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Hack's Target For The Week:

Learning from the Past

By David H. Hackworth

The three guerrillas were chowing down, with their loaded AK-47 submachine guns leaning against a wall within arm's reach. Lt. Patrick Graves of the famed 101st Airborne Division and a squad of his paratroopers were nearby in a camouflaged position well within grenade-throwing range.

Patrol leader Graves wanted to take the men out, but there was one small problem: the commanding general's Rules of Engagement forbade Graves' triggering the ambush unless the enemy pointed their weapons at him and his soldiers.

Graves' tough, combat-savvy platoon sergeant felt his leader's frustration and bolted forward toward the guerrillas, who immediately went for their weapons. But before they could get off a round, the sergeant had dispatched them.

This isn't a recent war story from Afghanistan. It occurred 37 years ago in the jungle just outside of Anh Khe, South Vietnam.

The scary thing is that the same insane Rules of Engagement apply today to a new generation of 101st troopers slowly sinking into another guerrilla-infested quagmire. Some things never change.

The 101st Airborne Division's Lt. Quinn Eddy went through a similar scenario in May near Khushai Lalmi Ghar, Afghanistan, except that the three armed men escaped. And when his lightly-equipped opponent scooted, Eddy's troopers were too loaded down with gear to give effective chase.

Like the Viet commanders in the 1960s, this century's Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership know they can't slug it out toe-to-toe with our superior firepower, greater mobility and superior technology. They also know that if they did, they'd lose every fight. So they've adopted classic guerrilla hit-and-run ops as their war strategy. Their objective is to make our troops bleed - to wear them down, just as they did with another superpower, the Soviet Union, and just as Hanoi did with us.

Our generals must get their act together and realize that the war in Afghanistan has morphed into a classic counter-guerrilla conflict and that all the bombers, helicopters and sophisticated technology the Pentagon can provide won't win this type of fight. Small engagements like those in Afghanistan or the Philippines, where we're also dropping the ball, won't be won by big-war tactics and modern Army micromanagement.

To win, we must fight smart and recognize that the terrorists won't be foolish enough to fight a big-battle war. Instead, they'll continue employing the ambush they used so effectively in Afghanistan Op Anaconda - which, incidentally, killed seven Special Warfare fighters when our high-tech stuff missed the enemy's "hide" locations - along with mines and booby traps, snipers and the sort of standoff attacks they now frequently use to pepper our units with mortars and missiles from a safe distance.

It's time to dust off the lessons learned from Vietnam.

In 1966, after a tour with the 101st in which I had the privilege of leading Pat Graves and another 800 gallant "above the rest" soldiers, I was assigned to the Pentagon, where I quickly seized the opportunity to tell Army Chief of Staff Gen. Harold K. Johnson: "We're losing the war." While informing a four-star general that his game plan stunk wasn't exactly the most clever career move for a junior officer, HKJ was a real combat-infantry soldier with several wars under his pistol belt who knew the dying game well enough to listen.

After hearing me out, he immediately sent me back to Vietnam with historian Sam Marshall to interview soldiers from every Army combat unit fighting there. We gathered almost a million-word body of data proving irrefutably that the World War II tactics used by Gen. William Westmoreland and his generals were catastrophic, and that we were losing the war.

Our database was condensed into a brief handbook called the Vietnam Primer, which became mandatory reading for all small-unit leaders. Graves said, "It sure kept a lot of my men alive on my second tour with the 101st - except when those idiots in charge had us storm Hamburger Hill."

My new book, Steel My Soldiers' Hearts, shows the primer's lessons learned applied to a battalion I had the privilege of skippering in Vietnam in 1969. Like the primer, it tells how to win against a guerrilla foe - if our generals will only read it.

I've offered them free copies, and so far have had but one taker.

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831.

Look for his new book, "Steel My Soldiers' Hearts," (Rugged Land LLC, New York City).

© 2002 David H. Hackworth

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ARTICLE 01

Three Simple Questions Can Transform Our Security

By Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd

Eighteenth-century British political philosopher Edmund Burke once observed, "All that is essential for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing." Unfortunately, a little more than two centuries after Burke's death in 1797, the world witnessed the unthinkable triumph of terrorists when U.S. governmental agencies (the CIA and FBI in particular) apparently did nothing with apparently critical clues to the intentions of at least some of the murderous 9/11 hijackers.

The emerging details of governmental compartmentalization of information and intelligence are sickening. Maybe even more sickening is the 'holier-than-thou' congressional cacophony from elected officials who are acting like they were not aware of this longstanding and too-long-tolerated bureaucratic 'stove-piping'' before their 9/11 investigative hearings began this week.

In a duty assignment that seems like eons ago, I had the privilege of working on a Marine division staff for a commanding general who was a true gentleman and a combat-proven warrior. The entire staff and his subordinate commanders loved and respected him.

He understood people, and he appreciated the deadly serious business of our chosen profession. Combining those two qualities, he always sought ways to explain everything in simple language so everyone would understand and work together toward common goals. He re-built a fragmented and demoralized staff into a team of tigers ready to take on any foe on any battlefield in any clime and place, at his command. That spirit of synergy was the secret to our success, and it is also the missing link in our homeland security efforts, both pre- and post-9/11.

That spirit of synergy was nurtured and constantly reinforced in an environment where three simple questions dominated relationships and communications:

* What do I know?

* Who else needs to know what I know?

* Have I told them?

I still vividly remember my initial exposures to this simple and effective philosophy when I joined my office. Across the top of each doorway in my part of the division headquarters building was a decal with those questions written in red and gold letters. Also, every computer had a pre-set screen-saver with those same three questions. In a short time I learned to subconsciously apply those questions to myself and to those with whom I worked.

Our commanding general's personal leadership brought to life his philosophy and infused each of us with its spirit. I saw and experienced the power of that simple and effective philosophy. I believe that our holistic homeland security "coalition of cooperation" would benefit enormously by institutionalizing that spirit at all levels with all organizations. Let's examine the import of those three questions:

What do I know?

This question is more than just a personal awareness of acceptable facts. It includes an overall understanding of where facts fit in with and relate to our personal assumptions, perspectives and experiences. A corollary question, "What do I not know?" is not only an essential healthy dose of humility, it forces one to seek other sources of information to help complete the paradigm of understanding.

Who else needs to know what I know?

