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FROM THE EDITOR:

Learning the Painful Lessons of Combat

By Ed Offley

Good news to report: It appears that the U.S. military units that saw combat in Afghanistan are taking a realistic look at what went right, and what did not, during recent encounters with the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists (a subject that we continue to write about as the facts come out - see Gary R. Stalhut's assessment, "Anaconda: Absolute Success, or Wake Up Call," Article 04 in this issue of DefenseWatch).

A reader and friend from the military Explosive Ordnance Disposal community forwarded one fascinating and troubling "lessons learned" memorandum [PDF] prepared on Apr. 15 based on a session at the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned.

According to our source, Mike, the memorandum confirms that a serious gap exists between real-world conditions on the ground in Afghanistan and the array of EOD training and equipment provided these specialist teams, a situation made more serious by the "degradation of training quality" that has occurred in the EOD community.

In what is a refreshing burst of candor, the memorandum's author - Army National Guard Maj. John L. Gore - quoted a senior Army EOD instructor as confirming that heavy micro-management by non-EOD officials in Afghanistan was hindering the clean-up work. Gore wrote:

"MICRO-MANAGEMENT. Unfortunately is occurring here too. One staff officer informed LTC [John] Stefanovich that he had '12 supervisors' for every soldier on the ground."

EOD operators are involved in some of the most dangerous and frustrating work possible in Afghanistan, where an estimated 10 million land mines and countless thousands of pieces of unexploded ordnance litter the countryside.

Four U.S. soldiers died on Apr. 15 near Kandahar, Afghanistan, while trying to secure some unexploded munitions. They were three soldiers from the 710th EOD Detachment based in San Diego Calif., Staff Sgt. Brian T. Craig, Staff Sgt. Justin. J. Galewski, and Sgt. Jamie O. Maugans; and Sgt. 1st Class Daniel A. Romero, from the 19th Special Forces Group based in Pueblo, Colo.

It is not yet known whether poor management or training were contributing factors to the friendly-fire accident, which is still under formal investigation. But it is refreshing to note that the U.S. military is probing its own conduct and performance with diligence and commitment.

Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at defensewatch@aol.com.

Last September, Army Sgt. Ken Eiland was sent to Bosnia, a very dangerous place even during the best of times, while his wife, Tina, remained at her job in Germany to supplement their skimpy income.

Eiland focused in Sarajevo on doing his job and staying alive, until his world blew up. Not from a mine or a sniper slug, but from finding out through intercepted e-mail that his wife was having an affair. His boss in Bosnia did the right thing and sent him straight back to Germany, where his commanding officer, Capt. Saul Gonzalez, immediately took him to a shrink. His evaluation was not exactly private in that Gonzalez insisted on sitting in while Eiland got his marbles counted and seemed disappointed after the doc said they were all present and accounted for.

Eiland next met alone with Tina, who admitted her sins, asked for forgiveness, named her playmate - Vernon Pollard, a senior sergeant - and provided a sworn statement. Both Eilands recommitted to saving their marriage.

Eiland, seeking closure, went on to confront the adulterer. "Be a man and admit what you've done," he said. "Stay away from my wife, apologize, and I won't press charges."

Pollard followed Rule One for being caught in the rack: total denial. Eiland showed him hard evidence. More denial. Finally, when Eiland demanded to meet with Pollard's wife, he agreed, probably to prevent the affair from hitting the Military Police blotter. In today's Army, from recruit to general, a fast-zipper rap is a career killer.

Eiland told Pollard's wife, "Just open your computer and read the traffic." Mrs. Pollard complied, finding e-mail to Eiland's wife and other women so sordid that even the editor of Hustler magazine might blush.

She was beyond furious.

"As she was reading the messages, Pollard, a 6-foot-4-inch giant built like a Rams linebacker, grabbed her, pinned her head on the floor and, with his free hand, deleted the red-hot messages," Eiland said.

Eiland then went to his bosses and requested - per the Uniform Code of Military Justice - that Pollard be charged. But his COs blew him off.

Finally, weeks later and only after Eiland had made a lot of noise, V Corps Commanding Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace's assistant, Capt. Erin English, was assigned to investigate. Eiland told English he had evidence Pollard had conducted numerous sexual liaisons with married women, specifically naming Military Police soldier Andrea Johnson, a member of four-star Gen. Montgomery C. Meig's personal security detail. Eiland alleges English warned Johnson and other players "to keep quiet and not discuss their affairs with Pollard."

So Eiland informed his battalion CO, Lt. Col. Robert Shaw, that he believed "English tipped off Johnson."

Shaw assured Eiland he was "taking care of everything." But when Eiland asked for a copy of the investigation, Shaw replied, "It's no longer your concern."

"All this compromised the entire investigation," says a former Heidelberg-based Criminal Investigation Division agent who's fine-combed this case. Incidentally, he thinks that if Wallace knew about the cover-up, "heads would roll."

Pollard, who has yet to be charged with adultery, remains assigned to a sensitive position, his career intact except for a slap on the wrist for attacking his wife. Somehow his incriminating staff computer was mysteriously wiped clean even though high-rankers in his staff division promised, "It will be preserved as evidence."

Meanwhile, Eiland, at a big transport cost to us taxpayers, has been told to ship out to another base in Germany, a move that'll cause his wife to lose her job and the now-recovering couple to suffer a 50-percent cut in income.

Several sources in Heidelberg allege that Pollard has dirt on other senior NCOs and high officers in the V Corps head-shed and has openly threatened to take a lot of people with him if he goes down.

The former military criminal investigator says, "The only person who's done nothing wrong in this cesspool of corruption is Sgt. Eiland, and he's been banished to the hinterland, where the conspirators hope he'll roll over and be quiet."

It doesn't seem like "The Army of One" is being true to its mantra - "We take care of our own" - at least not in the double-standard V Corps, where ironically, the commanding general recently banned alcohol and gambling on moral grounds.

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page, and he can be reached at teagles@hackworth.com. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831.

© 2002 David H. Hackworth

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ARTICLE 01

One Soldier's Victory Over 'Moral Rot' in Army

By J. David Galland

Master Sgt. Steve Croteau was a hell of a soldier and one of the finest and most dedicated military intelligence professionals I have ever met. If I had a dollar for each time I heard my old friend Steve described in that fashion, I would probably be kicking back in my house on Seventeen-Mile Drive in Carmel, Calif., puffing on a fancy cigar.

