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By David H. Hackworth

Our U.S. Army Rangers still aren't allowed to talk publicly about Operation Anaconda, fought last March in Afghanistan, probably because the Op proved in spades how out of touch the top brass are with counter-guerrilla tactics. I suspect the Secrecy Act is being employed once again to protect bad generals - at the cost of telling our countrymen the truth about an extraordinary mission conducted by the men of the 1st Platoon of Alpha Company, 1/75th Rangers.

Eyewitness reports I've stitched together from allied commandos testify to that platoon's daring and heroism while rescuing teammates and aircrew from a downed chopper as they were about to be snuffed out by a ferocious enemy.

Earlier, the platoon had been spread across the battlefield on separate missions. When word came down to find MIA Navy SEAL Neil Roberts, the lead element air-assaulted, its chopper was shot to smithereens upon landing, and the Rangers and aircrew were stuck on a rocky ridge surrounded by a large, well-dug-in al-Qaeda force.

Because of blistering enemy incoming fire, a 1st Platoon reinforcing element landed by chopper at the base of the mountain, about a mile from the besieged warriors. The 10 men began clawing their way toward the top - loaded down with 100 pounds of kit - on what would prove to be a 5,000-foot, almost-vertical three-hour climb. And throughout this near mission-impossible feat, they were battered by enemy rifle and mortar fire that wounded several of these elite warriors.

When the Rangers got to the top, they busted through the enemy's bunker line and linked up with their surrounded mates. But they soon found themselves waist-high in snow, the thermometer hovering around zero, in an increasingly hotter frying pan - with incoming RPG grenades, recoilless rifle fire, mortars thumping in and bullets snapping like angry bees across the open plain at 12,000 feet.

An SAS commando who watched the fight said, "These blokes, along with their tactical aircraft and chopper air support, killed a bloody lot of them."

Apart from their own incredible guts, the air support - virtually on top of them - is what kept them alive. If USAF air controller Staff Sgt. Kevin Vance wasn't on the ground bravely directing the fire, it would have been taps for all these good men. (Editor's Note: See "For the Record: Account of Gardez Battle, March 4, 2002" in this edition of DefenseWatch.)

Ranger Marc Anderson said, "This is where all the training pays off," before catching one with his name on it while bounding toward the enemy. Ranger Bradley Crose was hit in the head by a round that smashed under his helmet and out the back of his head, and Ranger Matthew Commons went down for the count as well. Air Force warrior Jason Cunningham was hit by two rounds in the gut and lay out in the bitter cold - slowly bleeding to death.

When the Ranger rifles were shot up, had malfunctioned or the men ran out of ammo, the Rangers policed up al-Qaeda weapons and waded into the fanatics, wasting them with their own bullets. For almost 18 long, blood-soaked hours, it was often hand-to-hand fighting with knives, pistols and rifle butts.

That terrible night, the Rangers were supported by USAF AC-130 Specter gunships that, according to an Aussie SAS commando on a nearby knob, lit up the hills around them. "It was bloody amazing, the most beautiful - yet fearsome - sight I'd ever seen," he said.

The entire action was relayed by Predator drone to the White House, the Pentagon and the generals whose flawed plan got our kids into FUBAR-plus in the first place. The spectators could watch in comfort and safety while our courageous Rangers fought and died and another squad fell wounded. But those who were hit never faltered, continuing to put heavy fire on the enemy in the fierce kind of combat and freezing conditions our forces haven't seen since the Korean War.

Marc Anderson used to tell his buddies he was leaving the 1st Platoon $5,000 to celebrate the good times if he checked out. Upon their return to Fort Stewart, Ga., they were stunned to learn he wasn't kidding. Hopefully, it won't be long before they'll be lifting a few to him and the other extraordinary men they - and we - lost during one of the most heroic small-unit fights in U.S. history.

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831. Look for his new book, "Steel My Soldiers' Hearts," (Rugged Land LLC, New York City).

© 2002 David H. Hackworth

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Editor's Note: The following interview transcript was provided to DefenseWatch.

Interview of Staff Sgt. Kevin D. Vance
25 March 2002
Bagram, Afghanistan

My name is Kevin Donell Vance. In June, I will have been in the United States Air Force for eight years. I hold the rank of Staff Sergeant. I am currently married with two children, ages four and two. I was born on 3 September 1976 and am currently 25 years old. My SSAN is XX-XX-XXXX

I entered into the USAF eleven days after graduating from high school. I went to open general basic training. I was not sure which career path to take until I was asked to try out to be a tactical air control party [TACP] from a TACP recruiter. I was one of the few who tried out and was chosen. I went to technical school in Florida for fourteen weeks.

My first assignment was at Fort Polk in Louisiana supporting the 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment [ACR] for three years. I then transferred to support the Joint Readiness Training Center [JRTC] for a year. Next, I was assigned to Camp Casey in Korea for one year. Afterwards, I tried out for and was selected for my present job. I have been with my current unit for two and a half years. I have had basic training, TACP training, Ranger School, Basic Airborne School, Air Assault School, HALO School, and Pathfinder School.

At around 0115Z on 4 March 2002, I was told that a military member was on the ground in a hostile area in Afghanistan after falling out of a helicopter. My team was told that another team was attempting to go in and get him, but if they were not successful, my team would go in.

We were waiting to find out if we would go in to try to get to our lost military member. My team was in a helicopter in route and our estimated time of arrival was 0150Z. My team consisted of ten people plus three special tactics squadron members [STS] and we were with eight crew members, a total of twenty-one personnel.

At 0140Z I had noticed we were flying in circles around the mountain top because I had noticed the same terrain twice. As we were circling about the third time, we were hit with a rocket-propelled grenade [RPG] around 0145Z. There were sparks on the right side of the aircraft and we started to shake violently. Then our helicopter just fell out of the sky about 15 feet to the ground. After the first RPG hit us to when the helicopter hit the ground, I do not remember specifics of what happened, it was a blur. No one, to my knowledge, was injured from the initial crash.

