
March 20,
2002
Soldiers For The Truth
(SFTT) Weekly Newsletter
When we assumed the Soldier, We did not lay aside the Citizen.
General George Washington, to the New York Legislature, 1775
In this week’s Issue of DefenseWatch:
Leadership in a Time of War
| Table of Contents | |
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By Ed Offley
As the war against terrorism continues and expands on multiple new fronts, the issue of U.S. military leadership effectiveness is coming to the fore.
While on surface, our recent combat actions in Afghanistan indicate an overwhelming military capability against the scattered al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, several recent incidents examined in this edition of DefenseWatch raise a legitimate questions about the effectiveness of the current leadership in the Defense Department and armed services.
A common question emerging from articles by Col. David Hackworth, DefenseWatch Deputy Editor J. David Galland and Contributing Editor Patrick Hayes is whether the U.S. military has itself - mentally and psychologically - made a successful transition from peacetime to war. Historians have noted that in the year before Pearl Harbor, then Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall employed the massive Louisiana maneuvers not only to test the warfighting capability of the Army, but to winnow out those peacetime commanders who could not handle the stress and uncertainty of combat, and to fast-track a number of then-unknown officers such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, George Patton and Omar Bradley into positions of wartime command.
Hackworth's observations on the recent Operation Anaconda are pertinent to the issue of contemporary leadership in that credible news reports have appeared indicating that many of the soldiers who fought in the mountainous terrain of eastern Afghanistan in recent weeks may have lacked the full physical preparation for combat in that harsh environment. While no one doubts that the soldiers - once deployed against al Qaeda - fought with all of their ability, it is a legitimate question to ask why (according to on-scene reports) many of them apparently were not up to the physical challenges of that harsh environment. It is not too late to review the adequacy of training, weaponry and logistics for those soldiers.
Galland raises an equally pressing point when he ponders whether the Army and other services may have been hobbled by a straitjacket of "social engineering" requirements and regulations imposed over the past decade that have actually prevented soldiers from attaining the full degree of mental and physical toughness essential for survival and victory in combat. While our current generation of generals and OSD civilian leaders have valiantly scrambled to prepare the force for a truly "come as you are" war in the wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, neither the nation nor the armed forces can afford to evade Galland's assertion: "America and its allies must remain committed and clearly focused on the eradication of its enemies." And that means fielding a force and leadership focused on that task list.
Finally, Patrick Hayes tackles a truly critical issue that has been the subject of much wooly-headed posturing by the legion of talking TV heads: Whether or not it is worth the effort to risk the lives of military personnel in an attempt to rescue a fallen comrade from the battlefield, as happened in Afghanistan on March 4 when six American soldiers perished during an operation to retrieve the body of a slain Navy SEAL.
Nowhere does the cultural gap dividing the military from the wider civilian society loom wider than on this issue, which to the uninformed may appear to be a rash and reckless wasting of lives. Hayes, in his eloquent article, clearly sets out the moral imperative that unites all men and women in uniform on this issue.
Any detailed reading of U.S. military history will reveal a number of dark chapters characterized by the conscious betrayal by the armed services and the U.S. government itself of men left behind on the battlefield. We now know that thousands of prisoners of war taken by the enemy in Korea were written off after they vanished into Chinese and even Soviet captivity. With the lifting of decades of secrecy, it is now known that more than a hundred Air Force and Navy aviators charged with reconnaissance missions near the Soviet Union were shot down, scores surviving only to be abandoned into the Soviet gulag. And just last week came stark and horrifying evidence that Navy Lt. Cmdr. Scott Speicher probably survived the shootdown of his F/A-18 on the opening night of the Persian Gulf War, and may well be languishing in an Iraqi prison cell more than a decade later.
The issues could not be clearer: The men and women in uniform who are deploying worldwide to fight al Qaeda and their state sponsors deserve nothing less than the best, most capable leadership their nation can provide. And as they go into harm's way, they have the right to expect that their comrades - and national leadership - will leave no stone unturned to bring them home from battle.
Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at defensewatch@aol.com.
The Vietnam War and the current shootout in Afghanistan have a lot in common - killer terrain, nightmarish weather, a determined, irregular foe with years of combat experience. That's a deadly enough mix without U.S. generals who don't understand guerrilla warfare.
Recently, I was reminded of these unfortunate facts by both a movie about an early U.S. battle in Vietnam commanded by an old friend, and the fighting at Shah-e-Kot.
The movie, We Were Soldiers, essentially a duel in the jungle between a U.S. helicopter outfit and a primitive, foot-slugging North Vietnamese infantry unit, caught Hal Moore to a T - brave, tactically savvy, the ultimate combat leader. It also captured his well-disciplined troopers hanging together like a veteran team even though they were grass-green in their first serious fight. Like their skipper, they were extraordinarily steadfast and held their ground against an enemy force many times their number.
Without Hal at the helm, I'm convinced the 7th Cav would've met the same fate it suffered under a previous commander, George Custer, at Little Big Horn: total destruction. Hal led from the front, and in his training he'd instilled a go-for-broke warrior ethic that allowed his men to accomplish the impossible.
