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FROM THE EDITOR:

Farewell to a Dedicated Veteran of the Skies

By Ed Offley

"Pray the wing flap grease don't freeze," said Maj. Bill Burt.

"Okay," I said with a puzzled frown. "Why?"

"Because if the wing flap grease freezes, we're going down on the ice and you're opening up a news bureau at McMurdo Sound for six months," Burt said with a grin as he continued to study the navigational chart.

We were 7,400 miles from home at the small Navy airport annex at Christchurch, New Zealand, and Burt was preparing to lead an Air Mobility Command C-141B Starlifter on a 22-hour nonstop mission to the South Pole and back. The windowless transport jet stood outside on the tarmac where a crew of loadmasters and ground support personnel were finishing their task of stripping the Starlifter of every extra ounce of weight for the flight.

This mission in June 1989 was an annual task for the Air Force, to airdrop about 30 tons of supplies to the U.S. scientific research bases at McMurdo Sound and the South Pole Base Camp, and I had volunteered to cover the crew from McChord Air Force Base, Wash., on what would end up being a 66,000-mile flight spanning the Pacific Ocean from the United States to Samoa, Australia, New Zealand and then the big jump down to 90 Degrees South.

The highlight of the two-week operation was a 22-hour round-trip flight from Christchurch to the South Pole, which involved three separate mid-air refuelings from a KC-10 tanker and two hazardous, low-level cargo parachute drops flown at near stalling speed while subzero wind shrieked through the windowless fuselage when the cargo doors came open.

It is an old truism that you learn more from direct observation than from a book, and my two weeks crammed into the Starlifter with an augmented crew of more than a dozen pilots, navigators and flight engineers constituted an advanced seminar in the vital but non-charismatic world of military airlift. And the one fact I came to appreciate and admire was that the old Lockheed transport was built sturdy and tough.

How sturdy, and how tough, came to mind the other day when I read that the 62nd Airlift Wing at McChord had held a ceremony marking the retirement of its last C-141B Starlifter from active service. Aircraft No. 50267 left the base to join dozens of other Starlifters in storage in the desert at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, N.M., on Apr. 10, ending its own 36-year tenure that included more than 46,500 hours of flight.

My own memories spanning a 15-year tenure at The Seattle Post-Intelligencer had ranged from numerous training flights around the Pacific Northwest (including low-level airdrop missions in the heat of summer where the plane bounced around the sky like a cement truck on an unpaved road) to intercontinental missions to places as far apart as South Korea, Europe, the Mideast and Somalia.

But it was Jeff Larsen, a newspaper colleague of mine in Seattle, who caught the full context of the Starlifter's contributions to our nation's military security: In a previous life, Jeff served as a C-141 loadmaster and recorded more than 1,000 hours in his logbook during the mid-1960s. His memories include one "hot" landing under fire in Vietnam during the January 1968 Tet Offensive where the Viet Cong tried to shoot down his aircraft as it came in to land.

The Air Force during the last four years has been gradually transitioning to the new and vastly improved C-17 Globemaster III, a state-of-the-art cargo jet with a maximum takeoff weight of 585,000 lbs., an increase of nearly 55 percent from the Starlifter's 323,000-lb. maximum weight, and an ability to land on an unimproved 3,000-foot strip while the older plane was limited to full-size, paved runways. Thanks to computers and advanced avionics, the C-17 can be operated by a crew of just three (two pilots and one cargo loadmaster) while the C-141B with its 1960s-era design relied on a crew of six (two pilots, one navigator, one flight engineer and two "loadies").

But what the C-141 lacked in grace, it more than compensated in longevity over a four-decade span that will come to a final end in 2006. The first Starlifters ferried troops and cargo to Vietnam in April 1965, and served in every operation and crisis since then, including the Korean standoff, the Middle East, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Operation Enduring Freedom.

The Starlifter fleet took troops to fight, returned the remains of those killed in battle, retrieved released prisoners of war, and hauled everything that could fit in its 168-foot-long fuselage, from babies to nuclear weapons.

If you wanted to cover the airmen and the troops, the Starlifter was your discount ticket to realtime - but you paid a price.

The aircraft was either too hot or too cold, and when it was cold the bare metal fuselage deck would suck the heat out of your body. Long hours sitting in the red nylon paratrooper seats would drive spikes of pain into your spine until you daydreamed of chiropractors. Only by the grace of God and a compassionate aircraft commander could you get any view of the outside world at all from the flight deck (other than the palm-sized windows on the paratrooper hatches far in the stern).

But thanks to the men and women of the 62nd Airlift Wing and 446th Associate Wing (USAFR), I was able to see the sun rise twice over the Antarctic ice sheet in a single morning. I saw a swirling constellation of stars that were the running lights of a trio of KC-135 tankers on a refueling rendezvous during a nighttime multi-ship flight nonstop from McChord to Korea. I saw a squad of combat controllers in scuba gear and parachutes step off the open cargo ramp in a spring evening for a 20-second fall into Puget Sound. I shared the red nylon seats with a platoon of mud-stained light infantry fighters coming out of combat in Panama. I watched the Nile River snaking below those large green wings as we flew down-range to Mogadishu. I took notes as paratroopers and Rangers and Green Berets hooked up their static lines to the cables as we came down to drop zones as far afield as Korea, Alaska and the Caribbean. I wouldn't have missed any of it for the world.

So long, baby, it was a hell of a flight.

Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at defensewatch@aol.com.

While the Army's small-unit combat leaders are second-to-none - the young officers and the steel backbone of any Army, the sergeants, are dedicated and motivated - most senior brass are better suited to guiding companies such as Microsoft than commanding an Army barreling across Iraq. They've been trained for management, not for preparing troops for battle or leading them when the compost hits the circular blade.

Help is on the way. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently gave his four-stars a good shake when he picked Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Jones to run NATO, traditionally an Army slot, and Gen. John Keane to take over the Army. In particular, Keane's appointment will help revitalize the infantry - the "queen of battle" - for the fights ahead.