Last week Steve called to announce that he had finally retired from his Army intelligence career after only 22 years. He had planned to soldier-on for more years, he told me, but the, "rot within" left him no option. Let me tell you a true story as to why this excellent, honest, highly-capable, professional intelligence soldier decided to hang it up early.

Steve Croteau enlisted in the Army later than most people do. He chose the military intelligence occupational specialty of counterintelligence. At the age of twenty-nine, he offered the Army some unique skills and he knew what he wanted to do as a soldier. He was a man with a plan.

Croteau had prepared himself well prior to enlisting. With a master's degree in history and an undergraduate degree in international relations, Steve was not the average recruit! His potential was also obvious by his General Technical (GT) Score of 147, placing him close to the genius category. Steve had quite a flair for foreign languages also. He was raised speaking French and English, as if that were not enough, he also mastered Russian, German and Dutch.

When he signed on, back in late 1979, Steve was offered the grade of private 1st class. He raised his right hand and swore his oath, "To protect and defend," and in all my years as a soldier, I have never seen it done better. Croteau rocketed through the ranks and progressed from private 1st class to master sergeant in just over 11 years. Anybody who has served in the Army knows this is a rare anomaly.

I first met Steve in 1985. He was on his way up then. I had the pleasure of getting him settled in and showing him the ropes at his new assignment, the old 430th Military Intelligence Battalion of the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade. The unit was located on old McGraw Kaserne, smack in the middle of Munich, Germany.

As the years passed, and our careers matured, we went on to numerous subsequent assignments within the U.S. Army Intelligence Security Command (INSCOM), including service in various positions within the 66th M.I. Brigade. When not attached to the same unit, Steve and I remained in touch, and it was inspiring to see him carve his niche in the intelligence world, "protecting and defending."

Epic events, now relegated to history, called for job changes and ultimately the redefining of our intelligence careers due to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Some say that it was a measure of our success. The changes translated into different assignments and challenges, as they have for many American soldiers.

In 1995, Croteau reported to another assignment within the 66th Military Intelligence Group, redesignated from its former brigade status and located in the city of Augsberg, Germany, but not too far from Munich. But Steve soon learned that not only the location had changed, but sadly, the quality of the senior leadership as well.

Steve was assigned to the 527th Military Intelligence Battalion of the 66th M.I. Group, but his actual duty station was far from the unit's actual location. He worked hundreds of kilometers away at a small liaison office for a civilian intelligence employee, whom he had known since our Munich days.

Shortly after Croteau arrived at his assignment (a three-year tour), a junior soldier reported in from the 66th M.I. to operate some of the exclusive communication systems that were installed in the liaison office.

This young specialist was not a particularly regimented soldier. He began exploiting his new, "non-garrison environment" in short order by breaking, and flaunting, German traffic laws. The violations required mandatory suspension of the young soldier's U.S. Army Europe driver's license and the possibility of severe disciplinary action to boot. However, the soldier's waywardness was not brought to the attention of his commander, but rather, to Steve and the civilian intelligence employee, who had diametrically opposed opinions when it came to punishing the slacker.

The soldier went unpunished for his misconduct. This led Steve to make the fatal mistake in today's Army. He blew the whistle and demanded the truth and accountability. Croteau wrote to his chain of command in Augsburg, informing his superiors how his civilian boss, through a contact at the U.S. Army Headquarters in Heidelberg, had had the disciplinary action quashed.

Croteau told me he believes that his action got as far as the desk of the 527th M.I. Battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel. The battalion CO was also the "reviewing officer" for Steve's yearly Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reports, and - unbeknownst to Steve - a very good personal friend of Steve's boss, the civilian intelligence employee.

Upon completion of his three-year tour, Croteau departed the 66th M.I. Group and left Germany on March 30, 1998, for an assignment to Fort Meade, Md. Two days prior to leaving, he signed his final Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Form (DA Form 2166-7). For administrative control and processing purposes, his chain of command requested that Croteau leave blank the date of his signature. He complied, signing the form but leaving the date blank.

This is an unfortunate, but common practice stemming from the Army procedure of designating senior officers to formally review the NCOERs, when in fact the paperwork is usually completed before the "formal" review. Since it is when the reviewer signs the OER that the dates then go on the report, this allows a dishonest officer carte blanche to screw an NCO being reviewed.

Thus, three months later, in July 1998, upon screening his Official Military Personnel Files, (OMPF), for consideration by the upcoming Command Sergeant Major promotion selection board, Croteau learned the reward for his honesty.

On Apr. 9, 1998, almost two weeks after he had signed out of the 66th M.I. Group in Germany, his battalion commander "poison penned" Croteau with a "Memorandum Of Nonconcurrence" to my friend's otherwise stunning, final Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report. The battalion commander then moved to ensure that it would be enclosed with Croteau's actual evaluation, and the documents were subsequently forwarded for inclusion in Croteau's official personnel file completely without his knowledge, a clear violation of Army regulations since AR 623-205 dictates that the rated NCO must be notified of any memorandum of nonconcurrence.

The date of signature on the report - remember, Croteau had been asked to leave that part of the OER form blank - was falsely filled in with the date of May 4, 1998, as if he had personally read and acknowledged the negative memorandum - even though he was nowhere near Augsberg, Germany, on that date.

Army Regulation 623-205 sets out specific guidance for the completion of Army Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reports. In denying Croteau the opportunity to be aware of the memorandum, and the chance to include a rebuttal in his records, the battalion commander committed a grave, illegal injustice against him.

Being the idealist that he has always been, Steve Croteau gathered his evidence and sent a well-founded and voluminous appeal of the battalion commander's memorandum - with reams of supportive documentation - to the U. S. Army Enlisted Personnel and Records Branch at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., in the late summer of 1998.

Still, anyone who has ever appealed, or tried to make a correction to the official military personnel files knows, to put it mildly, it is one heck of an uphill climb that can take years. But reviewing officials ruled in favor of Steve Croteau's appeal in December 2001. After receiving official notification of the appeal board's decision and the correction of his military records, Croteau immediately submitted his retirement request.

That's because Croteau had won his battle but lost the war: Since it had taken more than three years for his appeal of the OER to go through (rather than the 6-12 months he had anticipated), Croteau found himself at the age of 51 in December 2001, well past the maximum eligible age for consideration for promotion to command sergeant major. He could have remained on active duty for another four years but with no chances of promotion - so with retirement his only option, my friend opted to get out.

