FROM THE EDITOR:

Saluting Pvt. Tillman, USA

By Ed Offley

Many of the eulogies for the baseball legend Ted Williams upon his death on July 5 focused on the fact that he sacrificed nearly five years of his legendary athletic career to heed his country's call to serve in uniform.

What would have been a 21-year major league baseball career for Williams - with even greater records in batting and fielding - was actually cut short by five seasons because of his service as a Navy instructor pilot for three years in World War II, and as a Marine Corps fighter pilot for nearly two years in Korea that included 39 combat missions.

My rejoinder is: Don't congratulate Ted Williams - save your applause for Pat Tillman.

Of course, today's public astonishment over Ted Williams' act of self-sacrifice more than a half-century ago says more about American popular culture today than it does about the famed slugger or the era in which he grew up. When we get goggled-eyed over someone rich/famous/entitled actually doing something for his or her country rather than for narrow self-interest, our astonishment reflects our lowered expectations for others, and maybe even for ourselves.

But during World War II, a conflict where the very survival of the United States and the western world were at risk, it was different: The sons of the rich and powerful, and even some of the rich and powerful themselves, shed their civil lives to enlist in military service. Ted Williams was no exception.

Other star athletes who signed up at the military recruiting stations after Pearl Harbor include Detroit slugger Hank Greenberg, New York Yankee "Joltin' Joe" Dimaggio, and champion heavyweight boxer Joe Louis. Historian William Manchester caught the essence of the World War II-era civic spirit in his 1974 book, The Glory and the Dream - a Narrative History of America, 1932-72 (Little, Brown, New York):

Today, in an era where America once more is physically threatened as in no time since World War II, we are surrounded by the trappings of patriotism. But as many observers have noted, most of us have generally escaped any stringent obligations, living our lives as usual while keeping an eye on the news for the latest terrorist threat.

In one sense, it is nobody's fault: The U.S. military opted to convert from a conscription force to the "all volunteer" system it has managed since 1973, and any general sense of obligation for a young man or woman to serve the nation in uniform ceased to exist during the crucible of the Vietnam War. While the military encourages young people in their late teens to enlist or sign up for officer programs, the idea of a 40-year-old being granted a Marine Corps enlistment (like Paul Douglas) seems downright weird.

With that in mind, it is possible to fully appreciate what Pat Tillman has done. If you are a fanatic NFL fan, you know, of course, that Tillman is a four-season starting defensive safety for the Arizona Cardinals. Most recently he was offered a three-year, $3.6-million contract to chase rival wide receivers up and down the field in front of enthusiastic fans. In short, he occupied a lucrative niche as a potential star in the athletic division (football) of the worldwide, 24/7 entertainment colossus that fills our cable TV channels with confetti, pomp and flash.

That is, Tillman was a starting safety for the Cardinals.

Then he enlisted in the U.S. Army along with his younger brother and began basic training on July 8 with the hope of winning admission to the elite Army Ranger program. Tillman has rejected all requests for an interview about his decision which is an equally astounding act, given the universal theory in popular culture that what unites all Americans is our yearning for 15 minutes or more of fame at the hands of Larry King, Oprah, ESPN or "Saturday Night Live".

It is impossible, of course, to predict how Pat Tillman will fare in the Army, or whether his physical skills honed in the NFL will help him through the tough trials of Ranger training. But one thing is non-debatable: By his decision to put his country ahead of his own personal and financial self-interests, Pat Tillman has become an inspiring role model for his generation that no mere football star could ever hope to become.

"He said there were personal reasons he didn't want to divulge to me, and I didn't press him on it," Cardinals coach Dave McGinnis told the Associate Press. "I respect his decision. I think it's honorable."

Truly honorable. Godspeed, Pvt. Tillman. And to your brother, and your comrades in Army basic training too.

Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at dweditor@yahoo.com.

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Twenty-four U.S. airports in four weeks might be an easy gig for a rock 'n' roll star, but for me it was like being on a hot LZ. Last month, I started on the East Coast and zigzagged across this great land from the Big Apple to the Needle in Seattle and back promoting my new book, Steel My Soldiers' Hearts.

My previous book tours have always seemed a bit like infantry combat - at least in terms of the wild pace and no sleep - but prior to the World Trade Center catastrophe, you could pretty much count on coming back. Since last September, that's no longer a safe bet - and the more time you spend hanging around our nation's airports, the less you'll want to lay down your dough on a wager, let alone buckle up.

No kidding - in the past month I found only one airport that passed inspection. And the weak link wasn't the airport's physical plant, but the so-called checkpoint security screeners.

Back before passenger planes became kamikazes, the airport-security companies worked directly for the airlines. With hiring policies determined by the bottom line, they went for cheap labor rather than sharp screeners. Post-9/11, when the Transportation Security Administration took over the task, it inherited a bunch of screeners who just don't have the required skills or motivation.

Recent covert TSA tests at 32 of the nation's largest airports showed screeners failed to detect facsimile guns and bombs about 25 percent of the time. Their failure rate of finding explosives in luggage was 16 percent, meaning a 400-passenger jet could conceivably be filled with 64 terrorist bombs. And forget about the number of times screeners were caught asleep at their posts or using unplugged detectors.