I'm told Ironman Rumsfeld aims to radically change our military to make it ready for terrorism and other future wars that won't be fought - at least winnably - with the tactics, gear and formations of the past. Under Rummy, there'll be no more Gettysburg, Normandy or Hamburger Hill "high diddle diddle, straight up the middle" maneuvers. The game will be mainly played by small, agile units with awesome firepower, much like our Special Forces in Afghanistan.

Keane will replace Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki when his term runs out next year. Unless - since it's highly unusual to name a replacement 14 months in advance - Rumsfeld presents lame-duck Shinseki with a solid-gold surfboard and sends him home to Hawaii to test it ASAP.

According to most Army officers I know lieutenant colonel and below, the call on Keane was made in the nick of time. They see Keane as an innovative leader whose long troop experience runs from a rifle platoon in Vietnam to the command of a company, battalion, brigade, division and corps in mainly parachute units, where boldness and fresh thinking are the rule.

Whereas Shinseki - the father of the hated black beret and the equally disliked "Army of One" slogan - belongs to the Cold War-loving Armor Mafia. Not only is the multibillion-dollar fleet of technically and tactically disastrous light armor vehicles the present Army chief's baby, he's also been pushing the already-redundant 90-ton Crusader, a billion-dollar Cold War cannon that's about as necessary and functional as his infamous black beret.

Two other members of the Armor Mafia the troops say should join the Tanker's Early Retirement Club are beleaguered Secretary of the Army Thomas White, a former Enron vice president, and Training and Doctrine Command commander Gen. John Abrams.

Now the Armor Mafia geniuses want to change how the Army trains its combat-branch captains with a plan consisting of a computer-driven four weeks at home, four weeks at a training base and two weeks as an observer at a maneuver center. This high-tech, corporate-modeled, semi-virtual course will replace the present six-month, hands-on drill that already barely does the job. Back when I was a captain, the course ran a year - and most of my peers had at least one war under their belts and twice the time with troops that captains have today!

There's even more mischief on the Armor Mafia's agenda - moving the shorter training stint from Fort Benning, Ga., to Fort Knox, Ky., the home of Armor, even though the Infantry School has twice the training area and puts the emphasis where it should be: on soldiers, not machines.

While I'm betting infantryman Keane won't buy this dot-com type of training change, Fort Benning should make Rummy an honorary grunt, and every American parent with a boy who wears crossed rifles should send up a silent prayer of thanks.

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page, and he can be reached at teagles@hackworth.com. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831.

© 2002 David H. Hackworth

By Patrick Hayes

A long way from the rarified atmosphere of the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department, a team of 24 soldiers moves quietly under a thick jungle canopy, the only communication is by arm and hand signals. The only sounds are the distant squawk of a bird and the nearby rush of water.

The point man freezes, holding up a hand. The team drops quietly into a defensive position, automatically covering a 360-degree perimeter. The team leader moves forward, next to the point man. In a clearing, less than 50 yards away, sit a much larger group of enemy guerrillas. Although seemingly edgy and nervous, the guerrillas guard their position haphazardly as they cook over an open fire and chatter in high-pitched voices. However, their automatic weapons are clutched tightly - a most valued possession.

The scenario could be a flashback to Vietnam, but it's not. According to news reports in the Philippine press, scenes like this have been taking place for the past few weeks in Basilan, one of the southern islands of the Philippines.

While our attention in recent months has been focused on combat operations in Afghanistan and law enforcement actions against al Qaeda terrorists from Europe to the United States itself, the Bush administration, in the guise of prosecuting the war against terrorism, appears to be heading for an open-ended military involvement in a decades-old Philippine civil war.

It seems to be time for a "reality check" before we find ourselves inexplicably bogged down in another Asian jungle war.

While the enemy in Vietnam 35 years ago - VC guerrillas and main force NVA - were much more disciplined than the Muslim terrorists being hunted in the Philippines, today's foe, with ties to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda, still constitute a real threat to the Philippine soldiers and their American trainers.

Six of the 24 men in the combat team cited above were American Special Forces soldiers, accompanying Philippine soldiers from one of the U.S.-trained light reaction companies on a training exercise designated RP-US "Balikatan."

Officially, the U.S. troops are not allowed to "initiate combat," but can certainly defend themselves should hostilities erupt. And, although the current training program does not by itself portend trouble, sometimes "training" in such a hostile environment does involve the real thing.

Recently, in a running gun battle against Muslim terrorists that lasted several days, Col. Reynaldo Ordonez, chief of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Battalion, said his troops encountered the Abu Sayyaf band led by Hamsiraji Sali in Barangay Upper Manggas, on the island of Basilan. One Philippine Army soldier was killed and 14 were wounded in the battle. Only four of the Muslim terrorists were confirmed killed.

"We are now reaching the critical point of the operation," said Lt. Col. Danilo Servando, a spokesman for the Armed Forces Southern Command. "We have more or less pinpointed the main group of the Abu Sayyaf."

Besides training, U.S. Special Forces troops were there to render support and assist with the wounded, Col. Ordonez said. He added that he asked the Green Beret medics to treat his wounded soldiers, because they were better equipped than his own medics.

The Green Berets retrieved the wounded soldiers from the combat area and two HH-60 Pavehawk helicopters were called in to provide medevacs.

The steady escalation of violence in the Philippines should raise warning flags at the U.S. Pacific Command and at the Pentagon over US military involvement. However, Pacific Command and the Pentagon seem to have entered the current Asian conflict with blinders on. Are we trying to kill the fly while the tiger creeps closer?

Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is adamant about sending troops after the Abu Sayyaf group of Muslim terrorists, who kidnapped American Christian missionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham, and Filipina nurse Deborah Yap. In fact, her orders are quite explicit. "The target is the Abu Sayyaf group, not the kidnap victims," she said during a recent radio interview.

Last Friday, one Abu Sayyaf terrorist, Itting Sailani, surrendered and another, Arium Mustakim, was captured on Basilan. Both are undergoing military debriefing, said Philippine military spokesman Captain Noel Detoyato, and could provide valuable information as to the whereabouts of the missionaries.