Seeking additional information usually leads to interactions with others who have related concerns and interests. Asking this question should be easy and natural. Answering this question - in general - is becoming more difficult as many jobs and people become increasingly specialized. Focused specialization is important, but not as important as knowing where to take the results of that specialization to maximize the value of its focus.

Those responsible for creating and managing organizations must find ways to facilitate open cooperation with equally qualified and important individuals in other organizations.

Have I told them (those who need to know what I know)?

This question completes this simple but important philosophy. However, too often politically-imposed bureaucratic, 'turf-protecting' measures prevent many people from taking actions to answer this question affirmatively. These destructive measures stymie the synergy between individuals, offices and organizations. In today's world of unprecedented terrorist threats, those who foolishly cling to the fallacy that knowledge is power should be replaced with those who realize that synergistic knowledge maximizes our ultimate homeland security success.

The 9/11 terrorists fearlessly and effectively operated on the seams of our bureaucratic, stove-piped system. I sincerely hope that the ongoing congressional hearings into the alleged mishandling of information and intelligence prior to the 9/11 attacks result in more than just self-righteous finger-pointing. Now is the time for good men and women to do something positive to prevent another evil triumph of terrorism.

We need to find those responsible for the information and intelligence obstruction and hold them accountable. It is imperative that we direct those responsible for leading, managing and overseeing homeland security-related agencies and activities to break down stove-piped barriers to effective cooperation among organizations - and hold them accountable should they fail. Lastly, we must institutionalize at all levels and strictly enforce the three-question philosophy that I described above.

Critics may likely argue that such a simple, direct approach is easier said than done. I would agree. I would also counter that we will be easier dead if left undone.

Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.

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ARTICLE 02

Forensic Seismology - A Weapon in the War on Terror

By Robert G. Williscroft

It all started back in World War I when Britain's War Minister, Winston Churchill, asked the academic community if there was a way to locate the exact positions of the big German guns. The slide-rule boys put their heads together and gave birth to a new science, Forensic Seismology.

Initially, the approach these guys used was about as simple as you can get. They placed three sound receivers along a baseline of several miles, and then recorded the arrival times through the ground of the bang from a large cannon shot. The difference in the arrival times between each set of pairs resulted in a line of position after suitable calculation. The three pairs produced three lines of position, which nailed down the precise position of the gun.

Well, sort of.

There were other factors: If the ground along each line of position was significantly different, say rock for one, sand for another, and dirt for the third, then one could no longer assume that the travel velocities were the same, which introduced an element of error. Furthermore, they had only a marginal ability to determine the arrival times precisely. The nature of trench warfare also introduced its own difficulties ranging from how to locate the receivers sufficiently far apart, to how to preserve the installation during a frontal infantry attack.

Relatively soon, the researchers began measuring the phase difference of the arriving acoustic energy, which solved the timing problem. They introduced specially trained personnel who attempted to determine the geology of the intervening terrain, and to the extent that they were successful, the calculations improved again.

The bottom line was that the Germans frequently found their guns under direct attack very soon after the first shot from a new location. I'm not sure they ever figured out exactly what was happening.

The situation is reminiscent of the World War II situation where the British had developed radar, and shortly thereafter, the Germans developed the ECM receiver - basically a radio receiver that could pick up transmitted radar signals. This allowed German submarines to dive after being detected by British radar, but before the British anti-submarine planes could get to their location.

When the German submarines could no longer be found at the detection sites within a few minutes of detection, the British correctly determined that they must be carrying some kind of radar receiver. Shortly thereafter, however, the British discovered that the German receivers were, themselves, broadcasting radio energy. So the British turned off their radar transmitters, and commenced using several sensitive receivers along a baseline to triangulate the location of surfaced German submarines using these "defective" receivers. This capability allowed the British to destroy nearly all the German U-Boats during the last year of the war.

Historically, the only German U-Boat skipper to figure out what was happening was Herbert A. Werner, later the author of Iron Coffins. He concluded that the only time British fighters appeared was when he used his ECM receiver, so he threw it overboard. As it turned out, he was one of only a handful of German submariners to survive, which he attributed to this insight.

Following World War II, Forensic Seismology came into its own with the commencement of underground nuclear tests by the United States and later Russia, France and China.

Prof. Terry Wallace of the Department of Geology at the University of Arizona, has spent the last 25 years following his graduation from New Mexico Tech and his doctoral studies at Cal Tech developing this technology. In 1989, as the world moved to digital, Wallace turned his efforts towards creating computer models that mimic how sound travels through the earth. He also was instrumental in generating a vast database of seismic "signatures."

These signatures accurately identify specific kinds of sounds and enable researchers to determine their sources. Currently, 550 stations feed his lab, and over 1,500 stations feed the seismic community.

With time, Wallace's interest has turned increasingly to developing ways for identifying and locating man-made sounds. Some of these are obvious, such as the big gun sounds from World War I and modern battlefield explosions. Many of these sounds, however, are much more subtle.

Most warriors are at least peripherally aware of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) network that monitors all the world's oceans, tracking ship sounds with amazing precision. Perhaps the most interesting part of this technology is that the sounds being monitored are an order of magnitude or more below the level of the ambient noise of the ocean.

Wallace and his colleagues today are working on a similar technology to detect sounds in the Earth, sounds that are way below the natural level of ambient noise.

Where is this leading? Wallace explains that he probably will never be able to detect a special forces warrior landing by parachute, but he fully expects to have the capability to detect a Humvee arriving by chute, and to be able to identify the difference between a Humvee and an ATV by their characteristic signatures. He also expects to be able to count the number of vehicles in a column, and even determine what kind of vehicles they are.

Exploding C-4 produces a different signature than dynamite; and bombs are different still. How about determining whether the hand weapons being fired are Russian or Chinese, or whether the invisible moving group of men is 50 or 500 in number? Properly placed monitors can distinguish the man-made sounds emanating from a cave complex, even though they are "completely masked" by natural sounds like a rushing brook or other man-made sounds like traffic on a busy thoroughfare.

Here at home, Wallace and his colleagues are creating a seismic map of the entire country. Within 18 months they will have taken 400 coordinated measurements at 30-mile center-to-center seismometer positions. Over the next 10 years, the project will be completed. This detailed seismographic map of the United States will enable researchers to catalogue the signatures of literally millions of man-made events. They will also be able to fine-tune their forensic measurements with the detailed knowledge of the underlying terrain this vast study will generate.