The United States won the battle but eventually lost the war, since Gen. William Westmoreland concluded from the fight at LZ X-Ray that his big-battle style of warfare could beat his lightly armed opponent. His adversary, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, decided to take another approach - developing tactics designed to make his foe bleed. In the end, the United States and our main ally, the South Vietnamese, lost about a quarter of a million dead, and even though the communists paid a far greater price - with close to 2 million soldiers killed - they raised their flag over Saigon. They gambled that the American public would pull our troops from that meat grinder, and after eight years of our blood pouring out of the tube, we finally obliged.
Now we've just finished the first big U.S. conventional fight of the Afghanistan War. Sadly, our fine troops trained in the flatlands of New York and Kentucky weren't conditioned for mountain warfare at elevations of 9,000 feet, where their cruel and crafty enemy knew every fold in the ground. Our Joes were sent into battle loaded down like pack mules, insufficiently prepared for the freezing conditions and far from physically up for the game. The guerrillas also outranged our grunts both with a superior .30-caliber rifle, as opposed to our little popgun 5.56 M-16, and by the use of reverse slope mortars.
The crying shame is that our soldiers - bunched up like beetles at a bugfest - weren't ready to face some of the toughest fighters in the world employing the same timeworn tactics they used to defeat the Soviets and the Brits.
And when our brave Apache gunship pilots came to the rescue, they lost all their ships to enemy fire. The guerrillas cleverly recycled the same techniques with which they destroyed fleets of Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan and again in Somalia during Black Hawk Down.
The generals, from jovial Tommy Franks down to the two-star on the ground, didn't get much right until they shrewdly declared victory and hauled butt away from the bomb craters and their plan that went awry.
The generals had envisioned sealing the enemy inside a noose and then pounding him with bombs, a tactic that seldom worked in Vietnam and didn't work in Afghanistan this time around. Firepower's never the answer unless battle-ready soldiers deployed smartly back it up. It didn't help that our intelligence was bad regarding the size of the enemy force and its willingness to fight. Or that we forgot the lesson learned in Vietnam - never to allow the success of an operation to be dependent on a non-U.S. unit - and trusted our so-called Afghan allies, who left us in the lurch.
Amazing that none of the brass seems to have bothered to dust off copies of the Soviet-Afghan after-action reports. In Vietnam, we were also too arrogant to learn from those who failed before us, in that instance the French. I hope our generals learn fast and get it right in future battles.
As
now-retired Lt. Gen. Hal Moore would.
http://www.hackworth.com
is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179,
Greenwich, CT 06831.
© 2002 David H. Hackworth
| Article 01 |
| Our Soldiers Deserve Better Leadership |
Senior combat leaders worth their salt do not easily forget painfully-learned military lessons. Commanders who find themselves on the ground in the impact zone, where the killing and dying is done, had better pack their ammo pouches full of courage and maneuver savvy or they, and their soldiers, are going to die.
For those who may be confused, a six-month rotation in Bosnia, a roving patrol through Sarajevo, or four months sitting in the springtime Albanian mud in a tent, passing occasional spot reports, does not constitute combat experience. You may be a little closer to combat while wearing a Boston Red Sox hat on a Bronx subway ride to Yankee Stadium.
Today's Army is woefully short on capable combat commanders who have highly developed leadership skills vital in preparing, maneuvering and fighting a force of soldiers on the ground. Last week, the 10th Mountain Division's Commander, Maj. Gen. Franklin L. Hagenbeck, who touts among his accomplishments a Masters of Science Degree in Exercise Physiology, joined the growing list of unprepared and unimpressive senior U.S. military leaders.
One might think with Hagenbeck's college degree that the 10th Mountain Division soldiers might be better conditioned. Wrong guess: They were not adequately trained, conditioned, or equipped for the rigors of their mission in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan.
Hagenbeck was not the right man to be chosen to lead our soldiers in Afghanistan. But he may have still been better than many other general officers in today's U.S. Army. This translates into a very foreboding reality in my view.
The general's biographic sketch is evidence of a rapid rise in the ranks. He has held resplendent assignments, such as Pentagon duty where he was the deputy director for politico-military affairs for global and multi-lateral issues and Western Hemisphere, in the Joint Staff's strategic plans and policy directorate. Also notable in his biographic profile is a total absence of combat experience.
Senior military leaders are repeatedly falling short when the chips are down as evidenced by Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison's inept mistakes that shredded the Rangers in Somalia's slums. When I count up the score on that mistake, it still makes me sick.
Now we have infantrymen from Gen. Hagenbeck's unit - the elite 10th Mountain Division, part of the first-responding XVIII Airborne Corps, no less - who reportedly suffered from muscle failure, altitude sickness and exposure and who failed to rise to mission demands on the ridges and escarpments of eastern Afghanistan.
I am absolutely certain that the soldiers on the ground gave it their all and they deserve credit for their effort. I, however, indict the commander and my cross hairs rest right on Hagenbeck's shiny stars.
