February 6,
2002
Soldiers For The Truth
(SFTT) Weekly Newsletter
When we assumed the Soldier, We did not lay aside the Citizen.
General George Washington, to the New York Legislature, 1775
In this week’s Issue of DefenseWatch:
The Fog of War
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By Ed Offley
The day after that fierce firefight between U.S. Special Operations commandos and armed Afghans in the village of Hazar Qadam on Jan. 23, a reporter for The Washington Post wrote, "The raids underscored how the war in Afghanistan is far from over as U.S. forces search for Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and Mohammad Omar, the head of the Taliban regime that sheltered the terrorist network. It suggested that U.S. troops could face combat there for months to come."
It seemed so at the time: The raid reportedly led to the deaths of 18 Afghan fighters and the seizure of 27 prisoners with the combat injury to one American soldier.
Well, two weeks having passed since that violent mission, we are learning that the Hazar Qadam incident - and an earlier U.S. air strike against a convoy suspected of carrying Taliban officials near Khost on Dec. 22 - produced an altogether different lesson for the United States, its allies and the fledgling Afghan government of interim leader Hamid Karzai: Our friends may be as treacherous and dangerous to American troops as our enemies.
It now seems likely that the SOF commandos and U.S. fighter pilots and their forward air controllers were played for suckers by competing ethnic/political factions in the country.
Following a week of stout insistence that the Jan. 23 commando raid had correctly targeted remnant Taliban fighters, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld on Monday formally acknowledged that our soldiers may have instead encountered "friendly" Afghan forces in the village about 60 miles north of Kandahar. In what stands so far as the understatement of the year for 2002, Rumsfeld said, "It is not a neat, clean, tidy situation" on the ground.
Then yesterday, Karzai told reporters in Kabul that an unidentified supporter of warlord Bacha Khan - recently installed by Karzai as governor of Paktia Province - was the source of deliberately inaccurate information that led the U.S. military to target the convoy of rival Afghan officials as it proceeded toward Kabul for the Dec. 22 inauguration of the new Afghan government. Twelve people were killed.
The Pentagon still asserts that the convoy was a legitimate target, and Rumsfeld on Monday indicated that the Hazar Qadam firefight may have targeted both friendly Afghan officials and Taliban remnants.
"It may well turn out that in a situation like that, you will in fact have people who are friendly and people who are not friendly, and the people who are not friendly initiate the fire," Rumsfeld said of the Hazar Qadam firefight. "The return fire then comes in and ends up, unfortunately, killing or wounding some individuals that might have been friendly."
May be.
But a darker, more troubling possibility has also emerged. The Post and other news organizations have reported that two factions in the village - both of which are officially friendly to the Karzai government and United States, but not to one another - falsely accused the other group of being Taliban or al Qaeda fighters in order to unleash U.S. commandos against their rivals. Given the lack of success in tracking down bin Laden or Mullah Omar to date, our response was as expected.
In came the Green Berets and D-boys and AC-130s, up in flames went the two arms bunkers, and out the window went any illusion that our clear battlefield victory over the Taliban has liberated us from the vicious faction fighting that has shattered and impoverished Afghanistan for nearly a quarter-century.
To its credit, the Pentagon leadership has halted its initial attempt to bury the botched raid under clouds of cordite, brass shell casings and bovine supplements, and has directed Central Command to formally investigate whether we were misled into killing a bunch of Afghan fighters who were actually on our side. Central Command reportedly is reviewing the convoy air strike incident as well.
Meanwhile, news reporters in Afghanistan reported this week that SOF units have apologized for the incident and have begun making monetary settlements to families of the dead Afghan fighters.
The true "lessons learned" from Hazar Qadam and Khost are not the ones we heard two weeks ago: In "liberated" Afghanistan, our friends pose no less of a threat to the 4,000 American soldiers on the ground than the routed enemies we still pursue. Outside of central Kabul, the confusion of peace is still the fog of war.
Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at defensewatch@aol.com.