I find comfort in my belief that everybody will sooner or later have to answer to The Big Ranger In The Sky. The battalion commander, since promoted to full colonel, remains on active duty. I doubt that his leadership style has changed. I originally intended to reveal the battalion commander's name in this article, but decided not to at this point because he currently holds a critical position related to the ongoing war against terrorism. But I do this not for the officer himself, but rather for those men and women serving under him who might be hurt by negative publicity.

In any event, the purpose of this article was not to expose a morally-challenged officer, but instead to recognize and salute an accomplished colleague - Master Sgt. Steve Croteau - for a career of distinguished service that made the nation safer, and for proving that you can right a wrong by working within the system.

J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is a retired veteran of over thirty years of service in military intelligence who resides in Germany. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.

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ARTICLE 02

Marine Defenders in Bahrain Deserve Salute

By Matthew Dodd

Let me shatter a couple of myths and recognize some of our unsung heroes who risked their lives in service to our great country.

Shattered Myth #1: Our troops in Afghanistan and the Philippines are not the only U.S. service members to come face-to-face with radical fanatics capable of terrorist acts.

Shattered Myth #2: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict directly and indirectly increases the dangers to our forces stationed or deployed overseas.

On Apr. 5, the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain was attacked by an unknown number of out-of-control demonstrators participating in a pro-Palestinian/anti-U.S. rally near the embassy compound. Since this story was virtually ignored by the news media, let me share what I learned from a few official and unofficial sources about what happened at our embassy in Bahrain almost three weeks ago.

A few miles from the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain, at least a couple of thousand pro-Palestinian supporters gathered to protest against the Israeli offensive in the West Bank. The rally turned violent as radicals took charge and led the march to the U.S. Embassy.

Once at the embassy compound, some protestors began throwing rocks, sticks, and firebombs (Molotov cocktails) at the embassy. The embassy was closed and the only U.S. personnel present were five Marine security guards and two regional security officers (RSOs). Approximately thirty protestors climbed over the compound's walls and began setting cars, trucks, and trees on fire. Some even began to destroy unoccupied guard posts and satellite communications equipment inside the compound. The Marines were authorized to use appropriate force and they shot tear gas into the crowds of protestors surrounding the compound.

With no firefighters in sight or sound, three Marines left the embassy to put out the fires themselves. They entered the compound under covering fire of the remaining two Marines firing tear gas. Some protestors attacked the firefighting Marines with sticks and rocks. Two of the firefighting Marines wound up chasing the belligerent protestors and forcing them back over the compound's walls, while the third Marine fought the fires by himself.

Once the fires were out, the three firefighting Marines returned to the embassy and continued to protect the compound's wall from persistent protestors. Approximately three hours after the siege of the embassy began, Bahraini riot control police finally secured the area and order was restored outside the compound. The Marines remained in the embassy overnight for additional security.

According to an article on Apr. 8 in The New York Times, one protestor died on Apr. 7 from internal bleeding after being hit in the head by either a tear gas canister or a rubber bullet. The protestor's family contends the fatal shot came from the embassy compound, despite conflicting reports that the shot came from Bahraini police.

The U.S. Embassy released a brief statement regarding the force used by the embassy defenders that said in part, "In response to this provocation, embassy security personnel fired tear gas cylinders to compel the intruders to leave the embassy ground. Embassy personnel did not fire at demonstrators." My other sources back up the embassy's statement.

The Bahraini government, probably deeply embarrassed at its inability to control the protestors and protect the embassy, took immediate action to repair the damages in and around the embassy compound. Within a day, all the graffiti and firebomb burns on the compound's walls were painted over, the burned and destroyed guard posts were replaced, and the rocks and debris inside the compound were hauled away. Looking into the compound from the outside, passersby would not believe that the embassy was recently besieged. Bahraini government officials told U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann, that everything destroyed would be replaced regardless of cost.

According to one source, the embassy compound siege was caught on video by an Al Jazeera News Agency helicopter flying over the compound. This source believes that the video will not be released because of political and governmental sensitivities, and because Al Jazeera is the same agency that had the Daniel Pearl murder on tape.

The U.S. Embassy in Bahrain is still standing today because of the collective courage of its five Marines and two RSOs. Faced with an unknown and hostile situation involving a riotous crowd hundreds of times their size in a foreign land, these brave defenders held their ground. Their professionalism and self-discipline while under great duress was heroic. The difference between the eventual conclusion and a potential disaster was tiny and very much in doubt for at least a couple hours.

Maybe because none of the defenders were killed, because the compound was cleaned up immediately, because the Bahraini government promised to replace everything destroyed regardless of cost, and because the dead protestor's family insists that he was shot by one of the defenders, the mainstream news media thinks that the defenders' story was not newsworthy.

I respectfully disagree.

Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.

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ARTICLE 03

See Through Anti-Israel Disinformation Campaign

By Patrick Hayes

The ground shakes, flames explode into a blast furnace, debris and body parts fly through the air and the concussion knocks you down - if you're lucky enough to survive the initial blast. If you do, you'll be in shock from a few seconds to minutes - maybe longer.

That's as close as you can get to what it's like to be on the receiving end of enemy high explosives without actually being there - expected on the battlefield, but not in a shopping plaza or pizzeria.

The Israelis have put up with such murderous attacks by Palestinian and other Muslim fanatics for some time. To describe the Israeli reaction as restrained would be a major understatement. However, when the Israeli government finally had enough and acted in defense of its civilian population, much as the United States has following the al Qaeda terrorist attacks last Sept. 11, suddenly Israel became the aggressor, rather than the aggrieved victim.

Such is the power of disinformation. The Soviets were masters at it. The Left in this country still relies on disinformation, while also trying to shout down other points of view in order to sway, as the intelligentsia so lovingly calls them, "the great unwashed."

An example of this combined rhetorical left-wing and Muslim disinformation against Israel and the United States occurred this past weekend outside the Capitol in Washington, D.C.

By comparison, such attacks against their home states in the cities of Damascus, Tripoli, Riyadh, or Baghdad would not be tolerated.

Its enemies condemn Israel for trying to protect itself from the ongoing vicious onslaught by Muslim suicidal/homicidal bombers and gunmen. It's been there before. Without repeating every detail of Israeli modern history again (see "Israel Should Rethink Its 'Patience of Job' " DefenseWatch, Jan. 30, 2002, for a reprise), it is important to recognize that since 1948, not counting the various other attacks by Palestinian and other Muslim (then Marxist) terrorists, Israel has been attacked by up to five Arab armies three times. Each time, Israel destroyed the attackers and took land, which is what happens in war - the victor captures ground. If the Arabs didn't want to lose it, maybe they shouldn't have attacked. Having lost, maybe they ought to quit whining about it.