As things now stand, this army of incompetents will soon serve as the main body of 45,000 government inspectors. Unfortunately, changing someone's paycheck origin and handing that person better technology won't instill competence any more than giving an amateur driver an Indy race car makes him or her Mario Andretti. And like all things federal, once the Civil Service concrete has settled, they'll become unionized high-security risks. Untouchables.

The win/win solution would have been for the Federal Aviation Administration to set standards for the airlines and private companies to meet instead of federalizing what caused the problem in the first place. A higher bar and a handful of kick-butt inspectors would achieve greater safety for far less bucks. And private companies - unlike additional government departments, where everything always settles to the lowest common denominator - are free to improve, innovate and fire any slackers.

The one airport that did pass this old grunt's security test was Denver International, our fifth-largest. From Bruce Baumgartner, the airport's manager of aviation, to the lowest guy and gal on the security detail, these folks actually had their acts together. Baumgartner told me that DIA, considered by security whiz David Hunt "to be one of the safest airports in the world," has one of the best track records in America.

Baumgartner says they've always been "pro-active as far as security is concerned." Each security lane checks and passes 4.1 passengers a minute. "DIA exceeds FAA standards, provides continuous training to our personnel, and we screen 100 percent of baggage."

I was indeed impressed with DIA's shiny new plant, but what really turned me on was the high quality of the airport's security people. They were like Rangers, Marines or FedEx employees - competent, proud and dedicated. Every security person I met was on the stick, a total professional, all former military or police force who knew about security from the firing line up.

This STRAC outfit shows that you get what you pay for. Unlike most U.S. airports, DIA spends top dollar on its security team - at $15.46 an hour, they're among the highest-paid airport-security folks in the world. Big dough in Denver, but dirt-cheap when we're talking life or death.

Tom Ridge needs to hotfoot it to Colorado and personally check out this first-class operation. DIA clearly demonstrates how every U.S. airport should operate, and Mr. Ridge ought to camp there until he has the Rocky Mountain drill down pat.

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831. Look for his new book, "Steel My Soldiers' Hearts," (Rugged Land LLC, New York City).

© 2002 David H. Hackworth

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First in a Series

By Gary R. Stahlhut

In his 1798 essay, "The Principle of Population" the Rev. Thomas Malthus proposed that population constantly tends to outrun subsistence and it is held in check by war, disease and famine. This is no theory of historical interest only - it will define the very nature of war in the 21st century.

Malthus noted that even if all people were provided with sufficient sustenance, medical assistance and kept safe from war, the relief would be only temporary. The increase of births and the further growth of families would once again produce a population far in excess of its food supply and shelter. Using a well-known law of business to further elaborate this thesis (the law of diminishing returns), the populations of countries will continue to rise, the areas in which these people live will no longer handle the increase in population, forcing the population to construct new towns and cities.

Once the population is so great that the agriculture base feeding the population fails, Malthus continued, the population must move to other agricultural areas to survive, building more towns and cities to live in. If expansion is no longer possible, a saturation effect will be reached. When saturation has been reached everywhere, the population will universally exceed subsistence. This point of saturation can even cause the eventual collapse of the entire social and political structure of a country.

This saturation point has been reached in many countries on the earth today, causing massive urbanized population centers to rise and continue to expand at an alarming rate. The United Nations estimates that even with starvation and disease, the population of the earth continues to rise by 78 million people each year. It is only a matter of time until the Malthusian thesis will have a direct effect on combat in the 21st century.

During the 20th Century, the U.S. Army was loath to involve itself in urban combat, and for good reason. Urban Combat, like fortress warfare, is a stagnant form of combat. It drains soldiers and resources away from maneuver forces that can strike deeper and more decisively into an enemy heartland.

Armies on the defensive have historically tried to draw their advancing enemy into towns and cities in the attempt to slow or stop their advance. Stalingrad and Aachen are prime examples of this strategy during World War II. In both cases, precious time was bought by the defender to form a counter-offensive by forcing confrontation in an urban battlefield.

During the latter half of the 20th century, another strategy emerged in which an insurgency or guerilla force used the urban battlefield to counter superior firepower and technology. Hue City, Northern Ireland, Groznyy and Mogadishu are four perfect examples of this evolution in urban warfare.

By far the bloodiest urban combat during World War II was the Battle for Berlin in 1945, which cost the Red Army up to 100,000 dead. This single battle is truly a testament to the carnage of fighting in urban terrain, which is precisely why the U.S. Army chose mobility and maneuver to defend Western Europe during the Cold War.

As we begin the 21st century, it is essential that the U.S. Army take a much more active position on urban warfare. The era of preparing to conduct mobile armored warfare in the Fulda Gap, Hof Gap, and the open desert of Iraq has ended and that battlefield scenario will continue to diminish in relevance.

Most demographic studies agree that with the continued urbanization of the world, we will no longer have the luxury of bypassing towns and cities as we did years ago. We cannot just declare that towns and cities are off limits for battle because urban warfare is too risky and makes it nearly impossible to conduct the modern American style of war.

The consensus of modern military thinkers is that the control of large urban areas will be crucial to the successful accomplishment of strategic, operational and tactical objectives in future conflicts. Military thinkers also agree that it is soldiers, not just technology, that will be the key to success in urban combat. Therefore we must build our technology around what our soldiers need to win battles in urban terrain, rather than substitute weapons designed to counter conventional enemies in conventional wars.