According to recent intelligence reports, the Abu Sayyaf terrorists are on the run and have broken up into smaller cells to avoid contact with the Philippine troops and their American trainers. A news report on Apr. 5 stated that a U.S. spy plane caught digital images of the two American hostages and the Filipina nurse still being held on the island of Basilan, which is almost 500 square miles, much of it inhospitable country.

According to Admiral Dennis Blair, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, who recently arrived in the Philippines, "The important thing that we have is the commitment of the U.S. to help the Philippines beat the Abu Sayaaf."

The admiral also added candidly that the threats to peace and stability in Southeast Asia have changed.

But the Aby Sayyaf brand of al Queda-related Muslim terrorists are not the only ones stalking the Philippine Islands - nor are they the only danger facing Americans there.

Last Friday, according to local news services, Philippine Army troops patrolling in the Lanao del Norte Province of Mindanao encountered a sizeable force of Muslim guerrillas from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). A firefight ensued, during which three Muslims were confirmed killed and three weapons captured. It was not reported whether any Green Berets were with that patrol.

Also last Friday, Muslim leader Nur Misuari, the former governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and seven accomplices, were scheduled to be arraigned this week on charges of rebellion. Misuari is being held at the Santa Rosa police camp, south of Manila. He is accused of inciting his followers in the MILF to launch a failed uprising in the southern Philippines last November, which left nearly 200 people dead.

These incidents have occurred in spite of President Macapagal-Arroyo's request that negotiations between her government and the MILF continue without hostilities. Obviously, that is no longer the case.

In addition, last Thursday, three people were killed and five wounded in a Basilan home, into which an unidentified terrorist threw in a hand grenade. Deputy regional military chief Brigadier General Angel Atutubo believed that attack was because two males in the household were members of a paramilitary group helping authorities hunt down the Muslim terrorists.

The Philippines, like other ports of entry, has been given a blacklist of suspected Muslim terrorists. Some 15 to 20 of those on the list are members of the Abu Sayyaf organization. However, since the terrorist attacks against the United States last Sept. 11, the Philippine government has arrested 11 suspected terrorists, several of them members of Jemaah Islamiyah, another militant Islamic group with al Queda ties believed to have plotted bombing campaigns against U.S. and Western interests across Southeast Asia.

The group includes four Indonesians, four from the Middle East, two of Vietnamese extraction and one Japanese. The Indonesians include Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, Agus Dwirkana, Tamsil Linrung and Abdul Jamal Balfas. The others include Vietnamese-American Van Duc Vo, and Thuan Ngoc Huynh, a Swiss citizen of Vietnamese decent, Makoto Ito of Japan, and Filipina Florinda Estrada. They were arrested in a plot to bomb the Vietnamese embassy in Manila. The Middle Eastern men were not identified.

Besides the various Muslim terrorists roaming Mindanao and the other southern islands, U.S. Special Forces "trainers" and other American support elements must also contend with a sizeable and aggressive faction of communist rebels in other parts of the Islands.

In another firefight southeast of Manila last week with members of the New People's Army (NPA), one communist guerrilla was killed and three were captured. In other incidents, the Philippine Army reported that two policemen were killed in a gun battle with the NPA and one guerrilla was captured.

President Macapagal-Arroyo's government suspended peace talks with the communists last year after they murdered two members of the Philippine House of Representatives.

Philippine Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes last Friday, sounding more like an American liberal senator, said, "All these attacks mean that they (the NPA) are not sincere in pursuing the peace process."

Making matters more tense for American troops helping the Philippine Army conduct counter-insurgency operations against the Muslim fanatics, the communist insurgent chief of the NPA, "Armando Liwanag" (considered in the Philippines to be the pen name for founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines, Jose Maria Sison), last Saturday declared war on American troops. In the communist group's publication, Ang Bayan (the Nation), Liwanag called for his followers to "inflict severe casualties" on U.S. troops participating in joint exercises with the Philippine Army.

The Ang Bayan article continued, "We must be ready to use the social and physical terrain of the Philippines to inflict severe casualties on the invading U.S. forces and to take punitive action against U.S. economic and related interests." The NPA "must deliver lethal blows against the U.S. imperialists and the puppet military and police forces, whatever extent that the U.S. intervenes or aggresses against the people."

Although there have been no verified direct attacks against U.S. troops, an American MC-130 was struck by two bullets in January while flying low over a northern part of the country where communist guerrillas are known to be active.

In addition, the threat of action against American personnel in the Philippines comes at a time when Washington is preparing to increase the number of U.S. troops on the ground. As of now, there are 660 U.S. military personnel in the country (of which 160 are Special Forces soldiers), operating primarily in the southern islands against Muslim terrorists. Some 2,665 additional U.S. troops are due to arrive in the main island of Luzon later this month for separate joint exercises with their Filipino counterparts.

Beginning to sound more like Vietnam? I can see the squirms and hear the "Been there, done that" comments already.

The United States is correct in its commitment to fight the war against terrorism wherever the terrorist cells may be operating, but the quiet escalation of U.S. military involvement in the Philippines seems to be happening with little discussion or debate within the administration.

Key questions include: Just where is this policy going and whom are we really fighting in the Philippines? The Abu Sayyaf group may be knocked down, but what about the much larger and better-equipped MILF, with ties to other militant Muslim groups in the region (all of which have ties to al Qaeda), not to mention the communists.

President Macapagal-Arroyo has already requested that American involvement on the ground be extended. So, just how long is this "training mission" going to last and what is the expected outcome?

Finally, how do we define victory?

Adm. Blair said, "The threats now are the scenes of lawlessness which exist in various parts of the region, from international terrorists to crime and narcotics, and illegal immigration."

Sound familiar?

Regardless of what Adm. Blair says about dealing with Abu Sayyaf terrorists, while forgetting the other Muslim terrorists, communists and other anti-American elements in the region, it is time for a "reality check" before we find ourselves inexplicably bogged down in another Asian jungle war.

Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at Gyrene65@netscape.net.