Is this an isolated instance of failed leadership? Alas, no. More evidence of bizarre and inept leadership can readily be found. In Germany, V Corps Commander Lt. Gen. William Wallace has outlawed penny-poker games amongst the soldiers with threats of court-martial action if a soldier errs. He justifies this prohibition in his General Order by stating, "The Federal Republic of Germany is a sovereign state whose local laws and customs must be respected by the visiting U.S. Armed Forces." I fail to make the logic connection on this one.
Do you need more? Last year, Brig. Gen. Nicholas P. Grant, the senior military intelligence Officer in South Korea - a strategically vital place if there ever was one - was nominated for his second star and seemed destined to become the next commander of the Army's Intelligence Security Command. Alas, Grant's hopes for a shiny future were dashed upon disclosure of his affair with a civilian secretary. His career spiraled to an abrupt end, after his major general nomination was withdrawn by Congress.
It seems that the senior generals of the U.S. Army are unaware of the fact that the nation - and its soldiers - are at war. Why else are they tolerating such lapses of leadership in command?
Somebody has to put the brakes on these self-enamored princes before the toll goes higher. I wouldn't want my son to march off to the fray with this kind of lackadaisical leadership in the "winner-take-all" arena of modern war - would you?
Today, in Afghanistan and throughout the Army, we are having our faces rubbed with the painful reality of a softened military force. How much has been written, declared, and discussed in a critical light about the fashionable and trendy social-engineering projects that the Army has concentrated on to the detriment of combat readiness and battlefield performance?
From my corner of the foxhole, I say it is past time for the Army to undertake an historic wartime task: To identify the incompetents who are hiding within the Army leadership and to send them packing. It is high time that the Army gets back to soldiering and honing the skills of warriors.
The Clinton-era military environment, where sensitivity training helped soldiers to get in touch with their own uniqueness, to achieve closure from bad experiences, and to feel the pain and challenges of others who may have been misunderstood, came to a crashing end last Sept. 11 with the terrorist strikes on American soil, although some military leaders still seem to be acting the old way. It is time to re-cock our thinking and clean house.
If the Army and other services fail to identify and appoint the true wartime commanders we need to wage the war on terrorism, I fear that the critical lessons learned from our prior American adventure in Vietnam - lessons that we have apparently forgotten - will have to be learned again, with pain and blood and death.
America's involvement in the Vietnam War (against the caution of the French, who themselves had learned a bitter lesson) served as wake-up call for the United States when embarking on protracted battle with an unconventional force.
I am willing to wager that most junior military officers can provide a comprehensive briefing on the historic Battle of Gettysburg of 1863. However, I challenge you to find a young scholar who can recount the issues and "lessons learned" from Lam Son 719, Operation Junction City, Hastings, Linebacker, or what happened at An Loc and when.
At the time, there were very few people in positions of political responsibility, or in America's military, who comprehended what was at stake with America's involvement in Vietnam. There were even fewer who understood what was necessary to achieve our strategic goals in Vietnam - goals that begged for clearer definition. Most notable of those was President Lyndon B. Johnson, who vowed to not send American boys halfway around the globe to do a job that Vietnam's boys should be doing - then did just that.
Current military leaders will be well served, at all ranks, by rapidly and voluminously educating themselves on the lessons learned, and not learned, and combat leadership examples, bad and good, that constitute our legacy in Vietnam.
The United States not only got it wrong in Vietnam, but took much too long a time to realize the obvious, long enough to waste the lives of over 58,000 young American men who died, and over 153,000 who were wounded. The cost of Vietnam to our country was enormous and the wounds of our folly and failure are not fully healed even today. What's worse, events emerging in Afghanistan indicate that many of the hard lessons from Vietnam have been forgotten by our current Army leadership.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld has declared that the United States will not occupy and has no interest in occupying vital terrain in Afghanistan, a frightening echo of our failed strategy in Vietnam. Clearly, the tactical battle plan for our soldiers in Afghanistan cannot simply consist of a "hide-and-seek" approach. Terrain must be seized and held until all Taliban or al-Qaeda resistance and combat capability is destroyed. To do otherwise will likely result in American soldiers fighting for, and paying the grim reaper, more than once for the same terrain.
If Vietnam was a classic case of America serving as a heavily armed referee consumed by mission creep, is not the emerging situation in Afghanistan the same? Any observer, who cannot detect the similarities between the indigenous rival factions in Afghanistan, and those of Vietnam, is turning a blind eye to the scope.
America and its allies must remain committed and clearly focused on the eradication of its enemies. When the call for nation-building comes - and it will - we must remember that the mission of the Army is to fight and win wars and ultimately to preserve freedom in America.
We will be in a better place to avoid a failed strategy or the wasting of American lives in battle if the Army can take the necessary steps to promote generals capable of carrying out the right mission.
J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is a retired veteran of over thirty years of service in military intelligence who resides in Germany. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.
By Patrick Hayes
The early dawn of March 4 saw the latest combat incident where American fighting men fell on the battlefield, while their comrades did all in their power to support them and get them out. It began with the loss of Navy SEAL Petty Officer Neil Roberts, the latest to fall prey to our enemies. And, while his comrades tried to rescue him, his Islamic terrorist captors murdered him in cold blood.
