overseas going as far back as
the Reagan administration, where are our vaunted anti-terrorist teams? My
fear: They are probably in their training cycles in their compounds. The training
these teams go through is effective - the best there is. And they work jointly
with Mossad, SAS, CIA, and so forth to track terrorism around the globe. The
name of Osama bin Laden was used around these teams long before it became
commonplace in the rest of the United States.
Yet these teams never seem to be called upon to do the deed. Oh sure, they gather intel. Sure, they profile. Sure, they track. Sometimes they even participate in missions of indeterminate nature and scope. Perhaps they were even in Afghanistan recently - who knows? Certainly not the taxpayers who employ them. Or the terrorists who are supposed to be "deterred" by them.
Despite the fact that we have built a rapid-deployment system that allows us to deploy these troops anywhere in the world incredibly rapidly, we apparently have failed to use them in a deterrent manner. Deterrence/MAD as a strategy worked on the entire Soviet Union - why wouldn't it work on terrorists?
Instead, we have been known to negotiate, barter, and stall. We flip million-dollar Tomahawk missiles at Al-Qaeda tents. But we don't deploy our bad boys and kill the perps. And we keep the very existence of our anti-terrorist teams classified. So no one knows what they are truly capable of.
Is it a lack of political will on the part of our lawmakers and administrations? In the case of specialized anti-terrorist SEAL teams, is it a lack of conviction on the part of Navy leaders to use that force as it was designed to be used? Have the diseases of Vietnam persisted to this day? Are we really so afraid of the world opinion that we can't use our military as it is designed to be used? Are we afraid to win? After recent events, I don't think the American public will object too much.
The United States needs to use its quick-reaction forces to the limit of their capability. They may even be in Afghanistan now, but is that why we spend what we do to train them? So they can be used as glorified infantry? To occupy ground? There are numerous U.S. military forces better suited for that job.
Our anti-terrorist teams are the shiny tip of the spear, able to go anywhere and execute the mission. They are intended to be the thunderbolt of lightning from the clear sky, that leaves nothing behind but scorched earth where a terrorist organization once stood.
We know most of the terrorist groups in the world, where they train, where they live, and who they are. Why not eliminate them, as President Bush has so eloquently and correctly called for? If we are going to be a world police force, we should be an effective one.
The doctrine of "hot pursuit" has been long recognized in international law. A state in hot pursuit of terrorists has the right to cross borders and bring perpetrators to justice. We do not need to be caught in a quagmire of posse comitatus or "acts of war." Let it be known that the United States will pursue any and all terrorist groups immediately and eliminate them. Then make it stick as a basic element of our foreign policy.
We have the backing of the entire world to an unprecedented degree (as long as it lasts). Let's use that support - publicly and effectively. All it takes is the political will to do so.
Contributing Editor Jon Barrett is the pen name of a Naval Reserve officer who has served in both the surface Navy and Naval Special Warfare. He can be reached at jbarrett@computermail.net.
By J. David Galland
To most Americans, and certainly to most American soldiers on duty in Europe, the new Euro currency and future military challenges have little or no connection.
While many of us slept away our New Year's Eve revels on Jan. 1, the new Euro took hold and became the common currency for 12 nations in Western Europe. With the 55th anniversary of the post-World War II Marshal Plan coming in a few months, this currency change will signal a new era in economic and political relations between Europe and the United States.
The Marshal Plan pulled Europe out of destruction and its post-war stagnation and ruin. More than a half-century later, the plan has resulted in the continent leveling the playing field with Uncle Sam and the almighty dollar!
Europe has become a conglomerate of nations where national sovereignty has taken second place to economic unity. European leaders envision that this will be in the best interest of their economy and the bottom line - the trading value of the Euro against the dollar. Slowly but surely this economic union is taking on the identity, and certainly the role, of a governing force.
Some observers say the Marshal Plan has come full circle. Others realize, quite perceptively, that the dollar is about to receive an unprecedented challenge *from the unified European market and its unifying currency.
The true long-term effect of adopting a single currency is the creation of a political union. Political unions are symbiotic of their protecting force, even if the force strays a bit. This newly emerging European federal state will ultimately have responsibility for a continent-wide foreign and security policy as well as for what are now domestic economic and social polices.
While each government, and various key political figures, differ in their reasons for wanting a political union, there is little doubt that the real rationale for the European Monetary Union is political, and not, as the masses believe, economic.
Great Britain's Tony Blair, America's staunchest European ally on the continent, is clearly illustrative of my assertion. Blair walks in both camps, or as some say, talks out both sides of his mouth. He vehemently backs every American move. Meanwhile, Great Britain has no plan to eliminate its national currency while certainly considering itself an integral part of The European Union.
The European Monetary Union was created by the ratification of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which called for a future political union. There is no credible, or sizable, country in the world that does not have its own national currency, which is generally considered a fundamental characteristic of national sovereignty. It is also the domestic key to independent financial management and budget policies in any country.
As time goes on, and the European Monetary Union evolves into a more general political union, conflicts will rise from incompatible expectations about the sharing of power. This is absolutely something that the world can bet on.
Without a doubt, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the erosion of Communism in Eastern Europe changed the basis and need for European foreign policy and military collaboration. The United States and Western Europe shared a close alliance for many years and continue to coordinate military undertakings within the NATO structure, primarily in the Balkans.
But many Europeans in positions of responsibility see their economic interests and foreign policy goals differing from those of the United States in many parts of the world, including Eastern Europe itself. Further, the French and German governments want to develop an independent military capability that can operate without U.S. participation or consent. Great Britain is also a strong advocate for European military autonomy, at least in words if not yet in deeds.