By Paul Connors

Ever since Robert Strange McNamara became Secretary of Defense under President John F. Kennedy in 1961, a mindset has pervaded the Defense Department that has been injurious, if not downright dangerous to national security. That mindset has at its core the misplaced belief that all things military can be quantified and that technology will always prevail over human participation on the battlefield. This is the same misguided thinking that has led to some of our largest intelligence failures, tactical reverses and the loss of personnel once engaged in combat.

With the end of the Cold War, everyone expected the U.S. economy to be able to reap the benefits of the "peace dividend" and for a while, it seemed that we did. But at what cost?

American military prowess and superiority have suffered throughout the 1990s under the negligent misuse of the armed forces by the Clinton administration, the 40-percent cuts in personnel and the $80 billion a year shortfalls in the defense budget, not to mention the disastrous and wasteful social engineering programs that were rammed down our throats.

The most recent and glaring example of this loss of capability was the request by Gen. Tommy Franks that our British allies provide a combat team of Royal Marine Commandos to scour the mountains and valleys in Afghanistan for remaining pockets of Taliban and Al Qaeda combatants when the troops of the 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions proved incapable of completing the task.

For a nation that spearheaded the new war on terrorism, this battlefield failure - cloaked by the voices of our generals declaring victory, handing out medals and rotating home the units involved - is nothing short of a monumental national embarrassment. It is an admission that we are not as dominant as we thought we were, and that we have confirmed that loss of military capability to a watchful world by having to rely on our staunchest ally, a nation with a military approximately one-fourth the size of ours, to pull our chestnuts out of the fire.

What the use of the Royal Marines has proven is that the destructive social engineering policies and gender-based training of the departed Clinton administration have succeeded. In fact, they have succeeded magnificently. Those policies have robbed the grunt in the field (especially in the U.S. Army) of the fighting edge and physical capability required to prevail and win when facing a determined, hostile force. Those policies have accomplished what our battlefield enemies have not been able to do: They drove our troops from the battlefield after as little as two weeks in the field.

Yet despite this disgrace, the generals seemed to believe that handing out medals would make everything all right. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki traveled to Fort Drum, N.Y., to award the Silver Star to an infantry battalion commander and a stream of lesser awards to other soldiers in the 10th Mountain Division that only served to remind everyone of the mediocre performance of a once-heralded unit.

Since the Vietnam War, where senior officers began the now entrenched system of getting one's "ticket punched," officers have rotated quickly through command slots and received medals that they hardly earned. As a result, the awards for valor have been deflated and the system has been debased. Real achievement, real heroism no longer exists, because everything our soldiers do is heroic. And we hand out medals all the time to prove it.

In the meantime, we delude ourselves and the American people, who have a right to expect a capable and well-trained military and that it will be used for the national defense. What they should not be asked to pay for is a hollow force, devoid of combat capability, equipment, manpower and the resolve to win our nation's wars.

While it is true that military technology and the hardware to support and run it have become increasingly more expensive, the over-reliance on technical prowess did not serve us as well in the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan, where American infantry failed because of lack of physical ability to carry out the assigned missions. Lest we continue to fool ourselves, we must recognize that wars are not won by airpower alone. We should never forget that our ground forces are the cutting tip of the spear and they are the ones we entrust to close with and destroy our enemies.

If they are not up to the task because they are not fit enough or because their training has not been realistic enough to allow them to prevail and win in battle, then we might as well roll over and quit now.

What must be done?

We must repudiate and abandon all notions of gender-equality and train our men to fight our wars. We must give them the most realistic training we can and demand physical standards that will allow them to withstand the rigors of the field and close combat. If we do not provide our soldiers with "the right stuff," then we have no business sending them in harm's way and the United States has no business intervening in the hot spots of the world.

Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. He can be reached at paulconnors@hotmail.com.

By J. David Galland

March was another outstanding "Special Recognition Month" within the Department of Defense and the military services, featuring meetings, presentations, sensing sessions, informational groups and posters.

Also present was a catchy little picture of a woman, featured in official Army websites. She wore a steel pot and a diminutive rucksack as if to say, "Look at me, just like the men, we can do it, girls!"

Of course, I am referring to Women's History Month, which ran throughout March as mandated by Public Law 100-9 and promoted enthusiastically by the U.S. Army and DoD.

It almost makes me want to run out and pin a medal on a female soldier, the first one I see. What medal, you may ask, and for what? Oh, you know, for standing up against the odds, for showing her mettle, for being a productive citizen and showing the world that women have the moxie to be soldiers.

Here's my politically-incorrect question: Why is there a Women's History Month - by official designation a "U. S. Army Ethnic and Special Observance Event" - anyway? (Not only do women get a month of special significance, but every August 26th, they also get a "Women's Equality Day.")

I really don't understand the need for a "Special Recognition Month" or a special "Equality Day" for anybody, but the Department of Defense apparently does, at least for one of the genders. The theme of this day mandates that women will be appreciated in the military and in general. I appreciate a hard day's work from anybody, on any day, no matter what the gender is. So what the heck does one's gender have to do with the issue? Is the message, that we should not expect women to do a hard day's work and treat them special because they do? I don't think so.

This year when "Women's History Month" came along again, my curiosity got the better of me and I set out to learn more. I found that there are many other ethnic or special months, celebrations and events.

For example, April is "The Month of The Military Child," which commendably takes into consideration all stripes, races and genders. So, does this mean that we should appreciate our beloved children more during the month of April?

If the theme and message of "Women's History Month" is any indicator, I suppose we might see a cute little kid in the Army websites. Maybe in a little Kevlar helmet, butt-stroking an al-Qaeda terrorist wearing a diaper. Nonetheless, the reality of this is that one can logically deduce that women and children, according to the Army and the provisions of public law, are indeed, special.

Unfortunately, my research was completely unable to calculate exactly how much more special, on any measurable or definable scale, are women and children, when contrasted with the intentionally invisible group - men - who of course do not have and apparently do not deserve, their own special month or day. But some groups, and that particular gender, are of course completely ignored.