This is going to take a radical change in the way we do business, but it is a very necessary change if the United States is to win the wars of the future.

Currently the U.S. Army faces three courses of action with regards to urban warfare.

The first option is to avoid urban combat at all costs, declaring unqualified victory, even if it means the failure of the overall operation. The second course of action is to lay siege to the urban area, flattening key areas of the city with our superior firepower, and kill large amounts of civilians along with enemy combatants. The third option is to call in the Rangers and the Marines and seize the vital portions of the city with rapid strikes, while clearing out the pockets of resistance which will linger.

Both the Rangers and Marines are taking urban warfare seriously: The Marines have even went as far as to train for urban warfare in Chicago, Illinois and Boise, Idaho. But the Army cannot rely on its Rangers or the Marines to take the lead in this endeavor. Urban warfare requires large amounts of traditional infantry soldiers who must be specifically trained to do battle in a large city.

The enemies we will face will not give us the option to fight them outside their cities, where we can fight them on our terms. The enemies we will face in the first half of the 21st century will use cities to negate our technological superiority and enhance the effectiveness of their low-tech weapons against us. This foe will seek to avoid defeat, rather than achieve a decisive victory. Former Marine Corps Commandant, Gen. Charles Krulak aptly described modern urban combat as the "three block war" in which we will fight a highly-lethal battle on one portion of the city, provide humanitarian assistance in another portion, while conducting peacekeeping in yet another section.

Urban warfare, like mountain warfare, will require a highly-specialized fighter who is able to defeat a sizable enemy force on his own terrain.

All major Army installations today have Military Operations In Urban Terrain (MOUT) sites for training, but in many cases these facilities are limited to handling only company-sized units or at the most, a battalion at one time. While this is certainly an important segment of training, it does not truly prepare our soldiers to fight in an urban environment.

In many cases, MOUT training is only conducted as just another task to round out a training plan. Successful urban combat training takes much more than a day or two in a MOUT site.

Just as it is time for the Army to form a true Mountain Infantry unit, it is time for the Army to start training an Urban Combat Infantry Brigade. To achieve the high level of proficiency needed to win in an urban environment, the Army also needs to construct an Urban Warfare Training Center on the scale of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Cal., or the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La.

The modern urban warrior must be able to fight a highly-skilled enemy in an asymmetrical environment. The enemy will use rooftops, basements and even sewers as avenues of approach, striking out from highly populated areas to further limit our use of high-tech weaponry, while striking at our lines of communications and logistics. The size and scope of this type of warfare cannot be replicated in a MOUT site, only by using a larger, dedicated Urban Warfare Center to do the job.

The Israeli Defense Force is presently conducting operations in an urban environment as part of its punitive expeditions into West Bank cities and towns. Gone are the days of Israeli armored thrusts seeping their enemies before them across the Sinai Peninsula. Just as the Israelis are encountering the realities of the 21st century, so will the U.S. Army be more likely to spend the next two decades engaged in sustained combat in urban areas.

The 1993 urban battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, showed our need to radically change the way we conduct war in urban terrain. The documentation is there, the lessons learned are there. It is imperative that we train for the next war, not re-fight a last war that will most likely never occur again.

Next: The Enemy Warrior of the Future.

Gary R. Stalhut is an Army Reserve officer and combat veteran with 26 years of active and reserve duty. He can be reached at Gary.R.Stahlhut@eudoramail.com.

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By Patrick Hayes

Loose rocks slither down the mountainside from the narrow footpath winding across a ridge in the Badakhshan region of Afghanistan. The night is dark and cold. Slowly, a group of about 12 heavily-armed men comes into view as they make their way cautiously along the narrow ridge. Wary, their eyes watching every shadow, they move forward. Suddenly, bursts of suppressed automatic weapons fire erupts from concealed positions above the ridge. The men, caught in the strobe-like scene, try to return fire, but are cut to pieces in a matter of seconds.

As the last man falls, there is a pause. Then several shooters from the ambush team quickly move forward to check the downed bodies for signs of life and gather any intelligence material, including photographs, DNA samples and fingerprints of the dead, as well as any documents on hand. Several muffled shots ring out to confirm a kill. The shooters then pull back into the night, the scene again quiet

Sound fanciful? That's how combating terrorists is supposed to go down, based on good intelligence.

In his special address to a joint session of Congress just nine days after al Qaeda hijackers murdered thousands of civilians in New York, at the Pentagon and aboard United Airlines Flight 93, President Bush last Sept. 20 outlined the new form of war in which this nation had found itself: "Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen."

And, the president added, in addition to highly-visible military moves shown on our TV screens, the campaign against terror would require "covert operations, secret even in success." With most major military operations in Afghanistan now over, that is how the war against al Qaeda is now being fought.

The attack by an AC-130 gunship on a suspected enemy position in the Uruzgan region of Afghanistan on July 1, 2002, did more than apparently kill several dozen civilians. The Washington Times reported on July 12 that the attack also foiled the capture of a high-ranking Taliban leader by elements of Task Force 11, a highly secretive anti-terrorist group of U.S. Navy SEALS from the Naval Warfare Special Development Group (formerly SEAL Team Six) and Army 1st Special Forces Detachment - Delta.