Last
summer, the European Union announced tentative plans for the formation of
a Euro Army, or Euro-Force. Notwithstanding, Great Britain jumped on the bandwagon
pledging support and embracing the concept. However, this all seemed to lose
steam given the global events of the past eight months. Continued tensions
in Macedonia and Kosovo, coupled with the reactions caused by the September
11th terrorist attacks have muted many strong advocates for the rapid formulation
of the Euro-Force.
Clearly the movement toward a political merger based on the European Monetary
Union with the recent implementation of the Euro currency, will serve to accelerate
the development of an independent European military structure. By design,
this Euro-Army will be capable of force projection outside Western Europe
and supposedly will focus on humanitarian crises. Still, only a fool would
believe that this limited role and mission could not ultimately change.
It is my assessment that the attempt to forge a common military and a foreign policy for Europe could be an additional potential source of conflict - both among the member nations, as well as those outside of the group.
It is widely assumed that European countries still differ in their national ambitions. There is no doubt, however, that a Europe of nearly 300 million people with an economy approximately equal in size to that of the United States, could create a formidable military force.
One consequence of a politically unified Europe, with its own independent military and foreign policy, would be the accelerated reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe. This, in turn could weaken the role of NATO, and perhaps make Europe more vulnerable to attack from outside.
But don't bet on a reduction of U.S. military forces in Europe in the short term. The current presence of American forces in Germany today is almost solely justified by the need to insulate Western Europe from the complicated problems of the Balkan countries. In that regard, NATO and American soldiers are providing security for both the implementation and the competitive value of the Euro currency.
Military leaders both in Europe and Washington prefer to have everyone, including American soldiers themselves, believe that the real reason that they are serving in the former Yugoslavia is to make the Balkans a comfy, warm, secure and thriving place to live. But I beg to differ.
Marshall Tito, even with his iron fist, could not achieve that lofty goal in forty years, so it is neither rash nor defeatist to predict NATO's ultimate failure in the Balkans. The ancillary reasons - big business, defense contracts, research and development, and making money hand over fist, also keep U.S. soldiers on the continent.
Simply put, the implications for the United States and American forces overseas, as well as for all Americans, are that we will sooner or later have to re-think our foreign policy with respect to Europe. All these years after the end of World War II, 55 years after the Marshal Plan, and now more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, this stumbling former punch-drunk continent has risen to a formidable status.
I predict, not as an economist, but as a soldier, that a politically unified Europe will seek a different relationship with the United States. France will be a primary mover behind these changes and in so doing will again turn against us in a way reminiscent of former President Charles de Gaulle, who in the mid-1960s banned the U.S. military from French soil and left NATO in frustration over American interference with French policies toward countries such as Libya, Iraq, Iran and Vietnam.
The United States must recognize that it will no longer be able to count on Europe as an ally in all its relations with third countries. The Europeans, guided by a combination of economic self-interest, historical traditions and national pride, will seek alliances and pursue policies that will likely be contrary to the interests of the United States.
Mutual cooperation between Western Europe and the United States was long an exercise in quid-pro-quo, when the threat of conflict with the Soviet Union dominated international relations, and Europe's interest in containing the Soviet Union coincided with America's. The coming of the Euro currency as a harbinger of political autonomy across the continent sends a remarkably different message: For the United States to assume that similar levels of cooperation will continue to exist - economic, political and military - will be a very serious mistake.
J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is the pen name of a career U.S. Army senior Non-Commissioned Officer currently serving in Germany. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.
By Patrick Hayes
When it comes to dealing with terrorists, Muslim terrorists in particular, the Israelis can write the book - in blood. They've been bleeding at the hands of terrorists since nationhood in 1948 and before.
In 1967, when we were slugging it out in Vietnam with one hand tied behind our backs and a one-sided Geneva Convention favoring the VC guerrillas and NVA regulars, the Israelis showed American decision-makers how to fight a war - fight to win! But maybe they've lost the edge.
Muslims, we hear daily from mouthpieces of the Muslim communities in this country and the liberal media, never do anything wrong or against God's law. We have heard the same message over and over since 9-11: Whatever Muslim terrorists do, it is in response to American indifference, Israeli aggression and the memory of 12th century Crusaders trying to preserve the Holy Land - but it's never wrong!
However, the reality is the bloody slaughter of innocent civilians - one attack after another in Israel. Then, when the Israelis respond against military targets, often giving warning of the coming attack, world outcry is loud and vociferous. However, what we should see is that the Israelis, while burying the dead women and children slaughtered by murdering suicidal madmen, have been nothing but restrained.
Maybe it is time for that restraint to end. Former Fatah terrorist and leader of the Palestinian Council Yasser Arafat has done little to stop terrorist activities spreading from the Palestinian territories, instead providing Hollywood-style show-pieces for the international media.
Following recent attacks from the Palestinian town of Rafah, Israeli bulldozers pushed back a row of Palestinian houses on the thin border road between the Gaza town and the Egyptian border. The Palestinians say they were family homes with families displaced. The Israeli Defense Forces say they were vacant houses, used by Palestinian terrorists to snipe and ambush Israeli patrols along the border.
The United Nations has accepted Arafat as a "statesman" with his call for a "Palestinian State" and forgetting his terrorist past, while at the same time decrying the defensive actions of Israel. The reality is, the Palestinians had no state - ever! It is not, as the liberal media seems to assert, that the Israelis - or Jews - moved into an existing "Palestinian state" and took it over. Jews, or Israelites, have inhabited the area dating back to the 14th century B.C.
Some basic history should be noted.