There is much to learn about ethnic and special observances within the military and the DoD. However, from my corner of the foxhole, I detect that there is an established target audience for kudos and recognition.

I would like to go on record and compliment the Fort Gordon, Ga., Equal Opportunities Office for all the information, educational data and social guidance on the DoD's definition of ethnic identities that their website provides.

As I dug a little deeper on ethnic groups and, special observances, I even learned that I was defined in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 1350.2.

That directive delineates that I am officially, "a person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, North Africa or Middle East." That sounds about right to me, I thought. My grandparents came from the Scandinavian Countries and Nova Scotia.

So, believe it or not, I am defined, categorized, delineated, and quantified. According to DoD directives, I am officially a Northwestern European Canadian-American, which falls under the general category of "White Americans," in the Dod's formal terminology. So, there you have it! (To avoid creating any impression of racism, I'll henceforth use the less-controversial word, Caucasian, to describe myself.)

A few years ago I wishfully ascribed to the belief that I was, in fact, a Native American. Both of my parents, my sister and all my brothers and I were born within earshot of where American Colonists dented the local tea inventory in Boston while disguised as Native Americans.

That seems pretty Native American to me. However to narrow the parameters of qualification, they then tagged on additional caveats like, "Tribal Heritage" in the official description and hinted at, living on reservations and all the fine print. Woefully, I realized that I was not, in fact, a Native American, rather, just a Caucasian.

The rules are as precise as anything the Pentagon might attempt to quantify: The Department of Defense officially recognizes the following ethnic groups within American society: Arab-Americans, Asian-Americans, Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Jewish-Americans, Native Americans, and of course, Caucasians.

If one pursues expanded research into each of the ethnic groups there is much to learn. For example, based on the location of origin of one's ancestors, one can be further sub-categorized.

But first, we need to stop and note another category of recognition: During April and May each year, we will by law and DoD regulation observe "Days of Remembrance" during the Jewish Yom HaShoah week, in accordance with Public Law 96-388 (October 1980) requiring remembrance for the victims of the Holocaust. (My own Days of Remembrance - recalling my streak of three home runs in Little League in 1959 - do not merit government recognition.)

With May, we then move on to celebrate "Asian-Pacific Heritage Month." Much like all other ethnic celebrations, there are cultural and often delightful culinary offerings. Historical and educational presentations are offered and folks, in general, have a golden opportunity to learn about what I think is a very interesting and old culture.

Our next stop comes in August and the special observance previously noted, "Women's Equality Day."

So, before we jump into National Hispanic Heritage Month, which spans September 15th to October 15th, and National Native/American Indian Heritage Month, which is the entire month of November, we need to stop and take another look. Apparently there are some open months, and some unaccounted for ethnic groups amongst the notables of record.

It seems that June, July and most of August, as entire months, are not yet dedicated to any ethnic group or designated as months of special observance. June, July are still open slots, reserved - at least for now - for summer field training exercises, PCS moves and the like.

As far as my research could take me, I have determined that only Arab-Americans and Caucasians are still left out in the cold. To further exacerbate the issue, I am a male and can attest that all males in the U.S. Army suffer the absence of Men's Equality Day.

This fixation with ethnic pride and self-celebration would be a calendar joke at best, and a minor irritant at worst, if it did not so firmly collide with another Army principle: Equal treatment under the law and service regulations.

During my long military career, I never categorized or sub-categorized soldiers by their race, gender or ethnic origin. Never did I treat a soldier a certain way, with unique parameters, based on where his grandparents or great grandparents came from. I believe this tends to alienate within any large organization, including the Army.

I always considered a soldier a soldier and a member of a team, not an individual defined by any distinctions that set him or her apart from the rest. It is my belief that a little less factionalism in today's military would solve a lot of problems that, if allowed to fester, will erode the integrity of the force.

So it is my fervent hope that the Army will work to support and defend equal opportunity for all. And the best way to accomplish this is for the Department of Defense, the Army and the other services to review all of the personnel management systems - in particular, performance reports - with a view toward ensuring such equal opportunity.

Equality, is indeed, a two-way street. The DoD should do away with the lengthy roster of special ethnic or gender considerations. Or if the Pentagon lacks the moral courage to do so, let's get the flow going in both directions and immediately declare a "Men's Equality Day," a Caucasian Heritage Month, and an Arab-American Festival.

J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is a retired veteran of over thirty years of service in military intelligence who resides in Germany. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.

By Robert G. Williscroft

I was attending college in Montana in 1962 when a Naval Aviation recruiting team visited my school. My goal was to become an Astronaut, and I was convinced that the best way to do this was to become a test pilot with the Navy's Flight Program. I did rather well on their flight aptitude test (I nearly aced it), and so they wanted to recruit me into something called the NAVCAD program.

NAVCAD (Naval Aviation Cadet) consisted of qualified college students who had not yet received their undergraduate degrees. NAVCAD proposed to give these aspiring Navy pilots two years of concentrated training, and grant them a degree, a commission, and wings all together.

I was hooked, and dropped out of college - can you be smart and stupid at the same time?

As it turned out, I had an eye accommodation error that prevented me from becoming a fighter pilot, which I saw as a prerequisite for eventual astronaut training. So at the tender age of twenty, my first big dream was nixed.

A secondary interest of mine had always been submarines. I was out of college, and too embarrassed to ask my parents for help, so I cast my eye about for another way. A friendly Navy recruiter introduced me to the NESEP Program (Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program). Sailors who qualified would be assigned to one of 22 universities, all expenses paid for up to four years, after which they would be offered an unrestricted line commission in the Navy.

This sounded like a good deal to me, and all I had to do was wait a year as a Navy enlisted man. I decided I would do my waiting as a submariner, joined up, qualified for Sonar Class A school, and then went to submarine school. About the time I reached my eligibility date for NESEP, the Navy changed the program requirements, forcing me to wait another year.

I was having fun, so the wait, while distressing, was something I could handle. Finally I reached eligibility, and applied for the program, only to be shot down by my skipper, for reasons only he could understand. I waited him out, and a year later received my recommendation from his relief, and was assigned to Sonar Class B School while awaiting transfer to Prep School in Bainbridge, Md. (informally known as "knife and fork" school, with some make-up academics thrown in for good measure).

