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David H. Hackworth, Col. USA (Ret.)

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831.

Look for his new book, "Steel My Soldiers' Hearts," (Rugged Land LLC, New York City).

© 2002 David H. Hackworth

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By Thomas L. Carney

In the SFTT Feedback website on June 25, 2002, Michael Guyer said he would like to donate a new .45 ACP to the troops ("Readers Comment on U.S. Army Weapons," second letter). I know the Pentagon would have a total conniption fit over that, but it's still a great idea, given recent accounts in DefenseWatch of problems with the U.S. Army's 9-mm. Beretta in recent combat operations ("SITREPS from Afghanistan," June 12, 2002).

As an experienced handgun shooter, I believe that the Army made a grievous strategic error by going to the 9-mm. Beretta. The troops in Afghanistan are paying the price.

I have noted that several law enforcement institutions that once used the 9-mm. have now opted for a more effective sidearm. The Virginia State Police left the 9-mm. and went to the .40 Smith & Wesson. The FBI went to the Springfield .45 ACP. Why did the U.S. military stay with a virtual pea shooter?

I have three .45 ACPs: a Colt 1991A1 (virtually identical to the 1911A1), a Springfield Loaded 1911A1, and a Ruger P90DC. They are all in excellent condition.

My first .45ACP was the Ruger P90DC, which I bought because of its reputation for reliability and reasonable price. (I had just gotten out of college and bought a house, and needed something for home protection.) I have put over 6,000 rounds through it, and it jammed only once.

My second purchase was the Springfield "Loaded" 1911A1. I knew several people who owned a .45 from the Loaded Series and were more than pleased with it. This gun has needed zero modifications. It is an excellent .45 ACP pistol. It's no surprise that the FBI gave Springfield its biggest contract ever for .45 ACPs.

The third handgun is a Colt 1991A1, which is a direct descendant of the 1911A1. I have had it for three years and it is accurate and reliable. The only modification I have considered is to replace the standard grip safety with the beavertail grip safety. Otherwise it is excellent.

As an Air Force veteran (1978-83), I would like to put my "money where my mouth is" for our troops in Afghanistan. I will donate all three weapons if someone can get them to the troops, and I will throw in 1,000 hardball rounds.

Carney is a past member of The American Legion and Disabled American Veterans, and is a life member of Gun Owners of America.

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By Maj. Anthony F. Milavic USMC (Ret.)

In 1964, I watched a Special Forces soldier fire 15 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition into a tethered goat from an AR-15 rifle; moments after the last round hit, the goat fell over. As I looked at the goat lying there, I saw many little bullet entry-holes on one side; and when we turned him over, I saw many little bullet exit-holes on the other side. I saw no other holes or wounds.

During my next two tours of duty in Vietnam, I made similar observations, especially during 1969 as the principal intelligence officer of the 4th Marine Regiment while searching VC/NVA bodies for documents after ground engagements: I saw many little bullet entry- and exit-holes as was the case with the goat.

These observations conflicted with what we in the armed forces were being taught characterized the .223 cartridge's effect on humans: That the unique "tumbling action" of this bullet caused explosive wounds. This claim that the bullet tumbled was nothing more than puffery; and, it "greased the skids" for the acceptance of the full-blown lies on the lethality of the .223 caliber AR-15 and its adoption by the U.S. armed forces as the 5.56mm M-16 service rifle as they entered the Vietnam War.

This term "tumbling" prompts images of the .223 bullet traveling end over end through the human body in 360-degree loops: In reality, it does not. Dr. Martin L. Fackler (Col. USA, Ret.) served as a surgeon in Vietnam during 1968 and, subsequently, pursued the research of terminal ballistics by observing the effects of bullets fired into blocks of ballistic gelatin.

In "Military Rifle Wound Ballistics" he reports that "all" non-deforming pointed bullets "yaw" 180 degrees shortly after penetrating flesh point-first, then exit base-forward. The .223/5.56mm projectile acts in the same manner with a very precise exception. If this round impacts flesh at 2,700 fps or more, it will penetrate point-first, "yaw" to 90-degrees, and then fragment at its weakened serrated band (cannelure) into two or more pieces. These fragments traveling in different directions cause a large internal cavity. The term "tumble" was apparently derived from this "yaw" action and, as suggested by the following, was chosen in lieu of the word "yaw" because it would sell better.

The book, The Black Rifle, M-16 Retrospective by Edward C. Ezell and R. Blake Stevens, " … is, so far as [the authors] could make it so, the truth about the controversial 5.56-mm caliber AR-15 (M16) - What it is, what it is not, where it came from, and why."

The late Dr. Ezell, was the curator/supervisor of the Division of Armed Forces History, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. and the editor of perhaps the world's most famous gun book, Small Arms of the World. The book contains one of the earliest characterizations that the .223 tumbled in a brochure produced by Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company, Inc. The caption written by the book's authors reads, "From the first Colt AR-15 brochure, produced in a desperate attempt to interest somebody - anybody - in the merits of the AR-15's 'unmatched superiority.' " In one of the three internal brochure illustrations is text reading, in part, "On impact the tumbling action of the .223 caliber ammunition increases effectiveness."

In 1961, Colt did get somebody's attention. The Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense (DoD) was enjoined by the Kennedy administration to explore how the United States could support a foreign ally in a "limited" war. In the spring of 1961, ARPA's Project AGILE was implemented to supply "research and engineering support for the military and paramilitary forces engaged in or threatened by conflict in remote areas of the world."

In October 1961, ARPA provided ten Colt AR-15s to Vietnamese Forces in Saigon to conduct a limited test. The Black Rifle remarks of this test, "The number of rifles might have been small, but the enthusiastic reaction of the Vietnamese and their American advisors alike who handled and fired the AR-15s was just as [Colt's marketing agent] had predicted." Armed with these positive results, ARPA succeeded in expanding the Project AGILE study by procuring 1,000 AR-15s for distribution among select Vietnamese units for field testing. Ezell and Stevens wrote that this approval resulted in " … saving Colt's from almost sure financial disaster and also setting the stage for the most influential yet controversial document so far in the history of the already controversial AR-15."

The purpose of this test, as set forth in the final ARPA report ("Report of Task 13A, Test of ArmaLite Rifle, AR-15," dated 31 July 1962), was " … a comparison between the AR-15 and the M2 carbine to determine which is a more suitable replacement for shoulder weapons in selected units of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)."