Before I could get off the aircraft, another RPG hit the aircraft where the right door gunner was. There was only one military member between the right door gunner and myself. I am not positive how many times our helicopter was shot but I think altogether, four RPGs were shot at us.

I was snap-linked into the helicopter, a precaution so we do not fall out of the helicopter. First I was trying to get my snap link/safety line off but the pararescueman [PJ] behind me was pushing me so it pulled tight. I had a little bit of trouble getting it off; it slowed me down about 15 seconds. I then ran off the back of the aircraft.

By the time I was able to get off of the aircraft, three of our team members were already dead. One team member was on the ramp with a hole in his head. There was no mistaking that he was dead. The second team member was at the end of the ramp face down in the snow. His position was such that if there had been life left in him, he would have moved his head out of the snow. I later found out that he had been shot under the arm though his chest and out his above right nipple. The last deceased team member was lying on his back at the end of the ramp not moving.

These three deceased members survived the initial crash without injury, but had died from enemy fire. Their names were Marc Anderson, Brad Crose, and Matt Commons.

I knew we had three killed in action [KIA], which left seven of our team, three of which were injured. I had shrapnel in the arm, but did not notice it until later. My platoon leader had shrapnel in his leg, it was a pretty good chunk, and another team member had shrapnel in his lower left calf and was moving slow. Our team knew how to fight and how to operate on the ground. The aircrew did not have the same
training.

I exited the aircraft and threw my rucksack off but kept it within 20 meters from me. I figured out which way we were being engaged from and I sought cover behind a cut out in the rock face. It was just big enough for four team members to kneel behind it. We set up a perimeter. Two other members were back to my right and three members to my left. I was closest to the enemy.

There were two enemies about 50 meters north of us near a tree. There was one enemy behind me and to the right already dead. There were some more enemies to the south coming out.

Then we started to engage the enemy. I was shooting an M-4. At first, my priority was to keep engaging the enemy to hold them back and then to seek assistance for close air support [CAS] on the radio. My radio, a PRC 117F, was still in my rucksack. There was a combat controller [CCT] with us named Gabe Brown who was behind me a bit. I turned around and yelled at him to work on getting communications running, he already was working on it. I decided that I needed to be on the line fighting, if I had been on the radio, then the combat controller would have been sitting there doing nothing because he doesn't have the assault training. I decided that he should call in the CAS as I directed him.

I told him my rucksack had a radio in it. A member of the crew dragged my rucksack to the CCT so he had my radio.

First, we shot M203 rounds at bunker. An M-203 is a grenade launcher that fits on an M-4/16. As the squad leader and team leader shot M-203s, I stood up and provided covering fire. When he would stand up to fire a grenade at the bunker, I would standup and shoot at the bunker to cover him. I did the same when the crew members would run for more ammo. We tried throwing fragment grenades at the enemy but it they were too far away and the bunker was on the backside of the hill. The enemy threw fragment grenades at us but they landed 5-10 feet in front of me,
buried in the snow and blew up.

I believe one of the helicopter pilots was dead and the other was injured severely. The other pilot opened the door to the aircraft and fell out of the aircraft face first. He lay there in the snow securing his area. There was no power to the aircraft without which we could not operate the mini-guns. One of the team members yelled at a member of the crew to get the power working so we could use those guns. The mini-guns shoot 7.62 ammo and so does our M-240. The crew was taking ammo and
giving it to our M-240 gunner. When the crew members would run back to the aircraft for more ammo, I would stand up and shoot at the bunker to cover them. They were also taking M-203 rounds and magazines off of the KIA and bringing it to us. The crew pulled off insulation from the aircraft to wrap the casualties in to keep them warm.

Then four of us (myself, the platoon leader, squad leader, and team leader) started to assault the tree area where the enemy was coming from while the M-240 gunner suppressed it. Capt. [Nathan] Self, the platoon leader [PL], was in charge. Once we realized that it was a bunker, a couple of enemy came out from behind a tree and took shots at us. We were moving slow because the snow was up to our knees and we were going uphill.

The platoon leader finally said let's back up and rethink this. We backed up because we could not afford to lose any more guys.

The combat controller yelled that we have F-15s on station. The Platoon Leader was next to me and we discussed it. Then F-15s were overhead and the combat controller was directing them to the enemy according to my instructions. I told the combat controller to have the F-15s to strafe the bunker and have them come in from our right to our left. The CCT repeated what I said. He was smart enough that I did not have to tell him too much detail of what to say on the radio. We used the
position of the helicopter to give clock directions. He had basic knowledge of CAS so I could tell him to have the fighters do gun runs on an area from which direction and he would get on the radio and make it happen.

The first F-15 pass was really close and I was uncomfortable because I could not tell if the guns were pointing at my team or the enemy bunker so I told the CCT to abort it. I told him to have them come in more from behind us, so I could tell they were not pointing at us. I told him to clear them and the rounds hit right by the bunker. I told him to have them do that over and over again. I think the gun runs were made by both F-15s and F-16s. For the first 10-15 minutes, the CCT thought I was the team leader. He yelled to me "team leader" when the team leader was sitting next to him.

At this point, the team member who was injured in the leg and could not move easily was facing one way. Sgt. Walker and I were pulling security on the bunker. Capt. Self and I tried to determine where would be a good landing zone.

The fighters did some more gun runs and the enemy was still jumping up shooting at us. The enemy was moving on us from behind us (we didn't know this at the time) but the majority of enemy were firing at us were on the hill near the bunker area. We killed seven of them.

The last time I saw anyone move in the bunker, I was scanning the hilltop and I saw the upper half of an enemy behind some bushes. I shot three times, got down and stood back up. This was the last I had seen him. I never went over towards that bunker so I cannot confirm if I had killed him.

Then we shot some more bombs in the bunker area. I told CCT to direct them to shoot down the backside of the hill north of us. I thought it was better to have them shoot downhill with the first one so we could walk him in to the target. The first bomb hit the backside of the hill and then I told him to bring it up and hit the tree over the bunker. The second one hit the tree dead on and split it in half. The fire
from the bunker area ceased. We could not see over the hill and did not know what was over there. CCT said we have some 500-pound bombs to use.