Eventually, I spent three years at the University of Washington, where I advanced to Petty Officer First Class. I earned a BS in Physical Oceanography and Atmospheric Science, and then received my commission after attending OCS in Newport. Following that I went back to submarine school as an Ensign, and then to the newly established Poseidon Weapons Officer School in Virginia Beach.

During my entire time at college, I received full pay and allowances, all books and incidental expenses paid, and full tuition and all fees. It was one hell of a good deal. I actually purchased a house during my stay in college.

So how does a bright young sailor travel from E-1 to O-7 and higher in today's Navy?

Of several paths, perhaps the one closest to NESEP is the newly announced STA-21 Program - Seaman to Admiral-21 (no, I don't know what the 21 means).

This program leads to a commission in nuclear (surface or submarine), aviation (pilot), aviation (naval flight officer), surface warfare (swo), special operations (specops), special warfare (specwar), nurse corps (nc), supply corps (sc), and civil engineer corps (cec). Except for cec, there is currently no time-in-service requirement. Qualifications are the obvious ones: first and most importantly, these sailors must excel in their Navy jobs. Second, they should earn as many college credits as possible through the Navy College Program. Third, they should take college courses, especially mathematics courses that will prepare them for calculus and calculus-based physics.

Outstanding potential is paramount for selection to STA-21. Experienced sailors who successfully apply to STA-21 will have a record of superb fleet performance. Even the most junior sailors, however, will be considered for selection based upon their performance and accomplishments to date, including those achievements outside of the Navy which indicate the potential for success as officers.

The STA-21 package consists of: An annual voucher for up to $10,000 for tuition and related expenses for a maximum of 36 months, preceded by up to nine months of concentrated preparatory training for those who need it. STA-21 participants will receive full pay and allowances, and will be eligible for military housing where it is available. Any accredited university with a Navy ROTC is eligible, which makes STA-21 a better deal than NESEP, unless the annual tuition and related costs exceed $10,000, or the proposed curriculum lasts more than three years.

This year's deadline for application is July 1. Interested persons should contact Command Career Counselors or CNET (OTE6/STA-21), at DSN 922-4941 Ext. 313 or commercial (850) 452-4941 Ext 313, OR 1-800-NAV-ROTC (628-7682).

The best military officers have solid enlisted experience under their belts. STA-21 offers qualified Navy enlisted personnel a terrific opportunity to become such an officer at a time when really good officers are in woefully short supply.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

By Donald E. Vandergriff

People are the most critical aspect of the country's national security, yet the current military personnel system is the most ignored aspect of reform. By representing laws, policies, practices and beliefs that shape a soldier's behavior, the personnel system plays a major role in defining whether the military force will be effective or ineffective.

Why is it being ignored?

The efficiency of the personnel system is immersed in management science, which has a hard time evaluating intangibles such as leadership, cohesion, morale and effectiveness because they are difficult to quantify. This inability to measure is at odds with society's quest for order. Instead, today's solution is to seek technological means to military effectiveness. Many soldiers are no longer tolerant of this solution.

Other issues causing deep concern and alienation among junior officers relate to a lack of realistic training, inadequate materiel support, excessive unit rotations (including adverse consequences to family life), and a de-emphasis on the factors shaping unit cohesion. There is also a pervasive view that the Army personnel system views people as interchangeable parts of a machine instead of idealistic, motivated individuals who want to be part of a group culture that values selfless service.

The root of the problem is a structure of laws, polices, or cultural beliefs such as the "up or out" promotion system, the individual replacement system (IRS), and the practice of management science as it is applied to personnel management and the measuring of military effectiveness. Each of these elements has second-order effects, and are all interrelated in a vicious cycle.

First, the U.S. Navy developed "up or out" in 1916, and Gen. George Marshall - reacting to the slow and inadequate mobilization preceding World War II - formally institutionalized the system in 1945 to enable mass mobilization in event of a possible World War III against the Soviet Union. The unintended consequences of "up or out" spin offs include:

* Rank obsession instead of a focus on the profession of arms: it prevents officers from gaining the experience needed to perform complex collective tasks well, such as combined-arms tactics, because of inadequate time spent in leadership roles;

* Widespread "promotion anxiety" throughout the force, which in turn contributes to careerism and courtiership;

* A bloated officer corps at the middle and upper grades that undermines experience as even simple decisions are pushed higher, and which centralizes decisions in make-work jobs that have now become institutionalized over the last 54 years.

Second, the use of the Individual Replacement System (IRS) began in 1912. It was institutionalized after World War II as an efficient way to man units. Based on the theories of industrialist Frederick Taylor, IRS assumes that humans, trained in certain tasks are replaceable like parts on a machine. IRS's problems include:

* It undermines unit cohesion, discounting the reality that cohesion and leadership are won through shared, harsh experiences;

* It does not allow units and their leaders to master complex unit tasks, thus providing more operational and strategic level options to our senior military and political leaders

* It does not build up a psychological safeguard that only cohesive units can provide against the shock of combat

Finally, the U.S. military remains obsessed with management science causes that create the following problems:

* A dysfunctional officer evaluation system that pits one individual against another, a situation that has been made worse by every new version of the Officer Evaluation Report (OER);

* Fairness, transparency and objectivity have led to a system that causes Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs) to be "scored," in an attempt to quantify the unquantifiable;

* A centralized personnel system that is simply a part of the larger constellation of "management science" which, in addition to the personnel system, has given us the program bureaucracy, operations research and cost/benefit analysis.

While refusing to address these assumptions, the personnel system attempts to maintain "equity," where every officer has a shot at career-enhancing, troop-leading positions. As a result, the personnel system uses short-term fixes that accelerate what I term the "personnel death spiral."

Such revolving positions are bad for the officers and the troops. What happens to the morale and well-being of NCOs and soldiers when they are breaking in a new lieutenant every 6-8 months? It gets worse over time. Young officers need time as leaders. When they don't get this, they increasingly leave the service, thus fueling the officer shortage at the next grade, which prolongs the death spiral. It then becomes easy to assign the displaced platoon commanders, who go to the staff positions vacated by resigning officers.