The Project AGILE results were summed up, in part, by ARPA back in Washington as follows, "The suitability of the AR-15 as the basic shoulder weapon for the Vietnamese has been established. For the type of conflict now occurring in Vietnam, the weapon was also found by its users and by MAAG advisors to be superior in virtually all respects to the M-1 Rifle, M-1 and M-2 Carbines, Thompson Sub-Machine Gun, and Browning Automatic Rifle." NOTE: This study and its recommendations concerned the suitability of the AR-15 for Vietnamese soldiers, who were described by the testers to be of "small stature, body configuration and light weight," not United States soldiers.

In any case, the report was widely read and some of its components came under serious question, especially those purporting to describe the demonstrated lethality of the .223 caliber cartridge. The following are three such examples from the Project AGILE Project report:

Example 1. "On 16 0900 June, one platoon from the 340 Ranger company was on a ground operation … and contacted 3 armed VC in heavily forested jungle …. At a distance of approximately 15 meters, one Ranger fired an AR-15 full automatic hitting one VC with 3 rounds with the first burst. One round in the head took it completely off. Another in the right arm, took it completely off. One round hit him in the right side, causing a hole about 5 inches in diameter …. " (Rangers)

Example 2. "On 9 June a Ranger Platoon from the 40th Infantry Regt. Was given the mission of ambushing an estimated VC Company ….

Number of VC killed: 5 (Descriptions of the one-round killing wounds follow.)

* Back wound, which caused the thoracic cavity to explode.
* Stomach wound, which caused the abdominal cavity to explode.
* Buttock wound, which destroyed all tissue of both buttocks.
* Chest wound from right to left; destroyed the thoracic cavity.
* Heel wound; the projectile entered the bottom of the right foot causing the leg to split from the foot to the hip.

These deaths were inflicted by the AR-15 and all were instantaneous except the buttock wound. He lived approximately five minutes. (7th Infantry Division)"

Example 3. "On 13 April, a Special Forces team made a raid on a small village. In the raid, seven VC were killed. Two were killed by AR-15 fire. Range was 50 meters. One man was hit in the head; it looked like it exploded. A second man was hit in the chest, his back was one big hole." (VN Special Forces)

These "field-reports" are incredulous on their face. Yet they were incorporated into the official Project AGILE report to prove that the .223 varmint cartridge was not just for Ground Hogs, Prairie Dogs and Wood Chucks anymore, but was lethal for the biggest game of all - enemy soldiers. Some in DoD maintained their sanity and requested that these results be duplicated scientifically.

The Army Wound Ballistics Laboratory at Edgewood Arsenal attempted to do just that. Using .223 Remington ammunition provided by Colt's representative, they conducted their "standard lethality trials that consisted of measuring the cavitational and other effects of firing at known distances into blocks of ballistic gelatin, and where necessary, anaesthetized goats." They failed to duplicate the explosive effects reported by Project AGILE.

In November 1962, the Army initiated "worldwide" tactical and technical tests of the AR-15 using U.S. soldiers. Edgewood was tasked to perform further lethality testing using modified .223 ammunition. Ezell and Stevens describe the modifications: "They had modified some 55-grain .223 ball bullets of Remington manufacture by cutting approximately 1/4 inch off the nose and drilling a 3/32-inch-diameter hole about 1/4 inch deep into the lead core of each bullet."

The results? The authors continue, "As it turned out, even the hollow-points failed to duplicate anything like the spectacular effects recorded by the Vietnamese unit commanders and their American advisors, which had subsequently been taken as fact and much used as propaganda."

How could so many people be influenced by propaganda to adopt the .223 caliber cartridge? "All this was inspired by the principle - which is quite true in itself - that in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper stata of their emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily, and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods," wrote Adolph Hitler in Mein Kampf.

A rifle that entered testing for issuance to Vietnamese soldiers was adopted for United States soldiers. A bullet that was advertised to tumble, but did not, was accepted as the standard cartridge for that rifle. And, Americans were sent into battle with this rifle based on reports that its cartridge would: blow the head off a soldier with one round; blow the arm off a soldier with one round; kill a soldier with a one-round hit in either the stomach, back, chest, buttock or heel of the foot!

From the Ia Drang Valley of Vietnam to the mountains of Afghanistan, our soldiers and Marines only found that enemy soldiers continued to advance firing their weapons after being hit by multiple 5.56-mm. bullets!

It is time the Department of Defense recognizes this last remaining Big Lie from the Vietnam War and in the name of honesty, transformation, or combat effectiveness replaces this varmint cartridge with one that gives our warriors one-round knockdown power on an enemy soldier!

There are a number of effective replacements out there, but permit me to nominate one for consideration. It is one that has been evaluated against the 5.56mm and other NATO and Warsaw Pact rounds by Dr. Fackler in "Military Rifle Wound Ballistics":

"Bullet mass and bullet striking velocity establish a bullet's potential; they set the limit on the tissue disruption it can produce. Bullet shape and construction determine how much of this potential is actually used to disrupt tissue; they are the major determinants of bullet effect. Far and away the most disruptive bullet of those described is the West German 7.62 NATO round. Its fragmenting behavior maximizes utilization of its much higher potential (bullet mass well over twice that of any of the 5.56mm bullets and velocity only about ten percent less than theirs) for tissue disruption."

Semper one-round knockdown power.

Milavic, a retired Marine Corps major, is coordinator of the MILINET information network. He can be reached at majusmcret@aol.com.

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Editor's Note: The U.S. Army Natick Soldier Center in Natick, Mass., recently produced this unclassified summary of "lessons learned" from U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, ranging across a wide list of subjects including the adequacy of MRE rations, design problems with body armor and cold-weather clothing. Of particular relevance to this Special Report, soldiers expressed a wide range of dissatisfaction with the M9 Beretta sidearm (see page 21).

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By Paul Connors

For weeks now, the news media has fronted stories that the United States plans to attack Iraq for the sole purpose of removing Saddam Hussein from power and installing a regime less threatening to the United States and its neighbors in the region.

Well, as commentators all over America and the world have stated, "There's nothing like announcing your intentions in advance so that your enemy can prepare."

The leaks that came out of the government, whether they were deliberate or accidental, were and are extremely foolish. While the staging for such an invasion could not be hidden for the eyes of the world, announcing the rough timetable for an attack is the epitome of folly and shows that once again, politicians are meddling in the affairs of the military (much to the detriment of the people who will have to fight this next war).

Pundits argue that the United States can do this invasion by itself and that there need not be a broad coalition of forces under United Nations auspices to carry it out. From the noises coming out of European capitals, it also seems likely that our NATO allies will not be joining us in this endeavor and even the stalwart British have signaled that the United States may have to fight this battle all alone.