As they develop their models, they are also creating automatic systems able to track and catalogue man-made events, and alert them when these events are out of the ordinary. An unexpected explosion in the hills of Idaho can be pinpointed for further investigation by the FBI. An excavation where one should not be taking place can trigger another investigation. An out-of-the-ordinary movement of trucks can be tracked as they converge - for example - on the Golden Gate Bridge. Even a sudden increase in ATV traffic can be analyzed for its potential impact.

The list of possible ways this information can be used in fighting the war on terror is almost endless. From the initial investigations under Churchill's World War I War Ministry to the state-of-the-art activities of Wallace and his colleagues, Forensic Seismology has become an increasingly valuable tool in our fight against terrorism.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

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ARTICLE 03

Rumsfeld Plan Would Decimate the U.S. Army

By Paul Connors

The war in Afghanistan, the war against terrorism and just about everything surrounding the events related to 9/11 have turned into one huge point-the-finger game. But while public attention is transfixed by the ongoing hearings on Capitol Hill, a far more serious problem on the other side of the Potomac River is getting scant attention.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is reportedly preparing to recommend an ill-conceived major reduction in the size of the active U.S. Army, a step that would single-handedly do more to weaken the military strength of this country than any of his three Democratic predecessors were able to achieve in a decade of drastic defense cuts. In fact, Rumsfeld is well on his way to transforming the United States Army in such a way that if he prevails, we won't be able to defend ourselves from a rogue troop of Brownies.

With the current active component numbering 10 divisions - down from a high of 18 at the Cold War's end - Rumsfeld and Principal Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Stephen Cambone are arguing forcefully behind closed doors for an even smaller active Army, reduced to eight or fewer light infantry divisions (with wheeled vehicles instead of real armor). Moreover, the plan would transfer heavy armor and artillery units to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve where this capability would be held for short-notice call-up.

To further his case for additional ground force cuts, Rumsfeld has refused to grant permission for the Army and the other services to significantly increase personnel endstrength totals significantly above the currently authorized 1.4 million active-duty members.

What Rumsfeld and his staffers seem to be ignoring (despite repeated disclosures by DefenseWatch and other news media publications) is that the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve today are uniformly incapable of effectively serving as that "force in reserve."

Of course, with the Soviet Union gone and Russia moving closer to the West as a now-junior partner to NATO, the threat of a large-scale European land war seems to have dissipated. But that doesn't mean that the threat has been eliminated altogether. Nor does it mean that the United States will never face another large-scale conventional threat requiring the type of armed forces that we currently possess.

What Mr. Rumsfeld apparently believes - on the basis of anecdotal evidence based on reports from the initial phase of operations in Afghanistan - is that all wars in the 21st century will only require airpower, special operations troops and light infantry.

What Rumsfeld and his minions seem to have conveniently ignored is that the lightly-equipped troops from the 10th (We Don't Do Mountains) Division and the 101st Airborne Division did not successfully complete their assigned missions in Afghanistan. For one thing, they were not acclimated to the higher mountain altitudes and became quickly fatigued. Any close observer of the military can see a direct connection between that failure and the eight years of social experimentation under the Clinton regime also robbed these units of the physical toughness necessary to prevail against their enemies under such harsh conditions.

Yet the active component of the U.S. Army would be restructured into one vast Light Infantry Division under the Rumsfeld "transformation." Pentagon insiders have revealed that the eight (or fewer) light infantry divisions that would comprise the active component would be modeled on the current TO&E of the 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry Divisions.

Army generals, especially those who realize transformation is needed, are fighting to block this proposal, but they are up against a foe they didn't expect, a SecDef and an administration bent on an overhaul at whatever the cost. Although I have been critical in the past of the performance of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, I credit him for his vigorous defense of the Army from the additional force cuts proposed by Rumsfeld.

Inside reports from the Pentagon indicate that Shinseki is in almost constant disagreement with the SecDef's office over how the transformed Army should actually look. (Many insiders believe there is a connection between Rumsfeld's obsessive desire for a complete Army make-over and the announcement of Shinseki's successor more than a year before his term ends. It is also cited as another reason why the next SACEUR will be a Marine general, rather than an Army four-star.)

Among the general officers who oppose the Rumsfeld proposals, a certain identifiable strain of bitterness has developed. During his campaign for the White House in 2000, then-Gov. George W. Bush told the men and women of the armed forces that "help is on the way." That statement was viewed as an open acknowledgement that the Clinton-era force cuts had been too drastic and too deep and the combat capability of the American armed forces had degraded to dangerously low levels.

Mr. Bush also promised reform and realignment of forces to fight new threats, including terrorism. But among senior officers, and especially those recently retired, there is a belief that the Bush administration and especially the secretary of defense have stabbed the military in the back. They see the Rumsfeld force reduction plans as indicative of his desire to transform the U.S. Army into nothing more than a supporting force.

This is fine if all you need an Army for is constabulary work. It will not work in a world where most other advanced nations still possess significant armored and artillery capability and the desire to sell such weapons to Third World Nations, many of which have interests that do not coincide with those of the United States.

The proposed transformation, where armor and artillery will primarily reside with the reserve components, denies the basic reality that threats still exist where those systems will require employment. In fact, it was the armor-heavy VII Corps that pounded Iraqi armored forces in the 100-hour ground war in 1991. Although most experts agree that fewer U.S. forces overall would be needed against Iraq this time around, the need for armored units and artillery support would still be critical to success.

Like his distant predecessor Robert S. McNamara, Secretary Rumsfeld has already established a reputation for arrogance and an unwillingness to listen to military advice from his own Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, Rumsfeld and his staffers have placed an unacceptably high level of confidence in technology and smart weapons as the only solution for the employment of American military might in future conflicts. This is a naïve and dangerous approach to warfighting, if for no other reason than it ignores those types of campaigns that still require a massive amount of ground combat power to defeat and destroy the enemy.

The administration's gravest error is that it has drawn a far too sweeping conclusion from the unconventional war campaign that dislodged the Taliban from power last fall. The loss of traditional "heavy" combat capabilities, such as those provided by heavy armor and artillery, may not be missed in such an Afghan-style campaign. But those same capabilities will be essential in the future - especially in the ground invasion of Iraq that this same administration wants to carry out.

Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. He can be reached at paulconnors@hotmail.com.

© 2002 Paul Connors.

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ARTICLE 04

A Final Legacy of the Marshall Plan

By J. David Galland

Last Tuesday, May 28th, I watched intently as ex-KGB intelligence officer Vladmir Putin signed an agreement as president of Russia that ended his nation's 53-year status as the NATO Alliance's principal foe.