Unfortunately, keeping Lt. "Short-Timer" in place longer has a cost associated with it. Specifically, Lts. "New Guy" and "Newer Guy" may not get platoons. As combat arms officers without platoons, their future is limited and their morale plummets, so they exit at their first opportunity, thus perpetuating the shortage and deepening the spiral.

Proponents for the status quo often suggest that the tempo of operations, lack of adequate salary and benefits, and the downsizing of the force are the primary causes of morale and retention problems. Other officials suggest the solution is to secure higher pay and more benefits, in effect reinforcing the assumption that self-interest is the prime motivator of loyalty and job satisfaction.

The conclusion can be drawn from all this that the Army is producing too many junior officers. Lieutenants are competing for the positions where they can lead soldiers as the best assignment. And then, these so-called critical jobs are held for very short times (months).

A recent report by John Tillson of the Institute of Defense Analyses titled "It's the Personnel System," concluded that it is not deployments to Bosnia or Saudi Arabia that are causing dedicated service personnel to quit. Nor is it a question of pay and benefits. Although both of these issues are important, Tillson found that the real cause of dissatisfaction was the antiquated personnel system, laden with autocratic industrial-age management assumptions, that (1) arbitrarily moves service members and their families from place to place, (2) severely limits the time officers can stay in command, (3) foments careerism and the accompanying climate of fear, and (4) reinforces careerists.

Tillson does more than identify the need for a dramatic change in the entire DoD personnel system; he suggests a radical approach that would put young service members - the people who will inherit the system - in charge of deciding what changes should be made and how they should be made.

As we will discover, the personnel system must be completely changed prior to declaring any military transformation a success. Future combat, with 4th Generation opponents, demands the upmost trust in those junior officers. These junior officers must possess a competency and experience level never seen before. Instead, the current system breeds careerism and undermines moral courage, because of its zero defects mentality (one strike and you're out). Officers meanwhile constantly worry about promotions to remain within the profession. They also have to worry about the competition from their brother officers in an atmosphere of the "competitive ethic."

The current system breeds mistrust. Leaders in the past felt the "up or out" promotion system was more American and more acceptable to the civilian public, on the assumption that "up or out" would be viewed as preventing elitism within the officer corps.

To those who argue that in the business world the profit margin provides the incentive for measuring personnel success, the military is inherently different. While there is a place in the military for healthy competition (e.g. unit competition in free-play, force-on-force exercises), combat is a more stressful, totally different environment than business. In combat, you have to be able to trust the guy on your right, left, in front and to your rear.

And in terms of promotion and career advancement, I believe that the competition must be carefully managed and limited to early in an officer's career. To have an officer corps built on men and women of strong character, you must give each officer an air of autonomy, the ability to make decisions and learn from mistakes. By making this occur as early as possible, each officer can gain experience at leading and making decisions.

The current personnel system undermines this autonomy, so essential for winning effectively in combat. In the current system, it is constant, never giving the officer enlightened freedom. The definition of career success becomes warped as only making it to the top, not at mastering the skills of the profession of arms.

Vandergriff, a major in the U.S. Army, has published numerous articles on military culture and is author of the forthcoming book, Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs (Presidio Press, May 2002) available from www.d-n-i.net. He can be reached at vandergriffdonald@usa.net.

By Melana Zyla Vickers

Upon learning from newspaper reports in recent days that the Pentagon is planning to reduce considerably its dependence on basing in Saudi Arabia, many Americans doubtless bristled - after all, such a pullback is exactly what terrorist Osama bin Laden has demanded.

Probe the basing issue a little more deeply, though, and one discovers that the bin Laden link is a peripheral, almost coincidental aspect of a problem that reaches far beyond Saudi or indeed the Persian Gulf. Worldwide, the United States has been pulling back from bases for years. By the mid-1990s, the U.S. Air Force had only 15 bases in 10 countries, down from 46 bases in 17 countries in 1985 (and 70 bases in 25 countries in 1965.) This troublesome trend has severely hampered the ability of the Air Force, which remains unhealthily dependent on short-range fighters that need to be based near a given conflict, from conducting operations in numerous parts of the world.

Political pressures have driven the global base pullback - host governments generally want base use restricted unless their own, narrowly defined vital interests are threatened and they can't get away with feigning neutrality while the United States does the dirty work. Consider the balking at U.S. bases that has taken place in the last two decades alone:

* 1986: Spain and France refused to let British-based U.S. F-111s fly over their territory en route to the U.S. raid against Libya that followed a terrorist attack in continental Europe.

* 1992: The Philippines saw the United States close facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base, whence the Navy and Air Force defended against the Soviets and later counterbalanced a rising China. The closings following years of mounting domestic Philippine opposition to the bases.

* 1995: Italy refused to let the United States base F-117s at its NATO airbase in Aviano following NATO air strikes against Bosnia. Italy did so in an effort to boost its role in Balkan negotiations.

* 1996: Saudi Arabia and Turkey refused to let U.S. fighters conduct offensive operations from their soil after Iraqi forces attacked the Kurds in northern Iraq. Jordan, too, refused the United States permission to base fighters there.

* 1998: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates prevented the United States from conducting strike operations from their bases during Operation Desert Fox against Iraq, and allowed only support operations such as refueling.

* 1999: Greece, a NATO member, refused to allow U.S. forces to be stationed there during the NATO campaign in Kosovo. France refused to let Kosovo-bound B-52s carrying cruise missiles fly through its airspace.

* 2001: Pakistan and Central Asian countries severely limited the operations the U.S. military could conduct from their soil during the Afghanistan war.

* 2001: Saudi Arabia restricted U.S. use of its command and control center at Prince Sultan air base during the Afghanistan war against bin Laden, an enemy of Saudi Arabia's ruling royal family.