So, if we do plan and execute this attack, we will be on our own, and to many people around the world, the United States will have finally proven that it is a "cowboy" nation whose government is in the hands of a bunch of gunfighters.

When one listens to the American people, and I don't mean the pundits, but the folks you meet in the barber shop, or the people you go to dinner with, there is a sense of unease and puzzlement and perhaps an underlying fear that an invasion of Iraq in 2003 will not be as easy as anticipated by the administration.

There are many factors for this unease and perhaps most significant is the fact that Saddam knows he has nothing to lose. With all the rhetoric out of the Bush administration and the Defense Department that this next "phase" in the war on terrorism will be just that, the Iraqi dictator knows that we are coming for him in person and this time, there will be no U.N. resolution that will save him.

President Bush revealed his new doctrine of "strike first" - a method that will be employed when the U.S. government believe there is sufficient evidence that a nation is harboring, training or financing organizations whose sole intent is to wreak havoc on America and its citizens.

This is the doctrine the president will use to attack a sovereign nation, a nation that of late, has not committed any overtly aggressive acts against us. This doctrine and the announcements that it will be used is what leaves so many average Americans unsettled.

Should the United States go forward with the planning and implementation of an invasion, there are several key factors that differ from the 1990-91 buildup.

First, this will not be a U.N.-sanctioned expedition, and we probably won't have Saudi support or the use of the many bases we have counted on in the past. (Then again, this should come as no surprise since the Saudis are at best, fair-weather friends and Janus-faced in their dealings with us and the rest of the Moslem world.)

Second, the buildup of U.S. and allied forces for Operation Desert Shield/Storm took more than six months as American forces mobilized and transported the heavy mechanized and armored equipment necessary to fight a large-scale maneuver war against an entrenched enemy. And even though we will probably not need as many troops on the ground as we did in 1991, providing logistical support for a ground force of 200,000-250,000 troops will stretch American capabilities to the limit.

Then comes the real question: From which nation or nations will we stage our assault? Saudi Arabia? Not likely. Turkey? Another poor choice, given that the terrain bordering Iraq is not favorable to mechanized equipment and armored style warfare. That leaves Kuwait, the very same country we rescued in 1991. But their support, which would be vital, is still a question mark at this point and some reports from Kuwait City have indicated a lack of resolve by the Kuwaiti royal family out of fears that they don't want to be seen as a Moslem state supporting the world's last superpower as it attacks another Moslem state.

Even if Kuwait does grant the United States access, the actual buildup and preparations will be time-intensive as American forces move into the theater to join up with pre-positioned equipment. U.S. Marines, who it is presumed will come ashore from amphibious ships, will need to be moved into the region. That takes time and the fleet of amphibious transports, like all Navy ships, have been decommissioned over the past decade at a rate faster than they have been replaced. Vital transport capability for the movement of American forces was just one of the many capabilities lost during the Clinton Administration's cutbacks. Once again, the United States will probably have to rely on "requisitioned" merchant ships to move its military machine to the scene of battle.

It would be the epitome of foolishness to think that Saddam will allow American forces to enter the theater unopposed. With nothing to lose, there is a very high likelihood that he will make pre-emptive strikes against American troop concentrations when they are at their weakest. He may also launch punitive strikes against Israel knowing that the Israelis will retaliate and - once they do - support for the American cause in the eyes of more moderate Islamic states will disappear.

Let there be no doubt, Saddam will not merely use conventional forces to attack ours as they land. He will use whatever chemical and biological agents he can get his hands on to inflict as many casualties as he can. He's not stupid; he knows that we have no stomach for long wars and with CNN bringing the war into living rooms and offices 24 hours a day, Saddam also knows that American tolerance for battle casualties will not permit the loss of hundreds or thousands of GI Joes and Janes.

With a ground force projected at 200,000-250,000 troops, it will be necessary to use Army National Guard and Army Reserve troops in direct combat and combat support roles. As DefenseWatch and other media sources have revealed, the Army's reserve component combat forces are not uniformly capable of performing their combat missions without additional intensive training.

If we don't use National Guard combat units, where does Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld plan on getting the manpower? The Regular Army is already stretched to the breaking point and many of its units are operating at skeleton strength. The use of Army Guardsmen and reservists, either as individual replacements or as part of activated units, is all but mandatory if President Bush wants to be able to topple Saddam through the use of conventional means. Reserve component personnel form all of the services who will need to be activated to carry out an invasion with the numbers being discussed in Washington.

The activation of additional reserve component personnel would seem to be contradictory in light of recent DoD actions, where as many as 14,000 National Guardsmen and reservists called up for the initial war on terrorism have been demobilized for financial reasons.

That begs the question: If we are in the midst of a war and planning a major escalation against Iraq, why are we demobilizing our forces and discussing additional downsizings?

To be sure, the attacks on 9/11 caused great loss of life, property destruction and significant damage to an economy trying to lift itself out of recession. Yet in the midst of a war, one that may determine our long-term survival, the American people have not yet really been asked to make any genuine sacrifices. True, there are some inconveniences at airports and perhaps a bit more scrutiny by police and other law enforcement agencies, but the average American's daily life remains virtually unchanged.

The people who are making the sacrifices are the men and women in uniform, both active-duty personnel and the reservists/Guardsmen who have been activated to augment them. It will be these professionals who will take this war to Saddam. They will be the ones who will bear the brunt of Saddam's desperate attempts to stave off his destruction, and it will be the follow-on troops who will take the war into downtown Baghdad.

There will be no draftees fighting this war, and only those families with members in uniform will have a direct personal stake in the success of the administration's plans to overthrow Saddam and his regime.

The average American will get up each morning as he or she does today and go about the process of living his or her daily lives, with no personal commitment to the battles being fought halfway around the world.

As we prepare to send our military in harm's way again, to complete a job that should have been finished 11 years ago, my hope and prayer is that the president and his "shoot from the hip" defense secretary have carefully considered all the options so that we won't end up watching an endless stream of body bags on the 6 o'clock news here at home.

Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. He can be reached at paulconnors@hotmail.com.

© 2002 Paul Connors.

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By Robert G. Williscroft

During the 1991 Gulf War, I saw a report describing Saddam Hussein's personal bunker. The report was replete with diagrams and listed the German firm that designed and built the structure. An exhaustive search of the Internet and World Wide Web has produced no confirmation of this information.