By David H. Hackworth
Sadly, most World War II vets, whose sacrifices brought us V-E (Victory in Europe) and V-J (Victory over Japan) Day, will hear taps long before we celebrate V-T Day (Victory over Terrorism). And the rest of our citizens will feel the pain of this terrible war for decades. Not only from more deaths and further disruption of the good life, but from the financial burden that will rob medical and social programs and tear up family savings.
"In
all history, there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged
warfare," wrote Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu more than 2,500 years ago.
"Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realize
the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. It is only one
who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war who can thoroughly understand
the profitable way of carrying it on."
For sure, this war will not be Desert Storm short. Long before Israel became
a state in 1948, its people were fighting terrorists just as they are still
doing today - with an end to the bloodshed nowhere in sight.
But President Bush and his Pentagon wranglers deserve high marks for the well-aimed first shots fired and for gearing up to go the distance in this worldwide unconditional war against terrorism - that like cancer must be cut out wherever it festers - beginning with the countries they've retagged as this century's "Axis of Evil:" Iran, Iraq and North Korea. These repressive states have dealt in violence against free, civilized peoples for decades and should be taken out with the same speed and purpose as was employed against the last century's evil Axis - Germany, Japan and Italy.
Members of the Bush team must not only fight smart but stay as sharply focused on containing the costs of this conflict as they are on finding and fighting the enemy. If they think the war's given them license to raid the public purse, they should revisit the Vietnam War and think again.
Bush is seeking almost $400 billion for the Pentagon for next year and plans to increase the annual defense budget to about $440 billion by 2007 - more for guns and gunpowder than the rest of the world combined will be spending over the same period.
Sure, our fighting machine has atrophied during the past decade and needs money in a bad way to take care of the troops, replace worn-out gear and transform the military into a leaner, meaner fighting machine with more unpiloted aircraft and ever-more-modern weapons.
But we can't break Bank USA by using million-dollar weapons to kill $5,000 targets, as was done in Afghanistan. Nor can we allow the Pentagon to spend big on Cold War stuff - designed to take down the Soviet Union, which crashed a decade ago - like the half-billion-dollar heavy Crusader artillery system, the billion-dollar new reconnaissance helicopter, or the $5 billion budgeted to buy F-22 Stealth fighters.
We don't need 800-ton gorillas to take out 30-pound rats.
Most of the congressional porkers are afraid to stand tall and stop this the-enemy-is-at-the-gates spending spree. They don't want to come off as opposing a military buildup when their fickle constituency has war fever. And besides, there's the dough that'll be pumped into their states - not to mention their re-election coffers - for all this so-called "urgent anti-terrorist war gear."
We've got to start putting our money in the right places, not the right pockets. Like making our cities and our ports of entry - air, sea and ground - terrorist-proof instead of wasting another $60 billion on Star Wars II.
Why shouldn't our ports be at least half as tight as the Super Bowl?
And why aren't the Marines, Special Operations, Coast Guard, FBI and Border Patrol more sensible investments than most of those gold-plated toys at the top of the Pentagon's shopping list?
"In war, then, let your object be victory, not lengthy campaigns," Sun Tzu wrote. "(T)he leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or peril."
Our leader
is George Bush. Let's hope he's read Sun Tzu, or at least listened to the
LBJ tapes.
http://www.hackworth.com
is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Sign in for the free weekly
Defending America column at his Web site. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich,
CT 06831.
© 2001 David H. Hackworth
By Matthew Dodd
Since writing my original list of ten subjects on which I freely confessed my ignorance (DefenseWatch, Dec. 19, 2001), I've come to realize that my situational awareness is constantly being challenged. I also discovered that I am not so much ignorant as I am curious about my environment and the people around me.
So as a result of personal observation, casual conversation in the Pentagon and - most important, DefenseWatch reader Feedback messages - I am proud to present a new Top 10 roster of things I do not know or understand:
10. Why do so many people complain about ineffective and inefficient meetings, yet when most of those same people run their own meetings, they repeat the same ineffective and inefficient practices about which they previously complained?