So much for the Geneva Convention when dealing with these vermin.
In the attempt to rescue Roberts, six other Americans died. Since then, the cry has been heard, Why should other Americans go after fallen men on the battlefield? The answer is simple: Because it is expected.
I'm really getting tired of listening to the talking heads imply how easy it is to leave fallen comrades in the field in order to minimize the overall number of combat casualties. Order me to do so all you want, boss, but no one leaves a man in the field on my watch!
It sounds gung ho and crazy to say that you will recover a dead or wounded buddy from under enemy fire. However, he's out there waiting for you to come and get him - certainly not leave him to the murderous barbarians with whom we are currently engaged - whether he is dead or alive.
In the latest flap, many of the talking TV heads, including former officers from colonel on up - including one Medal of Honor winner whose life was saved by a young man who, in so doing, risked his own - have argued that retrieving fallen comrades is not a hard and fast rule. Their contention is that retrieving dead and wounded Americans depends on the circumstances because they don't want to put other Americans at risk.
But what does that do to a combat unit's morale if its members fear that they may be left to the whims of our enemies?
What about downed airmen? No one is suggesting leaving flyers on the field. No, a rescue team is dispatched as soon as the beacon alert is received. What about that rescue team? Aren't they being put at risk to retrieve the pilot?
It seems the higher the rank of the brass, the more cavalier the attitude as to who is worth saving and who is not. However, when they are asked what to do, most grunts from company grade on down who've been at the broken end of the bottle know: nobody gets left behind. That fallen man has got to know that he will be recovered and he will be brought home.
The father of Sgt. John Chapman, one of the men who went back to save Petty Officer Neil Roberts, knew well what is expected when he said, "It's a given. You do not leave your comrades behind."
In the Marine Corps, and in other elements of Special Forces, it's an unwritten law. You never, never, leave a downed man behind. When the Marines under Chesty Puller attacked in "the other direction" against the surrounding Chinese divisions in North Korea, it would have been easy and certainly more expedient, to leave their dead and wounded for the enemy to deal with. But they didn't do it. Everyone came out of that hell known as the Chosin Reservoir, including dead and wounded Army troops the Marines found abandoned along the way.
One of the first things I learned in boot camp as a green slimy maggot not fit to breath the same air as a Marine was never, never leave a fellow Marine behind - a message that was ingrained in subsequent years. It wasn't just bravado, it was fact. It was an oath taken. It was a bond between brothers. Wounded Marines knew their buddies would come and get them clear. The same runs true of Navy SEALs, Army Rangers and Army Special Forces - professionals all.
So where does the line of what we do in battle get drawn and by whom? Usually the policymakers who decide on the rules of engagement - what combat troops will and will not do - are pencil-necked geeks, probably lawyers, who have never spent time in the field, even on training exercises. What do they know about the realities of combat when the wounded and the dead stack up? When the man out there is a friend and brother?
Many efforts have been made by Hollywood to delve into the face of close combat, something all but impossible to capture on film. However, the motion picture, We Were Soldiers is one recent attempt that comes close, and it captured both sides of the question: Do you leave a man down under enemy fire? Do you risk the lives of other men to get them out? These are the quandaries of battlefield leadership.
As we saw in Mogadishu in 1993, we don't have a choice: The implications go far beyond the essential moral issue of military comrades protecting their own. When we left Americans in the field in that horrific urban battle, we also granted a gutless, savage enemy - trained by al Qaeda terrorists, in fact - a propaganda victory that was used effectively against the spineless Clinton administration decision-makers in Washington, who reacted to the sudden, violent eruption by ordering Central Command to pull out of Somalia entirely.
But the moral dimension remains critical: In leaving a man, we also break a faith that has bonded him to his peers since boot camp that no American will be left to the wiles of an enemy, whether to the relatively good treatment of a German POW camp in World War II, or to the vicious, inhuman antics of Islamic fanatics.
One of the few things besides each other that kept the American POWs at the Hanoi Hilton alive and together was their belief in each other and the knowledge that one day their country would get them out. It took longer than it should have, and many Americans are still missing in action. But it was a faith born out of trust in their fellows and in their country.
William Shakespeare is renown for cogent, prolific and astute thought. In Henry V, he seemed to understand the holy bond when he wrote a passage that is just as relevant today in Afghanistan as it was at on the fields of Agincourt, France in his time:
Rather
proclaim it, Westmoreland, through my host,
That he which hath no stomach to this fight,
Let him depart; his passport shall be made
And crowns for convoy put into his purse:
We would not die in that man's company
That fears his fellowship to die with us.
This day is called the feast of Crispian:
He that outlives this day, and comes safe home,
Will stand a tip-toe when the day is named,
And rouse him at the name of Crispian.
He that shall live this day, and see old age,
Will yearly on the vigil feast his neighbours,
And say 'To-morrow is Saint Crispian:'
Then will he strip his sleeve and show his scars.