Nevertheless, the information is clear in my memory, especially since I grew up in Germany and was particularly interested that a German firm designed and built the bunker.

The design is similar to how a modern submarine is constructed. The bunker consists of an outer and inner structure, where the inner structure is completely isolated from the outer one. In the case of submarines, of course, the isolation is for sound, to eliminate the transmission of sound from inside the sub to the surrounding water. Saddam's bunker is designed to prevent external shock - like from a nuclear blast - from reaching the inner sanctum.

The outer structure of the bunker is a vertically oriented egg-shaped shell of 20 to 30 yards of reinforced concrete - this is yards, not feet. This shell is buried deep underground. The inner structure is suspended inside the concrete shell by massive springs, not unlike giant trampoline springs.

Physical communication with the outside is through several tunnels suspended between the structures. These tunnels are designed to sever in response to severe external shock, rather than transmit the shock to the inner structure.

Calculations I have seen indicate that this bunker design can withstand a direct thermonuclear hit. I'm not entirely certain what this means, but in any plausible scenario we are unlikely to use our largest nukes, so that the bunker really need only to withstand several hundred kilotons. Megatonnage over Baghdad is really unlikely.

The internal structure is about five stories high, and it is provisioned to support approximately 100 people for a very long time. It contains a water holding tank and water recycling equipment so that there is no need to replenish water from the outside. The water system is said to be self-sustaining for more than ten years with no addition of water. My own calculations indicate that this probably can only be accomplished with severe water rationing, since evaporation and subsequent loss to the outside cannot be prevented. Food provisioning is freeze-dried of American manufacture. There is sufficient for at least a year for the full compliment of 100.

The structure is stocked with a large library of CDs, DVDs, and other compact entertainment materials. Hardwire electronic links are redundant many times over. It is possible that the personnel inside the bunker can remain in contact with their outside supporters indefinitely.

Furthermore, although I have no specific evidence, modern wireless technology probably can support their operations as well, although a concerted external effort to jam available frequencies can thwart their efforts. If they have incorporated full spectrum CDMA technology, however, it is entirely possible for communication and even data transfer to happen even in the presence of intense jamming efforts.

Interestingly, air is not manufactured inside the bunker, at least not as of about ten years ago. Instead, it is brought inside through a cleverly designed set of openings and filters that - at least in principle - are designed to prevent the influx of radioactive substances, poison gases, nerve agents and the like.

I suspect that the designers could not incorporate any practical method of generating air inside the bunker. A nuclear submarine distills seawater to fresh water, electrolyzes the fresh water to produce hydrogen and oxygen, discards the hydrogen back to the sea, and uses the oxygen. Carbon dioxide is chemically removed (scrubbed) from the air along with noxious fumes and other unwanted gases. So long as the reactor is functioning, a submarine can continue to make its air.

The bunker designers, however, could come up with no substitute for the water as an oxygen source, or the reactor as a power source. The original plans called for a small nuclear reactor to power the bunker, but I can find no evidence that Saddam has been able to develop and build such a reactor. In lieu of this, power must also be brought in from the outside. The bunker contains an emergency power system, but it is sufficient for only a few days because of fuel limitations. Thus, air is brought in from the outside, and the bunker has a limited reserve of stored compressed air for emergencies.

So what we have is a structure that we really cannot take out from the air, capable of sustaining Saddam and his cronies for several weeks. During this time he probably will continue to communicate with his outside supporters, generating sympathy against the American bullies and their nuclear strong-arm tactics.

Fortunately, the system has a significant flaw: Its air supply. I have no doubt that we know the exact location of this bunker. I suspect we have mapped its power and air sources, and have a plan in place to cut off communications as effectively as possible. If we really know its power sources, we can put the occupants on short notice by forcing them to rely on their internal emergency power. If the occupants cut back on everything, they might actually be able to last a month with no external power, but things down there will get pretty unpleasant in the meantime.

Our real goal should be to destroy the occupants - that's politically correct language for "kill them dead."

Although the German designers used their considerable skills to make the air supply system impervious to outside intrusion, this is a perfect place for our special forces guys to make use of their SADM Nukes (Special Atomic Demolition Munitions), the so-called back-pack nukes we developed during the Cold War.

No matter how well the German engineers did their jobs, nothing they built will withstand these SADM devices. The very best scenario from the occupant's point of view is where all the air vents permanently close their heavy-duty doors against the SADM explosions near the surface end of the ducts. This means that the occupants still will be alive, but without fresh air. That gives them a few days at most - and this is the "best-case" scenario.

A more likely scenario is that one or more of the SADMs will penetrate the heavy-duty doors down near the inner structure. Now we can really start to have fun. Pick your weapon: dirty up a SADM and let the radiation do its job, pump some of their own VX or Sarin down the pipe, or - here's a cute approach - flood the entire structure with water.

The whole point is that for any of this to happen, we need Special Forces on the ground near the bunker long enough to make it happen. We can drop them and their equipment from the air, but they will need heavy-duty fire support and back-up so they can do their jobs effectively.

I can see dropping several Ranger battalions on the periphery to hold off any would-be defenders of The Man, and inserting a couple of dozen Navy SEALs to do the actual SADM work. This assumes, of course that we know exactly where everything is, or at least enough of everything to make the plan effective.

The more I think about it, the more I like the water plan: blow the heavy-duty doors and fill the bunker with water. All we need is a nearby water source, and some pumps and hoses. And the water will make the SEALs feel at home.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

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By J. David Galland

Nearly three months after the fatal "friendly fire" incident in Afghanistan last Apr. 17 in which four Canadian soldiers were killed and another eight severely injured, U.S. and Canadian officials have concluded that the "proximate fault" of the mishap belongs to two Illinois Air National Guard F-16 pilots.

But it is still premature to rule out other factors that may have led to the accidental bombing of the Canadian soldiers, or to conclude that the two pilots alone merit punishment for the tragedy.

The release last week of a Canadian board of inquiry report, and the non-release of a formal "joint" investigation mounted by American and Canadian officials, did little to clear up the confusion over where the precise culpability actually lies. At a Tampa press conference organized to discuss the "joint" report that they refused to release, two senior American and Canadian generals could say little to clarify the matter.

"The board found the cause of the friendly fire incident to be the failure of the two pilots to exercise appropriate flight discipline, which resulted in a violation of the rules of engagement and inappropriate use of lethal force," said Lt. Gen. Michael Delong, deputy Centcom commander.