9. Why is it probable on any given day in the Pentagon to see U.S. Air Force personnel wearing the following uniforms and accessories: shoe taps; civilian backpacks, gym bags, computer carrying cases (hung from shoulders or slung on backs); varying shades of black umbrellas; at least a half-dozen variations of black shoes; regular and desert camouflage utilities (sleeves up or down and trousers bloused or tucked into their boots); short or long-sleeve shirts; parkas, flightsuits (sleeves up or down), tanker jackets, Gore-Tex jackets, overcoats, trenchcoats, varying shades of leather fighter jackets (zippers up or down for each); V-neck, crew neck, and button/cardigan sweaters (buttoned or unbuttoned); around-the-neck and retractable pocket-clipped badge holders; berets, flight caps, garrison covers, ball caps with various unit logos and slogans, many types of black gloves - cloth, leather and civilian? (I guess when it comes to uniform combinations, no one comes close to the Air Force.)
8. Why are there no more libraries or bookstores and only one gym/athletic center in the Pentagon, but over a dozen places to eat?
7. Why, after the attack on the Pentagon last Sept. 11, do we continue to value personal convenience over physical security for our senior defense leadership (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his senior staff, the service secretaries, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Richard Myers, Vice Chairman Gen. Peter Pace, the four service chiefs) by keeping their offices on the outermost ring of the Pentagon - the ring most vulnerable to outside attacks from the ground, vehicles and the air?
6. Why are there about 50,000 active badges allowing access to the Pentagon for the approximately 20,000 personnel stationed there?
5. Why is the World Trade Center "memorial" a public media issue but I have not even heard any discussion about a comparable Pentagon memorial? (A few appropriate words on a small wall at the recently opened Pentagon metro transit station is nice: "In memory of all those whose lives were forever changed by the events of Sept. 11, 2001" - but it is not enough.)
4. Why are there so many similar sounding and related words (not found in the latest version of the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) used interchangeably in papers, briefings, meetings and conversation without consensus understanding of the differences and similarities among them? Some examples: measures of performance/measures of effectiveness/key performance parameters; goals/objectives/aim points/desired end-state/desired results; common operational picture/common relevant operational picture; spectrum of conflict/range of operations?
3. Why do most of the bizarre phone calls requesting unusual things and actions come after 1530?
2. Why does it seem that the Defense Department prefers technologies to compensate for inferior tactical skills instead of using technologies to complement superior small-unit expertise?
1. Why do so many senior officials (O-6 and above) use such glowing terms to describe the reserve component, but so many juniors (O-5 and below) express a general unease and skepticism when talking about reserve component capabilities (e.g. Total Force vs. Total Farce)?
Looking back on my newly-expanded list of the 20 things I do not know or understand, I recall the words of Carl T. Rowan, Jr. in an eloquent 1963 New Yorker magazine article discussing press conference questions. Rowan wrote, "There aren't any embarrassing questions - just embarrassing answers."
Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.
By Jon Barrett III
After years of social experimentation in the U.S. military, fueled by societal trends towards "gender" equality, a disturbing situation has emerged: The sexes are still unequal! How did this happen? Can we really be so inept at our attempts to level the playing filed as to put in a decade of hard work to zero effect?
Proponents of feminism and equality will point to the ever-increasing numbers of females in the military and claim success, as if numbers tell the real story. Yet the evidence mounting from military sources supports the anecdotes from the sailors: women in ships is a recipe for disaster.
Statistically, women are fully integrated in the Navy and other services today. Currently, female promotion rates are equal to or better than those of men, and many women are now serving in high-ranking leadership positions in the Department of Defense and the services. Only recently, however, have women been serving in positions that are even remotely combat-related. The growing evidence is that this is not beneficial to combat units. So where are these "leaders" coming from? When I was commissioned, I was told that we were in training to be combat leaders. The mission of the military is, after all, combat. Yet the forces are looking more like corporations lately.