And say 'These wounds I had on Crispin's day.'
Old men forget: yet all shall be forgot,
But he'll remember with advantages
What feats he did that day
.
And
Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by,
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be remember'd;
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne'er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition:
And gentlemen in England now a-bed
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here,
And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks
That fought with us upon Saint Crispin's day.
When a man takes an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States, that oath should work two ways - that while the young man defends and upholds the Constitution with threat to his life, the United States will do all in its power to ensure that he will not die in vain and that he will not be left to the savage, inhuman inclination of the barbarians - dead or alive.
Every American fighting man has to know that, regardless of the odds, his comrades will try to reach him and get him back. It is part of the pact we make as that band of brothers. Americans in general and American warriors in particular, are not to be wasted lightly. And American fighting men must have faith in their brothers.
Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at Gyrene65@netscape.net.
By Paul Connors
This week, the Pentagon made an announcement to the world that has to rank with one of the most idiotic policy pronouncements ever made by a government in wartime.
It has been slightly more than six months since the United States suffered the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and already, the Defense Department has decided that the Combat Air Patrols (CAP) by Air National Guard fighters assigned to the continental air defense mission are no longer needed over New York City.
As usual, Pentagon officials cited the high cost of maintaining the airborne patrols as the main factor in their decision to terminate the 24-7 patrols in the skies above New York City. These patrols - primarily conducted by dedicated alert fighter aircraft drawn from the 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air National Guard, the 158th Fighter Wing of the Vermont Air National Guard and the 177th Fighter Wing of the New Jersey Air National Guard - were constant guardians of the airspace over the New York metropolitan area. Now, that is all coming to an end.
Citing the $50 million per day bill and increased security measures, along with the standard line that aircraft will be poised on 15-minute runway alert, the Pentagon would have Americans in general and New Yorkers in particular believe that they are now safe from further aerial terrorism and have nothing fear.
This brings to mind that old saw of the three greatest lies, specifically the one that states, "I'm from the government and I'm here to help." What everyone with even the slightest scintilla of common sense has been quick to point out is that the existing 15-minute alert scheme didn't work on Sept. 11th, when the terrorists piloting the two hijacked jets successfully reached their targets at the WTC and Pentagon.
The fifteen-minute alert is designed to deter and defend against intruders attempting to penetrate sovereign American airspace. It is next to worthless for aircraft already inside our borders that have been commandeered by people with nefarious plans of their own.
Once again, the federal government, which in so many other areas squanders money it doesn't have, has chosen the path of "pound foolishness." In the name of cost savings, officials have announced to the world that they are dismantling part of the air defense network that has provided an umbrella of protection for New York City and the Middle Atlantic states for the last six months.
This inadvertently shows the terrorists that we are exactly what they say we are, a people who will not stay the course. What is particularly galling about this mission abandonment is that the people in Washington, D.C., will not have to suffer the consequences of another hijacked airliner attack, since the nation's capital will continue to be patrolled by fighters on a 24-7 basis.
Considering that New York City is the nation's financial and economic capital, does it make any sense to provide it with less protection than the government's capital? After all, governments can be relocated and history has provided us with numerous examples. The most recent case is illustrated by Germany's re-establishment of Berlin as its federal capital after almost five decades in the sleepy town of Bonn. Re-locating the economic might of this nation, the financial sector and hundreds of corporate headquarters would be much more difficult than moving the governing functions now in place.
The announcement that the Air Force and Air National Guard units performing the actual mission will be standing down sends a very clear message to our adversaries. It tells them in no uncertain terms that we are more worried about the cost of security than we are about security itself. This is an extremely thoughtless and ill-conceived message and would seem to be one that was made by an accountant rather than an air defense commander.
In a country that prides itself on placing a high value on the life of each of its soldiers deployed overseas, how can we tell our citizens that we value them any less? After all, the people who died in the World Trade Center were not soldiers; they were the people who go to work every day, pay taxes, raise families and in their own way, do their small part to keep the economy chugging along. They are the backbone of the American nation and they are as much a part of the commonweal as the wealthiest oil executives or the Hollywood elites who contribute to the political coffers of both parties' war chests at election time.
The actions by the generals and Defense Department civilian leaders who made this decision have been interpreted by many residents of the New York metropolitan area as signs that Washington does not really care what happens to them. It's almost like telling the entire city of New York that despite all that happened on 9/11, they are own their own.
The callous disregard for the safety of New York City and its inhabitants borders on criminal dereliction of duty. The Defense Department has abrogated a significant part of its responsibility to the citizens of this great country and it has informed our enemies that this great city is once again fair game.
The actions by senior Air Force planners and the civilian leadership in this regard are truly reprehensible. The lives of our fellow Americans are not something that can be counted in how many millions of dollars a day the Treasury spends in their defense. The lives of our fellow citizens are the sacred trust that the military needs to remember every day.
How can a price-tag be placed on the lives of our American citizens? Apparently, the governing elites in Washington have found a way, and they have determined that New Yorkers are not worth the cost.
Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. He can be reached at paulconnors@hotmail.com.