With the rise in anti-Semitism in Europe during the 1880s, many Jews made their way to the "Promised Land," which alarmed the Muslim inhabitants who opposed what had been coined as "Zionism" by Theodor Herzl, author of the 1896 book, The Jewish State.
Before the First World War, the region was made up of little more than roving Bedouin tribes and some farmers. There were no national boundaries of statehood, other than those imposed by the Ottoman Empire, which had ruled the region from 1517 to 1917.
What exists today was, for the most part, a conglomeration of promises made by the British Empire to everyone involved. In 1915, the British bought the allegiance of the local Arabs, in the person of Husein ibn Ali of Mecca, against the Ottomans (which had sided with Imperial Germany in World War I) by promising them independence after the war. Unfortunately, they followed this up with the secret Sykes-Picot agreement with France and Russia in 1916, promising to divide and rule the region with these wartime allies.
Also, in a sign of the times (anti-Semitism) and because Britain sought financial support from the Jewish community, Britain promised a Jewish Homeland following the war in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. This promise was acted upon by the League of Nations in 1922, mandating the region of Palestine under British control. The Brits had firmly placed themselves squarely in the middle of the local Arab and Jewish communities.
It didn't take long for the action to begin. Anti-Jewish attacks by Muslims occurred in Jerusalem in 1920 and Jaffa in 1921. In an attempt to backtrack and appease the Arabs, the British severely reduced Jewish immigration and denied Jews access to most of Palestine.
In the intervening years, the British faltered back and forth between their promises. However, after Jewish immigration to the region rose substantially in 1933 following the rise of the Nazis in Germany and neo-Nazi groups in other parts of Europe, including England's British Fascists, Muslim Arabs revolted in 1936 - a conflict that continued until 1939 when Britain again restricted Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by Jews. Aggravating the already volatile situation in the region, during World War II, Muslim Arabs threw in with the Nazis, supporting their anti-Semitism and global view.
After the war, in 1945, Britain still played hardball with the Jewish survivors of the Nazi death camps and refused to admit 100,000 Jews into the Palestine Mandate. A three-way conflict ensued and, in 1947, Britain finally gave up and turned the mandate over to the United Nations. Although the Muslim Arabs in the region outnumbered the Jews over two to one, the Jews, many concentration camp survivors, were better prepared for a war, which for them, was one of survival.
The Mufti of Jerusalem rejected a U.N.-proposed partial statehood for the Jews in 1947, while the Jews accepted it. A short war ensued, which soundly defeated the Arabs. A Jewish state of Israel was declared on May 14, 1948, and the United States was the first to recognize it. Almost immediately, five Arab armies attacked the fledgling nation. They, too, were quickly defeated and Israel expanded its land, leaving the West Bank to Jordan and the Gaza Strip to Egypt. In 1967, when the Muslim armies tried again, Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula. With each successive attack, Israel has captured more land from its attackers. The question now is, what is to be done with it?
Israel has been patient, negotiate and offer settlements to the conflict, but each time its olive branch is met with attacking Muslim armies or suicidal terrorists coming in the night to kill women and children. The Israeli response has been measured. But "measured" doesn't seem to get the message across.
Rather than hit police stations and barracks, maybe it's time to go after the terrorists in the rat nests in which they reside - like the town of Rafah. Why move the buildings back 100 yards, when the terrorists just take up other positions? Maybe it's time to demolish that town and any other giving respite and support to terrorists. Isn't that the mandate against terrorism the United States is currently employing?
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a microcosm of the growing war between a civilized West and a 13th century Muslim mindset. Negotiations don't work. Arafat talks out of both sides of his mouth, so agreements mean nothing. The terrorists still come in the night. Restraint and patience have served no purpose. Terrorists, particularly suicidal terrorists, need to be sought out and destroyed.
Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at Gyrene65@netscape.net.
By Robert G. Williscroft
Remember the Cold War? Step into the past, to the decades between 1950 and 1990.
In the United States, we had developed the Strategic Triad concept to protect our country-and the free world-from nuclear attack. Our defense against nuclear attack rested on three fundamentally different and independent legs.
Leg one was manned bombers-beginning with World War II-era B-29s and ending in the 1990s with B-52Hs, B-1Bs, and B-2As.. Because these aircraft were continuously control by humans, in an emergency they could be launched and vectored towards the enemy-all the while negotiations attempted to prevent further escalation into full-blown nuclear war. At any time, the aircraft could be recalled, or ordered not to drop their lethal loads. In the event of an escalating situation, aircraft could be maintained in a local flight pattern, continuously refueled and ready on a moment's notice to fly towards designated targets.
Leg two was land-based missiles carrying one or more independently targeted warheads. These missiles were stored in silos that were capable of withstanding all but a direct nuclear hit. They were capable of withstanding an enemy first strike and could then deal a devastating blow to his ability to follow through with further strikes.
The third Triad leg was our fleet of missile submarines. These subs carried either sixteen or twenty-four missiles with multiple independently targeted warheads. Since submarines are nearly impossible for a potential enemy to track, we were, therefore, practically guaranteed the ability to deliver a killing blow to any attacking enemy, even after he launched a full-blown nuclear strike.
This Triad assured our ability to deter an enemy from striking in the first place, because he could not survive such a strike.
At least, that's how it was supposed to work.
One could argue that since we did not have a nuclear war, it must have worked. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, documents found in the KGB archives, and reports from senior former Soviet government personnel, lend credence to this argument. The concept was called MAD, for Mutual Assured Destruction. Despite the wags who could not refrain from Dr. Strangelove analogies, MAD appears to have been very effective in deterring the Soviets from launching a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States and NATO.