After discussing with the PL, I said let's drop them on the backside of the hill and walk them up. They were dropping them about 75 to 100 meters away from us. Some of the pilots did not want to drop them without the commander's initials because they were afraid they would kill us.

At that point we were not taking any more fire from the top of the hill so the platoon leader wanted to wait until our reinforcements linked up with us before we tried moving on the top of the hill.

By this time, the second helicopter landed at the bottom of the hill to our northeast and reinforcements were moving towards us. The second aircraft had ten team members on it. They moved uphill to us. This was about two and a half hours after we had crashed.

On the way, they were taking some mortar fire. At one point they had bracketed us
with the mortars but then they started shooting mortars down the hill to try and hit the second team members as they were coming up the hill to reinforce us. I do not know where the enemies were shooting the mortars from. Later, I learned they were being shot from a position about 300 meters from us on the backside of the hill.

Finally, our reinforcements linked up with us. Sgt. Walker took a couple of rounds in his helmet. When the reinforcements arrived, Sgt. Walker came forward and told Staff Sgt. Wilmoth which direction the enemy was located. Sgt. Walker's helmet had holes in the top of the head and the side of the head.

A 500-pound bomb hit just over the backside of the hilltop. It hit at an angle where it blew everything back over the top of us so it was raining debris and metal pieces down around us. That was the only point where we were really concerned with our safety from the friendly bombs. This was the last time we used the 500-pound bombs. Together we started to take the top of the hill.

Once we took the top of the hill we found two more friendly bodies. They included the member who fell out of the helicopter that we were there to find and a member from the team before us that tried to go in to get him. We were sent in because they were not successful.

Both members had been shot and killed. We had thirty-three members on the hill (including two deceased we found), sixteen were fighting, and three of those sixteen were wounded. The other half was working on casualties or were casualties themselves.

As we took the top of the hill, we started taking fire from behind us. We had to turn around and fight the other way. Meanwhile, all of our casualties were lying out in the open down the hill. Once taking fire from the other direction, we had to go downhill to get our casualties. The casualties were the first three team members out of the aircraft and the pilot. A PJ, SrA Jason D. Cunningham, and another team member were killed from gunfire as they were going down to get the casualties. Jason Cunningham was injured seriously but did not die immediately.

At this point, I was still on the top of the hill sitting next to the CCT and the PL while talking on the radio. I was reporting back to higher and CCT was talking to the aircraft. We were the command and control [C2] section. I could have taken the radio back from CCT and said that it is my job to call in CAS, but he had been working with them already and understood the landmarks he was talking about. If I had to do it, then it would have been a relearning process so I continued to monitor him and let him call in CAS.

The medics kept the PJ alive for about 10 hours (about an hour and half before we got exfiltrated). I reported it to the Controller when he died.

They also dropped 1000 pounders that landed 150 meters away from us. That was a little close and I made sure the CCT had them push those out a bit. It hit the near side of the hill instead of the far side and shook the team members up. No one was injured. When the bomb hit, some debris on fire flew up into the air about 75 feet over our heads and continued on into the valley where it caught something on fire in the valley.

After being on the ground for about three hours, we had to move the bodies up the mountain before we could be exfiltrated. This would have taken about one half hour. Controller asked me if the pick-up zone [PZ] was cold and how many guys we were going to lose if we waited to be exfiltrated. I asked the medic, "If we hang out here, how many guys are going to die?" The medic said at least two, maybe three. I reported to Controller "It is a cold PZ and we are going to lose three if we wait." Just as I said it was a cold PZ, we were shot at. However, we could have made it cold by the time they got the helicopters in there. It was just every once and while the enemy would take pop shots at us.

If we had CAS on station dropping bombs, we could have gotten out of there at that time. I told CCT to drop bombs down in the valley and on the small hill every now and again. Every time the plane showed up and you could hear them, we weren't being shot at. Just having the planes nearby kept the enemy away. Continuously dropping bombs discouraged them from coming after us. So every now and again, we would drop bombs on them with B-52s, B-1s, those were the last aircraft we had. I cannot remember which one.

I was watching our medic, he was a part of the second team, as he was working on the PJ. I saw him doing CPR on the PJ and I knew it was bad. I then saw the medic stand up, look over at me, and start walking to me. That is when I got on the radio
to Controller and told him that we now have seven KIA.

The whole fifteen and one half hours we were on the ground I was fighting, talking on the radio, or telling CCT what to call in.

I shot a total of 420 rounds during the fifteen and one half hours. I was on the C2 line the whole time while watching over CCT's shoulder to make sure everything was all right. As the hostile fire started slowing down, I barely had to tell CCT what to do, just drop bombs over here or over there.

I kept telling Controller that "We lost another one, cold PZ, when are we getting exfiltrated?" Controller said to hold on. After asking him three times, PL expressed urgency at getting the team out of there. I continued to tell Controller but he just kept telling me to hold on. After the third time, I handed the hand mike to the PL and asked him to tell Controller the same thing.

For the next thirteen hours, there were sporadic firefights from about 300 meters away. All of the close fighting was done because we had neutralized all close enemies. The mountain top had three different peaks. We held the two highest ones. About 300 meters to our south, southeast was the third hilltop where the enemy was coming up.

At one point Controller told me that the enemy was trying to reinforce with seventy guys. I was not clear if he was talking about seventy friendly or enemy. I then asked if the seventy guys coming up this way were not my friends. He said "Roger." I said I wanted to make sure that was clear. I tried to keep that between the PL and myself
because it would have destroyed the other guys' morale. I think the PL let the team know so they could be ready. We never did see the seventy enemies.

I put the PL on the radio and he was being told the exfiltration sequence of events. I was sitting next to him taking notes. Once the exfiltration plan was sorted out, we sat around and waited until the AC-130 checked in. We had them fly around and occasionally shooting.