Equality as a measuring stick is certainly appropriate in the corporate world. When we work with computers, minds, ideas, and products, women certainly suffer no disadvantage. In the military environment, the arguments against female integration in combat units are all too well known, particularly the gap in physical strength between male and female personnel. It is now a proverbial question to ask, "Can this 120-pound slip of a girl carry me or my other 200-pound buddies out of a firefight?"
When the military has to set different, lower standards for women, they have de facto declared the inadvisability of putting women into combat roles. And with different standards, what does that do to the ideal of being "equal" to men?
This is not to argue that women have no place at all in the military today. There are parts of the military that are administrative in nature, such as the Navy Supply Corps, and JAG, where physical differences are not so important. For years, women in the military honorably served in these positions and functioned well.
Retired Army Lt. Col. Robert R. Maginnis has written about the Navy's "tendency to ignore longstanding screening standards to accommodate the limited physical ability of women; even after significant training, the strength of women does not improve and they suffer up to three times as many back injuries as men. Navy policy also embraces pregnancy as an "acceptable" readiness problem." Acceptable? Since when?
The rash of pregnancies that occurs immediately before ships with large female contingents go to sea is another fact of modern Navy life. Is it possible that they get pregnant purposefully in order to avoid their duty? Maginnis recently wrote, "At any given time, up to 18 percent of Navy women are pregnant and a study of two ships showed a pregnancy rate as high as one in three. That's nearly 8,423 women, or enough to crew almost two aircraft carriers."
"During Desert Storm, 1,145 women on ships needed to be reassigned because of pregnancies, at an average of 95 per month," he added. That sounds like they really don't want to be in combat units after all." Maginnis cited data about the USS Eisenhower, which was the test case, where pregnancies grew from five to 39 in just a couple of months. "In all, 13 percent of the female crew became pregnant." According to naval policy, the "sailor" had to leave her shipboard duties. This experience has been echoed throughout the fleet, and stories of women getting pregnant to avoid deployment remain common a decade after the Gulf War.
For those who argue that shipboard duty is not the same as ground combat, the issue of physical strength, especially for lifting, is vital in determining a sailor's chance for survival if his or her ship is hit. Ships are made of metal and everything in them is heavy. Strength can be the difference between life and death for other crewmembers. Civilian policemen and firemen are forced to live with these facts, also.
Another unfortunate byproduct of placing women in warships units is that sexual harassment claims are in danger of becoming a tool to unprincipled women. My own Navy Reserve unit recently had a case where charges were made in order to facilitate the transfer to a different unit of a male and female who were involved in a relationship. Why? It turned out the transfer would place them in a unit with a lower operational tempo and thus they could enjoy unrestrained access to each other. The career of an otherwise outstanding commander was damaged as a result.
One officer who is a friend has told me in no uncertain terms that he is so afraid of the possibility that sexual harassment charges could be leveled against him that he will only speak to female sailors in response to a greeting - "Good Morning Petty Officer," or to give a direct order. That is not equality - it is a paralyzed command.
Another unpleasant reality is that in the Navy today, with harassment you are guilty until proven innocent. No career can survive an accusation where there is a presumption of guilt and no way to respond. The fact is, the current climate admits of harassment based on how the woman feels, not on what the male actually did.
The current situation is shameful. With a war on against terrorism, the Pentagon leadership should keep in mind the actual mission of the U.S. military force. The military is intended to be a ready combat force capable of rapid deployment to trouble spots -- not a social laboratory. We are supposed to land anywhere - ready to fight - not serve as a job corps for "disadvantaged" females.
Contributing Editor Jon Barrett is the pen name of a Naval Reserve officer who has served in both the surface Navy and Naval Special Warfare. He can be reached at jbarrett@computermail.net.