Referring to the more covert stage of the war against Muslim terrorists, White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer said last week, "There remains danger in Afghanistan. And as the president said at the very beginning of this battle last October, this will be a war that's going to go in various phases, some of which will be visible; some will not."

The mission of Task Force 11 is to hunt down and capture and/or kill high-ranking Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists, wherever the latter may be. Based out of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), in a secured compound at Pope Air Force Base, N.C., next to Fort Bragg, home of the Army's Special Operations Command, these highly trained operatives work in Special Mission Units (SMUs), or commandos.

Tasked with conducting counter-terrorist operations including strikes, intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance in denied areas -similar to the Special Operations Group (SOG) Spike Teams used in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam during the Vietnam War - the SMUs in Afghanistan work in close proximity to track down enemy movements, locate positions, monitor communications, and, when the opportunity presents itself, kill the terrorists.

Based on intelligence at the time, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar - a high-profile target if ever there was one - was believed to be in the compound that was attacked by Army Rangers and Task Force 11 SMUs on Oct. 19, 2001. Some conflicting reports from U.S. commanders have since stated that Omar had been at the compound and escaped shortly before the raid. However, the official word from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that he was not expected to be there after all. The latter sounds more like a PR cover-up for a failed mission. Nonetheless, Task Force 11 SMUs are continuing their search in the south-central region of Afghanistan, where Omar is believed to be hiding.

One U.S. official who would only give a general comment on the basis of anonymity, said of the SMU teams, "They are the best. They are going after high-value targets."

Since the pressure of Operation Anaconda in March, al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists have been scattering for cover. Many of them are trying to hide in the villages and mountains near Kandahar. Others have crossed into Pakistan, where they are welcomed into the tribal lands of the lawless Northwest Frontier province. However, since the Pakistani security forces began operating and targeting suspected al Qaeda and Taliban hideouts in the region, based many times on information gathered by Task Force 11 SMUs, many of the terrorists have attempted to make their way into the surrounding states, including the former Soviet Republic of Tajikistan.

It is believed that members of Task Force 11 SMUs operating in the region have gathered much of the intelligence information on the movements of al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist groups. Most recently, such reports have put the al Qaeda terrorists about 60 miles (100 kilometers) from the Tajik border.

Based on the new threat, the Tajikistan government has doubled the number of Tajik border guards, supplemented by Russian soldiers, along the mountainous, but porous border with Afghanistan that stretches for 815 miles (1,300 kilometers). In an area long known for its drug- and arms-trafficking routes, the mission is not only difficult, it is highly dangerous for the men guarding the border.

Nuralisho Nazarov, deputy head of the Tajik border guards recently told the Reuters News Service, "Several groups of al Qaeda are now massed in Afghanistan's Badakhshan region. We do not rule out the possibility that al Qaeda members may make attempts to enter Tajikistan with the aim of finding shelter here."

This, after much of the Badakhshan region on the Afghan side of the border has been bombed by U.S. warplanes, striking al Qaeda and Taliban targets.

The senior Russian officer, Major-General Sergei Zhilkin, in charge of Russian units assigned to the border region said the al Qaeda is running out of options as the American campaign against them continues. "The al Qaeda fighters have nowhere to go," he said.

Hunted through the mountains by Task Force 11 SMUs, Tajikistan is not a friendly retreat for al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists. The former Soviet Republic was a strong supporter of the Afghan Northern Alliance, which fought the Taliban for years. Ethnic Tajiks also play a major role in the current Afghan government. In addition, Tajikistan has also had internal problems with Muslim terrorists, notably the Khizbi Tahrir group, which originated in the areas of Afghanistan previously held by the Taliban.

The existence of the counter-terrorist SMUs only became public in 1998. But they have played key (if covert) roles in most major U.S. military operations for the past two decades.

This includes providing assistance to Italian authorities during their search for kidnapped U.S. Army Brig. Gen. James Dozier in December 1981; participating in Operation Urgent Fury, the U.S. invasion of Grenada, in October 1983; planning a rescue attempt of U.S. hostages in Lebanon in 1984; rescuing hostages being held aboard the hijacked Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro in October 1985; participating in Operation Just Cause, the U.S. intervention in Panama in December 1989; directing U.S. Scud missile-hunting efforts during Operation Desert Storm in early 1991; conducting operations in support of United Nations mandates in Somalia during 1992-93, and searching for suspected war criminals in the former Republic of Yugoslavia during 1995-99.

Also, in the event of a hostile U.S. military campaign against Iraq, it is likely that Task Force 11 SMUs will be involved in striking deep inside Iraqi territory to seize and destroy Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons before they can be used against American forces.

As the war against al Qaeda recedes into the shadows, all Americans should take comfort from the fact that these teams of specially trained commandos are out there on the hunt for al Qaeda and the remnants of the Taliban - and it is al Qaeda and the Taliban who are fearfully looking over their shoulders and who are on the run.

Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at gyrene@sftt.us.