The event, creating the unprecedented NATO-Russia Council, served to welcome Moscow into the alliance as a junior partner. The "Rome Declaration" effectually removed the last vestige of the adversarial relationship that existed between the Soviet Union (later Russia) and the West since the closing days of World War II.

It's worthwhile to recall how we arrived at this important juncture in history.

In June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall - who had served as U.S. Army chief of staff during World War II - offered unparalleled American economic assistance to the European countries still devastated by the destruction of the war two years after the surrender of Nazi Germany. His plan was simple: a blueprint for the economic recovery of Europe.

Marshall first outlined the concept of the recovery plan at a graduation day speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. This initially vague proposal quickly evolved into a detailed program within ten months, and became law with the support of the Truman administration and Congress.

A total of $13.3 billion in grants, loans and material aid flowed across the Atlantic Ocean. Large crates that were identified by the label "European Recovery Program" (ERP) became familiar sights in Western Europe.

Historians have unanimously concluded that the Marshall Plan was a large success. It fueled the energetic recovery of Europe at such a rapid pace that its success was termed "unpredictable" and beyond expectations.

The Marshall Plan served as the economic and political underpinning for the Western alliance that would go on to wage the Cold War. This fractious period in world history would lead to an arguably successful conclusion almost a half-century later with the dissolution of The Iron Curtain.

Under the Marshall Plan, for the first time in American history, the United States fully engaged itself in the international arena in peacetime, committing money and foreign aid instead of the blood of its soldiers.

At the same time, the United States safeguarded its investment in rebuilding Europe by means of an occupational military force. Eventually, that "Army of occupation" was called on to resist aggression in Berlin, an event that later would prove pivotal to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

By providing the initial monetary investments for the recovery of Western Europe, the Marshall Plan transformed its beneficiaries from nations of poverty and hopelessness into thriving global partners. In the 25 years following 1948, Western Europe recorded its highest rate of economic growth ever.

The Germans even created a word - Wirtschaftswunder - to describe this unbelievable level of national progress (literally translated as "economic miracle").

West Germany's progress stood in stark contrast to the communist state of East Germany that was saddled by the inefficiencies and central planning of Soviet communism. The "other" Germany simply ceased to exist in 1989 when the Soviets allowed a peaceful revolution to sweep throughout Eastern Europe.

From the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, to the fall of the Iron Curtain 28 years later, scores of East Germans attempted to flee to the prosperous West. They all risked life and limb, and a large number died seeking a better future in The Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In this Cold War game, with its deadly underpinnings, those who were least in control often suffered the greatest losses.

The Marshall plan provided for the necessary financial recovery and political stability that would result in national success and autonomy. Military security followed suit and the Americans envisioned that the Europeans would be potential contributors to their own protection. Washington became increasingly committed to the alliance.

Western European nations could emulate the United States and provide their citizens the good life, comfort, autonomy and security because of the Marshall Plan. meanwhile, the Warsaw Pact nations lacked the economic and political freedom needed to replicate the winning NATO strategy in the decades that followed.

The Marshall Plan, like any other large-scale undertaking that is subject to political debate, was not without controversies from the very beginning.

The future of Germany, and the overall European economic integration, was an initial point of debate, with some France and Great Britain questioning why the former aggressor in World War II should enjoy the benefits of the Marshall Plan. At this time, Paris and London were still receiving reparations from Germany, which actually threatened the struggling German economy and undermined the Marshall Plan by making Germany a de-facto conduit for American aid to France and Great Britain.

American officials correctly believed and stressed that German recovery was absolutely essential for overall stability in Western Europe. The Soviet Union itself unwittingly assisted in resolving this initial glitch in the implementation of the plan. In June 1948, the Soviets blocked ground access to Berlin, which at that time was occupied in zones by the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, but which lay hundreds of miles within the Soviet occupation zone of eastern Germany. This may very well be go down in history as one of the greatest political and military blunders of all time.

The Americans and the British ultimately refused to concede to the Soviet demand for exclusive control over Berlin. An armada of British and American aircraft began supplying and sustaining Berlin by air, which came to be known as the "Berlin Airlift." This massive, but non-combat operation, designed to help the beleaguered residents of Berlin, solidified NATO resolve against the Soviet Union for many years to come.

In May of 1949, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin finally realized that the British, the French and the Americans were not going to allow his exclusive domination of Berlin. He backed down on the blockade, and ground transportation resumed on the corridors that had been negotiated in 1945.

The die had been cast for The Cold War and relations between Western powers and the Soviet Union would continue to degrade.

Because of the Soviet aggression against the city and people of the former (and future) German capital, Berlin itself became a living symbol of Western resistance to Soviet antagonism. But in the short term, the confrontation resulted in Great Britain and France taking a far more conciliatory stance on aiding in the recovery of Germany.

A second question, pertaining to the overall economic integration of the Western European countries, remained unsettled. Many American officials argued that the European allies should move to create a common currency. But in 1949, nobody really knew whether members of the fledgling NATO Alliance could successfully set aside centuries of economic rivalry and political antagonism.

The Truman administration and its congressional allies believed and asserted that multilateral inter-European cooperation, along with quid-pro-quo measures, were critical to the continent's desired economic recovery. This approach aimed not only at eliminating duplication and waste, but would also

American officials argued that a bi-lateral plan would eliminate duplication and potential waste. They envisioned that this approach would maximize "continent exclusive" European trade, increase economic efficiency, and minimize frictions that could lead to renewed competition within the alliance.

There were hardcore security implications behind this push for a strategically leveled economic playing field. The threat to Western Europe from Soviet expansionism required firm and sustained military and economic commitments from all Western European nations for the long term.

In early 1948, British and American policymakers first publicly aired the possibility of a security alliance between the United States and Europe. This alliance would counter Soviet policies and the perceived threat of from the Red Army. A year later on Apr. 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was born.

Western Europe's recovery made certain that the Marshall Plan would become the model for future foreign aid initiatives and programs. The recovery program led to a 32-percent increase of aggregate growth in Western Europe's GNP, a 40-percent growth in industrial output, and an 11-percent rise in agricultural production during the four years the Marshall Plan was in effect.

The Marshall Plan's success in keeping Western Europe free from the Communist Bloc, and its political threat to the Warsaw Pact, clearly convinced American planners that economic weapons could solve contentious geopolitical issues. Even today, more than a half-century later, the Marshall Plan remains an exemplary model of positive economic diplomacy.