By Robert G. Williscroft
The U.S. Navy nuclear fast attack submarine fleet is the most awesome suite of weapons ever built, but gains in non-nuclear propulsion technology over the last few decades raise the question of whether we should augment our nuclear submarine fleet with equally effective and dramatically less expensive non-nuclear submarines.
We currently float 55 fast attack submarines. Thirty are Los Angeles class and 23 are of the Improved Los Angeles class - quieter, with improved weapons, retractable bow planes instead of sail planes, especially suited for under ice operations. The remaining two are the new Seawolf class - significantly quieter, faster, with even more weapons.
The Seawolf class originally was planned for 29 subs, but with the end of the Cold War, it was truncated to three, with two built and one scheduled. This was done to make way for a new, more versatile, less expensive submarine, the Virginia Class. The USS Virginia is expected to be launched sometime in 2004, costing about $1.6 billion, followed by the USS Texas, USS Hawaii, and the USS North Carolina. By comparison, the USS Seawolf cost about $2.1 billion, and the average cost of Los Angeles class subs was around $1 billion.
The annual operating cost for any of these subs is approximately $21 million. The typical service life of a nuclear sub is about 30 years. Refueling and modernizing at the half-life point costs about $200 million. Near the end of the service life, another refueling and extensive overhaul for about $410 million will extend the life another 12 years, for a total service life of 42 years. This totals to about $3.6 billion in constant dollars over the lifetime of a Seawolf class sub.
These are impressive numbers, on one hand for how long a nuclear submarine can be an effective weapon platform, and on the other for how much it actually costs.
Nuclear submarines are designed to operate in "blue water," out in the open ocean. They can run fast and deep, using thermal layers and other characteristics of deep water to disguise their movements and mask their noise.
In shallow water, a nuclear submarine often is longer than the water is deep, severely restricting its maneuverability. Like a large whale in the surf, it can fall victim to a swarm of smaller, more maneuverable subs, unable to detect and outmaneuver them, unable to deploy its weapons effectively.
While the new Virginia class is designed to operate closer to shore, especially for delivery of Special Forces and other tactical in-shore options, these operations are short lived, and the sub quickly returns to deeper, safer water.
A nuclear sub uses a compact nuclear reactor to generate steam to drive a turbine to turn the propeller. Except for modern adaptations, this differs little from old coal driven turbines. They are much quieter now, but they still make a lot of noise. Diesel submarines use reciprocating engines on the surface and while snorkeling, and battery driven electric motors while submerged. The first is noisy, the latter extremely quiet.
Near the end of World War II, Germany experimented with several methods for driving a submarine independent of surface air. Several Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarine prototypes ended up with the Russians, the British, and in our own hands. Over the next half-century vast improvements were made with AIP systems. In the 1950s, however, under the firm hand of Adm. Hyman Rickover, the United States turned towards nuclear power for submarine propulsion, and never turned back.
Elsewhere, AIP progress continued on four different fronts. German Thyssen Nordseewerke (TNSW) developed a closed-cycle diesel using liquid oxygen, diesel oil, and argon. The same diesel is used as a conventional air-breathing engine for surface propulsion. These systems are suitable for both retrofitting and new construction.
Howaltswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) in Germany has developed a hybrid fuel cell system for a diesel-electric sub. High-speed operations run off the conventional battery, while the fuel cell recharges the battery, and provides energy for low-speed operations. Typical submarine cost using either HDW or TNSW AIP systems is $250 million.
Hybrid diesel-electric units propel Swedish Gotland Class subs, supplemented with Kockum Stirling engines running on liquid oxygen and diesel oil to turn a generator to produce electricity for propulsion and to charge the vessel's batteries. Typical cost for a Gotland class sub is $100 million.
The French "MESMA" (Module d'Energie Sous-Marine Autonome) AIP steam-turbine system burns ethanol and liquid oxygen to make steam to drive a turbo-electric generator. The design permits retrofitting into existing submarines by adding an extra hull section. Typical cost for a new submarine powered by MESMA is $250 million.