The good news is that the Cold War is over. In response, we and the Russians have destroyed most of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and we have severely reduced the size of the remaining two Triad legs. In today's world, however, hitting a typical attacker with submarine launched nukes is overkill; but using expensive ballistic missiles to deliver anything smaller than large nukes is a huge waste of money. We can do much better with high-flying bombers and smart bombs.
The bad news is that we still have a fleet of 18 Trident ballistic missile subs - soon to shrink to 14 -- floating around, but there really is no significant military adversary that they can effectively deter. It is clear that our missile subs and bomber fleet clearly did not deter the al Qaeda terrorist strikes on last September 11. For deterrence to work, you must know where the strike originated. In the wake of the destruction of the New York World Trade Center we face something completely different: the need to create a totally new deterrent.
In Afghanistan, we have been able to use our bomber fleet effectively to combat terrorism, but fleet ballistic missile subs still have only one purpose, to deter nuclear armed adversaries. As long as Russia and China - despite current ties with the United States - possess nuclear arsenals that pose a potential threat - we still have an effective fleet of hidden and essentially unstoppable vehicles capable of totally destroying any nation choosing to attack us. As such, it still deters.
Having these missile subs out there, however, raises an interesting and important question: Could a ballistic missile submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a few men conspire and successfully bypass the built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons?
The people who established our nuclear weapons control systems created the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) to offset the element of human uncertainty.
Anybody with access to any element of nuclear weapons is under continuous, close scrutiny. From the admiral in command of a flotilla to the least significant seaman swabbing the deck around a missile tube-every individual having even the remotest contact with nuclear weapons and their means of delivery participates in the most closely supervised "buddy-system" in the world. Every participating individual submits to an appropriate background investigation. Before being assigned to more sensitive positions, each individual's dossier is updated.
Beyond this, however, each individual is specifically and legally responsible for observing every other individual in the program with whom he comes into contact.
If Lt. Jones suddenly starts drinking three cups of coffee in the morning instead of just one, Seaman Smith, who brings him the coffee, must report this change. If he doesn't, and if this change and Smith's knowledge of this change become factors in a future problem, Smith will suffer consequences as severe as Jones.
Every element that is remotely connected with launch authorization is under continuous "two-man control". It takes two individuals to bring together any system element that can ultimately lead to launch of a nuclear weapon. These individuals, while they usually will know each other, are prohibited from establishing close personal ties. In the event that such ties happen, they must voluntarily step forward with this information and be reassigned. Failure to do this requires their dismissal and disciplinary action.
Only the president can authorize a nuclear weapons launch. His encrypted authorization will arrive at the submarine by secure radio. Sealed authenticators which are kept under continuous two-man control ensure the message's authenticity. These plastic chips are created automatically by computers programmed to insert completely random symbols.
A launch message identifies a specific authenticator and lists the symbols it should contain. These symbols will have been determined by the sender only moments before transmitting the message by manually opening one of the authenticators. If the local authenticator does not match, the message is not authenticated, and the launch is denied.
While SSBN missile warheads do not contain mechanical 'Permissive Action Links' designed to prevent unauthorized launches that are built into nuclear gravity bombs and land-based missile warheads, during the 1990s the Navy added extra security measures to the Authentication System used with the Trident sub fleet that ensure the virtual impossibility of an unauthorized launch from a submarine. Details are highly classified.
There is no realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile either can be accidentally launched or deliberately launched without authorization - ever - under any circumstances - period.
The system isn't foolproof, but within the limitations of the trust we place in our highest officials it nearly eliminates the chance of a nuclear weapon being launched without proper authority.
Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.
By Matthew Dodd
What the heck does transformation of the U.S. armed forces mean, and what are we doing about transforming?
The answer to the first part of the question is, "It depends on who you ask and in what office that person works." The last part of the question is more complex: holding a lot of meetings, struggling to define transformation, searching for the elusive "lightening-bolt" nugget of transformation wisdom from above, and running down the path of putting the cart before the horse by trying to assign objective measurement criteria to something we cannot even describe.
For over a year, the Department of Defense (DoD) has been trying to understand what transformation of the armed forces means. What we have to show for our efforts are similar sounding, but decidedly different descriptions and definitions of transformation.
Transformation is described in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the last Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The president and the secretary of defense (SecDef) have articulated their visions of transformation, retired Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski (SecDef's director of the office of force transformation) has his own vision of transformation, each Service has a plan to transform its own forces, the Joint Staff is working on proposing a new definition, and the Office of the SecDef (OSD) is hoping to publish the definitive definition of transformation in the next DPG.
Since we still do not have an acceptable definition of transformation, and it seems that anyone can contribute to the discussion of transformation, I would like to offer some thoughts as a passenger on this transformation train.
According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, transformation is "an act, process, or instance of transforming or being transformed." Also, to transform means, "to change in composition or structure; to change the outward form or appearance of; to change in character or condition." Unfortunately (and not surprisingly), the latest DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not contain either term.
As Dr. Joe Strange of the Marine Corps War College said in a 1996 "Perspectives on Warfighting" paper, the lack of a common language results in "a confusion which cannot help but inhibit precision of thought and clarity of communication at all levels of war throughout the DOD community." How much longer will briefers say, "Well, this is our definition of … " or, "This is what we mean by … " without being challenged or silenced? We must collectively fix this language problem once and for all.
If I were the King of Transformation, here is how I would officially define transformation for all of DoD. I'd start by locking the same people involved in the yearly transformation efforts in a room to refine a starting definition of transformation computer-projected on a screen. Then, like the television show, "Survivor," every fifteen minutes we would vote someone out before continuing to refine the definition. This cycle would repeat until I emerge from the room with a single definition.