The aid program not only lifted Western Europe from post-war destruction and hopelessness, but it also became the foundation of an America strategy to challenge the Soviet Union peacefully.

The lessons learned from the Marshall Plan have taught us that investing to protect peace and prosperity abroad also safeguards prosperity at home.

It is clear, on this 55th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, that judicious investment of American capital for foreign aid can be as effective - if not more so - than relying solely on military might to protect the vital interests of the United States.

One belated legacy of the Marshall Plan occurred on Jan. 1, 2002, with the launching of the "euro" as a common European currency under the European Union. But a far more important one occurred last week.

The inclusion of Russia as a junior partner to NATO is a direct consequence of the Western European rebirth under the Marshall Plan. And coming 42 years after his death in October 1959, we can append a new line to the epilogue of the finest soldier-statesman in modern American history, General of the Army George Catlett Marshall:

He created the instrument by which a formidable Cold War adversary finally became our friend.

J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is a retired veteran of over thirty years of service in military intelligence who resides in Germany. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.

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ARTICLE 05

Constraints on Media Essential in This War

By Patrick Hayes

Eight months after the United States commenced combat operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, tensions between the U.S. military and the news media have risen to predictable levels. The age-old military precepts of operational security and need-to-know once more are in sharp collision with media issues of access to combat units and independent reporting.

Tension between what the U.S. Constitution refers to as "the press" and the U.S. military goes back a long, long way in American history and even beyond that.

Possibly since Athenian general Thucydides "reported" on the Peloponnesian War in 424 BC, which subsequently became a historical classic, members of the "press", in one form or another, have been present at, and have reported on, many of the major wars, campaigns and battles throughout history. Even Gaius Julius Caesar, in his Commentaries on the Gallic and civil wars from 100 to 44 BC, became his own reporter.

In British colonial America, freedom of the press was most publicly challenged on August 4, 1735, in New York City, when John Peter Zenger, editor and publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, was arrested for printing libelous articles against the British Governor, William Cosby. Although Zenger spent close to a year in prison, the case against him was subsequently dropped, based on his lawyer's argument that rather than rest a decision on the law of libel, the court should consider that what Zenger wrote was true.

In September of 1776, even General George Washington had to contend with "reporters" who witnessed the Colonial Army's retreat from New York City. One such report read:

By 1791, the first ten Amendments to the Constitution had been ratified and became known as the Bill of Rights. Amendment I reads:

Based on that short phrase within a larger context, a media empire has emerged with what to some appears to be a diminishing respect for ethics, demanding access to everything from the personal lives of individual citizens to the heart of government decision-making. In the latter case, unrestrained reporting by the press could place American lives in jeopardy - in the name of " ... freedom of speech, or of the press …. "

I seriously doubt that what passes for a "free press" today is what the Founding Fathers and Constitutional Framers envisioned - particularly if, by waving the First Amendment, that free press believes it has an uninhibited hand to write and publish whatever it deems appropriate, particularly in times of war.

However, the press exists as an institution and the U.S. military must deal with it.

One post-Bill of Rights example of how the military dealt with the media was during the U.S. Civil War, when Union Gen. Joseph Hooker became so disgusted with the erroneous and misguiding articles being sent from his camp that he ordered reporters, for the first time as a matter of accountability, to put their names on their stories (as he controlled the telegraph wires he could enforce the edict). The reporters railed against the idea, of course, but this was the birth of the newspaper byline.

As far back as the reports from Washington's winter encampment at Valley Forge to the last reports filed by Ernie Pyle before he was killed on Ie Shima in 1945, or those of Edward R. Murrow reporting from London during the German Blitz, there has been a sometimes tense, sometimes collegial relationship between the military and the press. During World War II, as an example, war reporting had been with the clear understanding of the times: that the enemy also reads press reports.

So, although military censors were present during World War II, for the most part, reporters censored themselves and, in so doing, were given almost unlimited access to decision-makers. In addition, there was the understanding among reporters of the day that World War II was an all-or-nothing proposition and much of the reporting reflected that sense of patriotism and support for the war effort, which some may now call propaganda and selective reporting.

Maybe censorship, selective reporting and putting a winning face on the ugliness of war can be called propaganda. However, given the circumstances, those World War II reporters seemed to know the difference between reporting news on one hand that - while accurate without giving away intelligence - usually had a positive slant for those not directly involved, and on the other - giving aid and comfort to the enemy, including information, which could be considered a treasonous act.

Then came the Korean War, which brought about a shift in the attitude by some on both sides - war correspondents and military leaders. Due to the nature of the undeclared war in the shadow of the Cold War, the press, by comparison to World War II, was given more limited access to combat units and their commanders. Their reporting was censored more and mutual distrust began to emerge.

By the time of the Vietnam War, the attitude of the press had turned a complete 180 from World War II, with many reporters openly attacking America's war in Southeast Asia as politically unjust, rather than using their position to report the news in an unbiased and non-partisan manner - particularly when such reporting had the potential of placing American GIs in the field in increased danger and disrupting the war effort at home.

However, many reporters were also in the "bush" with the grunts and saw a war fought by rear-echelon generals and political leaders, in direct contradiction to the real war that was being waged by battalion, company and platoon-level units.

Even so, for many, the actions of the press in Vietnam left an indelible scar of distrust for the press among those who served there. However, regardless of today's attitude about the war by those who fought and those who protested, what the press generally did in Vietnam was a reflection of the times.

Due to some actions by the members of the press, while waving the First Amendment to cover their occasional questionable activities, the military's relationship with them has again changed over the past 50 years. Controls on what the press was given and where they were allowed to go became an increasingly tense issue. The invasion of Grenada is a case in point, where the press was physically banned from the operation for the first 48 hours.

At the time of the invasion, the press exclusion was deemed to be for a good reason: confidentiality. Anyone who has put their lives on the line on a battlefield should realize that providing unnecessary information to the enemy is not covered under the First Amendment or the right of the press to know - particularly when American lives are at risk.

During the Panama invasion in 1989, the Pentagon press pool arrived after the fighting had already started and was sequestered far from the "action" until the next morning. The reason stated was the need for secrecy surrounding the operation. However, the military later admitted delays in getting information to press representatives, which further alienated them from the military.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm became a mixed bag of press relations. Although some units allowed media access, others did not and much of the press was restricted as to what they could do and where they could go.