Each of these designs has its own advantages and disadvantages, but they all allow for about a month submerged operating capability for 25 to 40 crew members, extended operating range, and capabilities limited only by hull strength, and installed electronics and weapons suits.
In particular, the HDW and MESMA systems are extremely quiet - far quieter than any nuclear/steam plant. Combined with a state-of-the art sensing system and appropriate weapons, such a sub would be a formidable opponent for any nuke.
AIP submarines costing between $100 and $300 million compare favorably to nuclear submarines costing from 5 to 16 times as much - $1.6 billion.
We won the Cold War, in large part, because of the important role played by both fast attack and ballistic missile nuclear submarines. Our large fleet of submarines, however, no longer serves its original intent. As we overhaul these behemoths and build newer versions, we are changing them to serve our current needs better - hence the Virginia class with its multi-mission capability and lower cost.
But $1.6 billion still is a lot of money. Can we do better and still meet our needs in today's world of armed incursion, coastal surveillance, and special operations?
When operating in littoral waters, ice margins, straits, and other global "choke points," AIP submarines can be particularly formidable. New underwater weapons will help equalize any remaining differences between AIP and nuclear subs. The U.S. Navy may wish to reassess its plan to build a fleet of 18 new Virginia class subs for a total of about $29 billion, when, for about half this cost, it could build a fleet of 30 AIP subs and the four already budgeted Virginia class subs.
More than twice the muscle for half the cost is a no-brainer.
Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.
By Robert Koontz
The United States has already experienced a biological attack with the most highly weaponized (and thus arguably the most dangerous) anthrax that has ever known to have been produced.
Indeed, the anthrax spores that were sent to Senators Leahy and Daschle were so finely milled and atomically conditioned that they tended to float in the air and, during examination under the most stringent bio-hazard conditions possible, were very hard for scientists to control. Senator Leahy has even said that 100,000 people could have been killed with the anthrax spores that came to his office.
Also, while it is true that some acknowledged experts speculate that the aforementioned anthrax was produced in a U.S. laboratory, we don't know who actually sent the anthrax - and we really aren't sure that the anthrax was indeed produced in America. (Even if the anthrax was produced here, it could have been sold to a terrorist group or a hostile foreign power; we essentially know nothing about the person or persons who sent the anthrax.)
Thus, we cannot at this time rule at the possibility that al-Qaeda operatives have possession of a large quantity of the most dangerous anthrax known to man - even if U.S. authorities might seemingly try to console us with ideas about a "domestic loner" distributing it.
It is thus my opinion that we should be reasonably concerned that there could be a terrorist strike with either this kind of biological weapon (anthrax) or some other kind of biological weapon. And even if a "domestic loner" is in possession of this kind of anthrax, that is hardly comforting, for this tells us what one man can do, as his actions have signaled to our enemies that we are very vulnerable to biological attacks.
(I would like to add that there is even evidence that the successful anthrax attacks we have experienced are viewed as a "demonstration exhibition" by one hostile foreign intelligence service.)
With respect to other WMD threats, there have been reports in the public domain that indicate that two suspected al-Qaeda smugglers recently died from radiation poisoning, one man reportedly dying while in U.S. custody, and it is well known that large quantities of radiological materials have been smuggled out of the former Soviet Union. It is also known that security of radioactive materials in Russia is dismal. In fact, a number of smugglers were recently arrested in Russia in possession of about three pounds of weapons grade plutonium. That is quite astonishing and extremely troubling.
Given the above, and given that a radiological weapon can be produced merely by sheathing a large amount of conventional explosives with radioactive isotopes, with the conventional explosives subsequently being exploded so as to distribute the radioactive isotopes over a large area, we have reason to be concerned about the possibility of a radiological attack. There can be no question that smugglers could bring these kinds of materials into our country. Indeed, it would be quite generous to say that U.S. border security is "porous."