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By Robert G. Williscroft

The first step of what may be the most horrible terrorist scenario yet, went something like this:

At the University of New York at Stony Brook, Dr. Eckard Wimmer and his colleague Jeronimo Cello recently assembled a team of graduate students, a couple of post-docs, and even one or two bright undergrads. These folks had in common one important ability: they were skilled in manipulating DNA.

What this means is that they understood how to split a long string of DNA into shorter segments, and then splice these segments together in differing orders, or even into other DNA segments. This activity sometimes is called gene splicing, but that name really doesn't do justice to what these people can accomplish.

For example, you can give one of these technicians a length of DNA with an unknown structure, and this person can not only tell you what the structure is, but can split it apart and reassemble it into all of its various possible combinations. And then (this is the really interesting part), even a skilled undergrad can test the results in order to determine what, if any, characteristics the new DNA material has.

One has visions of a mad scientist creating templates for modern-day Frankenstein monsters in one of these labs, but such is not the case. These DNA sequences typically can do nothing at all, unless they are part of an overall DNA structure that defines the characteristics for a creature found naturally in the world - anything from a simple virus or microbe to a full-blown human being.

What is ultimately both cool and terrifying is the word "typically" in the above sentence. We now have mapped the complete human genome. This means that we know precisely the entire sequence of the human DNA structure. We don't necessarily understand exactly what each segment does, but we do know the sequence of nucleotides in the DNA.

We also have mapped the sequences of many other DNA structures, including those of Polio and many other diseases that attack the human body. Furthermore, we are capable, in principle, of developing DNA sequences that are able to substitute into the human DNA structure by replacing something that nature put there for some purpose - known or unknown.

Any skilled researcher in this field can create these random sequences and then test to see what they do to a living structure. The action can take place outside the actual DNA structure in the guise of a "microbe" or "virus," or it can happen directly within the DNA itself, by splicing the unknown segment directly into the active DNA.

Wimmer's team mapped out the exact DNA structure of a simple Polio virus by using information available from the Internet, and then broke it into several small segments - here is the clincher - that are commercially available from laboratory supply houses. Then they placed orders to several supply houses for these tailor-made DNA segments, paid for them by credit card, and received them through the mail like any other letter or simple harmless lab material.

The junior people on the team assembled the segments using well-understood laboratory techniques, creating a completely artificial Polio virus. To prove a point, the team injected several mice with the virus. The mice came down with Polio, became paralyzed, and were subsequently killed.

The Bio-medical world is in a uproar. Many senior scientists are livid with outrage at this "unethical" procedure. Wimmer and his team, however, make no apologies. Their very clear point is that if it can be done, then it will be done. And in this case, the results are potentially horrific.

Wimmer is careful to point out that we are a long way from creating an artificial Ebola virus in the lab, and the skill level to do this ranges at the top. Nevertheless, skills can be learned, even very precise high-level skills. Al Qaeda has proven its mettle, in terms of its ability to accomplish its aims, even in the face of apparently overwhelming odds.

The World Health Organization is on the verge of declaring Polio eliminated from the world stage. If we cease vaccinations, and then follow up by eliminating stores of vaccines, we are simply asking for trouble. Polio is virulent and deadly. Wimmer proved a small group can produce it with very little effort. He warns that we should continue vaccinating against Polio and other potentially deadly diseases.

Unfortunately, there is a further potential problem inherent in Wimmer's work. His team simply obtained information from the Internet, purchased the indicated pieces, and stitched them together into a live virus. Everyone seems to be avoiding the horrific dark side of his work.

Any competent student can examine the human genome and order segments from the supply houses as Wimmer's team did. Then comes the "fun" part. By creating random segments from the purchased pieces, a student (read terrorist) can begin the process of inserting these random segments into the Human DNA sequence just to discover what happens. A fair amount of computer sophistication will enable a group of these people to do this insertion by computer to a virtual DNA sequence, applying rules already discovered by others. They can process literally thousands of insertions per second, looking for that one that has highly negative consequences.

Sooner or later, these will turn up, and then all they need do is order the necessary segments, and distribute the new virus. This will be a virus for which there is no cure - at least not one known to anyone else.

The only way to prevent this from happening, or at least to gain some measure of protection from this kind of activity is to ensure that all biomedical supply houses report all purchases, no matter what kind. The homeland defense team must then coordinate purchase information to see if there is a pattern, in order to prevent individual sequences from being purchased by separate groups who then put them together.

The priority for this is not at the top of the list, but we need to deploy the program soon in order that it doesn't become top priority, out of dire necessity, a year or so from now.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

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By William F. Sauerwein

The subtitle for DefenseWatch magazine's Special Report on June 19, 2002 - "The Army at 227 - A Rich Past, An Uncertain Future," was most appropriate given the issues confronting the service. This became more apparent as I read Michael L. Sparks' guest column, "Cancel Stryker, Upgrade the M113."

It seems to me that the U.S. Army's senior leadership all received lobotomies following the collapse of the Soviet Union. They appear not to have learned from the hard lessons of our history, including that part in which they actively participated. Now they are wasting time and scarce resources on the "interim brigade combat team" (IBCT), and everything associated with it.

Despite what the doctrine says, the IBCT is not a "full-spectrum" force. If true, it would not need the clarifying phrase, "against all but the most serious armored threats." The IBCT is touted as an early-entry force, but remember, our enemies do not have to deploy anywhere.