In the decade since Operation Desert Storm, significant improvements in military-media relations occurred overall, but in the two major U.S. military actions - Kosovo in 1999 and the ongoing war against terrorism - the historic tensions returned, fueled by the unavoidable clash of roles of the two institutions. The initial upsurge of media reports after 9-11 showed a rare, pro-American coloration, but have since returned to an overall tone of biting skepticism and ironic detachment, particularly in attempts to cover ground combat operations in Afghanistan.

Today, coverage of both the Israeli-Palestinian clashes and the war against al Qaeda has been clouded by charges of slanting and inaccuracy in media reports.

In Israel and the Palestinian Authority, reporters today seem more intent on showing the "sadness" of the "downtrodden" Palestinians rather than the murderous carnage that homicidal Islamic bombers and gunmen have brought on innocent men, women and children in Israel.

Similarly, news media reports focusing on the human rights of "alleged" al Qaeda prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, and continued stories exploring the well-being and treatment of American Taliban fighter John Walker are in stark contrast to the minimal coverage of the family of CIA officer Mike Spann, who was brutally murdered in the prison uprising near Mazar-e Sharif by al Qaeda-Taliban terrorists.

Acknowledging the complexities of the ongoing war against terrorism, particularly the blurring of traditional military operations with intelligence and even law enforcement functions, there are more "gray" areas today than in the global war of 60 years ago. But one bottom-line truth remains: There is a place for reporting in war, but that reporting cannot and should not place American fighting men at risk.

It seems evident that, given the time and place of their writing, the Framers of the Constitution would place the security of combat solders in the field and that of the nation as a whole before any "rights" of the press to unrestricted access.

The military's responsibility is to ensure the security of the United States and safeguard its citizens, not to keep the modern press moguls and their minions in business. However, a common ground of communication must be reached in order to avoid the potential for antagonism and slanted reporting - one way or the other. The press must be kept away from classified actions and/or materials because some reporters obviously cannot be trusted to keep secrets. However, reporters must also be given as much information as circumstances allow, which helps to reduce suspicion and keep them engaged, rather than antagonistic.

For its part, the press has a place in a free and open society, but judgment and even common sense need to be employed by editors and publishers, if not by reporters. The question is not whether a free press has a right to exist. It does. The question is the weight given to such a free press and its right to know, over the lives of Americans, whether on the battlefield, or taking a civilian airliner across the country.

Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at gyrene@sftt.us.

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ARTICLE 06

Seven Wars and a Century Later, a Failed System

By Don Vandergriff

To understand today's readiness problem confronting the U.S. military, it is necessary to take a close look at how the services - in this case, the U.S. Army - has managed its personnel for the past century. For the Army itself is firmly stuck in the past.

The current Army culture believes in and practices the Individual Replacement System (IRS), which can best be summarized by what one Army colonel recently told me: "I had a tank company in Germany, and you get a new guy, you want to put him in a tank knowing he's been trained at Fort Knox on this same tank. You put him in there and he'll fight the tank, because he knows what to do."

This cultural belief - which originated in the late 19th-century theory of management science known as Taylorism - has become deeply "hard-wired" in the policies and procedures of the Army in the more than a century it has been in place. It had enormous cultural prestige at the beginning of the 20th century when Secretary of War Elihu Root imported it into the War Department, and the service later adapted the IRS as the Army mobilization and replacement policy in 1912, six years before the United States entered World War I.

After-action reports in every conflict since World War I have documented the devastating impact of the IRS system on U.S. combat effectiveness, prompting the Army to implement personnel programs based on units rather than individuals. But the overall personnel system remains deeply flawed to this day. [suggested sentence addition for transition to next part - ed]

In the Army's history of the Army from the Revolutionary War until today, there have been 11 attempts at manning the force by unit instead of individual replacement. Up until the 1898 Spanish-American War, the country's military strategy relied on a strong Navy as its frontline defense, backed by a small regular Army - to garrison and defend the frontiers and coastal fortifications - backed by a state militia system for mobilization in time of invasion. This was the only system our young and economically-strapped country was willing to accept.

Prior to World War I, the Army was existed on a regimental system that was recruited its soldiers throughout the nation by regimental recruiters of numbered regiments. In time of war, this system expanded through state militias, later the National Guard. It met wartime needs by also recruiting locally and appointing its own regimental officers. Rapidly promoted West Point graduates or bestowing higher rank on ambitious politicians - to the demise of that unit in combat - temporarily filled the command and staff needs of brigades and higher units. To the country, through the results of previous wars, this system worked fine, but the first industrial age war, America's Civil War, presented new challenges.

The large scope of the Civil War put incredible demands on the personnel system. The Militia Acts of 1792 and 1795 had earlier put 90-day limits on serving state troops, but the Union disaster at Bull Run in June 1861 woke up the nation to the new realities of war. Many laws were passed following Bull Run, including a three-year enlistment of state troops, enlargement of the regular Army, and screening boards to get rid of poor officers. But the Army failed to effectively sustain units during the war.

The Union and Confederate armies used different methods in their attempts to sustain units. The Confederates in early 1862 adapted a system similar to a European depot system: They kept the number of their regiments low, and fed in replacements from the same geographical region. The intermissions between campaigns were the equivalent of a program to periodically rotate units back from the line - and veterans had time to integrate the "newbies" into their units prior to the next campaign.

This kept their regiments stronger - and more effective - until the mid-summer of 1864, when the Confederacy literally ran out of replacements.

In contrast, the Union continually raised new regiments at the demands of governors who wanted to reward political patronage by providing supporters with regimental commands. As a result, several times during the war these new regiments would go through a terrible bloodletting as both the leaders and the led experienced combat for the first time. Later in the war, the Union did ensure that the recovered wounded and sick were returned to the same regiment. But, the system was so wasteful that Gens. Ben Butler and William Tecumseh Sherman pleaded for its replacement with a "French depot system."

Thirty-three years after the Civil War ended at Appomattox, the United States went to war against Spain, and again, suffered from poor planning and personnel management.

As a result, President William McKinley appointed corporate lawyer Elihu Root as Secretary of War. Root misinterpreted Emory Upton's 1876 examination of the Prussian Army and translated this with an analogy that compared the big centralized corporations of the day with that of the German General staff.

Root's reforms established a weak Army general staff, which included centralized personnel management modeled on the personnel systems common to large corporations, particularly in the form of management policies evolving from industrialist Frederick Taylor, who advocated training individuals in specific tasks, which turned them into "cogs in a machine." By 1912, the War Department adapted the Individual Replacement System, with the military unit serving only as an administrative center.