However, one brief sentence in his statement merits close attention as this matter continues: "The board further found that failings within the pilots' immediate command structures, while not causing the incidents, were contributing factors," Delong added. Despite repeated questions, Delong and Canadian Brig. Gen. Mike Gauthier declined to amplify on that point or many others.

The investigation found that Maj. Harry Schmidt, the F-16 wingman - the two pilots' identities were earlier disclosed by The New York Times - failed to carry out proper procedures when he dropped a 500-lb. bomb from his F-16 on a group of soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, as they were conducting a night firing exercise near Kandahar.

U.S. and Canadian military investigators have determined that Schmidt did not take the time to properly and accurately assess the threat on the ground before sending his laser-guided bomb into the "breadbasket" of an infantry training exercise on the ground.

This negligent bombing of the soldiers represented the first military deaths to be suffered by Canadian troops since the Korean War, and is one of the most deadly "friendly-fire" accidents of the nine-month war in Afghanistan. It was eclipsed by an even more serious friendly-fire incident last week when a U.S. Air Force AC-130 gunship reportedly fired on an Afghan wedding party, killing 40 civilians and injuring dozens more.

The joint U.S.-Canadian investigative team conducted interviews with more than 70 people and determined that Schmidt acted in haste. However, speaking through his military attorney last week, Schmidt asserted that he believed he was under attack when he observed the ground fire, and that he was only returning fire against what he suspected was an enemy force.

Various news media reports last weekend indicated that the investigative panel has recommended that Maj. Schmidt and his fellow F-16 pilot, Maj. William Umbach, should both face an Article 32 hearing, which is the military version of a grand jury investigation. This tribunal has the authority to recommend trial by court-martial should the evidence warrant it.

Maj. Umbach was further cited in his role as the F-16 squadron commander. The investigation revealed that Umbach, while in command, allowed this event to spiral out of control. The implication is that he was responsible for the conduct of his soldiers and subordinates.

It is not hair-splitting to urge a more careful and detailed examination of all factors leading up to and contributing to the friendly-fire mishap. Any inquest which focuses on the two pilots alone while ignoring other factors could well lead to a form of "justice" that does little to change the actual conditions that made such a deadly mistake possible.

In my DefenseWatch article on May 1, 2002, "Friendly Fire, And a Broken National Guard," I revealed sobering allegations that the Illinois Air National Guard had become an organization with a dubious track record on command quality, integrity and illegal practices.

Now that the investigation findings are slowly dribbling into the news media, it should not come as a surprise that the pilots of the 183rd Fighter Wing of the Illinois National Guard have been found to be culpable for the deaths and injuries that they inflicted on the ground. But many questions remain that beg for an answer regarding full accountability.

Perhaps the most important unanswered question is, why the pilots did not realize that they were over an area where Canadian soldiers were training and involved in a live-fire nighttime exercise?

This is what the investigation has found to date:

Maj. Schmidt stated that the flashes he saw were believed to be anti-aircraft fire, but they were not, they were the firing of small arms and shoulder launched anti-tank munitions - neither of which were a threat to the high flying F-16s.

Initially, the flight leader, Maj. Umbach, reported back to an E-3 AWACS airplane that he had observed what the two pilots described as "fireworks" coming from an area just a few miles south of Kandahar. The AWACS plane approved their return to the area in an effort to pinpoint the source of the ground fire. As the pilots arrived over the area again, Maj. Schmidt requested permission to fire his 20-mm. cannons at the suspected hostile fire. The AWACS directed him to "hold fire" while providing more information about the potential target.

It was at this point that Schmidt reported back and immediately declared that he was "rolling in self-defense" and he released his 500 lb. GBU-12, laser-guided bomb.

The separate report released by the Canadian Department of National Defence last week contained one intriguing item bearing on that vital issue:

"From an air operations point of view, however, the F-16 pilots involved were not aware of the Tarnak Farm nor the planned live-fire exercise. There were a number of reasons why this was the case. Lacking this critical information, it seems clear that the F-16 pilots mistakenly interpreted the live fire as a threat to their formation, and engaged upon a decision-making process that led to the declaration of self-defence and the release of a weapon on friendly troops," the Canadian report stated.

Air Force Capt. James Key, the lawyer for Maj. Schmidt, said in a statement that months earlier, U.S. pilots had asked for more information about U.S. and allied troop locations "to avoid just this type of tragedy."

"It's a huge fact," attorney Charles W. Gittins told The Washington Post. "This suggests a systemic failure above their [the pilots'] pay grades."

Centcom commander-in-chief Gen. Tommy Franks has forwarded the "joint" investigative report, which delineates the failures of the two American pilots, to Lt. Gen. Mike Moseley, commander of the 9th Air Force at Shaw Air Force Base, S.C. Moseley has several options, including initiation of legal proceedings that range from no action, to nonjudicial punishment (which would merely wreck the two fliers' careers), to an Article 32 hearing and subsequent court-martial. As a last resort, Moseley could defer the decision making to his boss, Gen. Hal Hornburg, the commander of the Air Combat Command.

Sources have indicated to me that this case will not be referred to the Air National Guard for a decision. This will likely be the case as both of the pilots were considered to be on active duty and accountable to the Air Force chain of command when the incident occurred.

The net result is that it will be several more months before we learn (1) the full scope of responsibility for the Tarnak Farm incident and (2) whether the U.S. military chain of command has the honesty and moral fiber to go beyond merely pinning the rap on two pilots while ignoring deeper systemic flaws that may have led to this fatal mishap.

J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is a retired veteran of over thirty years of service in military intelligence who resides in Germany. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.

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By Patrick Hayes

Within less than a year after the 9/11 Muslim terrorist attacks on the United States, many Americans are still living in a dream world of Disney-like fantasy.

Liberals clamor to protect the "constitutional" rights of al Qaeda and Taliban murderers held at Camp X-Ray, Cuba, and within the United States, they scream with their Hollywood cohorts about civil liberties as the government moves to protect its citizens. (Meanwhile, left-leaning members of the judiciary attack the very basis of the American way of life and the principles upon which the country was founded. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco comes to mind - the most overturned court in U.S. history.)

Just what do these people think they will achieve by undermining the United States?

Whether the media makes any attempt to identify the threat of the wide-reaching Muslim terror network as "terrorism" (because to do so would not be politically correct), or whether the government publicly connects the dots of Muslim terror (because to do so might infuriate Muslims already in this country or our supposed "allies" in the Middle East), the simple fact exists: the United States is a target of Muslim terrorists. Whether they are Palestinian, Filipino, Bosnian, Nigerian, Somali, Saudi Arabian, Chechen or American, is not, or should not be, in question. Al Qaeda has trained Muslim terrorists from every part of the world, including the United States.