It wasn't too long ago that among the chic circles of the silver-spoon socialist elite, particularly in Hollywood, little forlorn Israel was considered to be the darling of the Left and the "underdog," surrounded, as they are, by hegemonic Arab dictatorships with hordes of foaming-at-the-mouth Muslim fanatics ready to tear the fledgling democratic Israeli state apart. But recently, there's been a shift of opinion in the left-of-center European political circles, which, combined with Europe's history of anti-Semitism, makes for a less-than-accurate portrayal of what has happened and what is happening in the Middle East today.

However, this blatant disinformation is also having an effect on public opinion in the United States, spurred on by the pro-Arab lobby, much of the mainstream media, pro-Palestinian activists on university (where today's most common academic major seems to be binge drinking and getting laid, rather than seeking knowledge), and even from America's own resident right-wing conservative, Patrick J. Buchanan, who also seems to be confused by it all, attacking, as he did, a measured Israeli response to unadulterated aggression.

For those with a short memory span, a selective memory, or no memory at all, the record demonstrates that Israel was consistently responding to aggression when it took military steps, either against the three attacks by Arab (read Muslim) armies, or its response to Palestine Liberation Organization assaults from southern Lebanon in the early 1980s.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon is a good case study. Israel attacked and chased the PLO and its Syrian cohorts north to Beirut until the United States brokered (read, imposed) a "peace" that not only sent the Israelis back home but also set the stage for the disastrous U.S. Marine peacekeeping effort in Lebanon.

Some peace. The PLO was a terrorist organization then and it is a terrorist organization today. However, since then, it seems that every time Israel has tried to defend itself against such attacks, the United States bullies it into accepting a "peace" that most Israelis know will not last and will not stop terrorism. Under pressure from questionable elements, the U.S. government is trying to force Israel to back down and take it - yet again.

Here's a scoop for U.S. policymakers: The terrorists do not want peace. In fact, they want to avoid peace at all costs; this is their raison d'etre. They and their Arab paymasters want to obliterate Israel. Period. If it were possible, they would like to do the same to the United States.

Proof is easy: If the Arab states really want a serious peace settlement, why are they supporting, if not actually defending, the Palestinian fanatics and their suicidal/homicidal bombers and gunmen (which are being paid for by our enemy in waiting, Saddam Hussein, and our supposed allies, the Saudis)?

During Secretary of State Colin Powell's recent visit to the region, another terrorist exploded himself and killed several civilians. When asked if this was an act of terrorism, Powell dodged the question, apparently so he would not offend supreme terrorist Arafat, with whom he was scheduled to meet.

This campaign of disinformation is also trying to separate what is going on in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks last year. But if we try just a little to be objective, we might see that there is no difference between the fanatical Palestinian Muslims who blow themselves up to kill innocent people in Israel and the fanatical Muslims from various Arab countries who blew themselves up to kill innocent people in the United States.

As reported recently by Paul Sperry in WorldNetDaily.com, the al Qaeda terrorist manual suggests patience to achieve its goals. According to the terrorist manual, "Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they always have been ... by pen and gun ... by word and bullet ... by tongue and teeth."

"Islam does not make a truce with unbelief," it continues, "but rather confronts it."

This frame of thinking is, as Perry points out, from the Koran itself. A footnote to the above passages found in the al Qaeda terrorist manual under, "The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an" by the widely respected Muslim scholar Abdullah Yusuf Ali, states, "Mealy-mouthed compromises are not right for soldiers of truth and righteousness."

Yet, this reality from the terrorist playbook is not getting through to many Americans. The disinformation campaign targeting U.S. public opinion is inextricably tied to the American war on terrorism itself - something else the Left in this country finds "tiresome" and a viable target for their politically correct thought police, particularly on university campuses.

Some people need a rock to fall on their heads before they wake up. The most recent example of fanatical Muslim extremism is the call in Afghanistan by al Qaeda and Taliban loyalists to use the same tactics of suicidal/homicidal bombing attacks against American and allied troops there.

These seemingly unconnected conflicts around the globe are not haphazard. They are not a matter of sides, economic issues, political ideologies, race, or location, like in the Philippines, Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia, or Afghanistan. It is becoming impossible to come to any conclusion other than that these various struggles are actually different fronts in a declared war of Islam against the "unbelievers" - the West.

Yet, since the last major Arab attack against Israel, the West has continued to badger that beleaguered country to give back the occupied territories. In fact, "land for peace" is the "battle cry" of the so-called peacemakers. One tactical question here is, why? Why should Israel give up land that was taken from its enemies in battle and render itself defenseless yet again to an unstable, hostile and extremely volatile Arab environment? Another question is, to whom should the captured land be given? The terrorists?

Yet another question for the pseudo-intellectuals sitting in their ivory towers pondering life's foibles is, how long was it before the United States, Britain and France gave back occupied territories captured during World War in both the Japanese islands and in Germany? Besides wishing to help build stable democracies and economies in those countries, they did not just beat the enemy into submission and then leave them to rebuild for war yet again. That's what happened after World War I, a mistake that had to be paid for with the lives of millions more just two decades later.

The bottom line to the current anti-Israeli disinformation campaign is a warning to the handwringers in the West: If Israel is left defenseless and alone in a sea of Muslim fanaticism, eventually it will have no alternative but to bring out the big guns for one final showdown - a showdown the United States must avoid at all costs.

It is time for the American people to wake up and fight against the left-wing/Muslim disinformation campaign and stand by its only real ally in the Middle East - a democratic Israel.

Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at gyrene@sftt.us.

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ARTICLE 04

Anaconda: Absolute Success, or Wake-Up Call?

By Gary R. Stahlhut

Now that the dust has settled with regards to Operation Anaconda, I believe this is the time to start writing a truthful and detailed after operations report. Since I was not directly involved in this operation I can only write about what I have observed, read about, or been told happened. We cannot only rely on official reports of the operation, since the information was controlled and censored, thus making it imperative to produce accurate and honest appraisals of what happened to our troops, especially AARs from the 10th Mountain Division. The conclusions derived from the lessons learned during this operation must be used to improve our training and our command and control procedures.