By Robert G. Williscroft
What drives a young man to sacrifice his life in order to take others with him? How do you explain a mindset where this happens routinely?
A Palestinian home video has recently received wide television coverage throughout the Western world:
The woman is a typical Palestinian Muslim, dressed in black from head to foot, but with exposed face. She is middle age, perhaps in her forties, short, a bit on the plump side - very motherly. Her name is Miriam Farhat. Nineteen-year-old Mohamed Gasa walks at her side. Tall and handsome, he is the fifth of ten children in Miriam's brood. She hugs and kisses him - and sends him on his way. Several hours later, Mohamed blows himself up along with five Israeli teenagers. Miriam's only comment is that she wishes she had a hundred more, so she could help kill all the Jews in Palestine.
Explain it if you can: This is a mother; the boy she sends off is the fruit of her womb. A mother's instinct is powerful - the drive is one of the strongest of human emotions. We all have heard stories of a mother sacrificing herself for her child - and these stories are not limited to our country or our culture. They come from the world over - throughout history.
What overcame this mother's basic instinct? What could possibly usurp a mother's most fundamental drive, an instinct stronger than self-preservation, stronger than life itself?
The short answer is: Religion.
But what kind of a religion can make this happen? What kind of radical, extreme, over-the-edge religious faith can inspire a mother to sacrifice not only one son, but be willing to offer all her sons?
Judaism reveres life. While no one doubts that Israeli fighters have taken a lot of life in the past months, it is equally clear to most observers that Israeli sorties have been in response to blind terrorist killings by Palestinians. The key word is: Response. Israel is fighting a defensive war, where even preemptive strikes are ultimately defensive.
Christianity "turns the other cheek" to violence. Christian philosophy is fundamentally non-violent. Yes, Christianity has a violent past. But the operative word is: past. Modern Christianity uses violence as a last resort, when everything else has failed.
Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Ba'hai and many other world religions all eschew violence.
All, that is, except Islam. That's right, Islam - not radical Islam - just plain, simple, generic, vanilla-flavored Islam.
American based Mullahs and Imams - Islamic clerics - have been preaching a mellow version of Islam ever since 9/11. Jihad, they tell us and their faithful, is an internal struggle, that it has nothing to do with real killing and - heaven forbid - real war.
While it is true that the Qur'an teaches that it is evil to do violence to innocent people, the Qur'an also contains a general call to arms against Infidels. Unlike any other world religion, Islam encourages the Jihad - the Holy War. Only Islamic clerics can call the faithful to arms in defense of the faith. Jewish rabbis cannot do this, Catholic priests and Protestant ministers cannot do this, Buddhist monks cannot do this, nor Hindu holy men, nor any of the others. Only in Islam can this happen.
But this is all medieval stuff, right? Like the Christian Crusaders 1,200 years ago; modern Islam is modern, right? Like Christianity?
Is it?
Islam is based on two writings, the Qur'an, revealed by Allah to Mohammad during the 7th century, and the Sunnah, which records the Prophet's life. Taken together, the Qur'an and Sunnah form the basis for Islamic jurisprudence, very much like our Constitution forms the basis for our secular laws.
The Shari'ah, which is analogous to codified law in Western society, consists of the Qur'an, Sunnah, and a constantly evolving collection of Fatwas or rulings that deal with every aspect of Islamic life from ideology to practical daily matters. Throughout Islamic history, Imams and Mullahs have issued Fatwas, which have the force of law among Muslims, similar to a ruling by a Western court. As in the West, these rulings can be confirmed or overturned by a higher authority, by issuing a Fiqh.
This is the gist of why the Osama bin Laden tape that was released to the world on Dec. 21 is so important. The tape contained several significant Fatwas, and made reference to several well-established Fiqhs, in effect linking them to the Fatwas. If unchallenged by higher Islamic authority, these Fatwas become part of Islamic law, and must be observed by all Muslims.
And this is also why mothers like Miriam Farhat so willingly sacrifice their sons. They have been told with absolute authority that by taking this action, a suicide bomber is guaranteed an exalted position in Paradise - no ifs, ands, or buts. A Fatwa not only unchallenged by a Fiqh, but reinforced by one is better than money in the bank.
Andrea Pia Yates, the Texas mother who drowned her children in a bathtub last summer in order to save their souls, is obviously insane by any Western standard. She is a tragic exception to the rule of life and reason that generally prevails in Western Society.
Miriam Farhat did virtually the same thing, although with more tragic consequences, since five uninvolved youngsters were also killed. The big difference, however, is that Miriam is completely sane, in full possession of her faculties. She is but one of thousands upon thousands (perhaps even millions) of mothers throughout a Muslim world that consists of 1.2 billion followers.
That is five times the total population of the United States, and - with a few small exceptions, mostly here in the United States - all unquestionably accept Shari'ah Law as absolute and immutable.