In a recent poll in nine Muslim countries, a majority of the respondents had unfavorable opinions of the United States. This should not be a surprise, nor should the fact that one of the most anti-American countries is Pakistan. Now, whether there is a logical basis for this opinion, or, as is more likely, that it is the result of the rabid ramblings of the mullahs in the mosques, is not the issue. The issue is, there are enough al Qaeda-trained Muslim terrorists floating around 60 countries to cause the United States considerable harm.

On July 4, a Muslim terrorist (what else would a Muslim be who uses a gun to attack Israelis and/or Americans?) entered the international concourse at Los Angeles International Airport, murdered two innocent people and wounded several others before he was shot dead by El Al Airlines security. While Americans continue to talk about security, the Israelis, who have lived with the threat of Muslim terror attacks for decades, act.

In killing 41-year-old Egyptian Hesham Mohamed Hadayet immediately, without worrying about his civil rights, the Israeli security agent not only reacted quickly and professionally to a terrorist threat, but he also saved many other lives. Hadayet carried two Glock handguns, one a .45 cal., the other a 9-mm., additional magazines for both weapons, and a six-inch hunting knife. Plus the question remains: If this had not been a planned terrorist attack, why did Hadayet send his wife and two children back to Egypt ten days before? Sending families home before the attack is also what one or two of the 9/11 terrorists also did.

One speculation put forth by the FBI was that Hadayet was angry because his upstairs neighbor, a former Marine, had raised the Starts and Stripes and Marine Corps flags on his apartment balcony last Sept. 11 and had done so every day since the attack - directly above Hadayet's apartment. If this turns out to be the official excuse put forth for the atrocity - that this Egyptian Muslim was so angered by the American and Marine Corps flags that he murdered innocent civilians - then what does that make his actions? If this individual was so angered by the American flag and eaten up with so much hatred, why was he in this country at all?

Hadayet was allowed entry into the United States on a six-month visa in 1992, but did not leave. While facing deportation some years later, his wife apparently "won" a visa in a State Department lottery and Hadayet was also allowed to remain. With this and other stories of both legal and illegal entry to this country by Muslims from all over the world, the obvious question is, how many more Hadayets are out there waiting to strike?

In this instance, the death of Hadayet saved American taxpayers the cost of yet another show trial, which would have given left-wing defense attorneys another venue for walking on the American Flag and undermining the very Constitution they purport to uphold. Had this Muslim killer lived, he would have had an army of defense lawyers vying to represent him with his "insanity defense" (the M'Naghten Rule), much like 9/11 terrorist, Zacarias Moussaoui.

Many Americans also seem to have forgotten the attack by Pakistani Muslim gunman, Mir Aimal Kansi, outside the Headquarters of the CIA. in Langley, Virginia, in January 1993. That attack killed two and wounded three more. It took a while for the FBI to catch Kansi in Pakestan, but two days after his conviction of capitol murder, four Americans were killed ambush-style in Karachi, Pakistan, in what investigators believed was a retaliatory attack by "unknown terrorists."

In February 1997, a 69-year-old Palestinian gunman killed one person and wounded six others on the observation deck of the Empire State Building in New York. He also saved the taxpayer by subsequently killing himself.

And, lest we forget, it was Palestinian Sirhan Sirhan who murdered presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles on June 5, 1968. Apparently, Sirhan had become enraged when he saw Kennedy wearing a Jewish yarmulke out of respect while attending a Jewish service. Kennedy had also suggested publicly that the United States ought to assist Israel in its war against the Arab armies (the 1967 war) by sending over American bombers. Showing absolutely no remorse about their son's involvement in the assassination, Sirhan's parents later said of their boy, "He killed for his country."

The litany of attacks against American targets by Muslim terrorists outside the country is extensive, yet in the past, little was done in response.

* November 1979, the attack on the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, and the taking of 52 Americans hostage for 444 days.

* April 18, 1983, Beirut, the suicide/homicide car-bombing in front of the American Embassy that killed 17 Americans.

* Oct. 23, 1983, Beirut, the suicide/homicide vehicle bombings by Shi'ite Muslim terrorists that blew up the French military headquarters and the U.S. Marine barracks, killing 58 French Paratroopers and 241 Marines.

* Dec. 12, 1983, Kuwait City, car bombings by Shi'ite Muslim terrorists in front of the French and American embassies, that killed five and wounding 86.

* Sept. 20, 1984, Beirut, car bomb explosion by Muslim terrorists outside the American Embassy annex that killed 16 and wounded the ambassador.

* June 14, 1985, hijacking of TWA Flight 847 by Shi'ite Muslim terrorists who later force it to land in Beirut, demanding the release of 700 Muslim terrorists being held by Israel. Terrorists murder U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem and dump his body on the tarmac.

* Oct. 8, 1985, hijacking of Italian liner Achille Lauro by Palestinian terrorists who murder Leon Klinghoffer, a wheelchair-bound American Jew,.

* Sept. 5, 1986, Karachi, Pakistan, hijacking of Pan American jumbo jet and seizure of 358 passengers, 20 of whom perish when security forces retook the plane.

* Dec. 21, 1988, Lockerbie, Scotland, bombing of Pan American Flight 103 killed 270 people on board and on the ground. The Muslim terrorists later identified as Libyan agents.

* Feb. 6, 1993, World Trade Center, New York, Muslim terrorists now linked to al Qaeda set off a massive car bomb in the parking structure, killing six and wounded over 1,000.

* Nov. 13, 1995, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, terrorists believed linked to al Qaeda detonated car bomb outside U.S. military headquarters by Muslim terrorists, killing five Americans.

* June 25, 1996, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, Muslim terrorists believed linked to al Qaeda ignited truck bomb outside the Khobar Towers military barracks, killing 19 Americans and wounding hundreds more.

* Aug. 7, 1998, Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Muslim terrorists explode car bombs outside the U.S. Embassies, killing 224 people and reportedly wounding thousands.

* January 2000, the failed attempt to blow up the destroyer USS The Sullivans in Aden harbor.

* Oct. 12, 2000, Aden, Yemen, Muslim suicide/homicide terrorists attack the USS Cole with an explosives-laden boat, ripping open a gaping hole in the ship's side and killing 17 U.S. sailors.

There have been other attacks, kidnappings and murders by Muslim terrorists during that 32-year period, including the brutal murders of Marine Col. William "Rich" Higgins, who was kidnapped in Lebanon, February 1988, tortured and killed sometime later, and Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, who was kidnapped in Pakistan in January of this year and murdered in February.