We should critically examine our current transformation efforts. Specifically, if transformation is a long-term, ongoing, synergistic process of continuous or quantum-leap improvements to our warfighting effectiveness, how can we possibly measure it using objective metrics? Warfighting effectiveness is a subjective condition relative to our adversaries. It seems to me that applying peacetime objective assessment criteria to transformation is a tremendous waste of time, manpower, and resources.
Why do we want or need to measure transformation? The answer is what unfortunately drives most DoD decisions: dollars. Everyone knows that transformation is now anted up into the high-stakes congressional budget poker game. Everyone knows that the definitions are wild and the congressional transformation pot is large. Everyone wants a piece of that pot. When Congress calls, your cards better contain checks in your metrics blocks or you will not get a piece of the transformation pot.
If we assign metrics to transformation with transformation tied to funding, then we run the very real risk that achieving those metrics will become the focus. Forcing transformation's long-term focus into a short-term process is counter-productive and a self-defeating prophecy. A related problem with transformation metrics is that without a common definition and a clear vision of what the transformed force will either look like or be capable of, there is a very real chance that our metrics may lead us to something short of or different from a truly transformed force.
Another troubling aspect of our transformation efforts is the almost exclusive emphasis on technology and senior leadership's information management and decision support systems and processes. Why do we not focus on institutionalizing maneuver warfare with distributed and decentralized decision-making that facilitates multiple, simultaneous, interdependent operations guided by commander's intent?
Most service and joint doctrine leads you to believe that we routinely operate in this maneuver warfare environment. I submit that our legacy organizational structure and processes, and our leaders nurtured within this legacy, do not facilitate the required human dimensions for future warfighting success. These required human dimensions include, but are not limited to trust, initiative, implicit communications, acceptance of risk, friction and uncertainty, and non-attribution critique and feedback up, down, and lateral within our command structures.
Historically, the human dimension is much tougher for us to understand, and precisely why we should expect our future adversaries to continue to focus on ways to exploit this critical vulnerability. A lesson we should learn from the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks is that it is possible for our enemies to use our own technological superiorities against us. A technologically focused transformed force must be prepared to adapt to opponents who willingly operate in environments below our technological 'high bar.'
Instead of thinking of transformation in terms of what we could do, we need to first focus on what we should have been doing all along. Given today's realities, my vision of our transformed force is one that should share a common language and future vision, should not allow funding to divert us from effectively transforming to that vision, and should shift maneuver warfare from doctrinal concepts to everyday practice.
To do any less is dangerous, and to try to do any more is ridiculous.
Contributing Editor Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.
By Paul Connors
Since the end of the Persian Gulf War more than ten years ago, the United States and Great Britain have maintained a constant patrol over the northern and southern "no fly" zones imposed on Iraq as terms of the ceasefire. Every day since, American fighter aircraft (primarily Air Force) have bored holes in the sky as they flew endless (and mindless) patrols over Iraqi airspace.
The patrols, designed to deny Iraq's armed forces two-thirds of their sovereign airspace, have cost the United States millions of dollars in fuel and maintenance costs as well as millions of man-hours as American service personnel deployed and re-deployed in support of the contingency operations.
Operation Northern Watch missions are flown out of Incirlik Airbase in Adana, Turkey. The USAF and RAF fighter sweeps patrol the northern no-fly zone to ensure that Saddam's fighters and helicopters do not fly. For the most part, the patrols are uneventful and the allied aircraft return home unchallenged and unharmed.
These periods of inactivity are made more lively by the unpredictability of Saddam Hussein and his air defense commanders. Without warning, Iraqi air defense systems will illuminate with radar the patrolling American or British fighters. On those occasions, the USAF almost always retaliates by interdicting the offending radar sites. The same happens to U.S. and British aircraft patrolling as part of Operation Southern Watch from aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and from bases in Saudi Arabia.
There are hidden costs to this on-going war of nerves. After Desert Storm, the U.S. armed forces went through a significant downsizing. As the Air Force reduced the number of active-duty fighter wings, the very units that would be used to patrol the new no-fly zones, it became readily apparent that the operational tempo could not be sustained with the smaller active force.
Consequently, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve fighter squadrons would need to fill in the gaps, so that sorely pressed active-duty crews, maintainers and aircraft could be rotated back to the continental United States or Europe for rest and re-fitting. In that same decade, the Guard and reserve units have stepped up to the plate countless times to give their active-duty brethren much needed breathing room.
The patrols over the no-fly zone have been tough on equipment as well as personnel. By some official estimates, the constant usage of F-15s and F-16s has shortened the useful life of these expensive weapons systems by as much as ten years per airframe.
In the late 1990s, the constant deployments were cited as the single largest factor for people leaving the Air Force. Departures by both pilots and highly skilled maintenance personnel created such a problem that the Air Force considered almost every idea, no matter how far-fetched, as it attempted to stop the hemorrhage of highly skilled maintenance personnel and pilots.
As the active component lost personnel, reserve component units stepped in to the maximum extent possible. But these deployments weren't just restricted to fighter units. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve rescue units and their personnel were also called upon to provide vital rescue and recovery skills for pilots who might be forced down in hostile territory.
While these deployments were staffed primarily with volunteers (many of whom traveled to the Gulf region for as little as 15-18 days), a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up was instituted while the United States was also flying bombing missions against the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic in 1999. A number of the Guard and reserve rescue aircrews did back-to-back deployments from Northern Watch to Southern Watch due to the lack of capability within the active component rescue units to fulfill all of their worldwide commitments.