Operation Ananconda was designed to encircle and destroy Al Qaeda and Taliban troops who had been infiltrating in to the caves and valleys of the mountainous region of Shah e Tot. Much like the mountainous area of Tora Bora, this region was also being used to store weapons and hide enemy troops in a multitude of caves and tunnels built into the mountains.

Operation Anaconda incorporated the use of blocking forces to avoid repeating the mistake of leaving the back door open, as happened during the Tora Bora campaign when most of the Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters infiltrated out of the area before being captured or killed. Operation Anaconda was fought by 1,500 soldiers at altitudes of 10,000 feet and more, making this operation one of the highest altitudes at which U.S. combat forces have fought in since World War II. Infantry from the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Special Forces, and Afghan allies fought gut-busting infantry combat which has not been seen since the war in Vietnam.

Operation Anaconda required infantry to pack in what they needed to fight and survive, the use of helicopters was very limited in the mountains due to the altitude and amount of ground fire thrown up against them.

The high altitude caused immense problems for the men of 10th Mountain Division, which, despite its name, is not trained for mountain warfare. Many soldiers suffered from altitude sickness, cold weather exposure, muscle failure, and weapons failures. To be fair, despite the 10th Mountain Division's best efforts, they were not trained or prepared to fight a prolonged mountain campaign. While division elements had earlier seen combat most notably in support of the 1993 Task Force Ranger relief in Mogadishu, most of the division's missions of the past decade were in support of peacekeeping missions in Kuwait, Haiti and Bosnia.

I believe that the results of Operation Anaconda give strong support to actually make the 10th Mountain Division, a true Mountain Division. The "Mountain" tab should be a qualification tab, not just another shoulder tab. Each soldier should go through a mountain school (much like Ranger School) and be awarded the tab only if they graduate, to be able to serve in the division. This includes the division support troops. Operation Anaconda will certainly not be the last time we will have to fight an enemy in mountainous terrain.

The war in Afghanistan is fast becoming a guerilla war, which cannot be measured by declaring each military operation an absolute success or by how many enemy we kill. Reporting estimates of enemy dead makes good headlines, but as we found out in Vietnam, our enemies are not only willing to sacrifice themselves in battle against us, their strategy is also to outlast our will to continue to fight them.

Success in a guerilla war is not won by any one battle or military operation. Guerillas will seldom welcome pitched battles against a superior enemy, but will use tactics that minimize the superiority of their enemy and maximize their own strengths. They will strike when they can achieve surprise, achieve a tactical advantage and inflict as much damage as possible before retreating from the area before their enemy can react against them. The guerilla will use hostile terrain against us, including jungles, mountains and urban areas. The battles in Somalia almost a decade ago, the battles we have recently fought in Afghanistan and the Israeli punitive actions in Palestinian West Bank cities are a testament to the wars of the future.

Success at beating the guerilla was is not measured by how many of them are killed, it is ultimately crushing the guerilla's ability to sustain and wage a war without having any impact of the government, or the people who live in the area of the insurgency. This takes time and it also takes the will to fight the guerilla until he is defeated.

This is why I do not agree with the initial Pentagon and press assessment that Operation Anaconda was the success it has been portrayed to be. As enamored as we tend to be with our superior technology and firepower, we completely underestimated the size of the enemy force at Shah e Tot and their tenacity to fight, even when confronted by our overwhelming firepower.

As far as I am concerned, reports of the use of the use of 2,000-pound "thermobaric bombs," (designed to deprive caves of oxygen) and many hundreds of smart bombs, were over shadowed by the ability of the Al Qaeda-Taliban ability to severely damage all the AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships involved in the battle and to pin down large numbers of our troops.

Operation Anaconda not only identified our overconfidence in the effectiveness of airpower and technology to break the enemy's will to fight, but it also showed our own short-sightedness to believe that the Al-Qaeda-Taliban forces would not be prepared to escape and evade the trap we had set for them.

The fact still remains that no matter how many bombs (smart or dumb) we drop, no matter how many Apache gunships or predator UAVs we use, the outcome of these battles will still come down to the ability of our foot soldiers to dig out the enemy fighters and kill them. This type of gut-busting infantry combat proved successful for Captain Kevin Butler of the 101st Airborne Division.

No matter how many air strikes he called in and how many smart bombs were dropped, his company continued to receive incoming mortar fire and small arms fire from caves hidden in the ridgelines above him. At times, the Al Qaeda fighters would emerge from their caves and taunt our boys, making fun of our inability to kill them with our smart bombs. Captain Butler eventually killed a number of these jokers, using a dime store 60mm mortar and timing an airburst above them as they emerged from a cave to taunt him once again.

This is evidence that taking the fight to the enemy with rifles, pistols, grenades and mortars proved to be more effective in this terrain than the use of airstrikes.

Unfortunately, there is no hard evidence nevertheless to suggest that we accomplished our original goal. At the end of Operation Anaconda, as well as Tora Bora, the majority of the Al-Qaeda fighters escaped, leaving behind a few bodies and many empty caves.

Of much greater significance is the fact that 10th Mountain Division units involved in Operation Anaconda were pulled from the battle after two weeks and then redeployed to Fort Drum, N.Y. Amid great pomp and circumstance these units arrived back home to the cameras of ABC's Good Morning America. Later in the broadcast, a news anchor reported that the first elements of a 1,700-man strong British Royal Marine battle group began to arrive in Afghanistan. It was also reported that no other U.S. troops were planned to replace the soldiers of the 10th, or in the words of the division PAO, "we have the Brits now."

I truly wonder if the significance of this one broadcast was recognized for the greater statement it made regarding the decline of our own combat capabilities. A country with one of the smallest armies in the world was formally asked to pick up the ball from the country with the largest and best financed military in the world. This indeed can qualify as an unqualified Wakeup Call.

Gary R. Stahlhut is an Army Reserve officer and combat veteran with 26 years of active and reserve duty. He can be reached at Gary.R.Stahlhut@eudoramail.com.

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ARTICLE 05

Leadership Failures Hamper the War Against Terrorism

By John M. Szelog

A San Francisco area newspaper reported on April 19 that four Army National Guard members assigned to bridge security details had admitted that they did not have the right weapons or training, and were using substandard equipment. Their complaints ranged from dirty weapons, to outdated bulletproof vests that the Guard had to borrow from the California Highway Patrol, to vehicles that didn't run. The Guardsmen also reported that they were told by their superiors that they were assigned at the bridges "just for show."

In response, National Guard and state officials denied that there are any problems, with a Guard spokesman saying that all weapons are serviceable, the protective vests are optional, and the Guard has requested newer vehicles.