At the beginning of both World War I and World War II, personnel experts advocated a unit rotation system at the division level (much like Germany's system). But the Army continued to favor the IRS system because of the emergency requirement to raise a large Army in a short time, the competition for manpower in other services, industry and agriculture, and the fact that the U.S. leaders recognized they could rely our allies to slow down or bleed the Germans while the U.S. military prepared for the conflicts.

When the Army finally entered combat in Europe in 1918, the bloody allied offenses allowed no time to rotate units. Instead, under the new IRS system, Gen. John J. Pershing and his staff broke up newly-arriving divisions as they disembarked in France, with individual troops then being fed into the committed divisions.

The Army again rediscovered the flaws in the IRS as early as the massive Louisiana Maneuvers in the American South in 1941. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall had drawn up plans for a 200-division Army in order to rotate divisions out of line and rebuild them. But by mid-1943, he then decided in favor of 90 divisions supplied by IRS. Again the reasons were competition for critical manpower with other services, industry and agriculture.

In the Pacific, where there were pauses between battles, veterans could easily integrate replacements into divisions. It was in the European theater where soldiers suffered the most from the use of the IRS. There, the system kept veterans kept on the front for the "duration" - with some suffering severe trauma and nervous breakdowns, while replacements had little time for acceptance into experienced groups before exposure to combat.

After World War II, serious debate resumed on what type of personnel system would best prepare the Army for war while conforming to the democratic values of the nation. The Keane Board in 1946 - analyzing the lessons of World War II - was harshly critical of the IRS. The panel advocated a regimental system incorporating unit cycles consisting of cohesive units. But again, the Army kept the IRS and was still using it in 1950 when the Korean War erupted.

Korea again confirmed the fatal weaknesses of the IRS system as individual replacements were used to fill up under-strength units as they arrived. Gen. Donn Starry, commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command during 1979-83 recalled, "The replacement [troops]s would arrive with dinner and after a night against the Chinese, leave in body bags as breakfast arrived."

Still again, the Army and Defense Department had mobilized for combat, prosecuted a war and returned to a peacetime posture afterwards, without seriously reorganizing a consistently failing personnel management system. And 12 years later, we did it yet again in Vietnam.

Once the Army began deploying ground combat units to Vietnam in 1965, it not only employed IRS to support them, but used an "infusion program" which destabilized units even more. It was the worst of all worlds: By inserting newly-arriving soldiers in deployed units, and by scattering soldiers with similar discharge or transfer dates from their unit to different ones, the Army successfully destroyed unit cohesion - the irreplaceable combination of esprit de corps and individual soldier morale critical to success in combat.

Between the end of the Korean War and after the Vietnam War, the Army did experiment with various unit-based programs, from the platoon to the division level. They all failed for the simple reason that they focused on unit rotation and not unit cohesion.

Of all these unit-based systems, the Cohesion, Operations, Readiness and Training, or COHORT, was the most successful. As with past systems, it was a compromise - only enlisted personnel would be involved. Unlike other systems, COHORT had the support of many senior Army leaders who obtained the necessary policy and legal changes to make it possible. COHORT was a small part of an evolutionary regimental system that involved cohesive units, managed deployment cycles and affiliation with a regiment.

But despite the superiority of COHORT over IRS-filled units (confirmed by Walter Reed Army Research Institute studies from 1985-87) the traditionalists imbedded in the Army personnel system waited it out. By the end of the 1991 Gulf War, COHORT was dead.

Our soldiers fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan today are struggling under a deeply-rooted set of personnel manning policies that hampered, and sometimes even crippled, U.S. combat effectiveness at San Juan Hill, the French Ardennes, Normandy Beach, Chipyong-ni, the A Shau Valley, Point Salines and Mutlaa Ridge.

After a century and seven wars, you'd think the Army's leaders would have gotten it by now.

But they haven't.

Vandergriff is a Contributing Editor to DefenseWatch, and is author of "Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs" (Presidio Press). He can be reached at vandergriffdonald@usa.net.

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ARTICLE 07

Guest Column: Al-Jazeera Is an Opportunity, Not a Threat

By J. Darren Duke

I am not an Arab-American but I do speak Arabic. I also happen to be a habitual viewer of Qatar's al-Jazeera news channel, which Contributing Editor Robert G. Williscroft called an Islamic weapon aimed at the West ("Target Al Jazeera - 'Information War' Weapon," DefenseWatch, May 15, 2002).

I've been watching al-Jazeera, as well as other Middle East channels, for about three years. I also just returned from a year of independent duty in Jerusalem where I actually witnessed many of the events portrayed on international news channels, watched the way news media of every stripe butchered the truth, and lived to tell about it.

While I agree that the Arab states suffer immensely and rather needlessly from despotism and corruption, Williscroft has poorly represented reality when he describes Al-Jazeera as "wartime propaganda weapon aimed at the United States and the West." The opinions he expresses, although obviously strongly held, are not backed up with facts. Consider the following quotes from his article:

"On Al-Jazeera suicide bombers are martyrs and Israelis are 'devils.' "

This is patently false. Homicide bombers are not referred to as "martyrs" by the news announcers themselves. They are called by a term whose meaning is closer to "guerrilla." The common term used for a martyrdom operation is ameliya istishhadiya. On al-Jazeera, these attacks are commonly referred to as ameliyaat feda'iya, or guerrilla operations. Israelis are referred to by their nationality and when the Israeli army is mentioned it is called the "army of the occupation" - jaysh al-ihtilaal - when speaking of the West Bank and Gaza. On other fronts, such as the Lebanese border, the IDF is referred to commonly as "the Israeli Army." These terms certainly may reflect a pro-Palestinian bias but fall far short of being "the worst kind of propaganda" that Williscroft thinks it is.

"The government of a supposedly friendly Arab nation underwrites the vilest, most acrimonious, inflammatory lies and half-truths ever broadcast."

Once again, the facts do not bear this statement out. Qatar has been a very loyal supporter of the U.S. presence in the Arabian Gulf, giving us quite generous support in maintaining our force posture in that region. As for the vileness and acrimony, I have always found the staff of Al-Jazeera to be very gracious, though aggressive, hosts. On Al-Jazeera, I have personally watched interviews with many members of the Israeli parliament, the British foreign ministry, and various academicians from the West (to include a few Americans). In each instance, the host was very professional and appreciative of the guest, even if their views did not comport well.