Controller said we had eight enemies moving in to our south. I never did run into them. CCT was talking to the AC-130 and I was talking to Controller. I gave Controller the approach heading, the land heading and the departure heading. There was a 090 approach heading, 235 land heading, and 270 departure heading. The first aircraft came in on a 090 and then came to a hover. I tried to get him on the radio to tell him to turn around and do a 180. I could not reach him so I called Controller and asked him to get in contact with the second and third helicopters
to have them land at 180 degrees from what the first one did. It was important to have the second one land that way in order to upload the KIAs quickly. He was able to reach them and the second and third helicopters landed according to direction.

Because the first one landed heading the wrong direction, the exfiltration was slowed down immensely. We had to drag the casualties all the way around the back of the helicopter and load them up. It was important that the second one landed the way it did. My entire unit got on the second helicopter while another unit got off to pull security. They then got on the helicopter and left. If they had landed the way the first one did, it would have taken a lot longer than it did.

The entire exfiltration process took too long, about 15 minutes for the first two
helicopters. It was all quiet when we were being exfiltrated.

It felt really good when I got back and my buddies said they were sitting around the radio listening. They were impressed that I never got emotional and was calm and professional the whole time. I tried to keep a monotone voice. There were times that I tried to throw some words in there to make Controller realize that we have to get
out. It became a personal conversation and we kept saying we have to get out of here.

I received a minor wound to my left shoulder. It is a shrapnel puncture wound. I didn't notice it until a day later when I woke up and my shoulder felt like someone punched me. I then looked at the T-shirt I was wearing that night and noticed it was blood-stained.

I went through so many different emotions, excited, mad, frustrated, sad, any other emotion you could possibly feel, you feel going through this whole thing. And I felt guilty if I felt anything was funny like Sgt. Walker's helmet with the holes in it because we had lost members of our team.

Everyone out there just did his job. I just did my job, everything came natural and my training kicked in. There is nothing I could have changed about that day. Nothing we could have done different or better.

I could not ask for a better group of guys to work with. I have trained for eight years to do this and now I had the chance to get to do my job - that is reward enough. Everybody working together and the good Lord is what got us home.

I swear that I have read this statement and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. This statement has been subscribed and sworn to before Capt Erin Bree Wirtanen, an officer authorized to administer oaths this 29th day of March 2002 and witnessed by Lt Col Kenneth M. Rozelsky, II.

__________________________________

KEVIN DONELL VANCE, SSgt, USAF

At Bagram, Afghanistan, I, Erin Bree Wirtanen, the undersigned do hereby certify that on this 29th day of March 2002, before me personally appeared Staff Sgt. Kevin Donell Vance, who signed and executed the foregoing document. I do further certify that I am a person in the service of the United States Armed Forces authorized the general powers of a notary public under 10 U.S.C. 1044a of the grade, branch of service and organization stated below and that this certificate is executed in my capacity as a person authorized notary authority under Title 10 U.S.C.1044a.

__________________________________

ERIN BREE WIRTANEN, Capt, USAF 332 AEG/JA Al Jaber AB, Kuwait

I certify I was witness to Staff Sgt. Kevin Donell Vance's oath of truthfulness and signature on the aforesaid document on the 29th of March 2002.

____________________________________
KENNETH M. ROZELSKY II, Lt Col, USAF


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Editor's Note: The following is a message to Col. David Hackworth from a member of the National Guard's 19th Special Forces Group, which is currently serving in Afghanistan.

Hack, Just a quick blip to let you know the SITREP for my SF teams in A-Stan. I'm an 182/18F on ODA 1966 (c/2nd/19 SFGA). My commo with the team says morale is low. They have been in the box since Dec 2001 and until recently have not been trusted with combat missions. I talked with two of my teammates who are deep in Indian country over there. It appears that the active-duty SF have rotated back and the [National] Guard SF is finally getting some missions. Better late than never. But getting missions does not obviate the mistreatment they received and still are receiving over there.

Sgt. [Gene Arden] Vance was a member of my unit - actually he was in the support company for our battalion. He was a member of a team called SOD-A. These are basically intel support for the SF teams in our battalion. Sgt. Vance was known for his humility and quiet nature. He was a good soldier and will be missed.

We are all National Guard but all have active SF time and all attended the same active SF Q-course. Several of our troops are Vietnam vets, some with Charlie Rangers and SOG. We are held to active duty SF standards including AFPT, weapons qual, validation and certification etc.

We are as good as active SF and yet being civilians we bring a more experienced and mature plate to the mission. I've been a detective with the Penn. State Police for 22 years, I've been in more real CQB than most of the active guys.

It's sad that good, dedicated men, leaving jobs and families, are treated as chogie boys and have to suck hind titty to the active troops. I believe the problems stem directly from SOCCENT brass.

Giving mission to SEALs that they are not trained for: Remember the airfield assault in Panama? That was a Ranger mission all the way, but military politics won the day. I've done many missions with the SEALs and am not impressed - movement and tactics being the major shortcomings. But active SF brass in 5th [SF] Group and SOCCENT are just as guilty.

So if you could say a word for the SF Guard warriors over there, we would be grateful.

--Kevin

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By Ed Offley

When Democratic Senate Majority Tom Daschle and conservative columnist George Will agree on something, it's time for the Bush administration to listen. In fact, when they are joined in agreement by Republican Sen. John McCain and ultra-liberal columnist Robert Scheer, there's something unusual going on that demands our full attention.

I refer, of course, to the sudden emergence of a strong bipartisan consensus for an impartial and comprehensive investigation into the terrorist 9-11 attacks. After months of White House opposition and tepid congressional support, calls for an external probe last week rapidly spread across the American political landscape.

Ironically, what triggered this development was the disgusting public behavior of a large number of Democrats (and several Republicans) and a nauseating feeding frenzy in the American news media, over allegations - subsequently refuted - that President Bush himself had advance knowledge of the terrorists' plans to hijack airliners and crash them into buildings.

Indeed, as follow-on news coverage shifted from the current national political leadership to the troubled track record of the FBI, CIA, Federal Aviation Administration and other agencies both in processing raw intelligence and heeding threat indicators, the terms of debate changed as well. The explosion of "gotcha" rhetoric and partisan ranting was, thankfully, short-lived. President Bush himself and Vice President Dick Cheney publicly warned that such political opportunism would backfire, and the American people - according to pollsters - agreed with the administration.