While the U.S. and Saudi Arabia reached a compromise for the Afghanistan war, tension over basing in the Gulf state that goes back to the 1950s has motivated the United States to seek alternate basing in neighboring Qatar. It's that pursuit of an alternate command and control center that made news last weekend.

Whether Qatar will fall into the same Janus-faced habit of accepting the bases but restricting their use remains to be seen. If it does, the solution of moving there will be exposed as a band-aid measure. Another question that remains open is whether military threats - missiles, weapons of mass destruction - will soon join political obstacles in keeping the United States away from bases near a given conflict.

What is clear, though, is that the "anti-access" trend isn't likely to be reversed. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's plan for the coming years, the Quadrennial Defense Review, argues, the United States has to work quickly and hard to diversify away from its existing bases near potential conflicts. Otherwise, it may find itself severely hampered should a conflict arise in the Mideast, South Asia, or North Pacific/China-Taiwan. Military planning was certainly harmed in the Afghanistan war, when Air Force fighter aircraft, dependent on nearby bases yet frozen out of Central and South Asia, were so far away they weren't even used.

There are several solutions to the anti-access problem. Among them:

* Add long-range, stealthy air power to the U.S. arsenal. The United States should buy more B-2 bombers, of which it has only has only 21, and add range to unmanned aircraft such as the upcoming Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, which can fly only 1,000 nautical miles on a tank of fuel - as little as a fighter.

* Enhance and enlarge bases that are under friendly, sovereign control, such as the U.K.'s Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean or the U.S. territory of Guam in the Pacific.

* In the short term, use the stopgap measure of finding new bases in conflict-prone regions and making greater use of the Navy's carrier-based air power.

There are other solutions as well, to be discussed at length in another column. The solutions will be meaningless, though, if the Pentagon doesn't act on them in a big way, A.S.A.P.

© 2002 TechCentralStation.com, reprinted with permission. Vickers is a defense columnist and can be reached at mvickers@techcentralstation.com.

By Lt. Col. John Winchester

As an active-duty officer in the U.S. Air Force, I have sworn to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic." Throughout my career, I've focused my attention on those foreign enemies that the commander-in-chief and Congress have found to be deserving of our wrath.

But now, I've found a domestic enemy to oppose - and they are us.

Or more correctly, I've found an enemy ludicrous enough to make me laugh.

You see, I have been reassigned overseas to a nation that does not permit the import of firearms. I'm not a "gun nut," but I have a couple of weapons, and rather than place them into storage, I've chosen to sell them. My first step was to post notecard advertisements on established bulletin boards at the local military exchanges - something I thought would be easy. Ironically, this is not the case at all.

At the Pearl Harbor Navy Exchange, I was informed that weapons advertisements are not allowed. So, here I am serving in the world's finest military (where our ultimate job is still to kill the enemy when required, using weapons!), only to find that either the local military exchanges, or the Navy Base bureaucracy behind them, are so politically correct and tainted (a legacy of the Clinton years?) that I can't fully exercise my own Second Amendment rights.

These are the very same Second Amendment rights that I am sworn to support and defend on behalf of my fellow citizens, so that they may freely exercise them. I and my compatriots in the Air Force defended all our citizens' constitutional rights - including the Second Amendment - during our combat missions over and around Baghdad during Operation Desert Storm, getting shot at and returning fire while defending the general principles of freedom on behalf of the Kuwaiti and Saudi people (not that they appear to be terribly grateful to us anymore).

Sure, I know the Navy Exchange hasn't told me I can't own a gun. And the individual managers there have expressed sympathy for my concerns.

Nevertheless, the system - the bureaucracy, the Navy Exchange managers and the Navy Base staff - by restricting my freedom in buying and selling firearms using their public bulletin board, have in essence limited or restricted me, a proudly serving member of the U.S. military, in the free exercise of my Second Amendment rights - the right to own and sell firearms - and have curtailed my First Amendment rights to free speech as well.

So now, how do I support and defend the Constitution of the United States against this domestic enemy?

Lt. Col. Winchester is the pen name of an active-duty, gun-owning member of the U.S. Air Force.

Rank and organization: Specialist Fourth Class, U.S. Army, Company C, 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade.

Place and date: Republic of Vietnam, 8 April 1967.

Entered service at: Montgomery, Ala. Born: 31 July 1947, Florence, Ala.

Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. Sp4c. Michael, U.S. Army, distinguished himself while serving with Company C. Sp4c. Michael was part of a platoon which was moving through an area of suspected enemy activity. While the rest of the platoon stopped to provide security, the squad to which Sp4c. Michael was assigned moved forward to investigate signs of recent enemy activity.

After moving approximately 125 meters, the squad encountered a single Viet Cong soldier. When he was fired upon by the squad's machine gunner, other Viet Cong opened fire with automatic weapons from a well-concealed bunker to the squad's right front. The volume of enemy fire was so withering as to pin down the entire squad and halt all forward movement.

Realizing the gravity of the situation, Sp4c. Michael exposed himself to throw two grenades, but failed to eliminate the enemy position. From his position on the left flank, Sp4c. Michael maneuvered forward with two more grenades until he was within 20 meters of the enemy bunkers, when he again exposed himself to throw the two grenades, which failed to detonate. Undaunted, Sp4c. Michael made his way back to the friendly positions to obtain more grenades.

With two grenades in hand, he again started his perilous move towards the enemy bunker, which by this time was under intense artillery fire from friendly positions. As he neared the bunker, an enemy soldier attacked him from a concealed position. Sp4c. Michael killed him with his rifle and, in spite of the enemy fire and the exploding artillery rounds, was successful in destroying the enemy positions.

Sp4c. Michael took up pursuit of the remnants of the retreating enemy. When his comrades reached Sp4c. Michael, he had been mortally wounded. His inspiring display of determination and courage saved the lives of many of his comrades and successfully eliminated a destructive enemy force. Sp4c. Michael's actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect the utmost credit upon himself and the U.S. Army.

Editor's Note: If you know of any MOH recipient who is hospitalized or has passed away recently, please email DefenseWatch MOH Editor Jim H. at bulldogleader@mindspring.com.