The fact is, these constant patrols are costly, time-consuming and ultimately wasteful of both human and material resources. Flying in less than optimum conditions is extremely tough on men and equipment. The constant overseas deployments are tough on individuals, units and the families they leave behind.
The downsized active Air Force cannot meet all of its commitments with the resources allotted to it and consequently, the longest consistent use of reserve component personnel in the republic's history (other than wartime) has also caused retention problems as citizen-airmen have had to choose between service, civilian job and family commitments.
As the United States and its Air Force continue to pursue the war against terrorism, more and more Guardsmen and reservists are being recalled to active duty to support homeland defense and other contingency operations around the world.
It is long past time to instigate a thorough reappraisal of the U.S. military's ongoing operations in Saudi Arabia and Turkey with a view toward drastically reducing - if not curtailing altogether - the no-fly zone patrols.
What is clear with the ongoing war against terrorism is that the resources are needed elsewhere. If the no-fly zones must be patrolled, then the U.S. government should have the Royal Saudi Air Force, the Turkish Air Force and the air forces of Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates accept responsibility for those mission areas.
After all, these very same air forces are equipped with expensive American and British equipment. Since they have the most to lose should Iraq attack again, isn't it time we asked them to put it to good use in their own common defense?
Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. He can be reached at paulconnors@hotmail.com.
By John Szelog
Some of the reports and studies coming from the Air Force and other supporters of the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs begin to blur the line between reality, and fiction. In a 1998 article in The Stars and Stripes, a Rand Corp. study was cited as saying that in the event North Korea invaded South Korea, two squadrons (about 48 aircraft) of F-22s could gain air superiority by themselves, switch to the ground-attack role, and using Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMS),halt the North Korean ground assault on their own.
I'm not making this up: If the Air Force, Rand Corp., and other proponents of the programs are to be believed, the aircraft will be able to do anything, anywhere, anytime, anyhow. And so it goes with the JSF, now type-classified as the F-35. I fully agree that the United States needs to continuously improve it's military capabilities and equipment, as the art of waging, and deterring, war, is always evolving. . However, history has also proven that the KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid) method works best. And that's the problem with the JSF: It is a violation of the KISS doctrine.
The JSF is intended to be a fast strike fighter, and in the case of the British, a fighter, at low and medium altitudes. But it is also expected to take over the job of the A-10, i.e, low-altitude, low-speed, not to mention high-flak close air support. Added to these aerodynamic demands are the requirements to have a land-based fighter, a carrier-based fighter, and a vertical take-off and landing fighter, all derived from the same-airframe.
The desire for a common airframe makes sense, and should be done whenever possible, but also within reason. One question that begs asking is, why the Air Force and the Navy won't use the same version? The F/A-18 operates superbly in both the land-based (Marine Corps, Canada, Spain, Australia, Kuwait) and the carrier-based roles, with no major design changes; but the Air Force and Navy will use two different versions of the JSF. The other question that comes to mind is how well the Navy version is going to hold up to the physically and environmentally brutal conditions of carrier operations, because it is simply "beefed-up" from the lighter-framed Air Force version.
As to the V/STOL version, it seems that the effort to develop a better V/STOL engine was given up in favor of expediency, which is sad. The promise of a better engine, without having to resort to a separate lift engine, meant that a more effective V/STOL fighter-bomber could have been designed around that engine. The Marines, RAF, and Royal Navy will have to settle for a not-quite-as-good-as-it-should-be aircraft instead.
The desire of the Air Force to replace the A-10 with the JSF is laughable at best. The basic design of the A-10 is perfect, for lack of a better word, for the job it does: loitering over the battlefield for extended periods, and providing close air support for ground forces. The JSF, on the other hand, is designed with a high-speed wing, a design that doesn't work well at low speeds and low altitudes, which means it won't have the loiter capability, or the low-altitude performance, that the A-10 has.
Another side-effect of that design, combined with the effort to keep the whole aircraft light, results in the airframe not being able to handle battle damage well, as it loses its structural strength, and its efficiency, very quickly. Additionally, by it's design, the JSF will be dependent on computers to fly properly, and those computers are very susceptible to damage from things like bullet and missile fragments. Without the flight-control computer, many modern aircraft turn into flying paperweights, and thereafter, rapidly succumb to the law of gravity.
Lastly, the JSF is going to be very hard to sell outside of the U.S. and British militaries. Cost considerations are driving many European nations, and surely other nations in the world who are watching, to move to aircraft that are smaller, less expensive to buy and maintain, and less technologically advanced, and relying more on missile and bomb systems that are more advanced and longer ranged, rather than stealth technology.
The JSF is expensive, compared to European designs, and it's not designed to have long-range interceptor capabilities, which most countries have a need for in addition to strike-fighters. That would mean buying the F-22, F/A-18E/F, or some other fighter to complement the JSF, and that's something that many can't afford. There are some alternatives that could make the program more realistic, and supportable.
First, use the Navy airframe for both the Navy and the Air Force JSF models. This, of course, makes just about everything, except service specific avionics, common.
One additional advantage that this could provide is allowing the Air Force and Navy to rotate aircraft. After a certain number of flying hours, aircraft are sent to a depot for repainting, upgrades, and inspections. At that time, Air Force aircraft could be refitted for Navy service, and vice versa. This would have the result of extending the lifespan of all of the aircraft in service, as Air Force aircraft are not routinely subjected to the severe physical stresses and environmental conditions that Navy aircraft are.