It's almost a given that members of the military don't like airing out problems such as this via the news media. The reasons for this vary from not wanting to draw attention, to distrust of the media, so it stands as a testament to the scope of the problem, and most likely to the failure of the system to remedy the problems, that this information made it to the media at all.

It would seem that having an airliner rammed into the Pentagon wasn't close enough for many of the civilian and military leadership in Washington. It would seem that they would have to have an airliner parked in their lap before they get the idea that this whole situation is serious. Why do I say this? Read the first two paragraphs again, and concentrate on the second one. How many times have you seen that type of response, whether it was concerning bad equipment or training, or why a group of Ranger and Delta Force soldiers were left to die while help was only minutes away?

I am forced to conclude that the leadership of the military and our country have developed a severe disconnect with reality. They apparently believe that if they talk about something being done, it will magically happen. This extends to these same people believing that if they said a problem should be fixed, then it must have been fixed, and so there can no longer be a problem.

When someone is given concrete and conclusive evidence that something "is," but that person continuously claims that it "isn't," that person is generally thought to be in denial. The same problems keep coming up, and it's not the same group of people over and over. In response, the military and civilian leadership continually claim that there aren't any problems, or that the problems are being fixed - yet the same problems keep popping up.

Perhaps they're just gremlins, or fairies, or gnomes, because, according to the leadership, there're no other plausible explanations. It just can't be happening, or the problems are being fixed.

These situations make a person wonder whether a government and a military that do nothing, aren't just as dangerous as a group of terrorists who ram airliners into buildings. The truly sad thing is, at least the terrorists have principles and convictions behind what they do. The people in the government and the military - the people who are in the positions to make decisions, and don't - what excuse do they have?

It can't be money: With a $1 trillion federal budget, and billions upon billions of dollars in off-budget bond issues, there is no way that there's a shortage of money.

It can't be equipment or resources: The United States has, or has access to, the greatest material and knowledge wealth in the history of mankind, so that can't be the problem.

That leaves the people running the show. The people who, several months after Sept. 11, granted amnesty to millions of illegal aliens; who, after claiming that federalizing airport security would result in smarter, better-trained security personnel, snuck and dropped the requirement for those personnel to even have a high school diploma; who sent a lone U.S. Navy destroyer into a known hostile port, and ordered that the ship's personnel not point weapons at anyone approaching the ship; who did not demand that the INS fire everyone involved with approving school visas for two of the terrorists who hijacked airliners and rammed them into the World Trade Center.

The only conclusion that can be reached is that the people in key federal government positions to make decisions don't care - plain and simple.

John M. Szelog is a Contributing Editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at streetgang52@hotmail.com.

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ARTICLE 06

Secret Tests May Have Harmed Over 2,000 Sailors

By Robert G. Williscroft

On April 7, DefenseWatch ran my article outlining the existence of a highly-classified Navy testing program called Project SHAD. In that article, I revealed that dramatic differences apparently exist between official published rules for the experiments carried out under Project SHAD, and what actually happened as narrated by several enlisted participants.

This article explores additional details that have emerged about the experiments and the ongoing Department of Defense (DoD) investigation into these events.

The experiments lumped together under Project SHAD were conducted over a period of several years during the early and mid 1960s, in Pacific locations near Hawaii and along the Atlantic coast. They were designed to determine the vulnerability to chemical and biological attack of ships, ship systems and shipboard personnel. The objective was to learn how chemical and biological warfare agents would disperse throughout a ship, and then to use that information to develop procedures for protecting personnel and shipboard decontamination.

At least initially, none of the experiments were designed to use live, potentially dangerous bacteria or chemicals. Instead, the designers proposed that traceable substances well known to be benign and harmless form the basis for these experiments.

What actually happened, however, is that the project designers moved the basis away from presumed biologically neutral markers and simulants to employ real biologically active bacteria and actual deadly toxins.

I'm not claiming that these guys were monsters who deliberately exposed unsuspecting sailors to such things. What appears to have happened is that the military bureaucracy played a significant role in the process. While it cannot be verified for certain right now, the initial test protocols probably mandated that all test subjects (read this as the crew members of all the affected ships) be outfitted with and trained in the operation and use of so-called NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) garb. These typically consisted of full-body, watertight coveralls with integral boots, gloves and hoods. They were designed to protect the wearer from any contact with whatever bad stuff was floating in the surrounding air or lurking on nearby surfaces.

It appears, however, that the bean counters decided the cost was too high, especially since the projected test materials were actually benign anyway. Consequently, the NBC garb never made it into the final protocols.

Parallel to this probable sequence of events, another set of project planners decided to take advantage of the fact that every participant with any risk of exposure would be adequately protected by the NBC garb. Since there really was no way to simulate the actual dispersal of active biological and chemical agents, and since absolutely no data had been collected on this subject, they must have decided to introduce the real stuff.

I suspect they had no idea the bean counters had, in the meantime, nixed the protective outerwear.

It appears, therefore, that the participating skippers received test protocols that made no mention of real biological contaminants or real toxic substances. Under these circumstances, especially in the military climate of the mid 1960s, the likely response of a Division Officer to a junior seaman's question about what was happening would be to admonish him to follow orders and to send him back to the job at hand - which in this case was to collect air samples containing highly toxic, very dangerous biological and chemicals agents, and to do so with no protection of any kind.

Here are some of the substances employed in Project SHAD, according to information disclosed by the DoD, along with a brief description of their toxicity or biohazard compiled from information supplied by the VA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), or as listed on WebMD:

Biological Warfare Agent Simulants:

Bacillus globigii (BG), also known as B. licheniformis: Members of the genus Bacillus are spore-forming bacteria typically found in decaying organic matter, dust, soil, vegetables, and water. Anthrax is caused by a member of this species, Bacillus anthracis. The DoD apparently did not consider BG to be pathogenic, and selected it as a less infectious biological warfare agent to simulate Anthrax in the Project SHAD tests. BG is, however, associated with a number of opportunistic infections that would be expected to occur shortly after an exposure event, and it appears that these infections can lead to long-term health effects. Symptoms of BG infection include ocular infections, deep-seated soft tissue infections, and systemic infections, such as meningitis, endocarditis, osteomyelitis, and recurrent bacteremia.