Aside from the inaccurate statements regarding Al-Jazeera's programming and editorial content, Williscroft misunderstands the real problem. The real problem with Al-Jazeera is the absence of any official U.S. government presence in Arabic on their programs. I have yet to see one American official speaking in Arabic to the Arab world. This is not because we have none - although those we have are far too few - but because we have not authorized any of them to be interviewed.

I personally know of one high-ranking State Department diplomat with decades of experience in the region and an uncommon fluency in the language who could perform this task but he has, to my knowledge, not been directed to make a statement.

The reason that Arab Americans do not watch CNN or Fox (although I'm not totally convinced that this is true - I think there are many who are well-informed of both the Arab and English press) is because CNN and Fox broadcast in a language other than their mother tongue. CNN is only now beginning its Arabic language news on the internet and I expect Fox will never broadcast in another language. So, lack of CNN viewership can hardly be a reason to "jam the Hell out of al-Jazeera," as Williscroft advocates.

When overseas, even in the Middle East, I go to an English channel when I want news fast and easy. How can Arab Americans be blamed for doing the same?

As the for the anti-Semitic and anti-American comments to which Williscroft refers, this type of language may be uttered from time to time on Al-Jazeera by guests from Islamist and terrorist organizations. I suspect, however, that a survey of their broadcasts would indicate that most of these epithets and curses came from telephone calls to the station during call-in shows such as "The Opposite Direction." In the West, we censor for civility. In the East, more license is granted to the caller to express his feelings. But whether in the East or the West, no station can guarantee against insulting remarks on a live call-in show.

Racist remarks are certainly inappropriate and unfortunate, regardless of cultural setting and Al-Jazeera does try to reduce the level of inflammatory editorializing during its broadcasts. I have personally seen the hosts chastise their guests when they begin to hurl insults and abuse each other.

Finally, let me say that Al-Jazeera does represent the best hope for freedom of the press in the Arab world. This is a fact to which even the Jerusalem Report - an Israeli magazine printed in English - has attested. Al-Jazeera reports on a wide array of issues of importance to the Arab and Muslim world. Corruption in Sudan, eviction in Egypt, famine and warfare in Ethiopia and Eritrea are but a few of the topics covered. Many times, these articles contain information that sheds a poor light on the leaders and governments of these failing states.

For example, Al-Jazeera recently hosted a debate on "No Boundaries" (Bilaa Hedood) that dealt with the rampant corruption in the Palestinian Authority. Members of the Palestinian Legislative Council were grilled by host and callers alike to explain how and what changes were going to be implemented.

Perhaps the only state that escapes Al-Jazeera's criticisms is Qatar, the network's host, sponsor and patron. While this is lamentable to those of us who believe in a free press, does anyone really expect American news media outlets to bite the hands that feed them? Of course not.

Williscroft is understandably frustrated by the bitter fruits of an unstable and oppressed region. The lack of respect for the rule of law and the value of human life is a pernicious problem that must be judiciously treated by the United States and our Western allies using all the tools of national power. Physical destruction of a news media outlet that has sewn the seeds of political liberalization is not, however, the way to bring about the needed change.

As a solution, I recommend that the U.S. government spend more time and resources on reaching the Arab world in Arabic. We do a very poor job of this. Investing money and resources in new Arabic broadcasts is probably too little too late, as Mr. Williscroft correctly observes, but there are numerous Arabic daily newspapers and TV stations that would love to have exclusive coverage and/or access to influential Americans.

It might also be wise to place added stress on language ability in our monoglotic society and provide the resources needed to train truly proficient linguists in both the diplomatic corps and the military.

Duke is a major in the U.S. Marine Corps.

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ARTICLE 08

For the Record: President Bush Graduation Speech at West Point

The full text of President George W. Bush's graduation day speech at the U.S. Military Academy on June 1, 2002, including video and audio presentations, can be reached at the official White House website.

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ARTICLE 09

For the Record: President Reagan D-Day Speech at Normandy

Editor's Note: With the 58th anniversary of the June 6, 1944 allied invasion of Normandy this week, DefenseWatch reprints the historic speech of President Ronald Reagan delivered at Pointe du Hoc in Normandy for the 40th anniversary of D-Day on June 6, 1984.

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ARTICLE 10

Medal of Honor - Father and Son Recipients

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, March 3, 1863, has awarded in the name of The Congress the Medal of Honor to:

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THEODORE ROOSEVELT UNITED STATES ARMY

for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty.

Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt distinguished himself by acts of bravery on 1 July 1898, near Santiago de Cuba, Republic of Cuba, while leading a daring charge up San Juan Hill. Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt, in total disregard for his personal safety, and accompanied by only four or five men, led a desperate and gallant charge up San Juan Hill, encouraging his troops to continue the assault through withering enemy fire over open countryside.

Facing the enemy's heavy fire, he displayed extraordinary bravery throughout the charge, and was the first to reach the enemy trenches, where he quickly killed one of the enemy with his pistol, allowing his men to continue the assault. His leadership and valor turned the tide in the Battle for San Juan Hill. Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army.

BRIGIDIER GENERAL THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JR.

Rank and organization: brigadier general, U.S. Army.
Place and date: Normandy invasion, 6 June 1944.
Entered service at: Oyster Bay, N.Y. Birth: Oyster Bay, N.Y. G.O. No.: 77, 28 September 1944.

Citation: for gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty on 6 June 1944, in France. After two verbal requests to accompany the leading assault elements in the Normandy invasion had been denied, Brig. Gen. Roosevelt's written request for this mission was approved and he landed with the first wave of the forces assaulting the enemy-held beaches. He repeatedly led groups from the beach, over the seawall and established them inland.

His valor, courage, and presence in the very front of the attack and his complete unconcern at being under heavy fire inspired the troops to heights of enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. Although the enemy had the beach under constant direct fire, Brig. Gen. Roosevelt moved from one locality to another, rallying men around him, directed and personally led them against the enemy.

Under his seasoned, precise, calm, and unfaltering leadership, assault troops reduced beach strong points and rapidly moved inland with minimum casualties. He thus contributed substantially to the successful establishment of the beachhead in France.

Editor's Note: If you know of any MOH recipient who is hospitalized or has passed away recently, please email DefenseWatch MOH Editor Jim H. at moheditor@mindspring.com. NOTE: NEW E-MAIL ADDRESS