While our forces must travel great distances, the enemy's early-entry force is already on the ground - on their home ground. They can bring their full force to bear before our forces are fully deployed.

Adopting the new "Stryker" wheeled infantry vehicle seems to me like rewarding failure by building on it. As Sparks correctly noted, rubber-tired vehicles in Mogadishu proved no match for RPG-armed guerrillas. Somalia had no regular army, or armored force, and still gave us a bloody nose. All three of the "Axis of Evil" nations possess well-trained and well-equipped forces, including substantial armored forces. Ironically, the ground commander in Somalia asked for armored units, but Les Aspin, President Clinton's first secretary of defense, denied the request.

The real purpose behind the IBCT is to overcome the Army's perennial weakness of deployment, called "strategic responsiveness." You can field the best-trained, best-equipped force in the world, but if you cannot deploy it in a timely manner, it is useless.

Unfortunately, the Army's strategic transportation assets are all organic elements of its competitors, the Navy and Air Force. In these times of limited budgets, the competition inevitably sinks to the level of bureaucratic hostility. Who, in their right mind, thinks that either of those services would willingly devote resources at the expense of their own modernization for helping the Army?

The Cold War revealed "strategic responsiveness" as a major weakness that needed fixing. Having served in both Korea and Germany during this period, I know that our salvation was timely reinforcement from CONUS. But how were these forces supposed to arrive in time, and would they arrive ready to fight? One big problem was moving heavy forces, which led to the establishment of POMCUS sites with pre-positioned equipment. Chartered civilian flights supplementing military transport aircraft would rapidly move troops into theater.

I do not think we can realistically place POMCUS sites in every potential combat theater today. Nor do I think our national leaders have the wherewithal for devoting the necessary resources to such projects. We must understand that this concept will not cure our deployment ills, nor are they without vulnerabilities.

Transportation needed for moving the IBCT would be better used for moving the heavy forces and their equipment sooner. If this type of transportation is either in short supply, or nonexistent, then we should fix the transportation problem. Again, these problems were identified in detail during the Cold War, reemphasized during Operation Desert Shield. Solutions, if not implemented, were certainly identified.

So a key issue confronting the U.S. Army today is that if we do not solve its transportation problem, creating the IBCT will not matter.

As for the "unimproved airfield" and C-130 requirement cited by Sparks in his June 19 article, I confess that I am puzzled. Sparks emphasized that a C-130 can only transport one empty Stryker, so it seems that this requirement is unrealistic. If it is unrealistic, discard it, and work on something practical, like using existing airfields.

Most Third World countries have "international airports" suitable for modern commercial aircraft. Airborne forces could occupy the closest "international airport," even in a neighboring country. If needed, then land engineers onto the occupied airport for improving it for C-17s. Even so, as Sparks noted, only a C-17 can deliver two Strykers, or two Bradleys, in a single sortie.

Any force landing on this airfield will be highly vulnerable until sufficient combat power is assembled. A mechanized infantry company has 14 tactical vehicles, which would require seven sorties by C-17. How many sorties does it take for putting the IBCT on the ground, versus a heavy brigade? In any event, we would not do this close to the combat zone for fear of having our forces picked off piecemeal.

Other analysts say that we need the IBCT concept because the division structure is too unwieldy for modern warfare. I do not believe this is the case, merely that our "zero defects" mentality stifles initiative in subordinate leaders. The division is made up of brigade-level combined arms teams, all with a "slice" of support troops. Every time I deployed to the National Training Center, Grafenwoehr, Hohenfehls or any other training exercise, it was at brigade- or lower-level. Most divisions deploy to combat theaters one brigade task force at a time, normally consolidating in a secure area.

If the task organization calls for a heavy/light mix, then organize it that way before deployment. Instead of waiting for disaster, establish command and staff relationships between heavy and light units now.

What happened to the "combined arms" concept that was drilled into our heads during the Cold War? The Army began conducting heavy/light exercises at NTC, two of which I experienced. Furthermore, the 1989 Panama intervention involved a mechanized task force from the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The Army's institutional experiences with heavy/light combined operations exist, and we should dust off this knowledge and learn from it.

Finally, it seems to me that the IBCT paints a rosy picture of a potential military disaster.

With insufficient transportation assets, the Army is forced to tailor its combat force to match this weakness. We then hope the enemy will not take advantage of this by engaging our troops upon landing. Instead of delivering the knockout punch, our forces will trickle in immediately facing the possibility of defeat.

We should instead organize the future Army combat force for defeating the threat, and develop sufficient transportation assets for rapidly moving this force. Doing otherwise jeopardizes our role as the world's sole superpower, and leaves us vulnerable to anyone who can perceive this weakness and challenge our power.

Retired Army 1st Sergeant William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com.

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By John E. Bloodgood

Few things have caused as much controversy and misinformation as the adoption by the U.S. military in the mid-1960s of the .223 Remington (a.k.a 5.56 x 45-mm.) round of ammunition as the primary round for our troops. Regardless, most people in the military genuinely hate this round and there is valid reason for that hatred: It is generally ineffective in combat situations and therefore constitutes a threat to the American soldier relying on it to survive in combat.