E. coli: Common bacterium that has been studied intensively by geneticists because of its small genome size, normal lack of pathogenicity, and ease of growth in the laboratory. E. coli has been associated with food poisoning, diarrhea, urinary tract infection, and even Rheumatoid Arthritis. It doesn't appear to have any long-term effects, except with its possible not-yet-understood association with Rheumatoid Arthritis

Serratia marcscens: One of several opportunistic pathogens, that causes infections of the skin, blood, wounds, and urinary and respiratory tracts. It doesn't appear to have any long-term effects.

Biological Warfare Agents:

Coxiella burnetii (OU): Hosted by domestic animals like cats, sheep, cattle, goats, wild animals, and ticks, causes Q fever in humans. Humans normally can become infected after contact with contaminated feces or blood, by inhaling contaminated dust or droplets, or ingesting contaminated food or raw milk. Symptoms of the disease include fever, headache, muscle pains, arthralgia, and a dry, non-productive cough. Hepatitis or pneumonia also may develop during the early stages of the disease. In rare occurrences, Q fever can cause endocarditis and subsequent aortic heart valve complications. Generally, however, victims recover, even without treatment.

Pasteurella tularensis, also known as Francisella tularensis (UL): Causes the infectious disease tularemia, also known as rabbit fever, deer fly fever, or Ohara's disease. Infected wild rabbits, other infected animals, ticks, or contaminated food or water transmit tularemia. The symptoms, high fever and severe constitutional distress, appear suddenly within 10 days of exposure. One (or more) ulcerating lesion develops at the infection site, usually the arm, eye, or mouth. The regional lymph nodes enlarge, suppurate, and drain. Pneumonia, meningitis, or perionitis may complicate the infection, whose mortality rate is about 6 percent.

Chemical Warfare Agents:

VX Nerve Agent: Six to ten milligrams of this substance absorbed through the skin or ten milligrams breathed into the lungs as an aerosol will kill. For reference, a grain of rice weighs about ten milligrams. VX is stable; it sticks to things as a slightly sticky, oily film. Its high toxicity and ability to remain on surfaces for a long time make this agent an excellent killing weapon.

GB Nerve Agent (Sarin): Requires about fifteen times the breathing dose and 200 times the skin dose of VX to be lethal. Sarin is very volatile so that it is most effective as a gas. This makes it excellent for use in enclosed areas like a large building or a subway.

Exposure to high doses of both GB and VX can result in widespread over-stimulation of muscles and nerves, and convulsions and death can occur. Limited evidence indicates that possible exposure levels of GB and VX during Project SHAD could have produced long-term health effects, including fatigue, headache, visual abnormalities, asthenia, shoulder stiffness, symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, and abnormalities on various psychomotor and EEG tests.

Chemical Warfare Agent Simulants:

Methyl acetoacetate: Listed with the FEMA as a toxic substance with a health hazard level of 2 (out of a possible 3).

Sulfur dioxide: Fatally toxic. Contact causes severe burns and blindness. Listed with the FEMA as a toxic substance with a health hazard level of 3 (out of a possible 3).

Tracer Material:

Zinc cadmium sulfide (ZnCdS): Used by DoD as a tracer material for studying potentially harmful particles dispersed in air. ZnCdS particles dispersed in air behave similarly to some biological agents. Since they fluoresce under ultraviolet light, they can be detected easily. ZnCdS is not acutely toxic when given orally, consistent with its low solubility and apparent lack of bioavailability. The particle size used in these tests could have been inhaled, however, and deposited in the deep lung. There are no data on the toxicity of inhaled ZnCdS, but toxicity data on cadmium, which is the most toxic component of ZnCdS, strongly indicate that inhaled ZnCdS causes lung cancer. The estimated upper-bound, lung-cancer risk ranges from less than one per million to 24 per million.

Bear in mind that all of these substances were used at one time or another on the unsuspecting crews of at least the following ships, according to the VA: USS Carpenter (DD-825), USS George Eastman (AG-39), USS Granville S. Hall (YAG-40), USS Hoel (DDG-13), USS Navarro (LPA-215), USS Power (DD-839), and USS Tioga County (LST-158). There may have been others, but this is the current list available according to declassified Navy documents. In addition to ships, I have identified five Army light tugs that were manned by Navy personnel during Project SHAD: LT-2080, LT- 2081, LT-2085, LT-2086 and LT-2087.

Using a 1960s-era edition of Jane's Fighting Ships, it appears that the tests involved over 2,000 sailors serving aboard the seven ships and five tugs.

The DoD currently acknowledges several tests took place in the Southwest Pacific, and at least one in the Atlantic. The exact number of Project SHAD tests remains unavailable. The DoD has largely declassified and released information on six tests: Autumn Gold, Copper Head, Shady Grove, Eager Belle I, Eager Belle II and Scarlet Sage. DoD officials are currently researching other suspected Project SHAD tests referred to as Flower Drum, Night Train, Big Tom, Fearless Johnny, Half Note, Purple Sage, Red Beva, 68-50, 69-31 and 69-32. My private reports indicate there may have been other tests, including several more in the Atlantic.

The real tragedy of this scandal is not only that it happened in the first place, but that still living participants seem unable to get any assistance with their consequential ailments from either the VA or DoD. The stated reasons are that the information is classified and that its release would be detrimental to the country.

I have been in contact with the now retired executive officer of one of the vessels. He steadfastly refuses to divulge any information, citing documents he signed upon retirement that specifically prohibit him from any direct comment on anything related to Project SHAD.

While I respect his decision, I have serious doubts about the underlying official reasons for the nearly complete lack of any substantive information on Project SHAD. I can see no reason whatever for withholding information on who may have been exposed, and to what chemical or biological agents they may have been in contact with.

But information released to date strongly indicates that the Navy exposed a relatively large number of American fighting men to biological and chemical toxins, with potentially serious long-term effects, without their knowledge or consent. It also appears that DoD officials are stonewalling any serious effort to establish the facts and proffer appropriate relief and compensation to the unwitting victims.

It is time for an immediate in-depth effort by the highest-ranking DoD officials to bring this sorry chapter of Cold War military history to a close.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

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ARTICLE 07

Job Assistance Program Shift Deserves Scrutiny

By Andrea West

Many veterans, myself included, completed their term of service and wondered just how they were going to become gainfully employed upon re-entering civilian life.

Employment specialists dealing exclusively in veterans' job searches are available at local state or county employment offices. These specialists, often veterans themselves, can explain the process of the job search, the federal and state veterans' employment preference system, and the local job reference procedure. They are employed by the state Department of Labor and are referred to under the cumbersome title of Disabled Veterans Outreach Specialist/Local Veterans Employment Representative (DVOP/LVER).