Much has been accomplished to date in reorganizing the federal government, military and other agencies to confront the terrorist threat: From renewed cooperation between the FBI and CIA counter-terrorism offices, to tough legislation aiding law enforcement officials to monitor and track terror suspects, to the creation of the new DoD Northern Command for homeland security. But even as such progress appears, even more structural problems and flaws come into view: the demonstrated inability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to monitor foreigners "temporarily" residing in the United States, the lagging implementation of airline security measures, and the lack of any effective means to adequately inspect shipping containers and other cargos coming across our borders.

It is to fully identify such shortcomings that a truly nonpartisan investigation is still urgently needed.

The proposal first made by Sen. McCain and Democratic Sen. Joseph Lieberman in late December 2001 still makes the most sense: an independent commission that is free of pressure or influence from either the White House or Congress and the poisonous partisanship that still lurks close under the surface in Washington today.

As DefenseWatch recommended last Dec. 26 ("Full Inquest Into 9-11 Attacks is Essential for the Nation"), the objective of such a probe should be threefold: (1) To compile an authoritative, accurate and detailed body of facts on how the al Qaeda terrorist cells succeeded in organizing and carrying out the deadly hijackings; (2) to determine accountability of any failures by government officials - or governmental policies and organizational structure - that enabled the al Qaeda conspiracy to succeed, and (3) to identify a full range of legal reforms and governmental reorganizations necessary to minimize the chances that subsequent attacks could occur. The probe should aim at maximum public disclosure of the facts, although it is inevitable that some material will be withheld to avoid undermining ongoing security and counter-terror measures.

Sen. McCain this week reiterated the need for such an investigation in compelling terms:

Mr. President, let's roll.

Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at dweditor@yahoo.com.

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By Patrick Hayes

It's as old as politics itself - knowledge is power. Another axiom that is as true today as it was for the Greeks and Romans is that for combat troops to be effective, they need to have information about the enemy - location, movement, strength, armaments, etc. This is also true for political leaders who must defend the homeland against attack.

In The Art of War (written about 500 BC), Chinese general Sun Tzu said, "And therefore only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things. Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move."

Sun Tzu also described the various types of spies or agents to be used and how they should be used. However, as we have recently learned, all the intelligence information achievable is virtually useless unless it is centralized, analyzed, corroborated by at least three different sources, and, maybe most importantly, shared!

When given the opportunity to do its job unhindered by political motivations, the U.S. intelligence community has had little trouble collecting, analyzing and confirming information from a myriad of sources. Where we have run into problems historically has been that the various intelligence branches of government have not shared their jealously guarded information, or they have used it judiciously to advance certain limited agenda, while the nation suffered as a result.

There are currently 13 major intelligence-gathering organizations within the framework of the U.S. government. They are the Central Intelligence Agency (under which is the Community Management Staff and the National Intelligence Council), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps intelligence, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's intelligence gathering apparatus, and the intelligence services attached to the Departments of the Treasury, Energy and State.

One might well consider that with this entire intelligence-gathering operation in motion, the United States would be ahead of the curve when it comes to identifying viable terrorist threats. One primary reason the Sept. 11 attack slipped through the cracks is that although there is a "Central" Intelligence Agency, with all its own capabilities of collecting and disseminating information, the term is a misnomer. In reality, as the name implies, the CIA should be operating as the clearinghouse for all other intelligence gathered from various sources.

Unfortunately - as we discovered in the political uproar last week over garbled (and untrue) allegations President Bush may have had some advance indication of al Qaeda's 9-11 hijacking plans - that is not the case.

A more serious issue was briefly obscured by the political posturing in Washington over the president's intelligence briefing report on Aug. 6, 2001, that appeared (for a time) to suggest some advance warning of the 9-11 attacks: Several U.S. agencies apparently had small fragments of information linked to the 9-11 threat and did not share them with other intelligence organizations. If that is confirmed, then there is more than a dire need to confront this lack of cooperation in a meaningful, concrete, decisive, and speedy manner.

The now infamous and formerly classified "Phoenix Memorandum" originating from the FBI's Phoenix office goes to the heart of the real problem. Written by veteran FBI agent Kenneth Williams on July 10, 2001 - nearly a month before Bush received the controversial intelligence briefing - the memorandum warned that al Qaeda terrorists might be training at U.S. flight schools and recommended that the Bureau screen all students from the Middle East attending such training facilities.

Not only was the Phoenix memorandum not shared with the CIA or other intelligence organizations, due to bureaucratic bumbling it was not even shared with the Minnesota office of the FBI itself, which began investigating accused al Qaeda conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui on Aug. 15, 2001, following a tip from flight school instructors. (Moussaoui was detained on immigration charges the following day and was in federal custody at the time of the 9-11 attacks.)

According to senior defense analyst Charles Pena, of the Washington-based Cato Institute, the reason for the lack of coordination and communication is "a very large intelligence bureaucracy that is very compartmentalized. People literally don't talk to each other."

However, intelligence officials and outside experts argue in defense that the sheer volume of raw data that comes to light in a 24-hour period is tremendous. As former CIA Director Stansfield Turner said recently, "There are always these little indicators that come in - of one sort or another - that don't get enough decibels to receive attention."

Agreeing with Turner's assessment is Jim Harris, who was formerly with the CIA's Strategic Assessments Group. He affirmed that the various agencies are "swamped with data." One answer, according to Harris, is the need for "analytic horsepower," or the need for additional analysts to pour over the continuous influx of information.

If a central intelligence-gathering authority has enough manpower to review the data and perform meaningful analysis, patterns in the data will appear more rapidly, which leads to a clearer picture of threats and other material. Once those patterns emerge, viable intelligence can be accumulated, assessed and passed to the president, and the government can take the appropriate action.

This could mean hitting a properly identified target in the field rather than mistakenly bombing a pill factory (as the Clinton administration did in 1998), or taking out a terrorist target rather than watching the terrorist escape while waiting for a response from a JAG lawyer.