Nor does that list count the dozens of attempted acts of terrorism foiled by U.S. and allied governments before - and since - 9/11, including the Muslim plots to blow up highway tunnels and other targets in New York City, the millennium plots to attack Los Angeles International Airport and hotels in Jordan, and various al Qaeda strikes planned from Malayasia to the Strait of Gibraltar.

Although American targets abroad appear easier to hit, most American experts on terrorism, including Harvey Kushner, of Long Island University, believe it is only a matter of time before the United States experiences the up-front horror of the suicide/homicide bombers and shooters that have attacked Israeli civilian targets. "Absolutely, positively, the suicide bombers will eventually hit the United States," Kushner warns.

Former President Theodore "Teddy" Roosevelt was not a man to falter under pressure or mince words. At a speech in April 1917 at Oyster Bay, Long Island, he made some valid points about dealing with an insatiable enemy. At the time, he was referring to Germany, but if the quotes are updated to replace "Germany" with "Muslim terrorism" the same bold statements can be made today.

Roosevelt said, "We are fighting in the quarrel of civilization against barbarism, of liberty against tyranny. (Muslim terrorism) has become a menace to the whole world. She is the most dangerous enemy of liberty now existing."

Roosevelt also added: "The man who does not think it was America's duty to fight for her own sake in view of the infamous conduct of (Muslim terrorism) toward us stands on a level with a man who wouldn't think it necessary to fight in a private quarrel because his wife's face was slapped."

As for the continuing argument by some that pacifism should be the order of things and that we need to "negotiate" with an irrational, terrorist enemy, at a speech Roosevelt gave in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on July 27 1917, the former president said, "Those not willing to accept that we are at war, whether we like it or not, those who call themselves 'pacifists,' are nothing more than the disease that can destroy this country from within." He added, "The pacifist is as surely a traitor to his country and to humanity as is the most brutal wrongdoer."

The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, have been compared to the unprovoked attack by Japan on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. Following the Japanese attack, Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto said, "I fear all we have done is awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with terrible resolve."

The attack has been made and the continued threat of terrorism is evident. But where is the national resolve? As the government is clear to point out, we now face it every day. It is past the time for wringing hands, burying heads in the sand and hoping it will all go away.

The United States needs to take a leaf from the Israeli book. Quit talking and act.

Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at gyrene@sftt.us.

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By Charles Clune

As the nation continues to grapple with the issue of continued terrorist threats, the issue of port and harbor security has come to the fore. As a former Coast Guardsman, I would like to review the tangible and intangible dimensions of that important security concern.

The first two areas are intangible - defining an accurate threat assessment based on current intelligence, and resolving the psychological implications of a semi-permanent alert system for warning the public of that threat.

I am not by any means an authority on the collection and collation of intelligence. From my limited experience it seems that for most local law enforcement and security services, most "hot tips" - aren't; most "imminent threats" - don't materialize, and calling for "heightened awareness" in these times, is an oxymoron.

Except for the particular issue of security awareness against renewed terrorist attacks, these are not new experiences for members of the Coast Guard or other military services. But given the terrorist attacks of 9/11, there is a new urgency in the collection, analysis and dissemination of usable and meaningful intelligence.

To fully understand the challenge confronting us, it is useful to look at the "other side" of the protection equation. To do that, let's take the threat of a terrorist attack and use a crime prevention model to determine how we should proceed to prevent it.

In spite of the general consensus that the U.S. government will remain indefinitely on some form of alert or heightened security awareness, it is inevitable that some form of normalcy will return despite the proclaimed threat level.

The "normal" status of preparedness at many potential targets may be higher than the past, but it will be become the normal status in any event. That is because it is psychologically and physically impossible to always remain on the "highest" state of alert.

For example, if a city is experiencing a string of violent gang-based robberies in its transit system, the police department will respond by setting up a new high alert level. It will assign extra officers at transit terminals and on trains and buses. Officials will ask citizens to look out for unusual activity and report it. Authorities will give transit employees a profile of the robbers and likewise caution them to be especially attentive at all times. And the level of criminal most likely will decrease.

Then what? Does the city leave the level of policing (which has had good success) at current levels? Here's where cost and manpower issues come into play. Does the city go back to the original level of police presence (and hope the robbery gang has moved on to another city)? Or, does the city establish and maintain some policing level in between?

In any case, there is a "new normal" mode of operation. It makes no difference if you're deterring criminals or patrolling airports, seaports, nuclear power plants or any other high-value targets to prevent terrorist attacks - this reality still applies. There will be a "normal" level of preparedness in effect. The only question is, how costly and manpower-intensive it will be.

And having recognized that, there are a number of straightforward measures that government (local or federal) can undertake to keep the deterrent level as high as possible.

The best deterrent to criminal (and terrorist) activity in almost any location is good lighting. No intruder can succeed at sneaking around a target can occur in bright light. Authorities should make one of the first steps the upgrading of lighting at any facility determined to be at risk.

Let's use a port facility as an example. Every commercial port has a security system of some kind to prevent unlawful removal of property and illegal entry. If authorities suspect that U.S. ports are (1) being used to infiltrate terrorists and/or weapons of mass destruction, or (2) are themselves being reconnoitered for possible attacks, it is imperative to first beef up existing methods of security.

These would include creating well-lighted and patrolled access points, with an effective barrier system to prevent unauthorized entries elsewhere. (A 15-foot-tall cyclone fence with inward-rolling screen material has shown to be effective in stopping almost all climbers. The fence must be anchored well into the ground and properly maintained, and patrolled regularly or observed by a monitored detection technology.)

There has been a lot of media speculation about terrorists using commercial shipping containers as a method for either smuggling themselves or potential weapons of mass destruction into the country. The general concern has assumed that there is no effective means currently available for Coast Guard or Customs Service inspectors to check every container.

My assessment is slightly different: I guess is that a number of people - cargo company employees, stevedores, ships' crews and inspectors - do handle every container a couple times in its trip from point of origin to final destination.

It does not appear automatically impossible to establish a monitoring regime that would employ a number of measures to survey, inspect and track all cargo shipments. This could include a combination of computer checks of shipping companies and cargo manifests tied in to law enforcement and intelligence databases.