I have had great personal success with these fine people who have bent over backwards to help me find work in the past. In Montana, where I live, the procedure is as follows: The veteran makes an appointment with the DVOP/LVER. After an initial assessment, which includes a skills list, the DVOP/LVER interviews the veteran and helps him or her come up with possible job types. The DVOP/LVER then looks on the database of job openings and recommends various jobs to the veteran. If the job prospects appear good, the DVOP/LVER provides a recommendation and sends the veteran out to make contact with the prospective employer.

It was, therefore, interesting to receive the following e-mail from one DefenseWatch reader:

It is true that the Department of Labor, under Secretary Elaine Chao, proposes to hand over the DVOP/LVER program to the VA. (For a look at their proposed budget, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/bud19.html.) According to the White House website, the general aim of the proposed budget is to move money out of programs that don't perform and put it into ones that do.

Among its various recommendations in its 2003 budget proposal, The Department of Labor rates the Veterans' Employment and Training Service as ineffective and calls it and "unnecessary overhead" that "monitors another employment program, rather than helping veterans find jobs." The DOL proposal further notes that the One-Stop Career Center grant program itself "has not been evaluated" and that the Employment Service "currently rates its performance only in terms of services provided to job seekers, but is developing measures based on whether job seekers find work."

It should also be pointed out that this is currently only a proposal and may or may not come to pass. Various departments have to weigh in, and prospective gaining units have to juggle their budgets to see if they can accommodate this change. The DVOP/LVER specialists themselves are, naturally, concerned about how this is going to shape up in the end. One possible place for the DVOP/LVERs to be sent to is the VA's Vocational Rehabilitation program, which administers the retraining of veterans for civilian employment.

As a personal perspective, I have worked with the VA's Vocational Rehabilitation program and found it to be first-rate. The agency chosen to administer my training was very helpful and professional. In addition to documenting that she had seen me, my counselor was required to indicate to the VA what we worked on, what my grades in school were, and in general to show some progress in the training program.

The move proposed by the Department of Labor appears to be a paper one, at least here in Montana. In all likelihood, the program transfer will be invisible to veterans, and the same person who handled the veterans' job searches in the past will probably continue to do so in the future.

Still, if this change concerns veterans and military people planning to re-enter civilian life in the near future, they should look into the matter and see how their individual state is handling this proposal.

A final word of advice to the veteran who is looking for work: Don't put all your eggs in one basket. Remember that contacts through your family, friends, co-workers, clients, and correspondents are other good prospects for finding work.

Andrea West is DefenseWatch Veterans editor. She can be reached at defensewatchvet@yahoo.com.

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ARTICLE 08

Letter From the Front

Gentlemen:

While marching from Portugal to a position which commands the approach to Madrid and the French forces, my officers have been diligently complying with your requests which have sent by His Majesty's ship from London to Lisbon and thence by dispatch rider to our headquarters.

We have enumerated our saddles, bridles, tents and poles, and all manner of sundry items for which His Majesty's government holds me accountable. I have dispatched reports on the character, wit and spleen of every officer. Each item and every farthing has been accounted for, with two regrettable exceptions for which I beg your indulgence.

Unfortunately, the sum of one shilling and ninepence remains unaccounted for in one infantry battalion's petty cash, and there has been a hideous confusion as to the numbers of jars of raspberry jam issued to one cavalry regiment during a sandstorm in Western Spain. This reprehensible carelessness may be related to the pressure of circumstance, since we are at war with France, a fact which may come as a bit of a surprise to you gentlemen in Whitehall.

This brings me to my present purpose, which is to request elucidation of my instruction from His Majesty's government, so that I may better understand why I am dragging an army over these barren plains. I construe that perforce it must be one of two alternative duties, as given below. I shall pursue either one with the best of my ability but I cannot do both:

Gen. Arthur Wellesley RA
Duke of Wellington
Spain, 1812

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ARTICLE 09

Medal of Honor Recipient - Capt. William E. Barber USMC

Rank and organization: Captain U.S. Marine Corps, Commanding Officer, Company F, 2d Battalion 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Rein.).

Place and date: Chosin Reservoir area, Korea, 28 November to 2 December 1950.

Entered service at: West Liberty, Ky. Born: 30 November 1919, Dehart, Ky.

Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer of Company F in action against enemy aggressor forces. Assigned to defend a three-mile mountain pass along the division's main supply line and commanding the only route of approach in the march from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, Capt. Barber took position with his battle-weary troops and, before nightfall, had dug in and set up a defense along the frozen, snow-covered hillside.

When a force of estimated regimental strength savagely attacked during the night, inflicting heavy casualties and finally surrounding his position following a bitterly fought seven-hour conflict, Capt. Barber, after repulsing the enemy gave assurance that he could hold if supplied by airdrops and requested permission to stand fast when orders were received by radio to fight his way back to a relieving force after two reinforcing units had been driven back under fierce resistance in their attempts to reach the isolated troops.

Aware that leaving the position would sever contact with the 8,000 marines trapped at Yudam-ni and jeopardize their chances of joining the 3,000 more awaiting their arrival in Hagaru-ri for the continued drive to the sea, he chose to risk loss of his command rather than sacrifice more men if the enemy seized control and forced a renewed battle to regain the position, or abandon his many wounded who were unable to walk.

Although severely wounded in the leg in the early morning of the 29th, Capt. Barber continued to maintain personal control, often moving up and down the lines on a stretcher to direct the defense and consistently encouraging and inspiring his men to supreme efforts despite the staggering opposition. Waging desperate battle throughout five days and six nights of repeated onslaughts launched by the fanatical aggressors, he and his heroic command accounted for approximately 1,000 enemy dead in this epic stand in bitter subzero weather, and when the company was relieved only 82 of his original 220 men were able to walk away from the position so valiantly defended against insuperable odds.

His profound faith and courage, great personal valor, and unwavering fortitude were decisive factors in the successful withdrawal of the division from the deathtrap in the Chosin Reservoir sector and reflect the highest credit upon Capt. Barber, his intrepid officers and men, and the U.S. Naval Service.

Editor's Note: Retired Marine Col. William E. Barber died on Apr. 19 at his home in Irvine, Calif., following a long illness. He is survived by his wife, Ione Barber, and two children.

If you know of any MOH recipient who is hospitalized or has passed away recently, please email DefenseWatch MOH Editor Jim H. at bulldogleader@mindspring.com.