Already in mosques across the Islamic sphere of influence, literally thousands of Mullahs and Imams are exhorting to Jihad, confirming bin Laden's Fatwa that Sept. 11 was ordered by Allah (see http://www.sftt.us/dw12262001.html - 3). Moderate Islamic clerics in America are preaching that Jihad takes place inside the heart and soul of a Muslim - a basic struggle between good and evil - but this message pales in the face of Islam's universal call to arms to approximately 1.2 billion Muslims worldwide.
Unless the Imams and Mullahs of worldwide Islam unite to discredit violence in Islam, Medieval Islam - the Islam of bin Laden and the Prophet himself - will prevail, and the world will be headed towards a disastrous world-encompassing Jihad for which there can be only one possible outcome: the total destruction of Islam and Islamic culture and society everywhere.
Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.
By
Robert Koontz
Over the last few weeks there has been both national and international interest
and concern regarding the Pentagon's recent report on changes to the U.S.
nuclear posture.
Partly this concern has occurred because Iraq - now in U.S. crosshairs - is identified in the report as a possible target of U.S. nuclear strikes. Some people and even some governments the world over seem to be asking, "Is the U.S. government thinking about attacking Iraq with nuclear weapons?"
But, in addition to the above, three other Middle Eastern countries in the report, known to have at least historically sponsored terrorism, are identified as possible targets of U.S. nuclear strikes - at a time when the United States is vigorously prosecuting a worldwide war on terrorism. This leads to the more general question: In order to realize its goal of eliminating terrorist threats to its security, will the United States not only attack Iraq with nuclear weapons, but also use these weapons to attack other countries in the region, such as Iran? These appear to be the first of two pressing concerns of some people.
The second concern relates to the nuclear posture report's statement that the United States should develop low-yield nuclear devices for possible use against very deep bunkers or in other situations that would require the use of nuclear weapons that are not now available to the U.S. National Command Authority. This appears to cause concern in some quarters because it suggests to some people that the United States has lowered - or will lower - the threshold for use of nuclear weapons. It is also suggested that the United States is contemplating the use of nuclear weapons in situations far different than those posed during the Cold War.
Let us now address some of these issues.
The attack in October 2000 on the USS Cole, which was followed within a year by the massive attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, represent qualitatively new forms of threat to the United States. We have now experienced the kind of terrorist attacks that kill thousands of people, and, alarmingly, it is also known that terrorist attacks have steadily increased in scale over the last eight years.
One could thus expect that the next terrorist attack - if successful - might kill tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of people.
But there is something else: The United States has been subjected to its first biological attack of significant consequence, and that biological attack employed the most dangerous form of anthrax known to man.
And, even though it is true that only five people died in those anthrax attacks, involving just a small number of letters in the mail, the fact remains that those attacks led to approximately 30,000 people being placed on antibiotics. Also, enough anthrax was distributed through the mail to potentially kill hundreds of thousands of people.
Regarding these attacks, we can make the following assertion: Given that the United States has been the object of a terrorist attack that has killed approximately 3,000 people, and given that the scale of terrorist attacks has been an increasing function of time, suggesting that even more terrible attacks may lie in the future, and given that weapons of mass destruction are rapidly and dramatically proliferating in countries that sponsor terrorism or are sympathetic to the goals of terrorists, the United States may soon be at risk of attacks so grave that they could threaten the nation's present form of political existence.
It is asserted that this is currently the prime national security assertion of U.S. policy makers.
What this then means is that the United States can no longer look upon the "nuclear option" as an option reserved only for other nuclear states, such as the former Soviet Union. And this has apparently become U.S. policy, as partly indicated by the fact that the United States has - within the last three weeks - implicitly renounced its longstanding pledge to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
That is, because of the current and most grave threat to American national security, U.S. officials at the highest levels have reportedly adopted a policy that allows for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states - if (and perhaps only if) use of nuclear weapons is necessary to insure that those states do not place biological, chemical or nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, such as the al Qaeda group.
Thus, non-nuclear states that have neither attacked the United States nor are at war with it, but which are nevertheless providing - or are attempting to provide - weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups may be subject to nuclear attack without warning. That appears to be the developing U.S. policy.
Regarding nuclear bunker-busting munitions: Inasmuch as at least one terrorist-linked government hostile to the United States has constructed underground bunkers that may be sufficient to withstand attack by a limited number of conventional "bunker-busting" munitions, and because those bunkers may house biochemical and nuclear weaponry, as well as to protect those who may soon provide such weaponry to terrorists, the question arises as to how the United States would attack those hardened sites. The only answers available today are to either build larger bunker-busting conventional weapons or to use some sort of nuclear devices.
While the United States is in fact urgently attempting to build larger bunker-busting conventional weapons, the possibility remains that it will be impossible for conventional munitions to handle the task. Therefore, one is forced to look for a nuclear solution.
But, since at least some of the bunkers mentioned above are reportedly located in populated areas, the use of ordinary tactical nuclear weapons against them would lead to the deaths of innocent people in possibly-large numbers, along with unnecessary and vast destruction. This immediately suggests the need to investigate the possibility that very low-yield nuclear weapons could be created that are sufficient to "kill" the kinds of bunkers being discussed without so much collateral damage.