One longstanding cause for concern among intelligence agencies about sharing their information is the possibility it will expose their assets not only to enemy intelligence, but also to other U.S. intelligence agencies. This is one reason intelligence data, even from a deep mole, needs to be authenticated by at least two other sources when possible. It is also a reason why intelligence agencies "sanitize" their material to avoid identifying the source.

In response to the recent news of the intelligence debacle leading up to 9-11, the Bush administration moved quickly to institute several new safeguards. One long overdue change is the merging of domestic FBI intelligence with that from the CIA's international intelligence when briefing the president.

Another new concept that should have been introduced years before is the White House's own Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) that Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge has set up. The SCIF - a physically secure room limited to a small number of officials with the appropriate security clearances - enables the actual sharing of highly-classified information from the CIA, FBI, DIA and other intelligence agencies on site. Whether such true cooperation will actually happen, or whether the various agencies will hand over everything, remains to be seen.

In the meantime, the emerging allegations of non-cooperation among U.S. intelligence agencies demonstrate the need for an independent and comprehensive review of American intelligence-gathering, analysis and dissemination. Absent a thorough probe that gets to the hard facts while protecting current intelligence material and information-gathering techniques, it is a sad possibility that 9-11 will give birth to poisonous conspiracy theories that will undermine public confidence in the U.S. government. (Even now, there are unresolved rumors to this day that intel predicting the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 had been given to President Franklin D. Roosevelt beforehand, but that he had chosen to allow the attack to proceed in order to ensure the United States entered the war.)

It obviously doesn't matter how many intelligence-gathering organizations serve the United States if they don't work together and share the information with the president and strategic decision-makers. In so doing, it is also necessary for each agency to share information with each other, in order to provide a more complete and detailed picture of potential threats.

The United States is confronting multiple challenges that demand the fullest cooperation among our various intelligence, law enforcement and military organizations. We are waging war against Islamic terrorists in a number of theaters of operation; we are in the incipient stages of an anticipated war against Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. We are monitoring unrest and violence both in the Middle East and South Asia (India vs. Pakistan, see "Kashmir: The Hidden Trigger for an Asian Nuclear War," DefenseWatch, Feb. 20, 2002) that could erupt into major violence at any time. And we are even being forced to keep a close eye on our European "allies."

Any one of these situations dictates the need for a centralized clearinghouse of intelligence material that can be properly disseminated without the prospects of turf battles and political agendas that obscure national security requirements. With all of these situations in effect at once, the need is even greater.

Sun Tzu's analysis 2,500 years ago is pertinent today:

Foreknowledge gives us the edge in battle. Without it, we are flaying in the dark against shadows. Those who would deny this foreknowledge, this intelligence, to our country are of questionable character and questionable loyalty to the United States.

This is no time for petty envies or self-serving agendas. It is time for the members of the intelligence community to stand as one and help deliver the deathblow to those who threaten us.

Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at gyrene@sftt.us.

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By Robert G. Williscroft

I listened carefully to what Vice President Dick Cheney said last Sunday, May 19: "It's almost certain that America will suffer a terrorist attack of the magnitude of 9-11. It could happen tomorrow, next week, next month, next year, but it will happen .… "

When I filter this statement through my sophisticated submarine BS filter, I get the message that the VP believes we will be hit again sometime, somewhere.

Well, gee, I suspect he's correct - even if 9-11 hadn't happened. After all, we have received significant terrorist hits periodically for more than a decade. I can't think of any reason why it should stop now. I think the VP is on safe ground with this prediction.

So what's all the fuss about?

I know we all get tired of hearing: the news media this … the news media that. But just this morning, Fox news interrupted one of its sage talking heads to show a continuous live broadcast of the Phoenix police chasing a hapless thief in his stolen pickup. The 30-minute broadcast beat watching grass grow, but not by much.

I guess things in the news media business are pretty slow right now.

Let's see: Another homicide bomber in Israel, but they didn't strike back (yet) so only Israelis died; a Special Forces casualty in Afghanistan, but he was just a reserve; no big games; no riots; independence for East Timor, but who cares; an idiot leads Phoenix police on a slow-speed chase; and - oh - the Bush Administration is predicting another attack. Now this is news - or is it?

What do we have? An increase in cell phone "chatter" that mimics what we saw (with 20-20 hindsight) after the 9-11 attacks. Several vague, undefined comments from several vague unidentified presumed bad-guys. A period of relative quite, like the dark before the dawn. And some Democrats are asking questions about connecting dots before 9-11 for which the administration has no convincing answers.

What is needed is a good dose of "They're comin' again … sometime, somewhere," to focus attention elsewhere.

You gotta admit: It worked pretty good!

More seriously, however, Dick Cheney has a point. I cannot personally believe the bad guys will simply go away. I agree with the VP that another attack is a virtual certainty.

Let's examine how this might happen:

Al Qaeda can operate in several basic modes: Their most potent weapon to date has been planes-as-missiles, and on a smaller scale, people-as-bombs. If they have access to nuclear anything, we don't seem to have any convincing evidence yet. The one piece of information that went public was about a canister with nuclear markings that turned out to be a fake. The third mode is biological or chemical. We have some evidence that they might have made one or more test runs with some of these substances, but nothing is definite.

Can they pull off another 9-11? I don't believe they can. Our homeland security net may not be perfected yet, but it is nearly inconceivable that a group of these guys could commandeer several more passenger aircraft and do it again. We shouldn't relax our vigil, but so long as we don't, there is really no way.

How about a smaller aircraft, like a Piper? That may be possible, but such a plane doesn't carry sufficient fuel to become a potent aerial bomb. Can they pack a small aircraft full of High Explosive (HE), and then use that combination as a missile? Possibly, but HE is not the same as burning jet fuel. The difference here is between local damage versus catastrophic damage.