In this article I hope to present an analysis of various military and civilian rounds that shows that a more effective bullet can be adapted for military use from the civilian market.

Many people are not clear as to why the .223 round was adopted in the first place. One theory has been that it was designed to reduce enemy combat effectiveness by tying up extra personnel with care for the wounded. Other people mistakenly think that the .223 round was designed to tumble upon impact and that this causes extra horrific wounds in contrast with other rounds. Many also believe the bullet is too light and more easily deflected by things like twigs and even leaves.

Developed in the 1950s, the .223 was a slight modification made to the .222 Remington civilian round in order to give it the kinetic energy required by the military, about 1,000 foot-pounds at 100 yards.

The generally accepted premises behind the development of this round included: (1) that military experts had figured the older .30 caliber rounds fired by the M-14 and M-1 had generated such heavy recoil that it adversely affected marksmanship to the degree that many soldiers were afraid to shoot their rifles; (2) that the Army therefore needed a lighter round; (3) that volume of fire was as important, if not more so, than accuracy of fire, meaning a lighter round would be necessary to sustain shootability at such volumes, and (4) that since the larger volume of fire meant soldiers needed to carry more amounts of ammunition, there was a need for smaller/lighter rounds.

It may come as a surprise to many, including soldiers, but the .223 does not tumble any more than most other bullets. There are stories of people being shot in the shoulder and the bullet exiting at the hip, but for the most part they are just that - stories. The .223 will not normally behave in such a fashion. There is the very slim possibility that a rare and random set of ricochets off bones could cause the bullet to"travel" like that, but this can occur with most bullets.

All modern bullets are lighter in the front than the back and will yaw after entering a denser media, eventually ending up with the back end facing forward. The bullet also does not tumble in flight - if it did, shooters would not be able to hit the broad side of a barn. The .223/AR-15 combo has proven to be very accurate. Further, while the bullet is fairly light, it is not affected by twigs and leaves that much more than other bullets.

While the .223 offers advantages of low recoil, rapid-fire controllability and shootability, and about twice the ammo load-out as the .308-cal. Winchester (a.k.a 7.62 x 51-mm.), it really is not well suited for warfare. Civilian shooters consider the .223 as "varmint" round, suitable for rabbits, coyotes, prairie dogs and other small game. In many states it is illegal to shoot medium to large game with the .223, as it is not considered to be sufficiently powerful (although I have personally -and legally - taken a deer with one).

But it is important to note that in warfare, we are shooting not at game, but at humans. At 120-220 pounds, humans are smaller than deer (whitetails and mule deer can weigh more than 400 pounds), but larger than coyotes and varmints. For comparison, here is a look at a few commercial rounds:

Example 1: .223 Remington (5.56-mm.)

55-grain soft point: suitable for small game; muzzle velocity 3,240 ft./sec., kinetic energy 1,280 ft./lbs.

64-grain power point: suitable for thin-skinned medium game; muzzle velocity 3,020 ft./sec., kinetic energy 1,296 ft./lbs.

Example 2: .243 Winchester (6-mm., usually the smallest round allowed for deer hunting)

100-grain soft point: suitable for thin-skinned medium game; muzzle velocity 2,960 ft./sec., kinetic energy 1,945 ft./lbs.

Example 3: .260 Remington (6.5-mm.)

120-grain soft point: suitable for medium game; muzzle velocity 2,890 ft./sec.,; kinetic energy 2,226 ft./lbs.

Example 4: 7-mm.-08 Remington (.284-in.)

140-grain soft point: suitable for medium game, muzzle velocity 2,860 ft./sec., kinetic energy 2,542 ft./lbs.

Example 4: .308 Winchester (7.62-mm.)

150-grain soft point: suitable for medium game; muzzle velocity 2,820 ft./sec., kinetic energy 2,650 ft./lbs.

180-grain soft point: suitable for large game; muzzle velocity 2,620 ft./sec., kinetic energy 2,745 ft./lbs.

Example 5: .375 H&H (9.5-mm.)

300-grain soft point: suitable for dangerous game; muzzle velocity 2,530 ft./sec., kinetic energy 4,265 ft./lbs.

One can easily spot a trend with these rounds - as the animal gets larger or more dangerous, bullet velocity goes down while diameter, weight and kinetic energy go up. Kinetic energy is a function of mass (weight with gravity factored out) multiplied by the square of velocity and then divided by 2.

So where does a human "target" fit in on this varmint-through-dangerous-animal scale? Humans themselves are on the small end of the medium category, meaning that the .243 Winchester (Example 2) would be an excellent military round. But there is one very important twist: The human targets, unlike varmints and deer, are dangerous - much more dangerous, in fact, than "dangerous" prey - because they are trying to kill us even as we are trying to kill them.

We don't really have a target category that fully incorporates that unique factor, but the obvious answer for the ammunition designer is to increase bullet diameter and weight to ensure that the human target - that is, the enemy soldier or al Qaeda fighter - ceases to be a danger as soon as possible.

I have a friend uses a 9.3 x 74-mm. bullet (roughly a .366 caliber) for hunting Boar - for this very reason.

In considering an effective replacement for the .223 bullet, we logically would come to the .260 Remington (Example 3), another excellent hunting round - but there is another twist: This is a soft point hunting bullet specifically designed to expand in order to cause more tissue damage upon impact.