Second, the Pentagon and the British Ministry of Defense should push the development of a new V/STOL engine and then design a new airframe around it. The new airframe could still be based on, and have a lot of commonality with, the JSF design, but be tailored, and properly designed, to take full advantage of the new engine and unique V/STOL capabilities, such as VIFFing (Vectoring In Forward Flight. The AV-8 Harrier uses turnable nozzles to direct thrust down for takeoff and hovering, back for forward flight, and slightly forward for moving backwards while hovering.
(VIFFing is a defensive air-to air combat tactic, used when the Harrier is in forward flight, with an enemy aircraft chasing it. The Harrier pilot rolls the aircraft upside down, and moves the nozzles fully forward - reverse thrust - which has the effect of rapidly decelerating the aircraft, causing the chasing aircraft to fly past.)
Lastly, the Pentagon should explore dropping the requirement for the Air Force JSF to replace the A-10, and look into the possibility of re-opening production of A-10s.
John
M. Szelog is a Contributing Editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at streetgang52@hotmail.com.
Table of
Contents
By Andrea West
When attempting to work with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), particularly when trying to establish a service connection for an injury or to increase a disability rating, the first word that comes to mind is, "daunting." The novice sees the VA as a massive machine that will grind up and spit out anyone who doesn't know which to punch.
In truth, this organization is quite understandable and easy to work with. I have been in the VA system since 1994, and my experience has been overwhelmingly positive. I am confident that, by avoiding two common mistakes and adopting a positive attitude, the veteran will significantly improve his or her chances of establishing a service connection or disability rating.
The first mistake many veterans make is to treat the VA as the enemy. Acting on this premise, the veteran trying to establish a service connection takes the offensive approach, treating every obstacle and the person who tells him or her about it as an opponent to be defeated. This approach is wholly inappropriate.
The VA and its staff should be viewed as potential allies, whose cooperation will help each veteran achieve his or her objective. The VA is not out to deny services. Like any other large and complex organization, it has a body of rules governing services and budgets, and each department understands the rules that pertain to its own area of expertise.
VA staff members have a vested interest in making sure that veterans are served properly, in accordance with its rules and authority. Veterans should bear in mind that under the rules, they may not receive the service connection or the disability rating they seek.
The second mistake veterans frequently make is trying to navigate the VA by themselves. This can lead to confusion if they start out in the wrong department. A better approach is to begin by visiting one of the veterans' service organizations representatives. There are a number of these organizations whose purpose is to serve the interests of veterans and assist them in working with the VA.
The Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, and the Disabled American Veterans are three such organizations, and all of them typically maintain a service representative on the VA premises. Veterans should call the organization of choice and make an appointment to visit the service representative.
Each veteran should bring a copy of any pertinent records that explain what he or she is trying to accomplish at the VA (enroll in the VA system, establish service connection for an injury, etc.), and specific information indicating what difficulties have occurred to date (missing records, eligibility questions, etc.). At this point, the veteran can ask the service representative what action should be taken. The service representative may ask the veteran to sign a limited power of attorney or similar permission for the representative to act on his or her behalf.
It is important to remember that the service representative is there to advise and assist the veteran, but the veteran must do most of the actual work. This is especially true when it comes to providing documentation, because the burden of proof is on the veteran to produce the necessary records in his or her case. If records are missing, the service representative will indicate what forms must be filed to obtain them, but it is the veteran's responsibility to fill out the forms and follow up on their delivery. In fact, the service representative will point out which actions need to be taken, but the veteran must take them.
Active-duty personnel should make sure that every injury is documented in his or her records. It is advisable to make two copies of everything in one's medical and dental records, and keep them in separate, safe places.
When out-processing, a service member should carefully look for anything in his or her file that would be essential for claiming assistance for service-related injuries or medical conditions. It is recommended that he or she list all injuries and conditions accrued in the service. This will greatly facilitate filing a claim for injuries or other medical conditions with the VA after the discharged or retired military person makes initial contact with a veterans service organization.
Another issue concerns the all-important DD-214 form, the formal record of service for each discharged or retired military service person. It is imperative that this form be completed correctly and in full when it is drawn up during out-processing. Making changes afterward is very difficult and time-consuming, if it can be done at all. Items to review in detail include the number of days of active service; combat or combat support details; medals and decorations, the reenlistment code and - last but not least - the type of discharge). It will save the service person a lot of future grief to ensure that all information presented is complete and correct before signing the form.
Having enrolled in the VA system, what actions should the veteran take when seeking to establish service connection for an injury? Here is a simple but helpful roadmap for succeeding in that contact:
First, the veteran should refer all questions concerning the process to the service representative, and all questions concerning medical conditions to the primary care physician. It is helpful at this point to adopt the three Ps - patience, persistence and politeness - as a personal motto:
Patience is the first virtue, because claims of this nature are time-consuming and there is no way to rush the process. Some claims can take more than a year to process, so the veteran should be prepared to wait. Persistence comes second but is no less important. The veteran or retiree should check in with his or her service representative regularly. The final virtue is politeness. For VA officials and service representatives alike, it is much more of a pleasure to help a nice person, one who views the VA staff as his or her allies rather than enemies.
The new
veteran or retiree should also be prepared to attend a slew of appointments
pertaining to his or her claim. Some of these may be offsite, such as at the
offices of a private practitioner on contract to the VA for a particular service.
It is essential that these appointments be kept, since the information gained
from them is germane to the claim.
There is no guarantee that the veteran will get the service connection or
the disability rating he or she seeks, but following the procedures listed
above is the best way to ensure ultimate success.
Andrea West is DefenseWatch Veterans editor. She can be reached at defensewatchvet@yahoo.com.