How about detonating such an HE-laden aircraft against a nuclear power plant containment building? It's possible, but the plane will most likely simply bounce off, and make a lot of noise when it explodes. You can't carry sufficient HE in a small plane to burst a containment building. If you could somehow strap the plane tightly to the surface of the building, then you might be able to penetrate the concrete, but a plane in flight is just going to bounce. It's possible that the plant operators inside the building may not even be aware of the incident.

Replace the HE in the Piper with a small nuclear device, and you will definitely make your point. The problem is, of course, that it is nearly impossible for our opponents to obtain a working nuclear device. As I noted in an earlier article, ("New Nuclear Threat Is Based On Junk Science," DefenseWatch, Mar. 6, 2002), the best these guys could hope for even if they actually got a nuke is a relatively confined ground burst in one of our larger cities.

A related option is for Al Qaeda to assemble a group of fertilizer-bomb laden trucks on the deck of a major bridge such as the Brooklyn Bridge or the Golden Gate Bridge. With a bit of coordinated timing, and the willingness of the drivers to go meet their 79 virgins, there is no realistic way we can stop this approach, short of inspecting every single truck approaching such bridges. Such a preventative action would be so disruptive that we are unlikely to undertake it.

Realistically, we don't need to go to any great lengths to protect ourselves from these threats, beyond what we already have done, and should continue to do.

Unfortunately, the zealots seeking our demise still have a potent weapon that will be used with, in Dick Cheney's words, a near certainty.

How many guys riding bikes did you see today? How many of those bike riders had backpacks strapped to their backs? If you live in a university town, you probably don't even see these guys anymore. They have become invisible, blending completely into the general background.

Students frequently carry items that are longer than their backpacks. A tube sticking out of a bike rider's backpack, therefore, would be as invisible as the bike rider carrying it.

I have frequently disparaged our opponents by indicating that, as a group, they probably do not qualify for membership in Mensa. On the other hand, designing and building a small device that fits into a typical backpack, that will spray an aerosol in the wake of the rider, is within the capability of even these guys. If the rider is smart enough to ride into the wind, he can even survive the event.

It is very reasonable to assume that our potential attackers can set up a delivery system similar to what I have described. Short of stopping every bike rider with a backpack, I can see no way to intercept such attackers. If Al Qaeda decides to go this route, it will be successful. There is nothing we can do about it.

So how do we protect ourselves from this kind of attack?

The first question must be, what is the likely vector, the likely disease?

Anthrax comes to mind, of course, because of what has happened during the past months. Anthrax has a distinct disadvantage, however. It is not contagious. This means that each infection must come from released spores. It cannot be passed from person to person. As a biological weapon, therefore, it can start out with a bang, but will fade away with a whimper.

Ebola and some of the other hemorrhagic fever-producing viruses have been mentioned from time to time as potential biological agents. All of these, however, are very difficult to keep viable outside of a living host. This means that the mechanism we have developed in this article for disbursing the agent will not work for this disease category. The terrorist attackers simply do not have the sophistication to develop and maintain a useable hemorrhagic fever agent as a disease vector.

One very real possibility is Smallpox, assuming that the Russians retained a significant quantity of their weaponized Smallpox stock after the Soviet Union disintegrated. With the break-up of the Soviets, it is not a stretch for a significant quantity of weaponized Smallpox to have fallen into Al Qaeda hands.

Most American adults have received Smallpox vaccinations in their childhood, but since the United Nations announced the demise of Smallpox world wide several years ago, most younger Americans have not been vaccinated. Furthermore, medical experts tell us that the old vaccinations probably will not protect anyone from a Smallpox attack.

Since Smallpox posses a genuine threat, and since we cannot defend ourselves from its dispersal, our only option is to prevent post dispersal infection. In other words, we need to vaccinate the entire U.S. population for Smallpox, and we need to do this as soon as possible.

Unfortunately, the enemy has other available options.

What is the enemy's goal? To make as many Americans either dead or deathly sick in as short a time as possible. Actually, deathly sick may be preferable, since this will tie up hospital facilities and generally disrupt the pattern of life dramatically.

What happens every Winter? What is another name for the winter season?

We call it the flu season, and for good reason. Even with our best intentions, every few years a new flu strain savagely ravages our society, killing the very young and the elderly, and making everyone else sick as a dog.

Unlike most viruses, the flu appears in literally numberless mutations or variations, all of which seem to make us sick. It's relatively easy to incubate and grow, something a clever undergraduate can do with inexpensive equipment.

In other words, Al Qaeda can create and distribute a significant quantity of any number of flu strains, enough, in fact, to bring America to its knees, at least temporarily.

But it doesn't end here. There is no compelling reason the distribution cannot be for more than one disease. If a thousand distributors circulate the streets and trails at a thousand campuses, distributing dozens of flu strains, plus Smallpox, Anthrax, Dengue Fever, Yellow Fever, Polio, Diphtheria, even Malaria and Plague....

This is how you bring the Great Satan to its knees.

How can you possibly stop something like this from happening?

Most likely, it's impossible to prevent. Nevertheless, you do what you can:

* Vaccinate everybody for everything possible, without exception, by force, if necessary;

* Then close the borders - completely, totally, absolutely: nobody in or out for any reason, for the duration;

* Check out everybody who even looks like his or her grandfather might have been from the Middle East: profile, profile, profile;

* To control the courts and those who don't get it, declare nationwide martial law;

* Detain anyone who cannot completely verify their bona fides.

Will any of this happen? Some vaccination, perhaps. Some border controls, possibly, but that's it. You can't do more in America - you don't want to do more in America, otherwise, the bad guys win by default.

Consequently, a lot of us will get sick, and some of us will die. But the rest of us will prevail, and we'll stay free, and this still will be the best nation ever to exist in the history of this planet.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

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By Paul Connors

Contributing Editor John Szelog argued very convincingly in Defensewatch on May 15 that the U.S. armed forces are not ready for an Operation Desert Storm II (Special Report: Target Iraq).

Just about anyone in the military today, and especially readers of this online magazine, are painfully aware what eight years of downsizing and active neglect - if not sabotage - by the Clinton administration have done to the capabilities of the U.S. military.