Regarding WMD threats, the third possibility is that al-Qaeda operatives have possession of a nuclear device, even though that is most likely a remote possibility. Yet, according to General Alexander Lebed, president Yeltsin's former national security adviser, approximately 80 backpack nuclear devices were unaccounted for in the Russian nuclear arsenal as far back as 1995. And we know that Russian nuclear security is dismal, as mentioned. Then there is the fact that the Russian economy has been in extremely poor shape for approximately a decade, and is only now somewhat improving.
So, when Russian generals aren't paid for months and must drive taxi cabs at night to survive, the question is raised as to whether they - or their less fortunate soldiers - would be willing to conspire to sell nuclear devices to such people as Osama bin Laden. One would think so - or maybe so.
It was also reported as early as 1997 that Osama bin Laden had purchased perhaps two or more of the backpack nuclear weapons that were unaccounted for in the Russian arsenal. But whether or not those reports are true is not known. Certainly it can be said that bin Laden did express an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.
My own feeling is that we need to be principally concerned about either a biological weapon attack or a radiological weapon attack. But, it is probably true that the authorities have no credible evidence to further raise our fears at this time, except for the fact that we are still officially on high alert - apparently because of an increased volume of al-Qaeda communications traffic associated with terrorist attacks and the existence of credible evidence indicating that there might be radiological materials in place in the U.S. for a radiological attack.
In all cases, we should not forget that rather large quantities of the most dangerous anthrax known to man have already been distributed in this country, and we should not forget what 19 young men did on Sept. 11 - with only a relatively small amount of money, a few box cutters and quite a bit of diabolical ingenuity.
Robert Koontz holds a Ph.D. in experimental nuclear physics from the University of Maryland and has been a student of al-Qaeda tactics since 1997. His experience in intelligence activities dates to 1968 when he served with the Naval Security Group as an instructor at the NSA.
By J. David Galland
As defiant as ever, former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic finally got the floor at the International War Crimes Tribunal last week.
As expected, Milosevic is raising a defense that he is being made the sacrificial lamb served up to the International War Crimes Tribunal in exchange for promised international aid to the Former Yugoslavia. Most people will recall how he was whisked away, shackled, in the dark of the night last summer to wind up at The Hague in pre-trial confinement, becoming the highest-ranking diplomat and head of state to be charged with war crimes since the Nurnberg Tribunal that tried the Nazi leadership of Germany after World War II.
Milosevic has vigorously defended himself, accusing the U.N. tribunal of an "evil and hostile attack" against him that culminated in what equates to a political kidnapping. (Milosevic was ousted from power almost two years ago following the 1999 NATO air war against Serbia for its ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Muslims.)
Milosevic is certainly no gentleman, but the chief war crimes prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, seems to be bearing a personal grudge against him that is obvious to observers of the ongoing tribunal. I have personally heard her announce this to everyone who cared to listen, as well as launching frequent tirades leveled at everybody whom she felt was not complying with her wishes - including Gen. Wesley Clark, then the NATO Supreme Allied Commander of Europe and his subordinates.
The former Serbian President faces a litany of war crimes, spanning nearly a decade of conflict in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. But the Milosevic trial promises to be a "who's who" of complicity in the Former Yugoslavia, and indeed worldwide. It is generally anticipated that the Milosevic defense team will attempt to level the playing field by implicating many Western officials who have themselves allegedly committed censurable acts against the people of Yugoslavia.
While Milosevic has been demonized in the United States and much of Western Europe as a war criminal, his legal defense strategy is likely to contend that both Serbia in general and Milosevic in particular are being punished for the gross failure of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords sponsored by the Clinton administration that were aimed at ending years of ethnic strife in the Former Yugoslavia. It is an uncomfortable fact that Serbia itself has never been treated equally or received any material or financial aid as a result of the Dayton Accord.
It is safe to assume that former U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrook or Clinton administration Secretary of State Madeline Albright are not going to take blame for the Dayton failure, even though they were the masterminds of the negotiations and ultimately unsuccessful settlement.