Naturally, this does not address the technical questions associated with building nuclear bunker-busters, and it may turn out that these weapons could not possibly be built in the way that conventional earth-penetrating weapons are constructed. For instance, nuclear warheads are very sensitive to changes in their shape. Thus, while a conventional bunker-busting bomb deeply penetrates into the target before detonating, because of warhead deformations that are produced during such penetrations, it might not be possible to penetrate the target in this way with a nuclear device because a nuclear warhead would be so distorted that it would only partially detonate in what would amount to a nuclear "fizzle."
Setting aside for now the technical issues related to the feasibility of developing nuclear bunker-busting weapons, the current issue centers on whether we should proceed with developing such a capability or seek alternatives.
Some people argue against the development of low-yield nuclear weapons because of concern that their successful research and development would make their use more probable; these men and women argue that the newer nuclear weapons might be used when conventional devices could do the job. But since there are underground bunkers already in existence that experts say would be exceedingly difficult, or even impossible to successfully attack with a limited number of conventional munitions, there is actually not much choice but to consider the development of nuclear alternatives.
It has also been argued that use of low-yield nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states may in fact make future use of nuclear weapons more probable. That may also be true. But, in accord with what appears to be the thinking of U.S. decision makers, the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists is so grave that the United States must expeditiously proceed to defend itself - even if this leads to future developments that are far from ideal.
My assessment is that the United States will - and should - act to protect the nation from the terrorist WMD threat, even if world opinion opposes drastic steps that the government might feel compelled to take - including use of low yield nuclear weapons. It is also clear to me that the government will seek to build smaller nuclear weapons, possibly as bunker-busters.
I would also say that it is highly probable that the government will soon order the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing - both to ensure the safety and security of the current strategic nuclear arsenal as well as to allow the expedited development of new weapons.
As I see it, these are simply the facts that now confront us, as it is a fact that almost 3,000 people were killed in the last terrorist attack we experienced, which included an attack on the command-and-control headquarters of the United States military.
In summary, it is clear that American authorities have taken the position that they will do what they must to protect U.S. national security from any and all terrorist threats. But that appears to be especially true when it comes to keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.
Koontz holds a Ph.D. in experimental nuclear physics from the University of Maryland and has been a student of al-Qaeda tactics since 1997. He can be reached at dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
How the Marine Expeditionary Unit Did It:
Kills
snake with bayonet charge up Snake Hill after amphibious landing. Loses
only 30 percent of assault force. Defends Snake Hill for six weeks without
resupply or reinforcements and against suspected assaults by waves of fanatic
snakes. Last como: "Send us more snakes!"
How a Marine Sniper Did It:
Stalks snake for four days, sets up hide near known snake residence. After six more days of observation, kills snake with one .50-cal. rifle shot between the eyes from 1,713 yards in a 16 m.p.h. quartering wind at 3,100 ft elevation, 4-percent down-sloping terrain, 23 percent humidity and 87 degree F temperature. Reports back on locations, residences, descriptions, known associations and best kill opportunities for 22 additional snakes in target area. Sniper is reprimanded for rushing the shot and endangering noncombatants.
| ARTICLE 07 |
| Medal of Honor Recipient - Ray, Ronald E. 1st Lt. USA |
Rank and organization: Captain (then 1st Lt.), U.S. Army, Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division.
Place and date: la Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam, 19 June 1966.
Entered service at: Atlanta, Ga. Born: 7 December 1941, Cordelle, Ga.
Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. Capt. Ray distinguished himself while serving as a platoon leader with Company A. When one of his ambush patrols was attacked by an estimated reinforced Viet Cong company, Capt. Ray organized a reaction force and quickly moved through two kilometers of mountainous jungle terrain to the contact area. After breaking through the hostile lines to reach the beleaguered patrol, Capt. Ray began directing the reinforcement of the site.
When an enemy position pinned down three of his men with a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire, he silenced the emplacement with a grenade and killed four Viet Cong with his rifle fire. As medics were moving a casualty toward a sheltered position, they began receiving intense hostile fire. While directing suppressive fire on the enemy position, Capt. Ray moved close enough to silence the enemy with a grenade.
A few moments later Capt. Ray saw an enemy grenade land, unnoticed, near two of his men. Without hesitation or regard for his safety he dove between the grenade and the men, thus shielding them from the explosion while receiving wounds in his exposed feet and legs. He immediately sustained additional wounds in his legs from an enemy machine gun, but nevertheless he silenced the emplacement with another grenade.
Although suffering great pain from his wounds, Capt. Ray continued to direct his men, providing the outstanding courage and leadership they vitally needed, and prevented their annihilation by successfully leading them from their surrounded position. Only after assuring that his platoon was no longer in immediate danger did he allow himself to be evacuated for medical treatment. By his gallantry at the risk of his life in the highest traditions of the military service, Capt. Ray has reflected great credit on himself, his unit, and the U.S. Army.
Editor's
Note: If you know of any MOH recipient who is hospitalized or has passed away
recently, please email DefenseWatch MOH Editor Jim H. at bulldogleader@mindspring.com.
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