As Szelog pointed out in his article ("U.S. Military Not Yet Ready For a Desert Storm II), the American military in 1991 possessed many more combat capabilities than it does today. And what the average American citizen is not at all aware of is this: The politicization of the military leadership has become so rampant that the truth is in very short supply.

When several four-star officers finally offered up the truth to Congress and revealed the true state of their forces in March, they received a rebuke from Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld that displayed the arrogance and lack of knowledge that we had come to expect from the three twits who had preceded him under Clinton, the most disgraceful Commander-in-Chief this country has ever seen.

Rumsfeld's reaction was especially disheartening since it came from a man representing an administration that has vowed to restore and transform the military after years of neglect. And for Rumsfeld to repeatedly argue in this day of uncertainty that we actually need fewer people in uniform is the epitome of folly. No, not folly, but downright stupidity!

As I noted in my column last week ("Stretched U.S. Military Can Win, But At a Steep Price"), the U.S. military today is 40 percent smaller than it was at the end of Desert Storm in 1991. The Army is no longer armor heavy and in fact, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki has done his level best to further destroy that capability by foisting wheeled light-armored vehicles on the service in the name of increasing mobility.

Rumsfeld doesn't believe in the need for additional airlift or fighter capability, more artillery tubes, warships, infantrymen, tankers, Marines or any of the other combat specialties that the United States uses to ruin the days of all those bad guys. He seems to have reached the conclusion that a smaller Defense Department, with fewer people and conventional weapons systems, can be replaced by "smart bombs" and other whiz-bang technology that will make the presence of the American fighting man on the battlefield all but redundant.

I find this to be an arrogant and simplistic view of what we as a people, fighting the wars of the future, will need to preserve our security, freedom and very existence as a nation.

As the reports from Afghanistan in recent weeks have confirmed, all the smart-bomb tonnage dropped on Al Qaeda and Taliban forces did little to dislodge them from their caves and fortified positions. Yes, they took casualties, but they were still able to inflict heavy punishment on U.S. and allied ground forces. Using obsolete Russian anti-aircraft weapons supplied by the United States for the war against the Soviets, Islamic radicals dealt us a blow that reminded everyone that they were still capable of inflicting significant damage. In the future, it will be this type of ragtag force that we are most likely to engage while still having to be prepared to fight a major conventional force anywhere in the world.

Downsizing all the services has brought us to the condition today where we are woefully short of personnel and equipment to meet all of our global commitments.

There would seem to be one of two directions to choose: Either we can cut back on commitments, or add people to the force so that the military can keep those same commitments. But it's not just about personnel. We still need massive infusions of money to replace worn-out and obsolete systems still in current use. If we're going to challenge all the bad guys who threaten our way of life, then it stands to reason that sooner or later, those efforts will require the presence of American fighting forces on the ground and preferably, in the other guy's country so that ours doesn't get destroyed.

Technology and even warfare itself are not cheap. But technology is only as good as the application and mission for which it was designed. Technology cannot and should not become the raison d'etre for our armed forces - technology can only be a supplement to the people who will fight and win wars. By his remarks, Rumsfeld seems to have forgotten that all our wars are fought by people, using the technology currently available to achieve the final goal.

Rumsfeld is deceiving himself if he truly believes that the U.S. military today is "good to go" anytime and anywhere. His rebuke of then-Pacific Command CINC Adm. Dennis Blair, Joint Forces Command CINC Gen. William F. Kernan and NATO CINC Gen. Joseph W. Ralston seems to confirm that he is ignorant of the current declining state of readiness within our active and reserve forces.

Undermining his generals and admirals who attempted candor with Congress after eight years of active neglect and the diminishment of combat capability under the Clinton regime is not the way to win and keep the respect of senior uniformed leaders and the rest of the troops.

It shows once again, that politics, not the security of the republic, are what matters most in Washington, D.C., even in a time of war and continuing terrorist threats.

Rumsfeld's recent actions and statements raise the question as to whether he is the right man to lead the Defense Department. The U.S. military desperately needs more people and equipment, and if the SecDef himself can't or won't accept that prospect, that scares me more than the terrorists lurking outside our gates.

Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. He can be reached at paulconnors@hotmail.com. © 2002 Paul Connors.

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Rank and organization: Private First Class, U.S. Army, Company C, 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate).

Place and date: Castellina, Italy, 7 July, 1944.

Birth: Hawaii. Entered service at: Spreckelsville, Maui, Hawaii.

Citation: The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, March 3, 1863, has awarded in the name of The Congress the Medal of Honor to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS KAORU MOTO
UNITED STATES ARMY

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty:

Private First Class Kaoru Moto distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action on 7 July 1944, near Castellina, Italy. While serving as first scout, Private First Class Moto observed a machine-gun nest that was hindering his platoon's progress.

On his own initiative, he made his way to a point ten paces from the hostile position, and killed the enemy machine-gunner. Immediately, the enemy assistant gunner opened fire in the direction of Private First Class Moto. Crawling to the rear of the position, Private First Class Moto surprised the enemy soldier, who quickly surrendered. Taking his prisoner with him, Private First Class Moto took a position a few yards from a house to prevent the enemy from using the building as an observation post.

While guarding the house and his prisoner, he observed an enemy machine-gun team moving into position. He engaged them, and with deadly fire forced the enemy to withdraw. An enemy sniper located in another house fired at Private First Class Moto, severely wounding him. Applying first aid to his wound, he changed position to elude the sniper fire and to advance.

Finally relieved of his position, he made his way to the rear for treatment. Crossing a road, he spotted an enemy machine-gun nest. Opening fire, he wounded two of the three soldiers occupying the position. Not satisfied with this accomplishment, he then crawled forward to a better position and ordered the enemy soldier to surrender.

Receiving no answer, Private First Class Moto fired at the position, and the soldiers surrendered. Private First Class Moto's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit on him, his unit, and the United States Army.

Editor's Note: If you know of any MOH recipient who is hospitalized or has passed away recently, please email DefenseWatch MOH Editor Jim H. at moheditor@mindspring.com. NOTE: NEW E-MAIL ADDRESS