The purpose of last week's latest hearing was to determine whether the three indictments against Milosevic, totaling 66 counts, should be joined in one trial. Although Milosevic's trial is scheduled to begin Feb. 12, he did not address the motion that was actually before the court during this appearance. He did, however, seize the opportunity to give his view of the decade of tumult in the former Yugoslavia. He called the long record of charges against him "abnormal and nonsensical." Milosevic went on to assert that his goal was to protect Serbs and bring peace as soon as possible to the troubled republics of Yugoslavia.
This assertion may seem preposterous to many, but Milosevic again has a legitimate argument when one tallies up the number of Serbs who were butchered by NATO and its allies, the Albanian fighters. Milosevic argues that putting him on trial is "an attempt to turn the victim into the culprit."
Milosevic has appealed to the court for a provisional release from confinement assuring the justices that he would not consider escape and that he would be present at all future hearings. "This is a battle I will not miss," Milosevic said.
More troubling to an impartial observer is how the courtroom rules seem to have been regularly re-defined to deny the accused the ability to mount any effective defense.
Del Ponte successfully appealed to the International War Crimes Tribunal's appellate bench to reconsider its initial refusal to hold a single trial on three indictments. As a result, it will be much easier for the tribunal to convict Milosevic of all charges. All Del Ponte has to do is simply link all the charges in a chronological sequence.
The prosecution convinced the court by indicating that it intended to call several former insiders from the Milosevic regime. Del Ponte declared that she feared that these officials would not be able to return to The Hague to testify more than once if the trials were held separately - a rather implausible contention, given the change in regimes and the new Belgrade government's willingness to hand over Milosevic in the first place.
Another troubling aspect of the pre-trial proceedings was the prosecutor's intent to call prosecution witnesses who themselves may well be complicit contributors to the very crimes for which Milosevic is charged. Deputy Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice inadvertently underscored this point when he said, "They are high-level witnesses who can give direct evidence of what he [Milosevic] was doing."
In Del Ponte's closing argument, she asserted that Milosevic was the designer and the implementer of a plan to create a "greater Serbian state" dominated by Belgrade. She added, "The core impetus of all these crimes was forced expulsion." Her contention is that the implementation of that expulsion resulted in the deaths of thousands, and the uprooting of many more, all at the hands of Slobodan Milosevic.
NATO won the war against Serbia three years ago. As in the aftermath of World War II, the victor opted to move against the defeated enemy with an international tribunal. But unlike Nurnberg, it is clear - and troubling - to see the forces of justice focused on only one man, while ignoring hundreds, if not thousands of others inside Serbia and without, who may be equally guilty.
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Rank and organization: Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Rein.).
Place and date: Near Sudong, Korea, 4 November 1950.
Entered service at: Downey, Calif. Born: 1 December 1916, Bloomington, Ill.
Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a squad leader in a rifle platoon of Company A, in action against enemy aggressor forces during the defense of Hill 532, south of Sudong, Korea. When a vastly outnumbering, well-concealed hostile force launched a sudden, vicious counterattack against his platoon's hasty defensive position, Sgt. Poynter displayed superb skill and courage in leading his squad and directing its fire against the onrushing enemy.
With his ranks critically depleted by casualties and he himself critically wounded as the onslaught gained momentum and the hostile force surrounded his position, he seized his bayonet and engaged in bitter hand-to-hand combat as the breakthrough continued.
Observing three machine guns closing in at a distance of 25 yards, he dashed from his position and, grasping hand grenades from fallen Marines as he ran, charged the emplacements in rapid succession, killing the crews of two and putting the other out of action before he fell, mortally wounded.
By his self-sacrificing and valiant conduct, Sgt. Poynter inspired the remaining members of his squad to heroic endeavor in bearing down upon and repelling the disorganized enemy, thereby enabling the platoon to move out of the trap to a more favorable tactical position. His indomitable fighting spirit, fortitude, and great personal valor maintained in the face of overwhelming odds sustain and enhance the finest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.
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