By Melana Zyla Vickers
The image of Army Special Forces Sgt. 1st class Nathan Ross Chapman, 31 and a father of two, bleeding to death after being shot in the leg outside the Afghan town of Khost on January 4, is enough to evoke great heartsickness. Add the fact that Chapman, who had devoted 12 years to the Army, was making an estimated $52,000 per year, and the sorrow gives way to no small amount of guilt.
Chapman wasn't the only one to give his nation everything while receiving almost nothing. The CIA's Mike Spann, a 32-year-old father of three killed in Afghanistan in late November, earned less than $50,000 per year. The three Army Special Forces sergeants killed by a stray U.S. bomb in early December were similarly poorly paid.
Patriotic, adventurous service is its own reward, some might retort. While there's a grain of truth in that, it's important not to exploit these brave Americans' sense of national duty. Compare the salaries of men on the front lines to others that might be judged comparably adventurous and service-oriented, and you'll find that soldiers serving in Afghanistan are getting short-changed.
New York City firefighters such as the ones that doused the World Trade Center flames, for instance, can make $60,000 after only ten years. Unlike Special Forces soldiers, firefighters can also arrange their work in shifts that allow them to hold lucrative second jobs. Similarly, police officers in the Seattle area - where Chapman was raising his family - can make $60,500 after six years. These figures don't count overtime pay, which a soldier doesn't get even if he's working 24/7. Pointing this out is not to suggest that New York's bravest or Seattle's finest are overpaid. On the contrary, it is simply to suggest that, by comparison, U.S. military personnel are getting short shrift.
And there's a contrast between the soldiers and broader society as well: According to a study by the think tank RAND, half of civilians with some college education earn more than their counterparts in the military do.
Remuneration is faulty within the military, too. The paycheck that goes to a soldier suffering months of privation and threats to his life in Afghanistan is almost the same as that of a soldier of equal rank patrolling the Coke machines in the Pentagon. The maximum difference between the monthly pay of a Sgt. Chapman and a Sgt. Desk Jockey is about $800 and usually far less. It's broken down into special pays for such skills as freefall parachuting or scuba if the soldier has them, foreign-language proficiency, and a paltry $150 in "hostile fire and imminent danger" payments known as combat pay.
To be sure, there's some simple economics at work here: The price of combat soldiers is set where the supply of young, intelligent, patriotic, able-bodied Americans meets the military's demand for them. If the nation had a shortage of qualified applicants for the Special Forces, it could presumably attract more candidates by raising the pay. The fact that it doesn't suggests that the country remains full of willing candidates.
But at a time of war when combat soldiers' sacrifices are so glaring, there should be more to a discussion of their compensation than the cold logic of a supply curve. What's more, the question of fair pay is sure to come up again as the U.S. becomes more dependent on fighting wars Afghanistan-style, with air power supplemented by Special Forces.
Fairness alone argues for rewarding the soldiers who put their lives at risk for the country, or indeed give their lives for it, with better financial compensation. If the services want to preserve the equity among all servicepeople of a certain rank, so be it. But for national gratitude's sake, the Department of Defense should increase the pay that goes to soldiers who actually serve in the line of fire.
DoD has begun to improve the lot of soldiers overall, albeit modestly. An across-the-board, 5 percent increase in military pay kicked in this year. In addition, DoD offers servicepeople bonuses for reenlistment that can go as high as their basic annual salary minus special pay. And in a practice that arose to lure young people into the military during the 1990s boom years, when other jobs had much greater financial appeal, it will in some cases pay signing bonuses of up to $20,000. But these are one-time windfalls, and they don't particularly reward soldiers such as the Green Berets in Afghanistan.
Far better for the nation to recognize the sacrifice of these men and their families and to reward it, than to remain slavishly attached to principles of intra-military equity, supply, and demand.
© 2002 TechCentralStation.com, reprinted with permission. Vickers is a columnist for TechCentralStation.com and can be reached at mvickers@techcentralstation.com.
Rank and organization: First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps, Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Rein.).
Place and date: Near Hansan-ni, Korea, 26 November 1950.
Entered service at: Roaring Springs, Tex. Born: 18 August 1921, Indian Gap, Tex.
Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as leader of a rifle platoon of Company A, in action against enemy aggressor forces. Leading his platoon in point position during a patrol by his company through a thickly wooded and snow-covered area in the vicinity of Hansan-ni, 1st Lt. Mitchell acted immediately when the enemy suddenly opened fire at pointblank range, pinning down his forward elements and inflicting numerous casualties in his ranks.
Boldly dashing to the front under blistering fire from automatic weapons and small arms, he seized an automatic rifle from one of the wounded men and effectively trained it against the attackers and, when his ammunition was expended, picked up and hurled grenades with deadly accuracy, at the same time directing and encouraging his men in driving the outnumbering enemy from his position.
Maneuvering to set up a defense when the enemy furiously counterattacked to the front and left flank, 1st Lt. Mitchell, despite wounds sustained early in the action, reorganized his platoon under the devastating fire, and spearheaded a fierce hand-to-hand struggle to repulse the onslaught. Asking for volunteers to assist in searching for and evacuating the wounded, he personally led a party of litter bearers through the hostile lines in growing darkness and, although suffering intense pain from multiple wounds, stormed ahead and waged a single-handed battle against the enemy, successfully covering the withdrawal of his men before he was fatally struck down by a burst of small-arms fire.
Stouthearted and indomitable in the face of tremendous odds, 1st Lt. Mitchell, by his fortitude, great personal valor and extraordinary heroism, saved the lives of several marines and inflicted heavy casualties among the aggressors. His unyielding courage throughout reflects the highest credit upon himself and the U.S. Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country
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