It takes literally months to ship things around the world. If the terrorist target is outside the immediate port of entry, the container will need to pass through at least four handling phases: off the ship, onto the cargo-handling shuttle, into the yard, and from the yard to the road or rail transporter. It will be expensive and probably labor-intensive - but easily capable given current technology - to establish a screening process using key data such as countries of origin and transshipment, intelligence on shippers, bills of lading and surveillance information such as weight and signs of any suspicious characteristics (e.g. smuggled humans, or traces of radiological or chemical/biological agents).

It appears clear to me that such a system would pose enough of a detection probability to deter the terrorist group from attempting to infiltrate terrorists or weapons by sea. It would be difficult but doable.

There is one unavoidable problem. You would have to do it at every port. If there are 100 inspectors checking containers in Boston every day, and 75 in Portland, Maine - but one inspector at Eastport. Maine, for every third of fourth ship, you are providing the enemy wuth a big open window. Consistency is an absolute requirement for any physical security system to be effective.

Another problem, of course, is where do we stop? How much security and accompanying restrictions on easy access and movement do we need?

Investigations in the wake of the 9/11 strikes have shown that the 19 hijackers used legal methods and regular border-crossing to enter the United States (triggering a top-to-bottom overhaul of immigration policies). But we need to address the strong likelihood that other al Qaeda terrorist cells may already be here inside the United States. The implication of that is that closing our borders alone won't work - a tough challenge to the FBI and thousands of local and state law enforcement agencies who serve as an internal line of defense.

Meanwhile, random physical patrols of our borders by land and water must continue and be increased. For the U.S. Coast Guard, one possible tactic will be to revive the "cruising Cutters" of the early 1800s, characterized by consistent but random and unpredictable patrols - both ashore and afloat.

As President Bush has said, and Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge has echoed, homeland security is not just a mission today - it is the Mission.

Clune retired from the U.S. Coast Guard as a chief warrant officer after 22 years of active service, and has worked as a civilian nuclear power security official. He can be reached at Charles_Clune@umit.maine.edu.

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Editor's Note: The following letter to the editor was recognized by The Orange County (Calif.) Register on June 30, 2002 as winner of the newspaper's Golden Pen Award. Each Sunday the newspaper recognizes a letter that eloquently expresses a viewpoint or engenders a debate on a topic of public interest.

A Young Marine Restores My Faith

It was our normal Thursday morning business meeting at our real-estate office. No big deal. Before the meeting, we hung around the bagel table, as usual, with our coffee. He stood aside, looking a little shy and awkward and very young, a new face in a room full of extroverted salespeople. An average looking guy, maybe 5 feet 8 inches. A clean-cut, sweet-faced kid. I went over to chat with him. Maybe he was a new salesman?

He said he was just back from Kabul, Afghanistan. A Marine. Our office (and a local school) had been supportive by sending letters to him and other troops, which he had posted on the American Embassy door in Kabul. He stood guard there for four months and was shot at daily.

He had come to our office to thank us for our support, for all the letters during those scary times. I couldn't believe my ears. He wanted to thank us? We should be thanking him. But how? How can I ever show him my appreciation?

At the end of the sales meeting, he stepped quietly forward, no incredible hulk. As a matter of fact, he looked for all the world 15 years old to me. (The older I get, the younger they look.)

This young Marine, this clean-faced boy, had no qualms stepping up to the plate and dodging bullets so that I might enjoy the freedom to live my peaceful life in the land of the free. No matter the risk. Suddenly the most stressful concerns of my life seemed as nothing, my complacency flew right out the window with his every word. Somewhere, somehow, he had taken the words honor, courage and commitment into his very soul and laid his life on the line daily for me and us. A man of principle. He wants to do it. Relishes it. And he came to thank us? For a few letters? I fought back the tears as he spoke so briefly and softly.

He walked forward to our manager and placed a properly folded American flag in his hands. It had flown over the Embassy. He said thanks again. You could hear a pin drop. As I looked around I saw red faces everywhere fighting back the tears.

In a heartbeat, my disillusionment with young people today quickly vanished. In ordinary homes, in ordinary towns, kids like him are growing up proud to be an American and willing to die for it. Wow.

We'll frame the flag and put it in the lobby. He only came to my office once, for just a few minutes. But I realize I rubbed shoulders with greatness in the flesh and in the twinkling of an eye my life is forever changed.

His name is Michael Mendez, a corporal in the USMC. We are a great nation. We know because the makings of it walked into my office that day.

--Ann Baker, Huntington Beach

July 8, 2002

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, and welcome to the White House. It's a - this is a special occasion. I am honored to be a part of the gathering as we pay tribute to a true American patriot, and a hero, Captain Humbert "Rocky" Versace.

Nearly four decades ago, his courage and defiance while being held captive in Vietnam cost him his life. Today it is my great privilege to recognize his extraordinary sacrifices by awarding him the Medal of Honor.

I appreciate Secretary Anthony Principi, the Secretary from the Department of Veteran Affairs, for being here. Thank you for coming, Tony. I appreciate Senator George Allen and Congressman Jim Moran. I want to thank Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and General Pete Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; Army General Eric Shinseki - thank you for coming, sir. I appreciate David Hicks being here. He's the Deputy Chief of Chaplains for the United States Army.

I want to thank the entire Versace family for coming - three brothers and a lot of relatives. Brothers, Dick and Mike and Steve, who's up here on the stage with me today. I appreciate the classmates and friends and supporters of Rocky for coming. I also want to thank the previous Medal of Honor recipients who are here with us today. That would be Harvey Barnum and Brian Thacker and Roger Donlon. Thank you all for coming.

Rocky grew up in this area and attended Gonzaga College High School, right here in Washington, D.C. One of his fellow soldiers recalled that Rocky was the kind of person you only had to know a few weeks before you felt like you'd known him for years. Serving as an intelligence advisor in the Mekong Delta, he quickly befriended many of the local citizens. He had that kind of personality. During his time there he was accepted into the seminary, with an eye toward eventually returning to Vietnam to be able to work with orphans.

Rocky was also a soldier's soldier - a West Point graduate, a Green Beret, who lived and breathed the code of duty and honor and country. One of Rocky's superiors said that the term "gung-ho" fit him perfectly. Others remember his strong sense of moral purpose and unbending belief in his principles.

As his brother Steve once recalled, "If he thought he was right, he was a pain in the neck." (Laughter.) "If he knew he was right, he was absolutely atrocious." (Laughter.)

When Rocky completed his one-year tour of duty, he volunteered for another tour. And two weeks before his time was up, on October the 29th, 1963, he set out with several companies of South Vietnamese troops, planning to take out a Viet Cong command post. It was a daring mission, and an