As lawful combatants, U.S. military troops cannot use these bullets. The soft point bullets in this comparison are similar to the "dum-dum" bullets outlawed by the Hague Regulations and currently banned by Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. So the military uses non-expanding jacketed bullets, though when hunting terrorists (unlawful combatants) we might be able to sidestep the Geneva Conventions and use expanding bullets (I would give this serious consideration, especially bullets like the Nosler Ballistic Tip - such bullets can be and are used by police).

Since the U.S. military does not use expanding bullets, the only way to increase the diameter is to increase the actual caliber, within limits. Most expanding bullets will significantly increase the diameter upon impact, sometimes approaching twice the original diameter. To compensate for such expansion we would have to use .45-cal. bullets instead of .223! This would be impractical.

But experts know that we can increase effectiveness a great deal with modest increases in diameter. This might bring us to the .308 Winchester round (Example 4) in the search for an effective military round.

Recall, there are really two issues with increasing the overall size of the bullet: weight and frontal area. As weight increases, so does kinetic energy (the ability to cause damage), but a lot of that energy is wasted as most rifle rounds pass right through people. Frontal area roughly translates to the size of the primary wound channel (permanent cavity) when a bullet passes through something. Basically, more frontal area means a bigger hole.

A .308 bullet has almost twice the frontal area of a .223. Additionally, despite being slower than the .223, the .308 has about twice the kinetic energy. This would lead us to assume a .308 round would be about twice as lethal as a .223 round.

Another possibility to increase the lethality of our bullets is to change their shape. Modern bullets are very pointed to decrease their coefficient of drag and increase their ballistic coefficient. This leads to flatter trajectories, better accuracy, longer range and better penetration. But it also leads to less tissue damage.

For the most tissue damage from a non-expanding bullet we would want a completely flat nose, but this is bad from both a ballistics standpoint and a firearm functionality stance. So there has to be some degree of compromise between these extremes.

By simply adopting a slightly less streamlined bullet shape, we might dramatically improve the effectiveness of our ammunition. We could even have round-nosed bullets for anti-personnel firing and more pointed bullets for longer range or penetration - after all, the military already uses tracer, armor piercing and "ball" bullet variants.

Also, high-velocity rounds are not needed on the battlefield. Higher velocity can mean higher kinetic energy, but velocities of around 2,900 ft./sec. are plenty fast. Exceeding that gains few tangible benefits for the shooter, wears out gun barrels faster, and can lead to increased recoil. Higher velocity rounds should remain specialty items.

In light of the international limitations on bullet design, the .308 round or something similar should be our primary rifle round, not the .223.

However, this takes us back to square one in weapons design - a heavier recoil, a smaller ammunition load, and a reduced volume of fire. The Sino-Soviet bloc may have been on the right track with the 7.62 x 39-mm. AK-47 round. Maybe something like the 7-mm.-08 would be a good choice.

Or maybe the U.S. military just needs to increase the quality of its marksmanship training (something I firmly believe we need to do anyway), so that people learn to properly shoot and are not afraid of their rifles. We should also study how to reduce the rest of our load so we can carry more ammunition. We tend to load our people down with way too much unnecessary gear because of our "carry-this-it-may-save-your-life" mindset. After all, combat vets usually ditch the extras the first chance they get.

Bloodgood is an Air Force master sergeant with 19 years of active duty including 11 years in tactical units and has been a certified private firearms instructor. The views expressed here are his own and not the viewpoint of either the Air Force or DoD. He can be reached at jbloodgood@msn.com.

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Editor's Note: The following SITREP on Afghanistan was passed to Col. David Hackworth from reliable military sources serving in the region.

The Taliban is completely unorganized and incompetent. However, Al Qaeda is organized and an efficient fighting force. They have been entering into Afghanistan through Pakistan and travel in groups of two to four. Al Qaeda is well funded by [supporters in] Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The fighters who are captured are brought in wearing expensive North Face gear, top of the line American hiking boots and Gore-Tex clothing (incidentally, much nicer gear than what the American troops have been issued). Many have their own state-of-the-art Garmen GPS systems. According to one source, they appear to have just "gone on a shopping spree at REI." Al Qaeda money and troops move in and out without hindrance.

Many are armed with brand new M-16, CAR-15 and M-4 rifles. However, they wear Russian H-gear/Web gear and travel very light, usually with no more than three magazine pouches (each magazine pouch holds three magazines containing 30 rounds of ammunition apiece), giving them great speed on the battlefield.

They fight from [weapons] cache to cache. This gives them the ability to advance, retreat or move laterally while always having a hidden resupply with plenty of food, water and ammunition.

The Chechen Al Qaeda, which are estimated to have between 2,000 and 5,000 members in the Kowst Gardez region at any given time, are not only efficient and well-organized but are also exceedingly brutal. They travel and hold up in much larger groups than the standard al Qaeda [units]. One of their preferred fighting tactics is to leave a 2-4 man group in a very precarious position (bait-and-run). When these men are able to draw fire from U.S. forces they run, drawing the U.S. soldiers into a well-organized Chechen ambush.

Under fire, the Chechen fighters are calm and have been heard singing songs professing faith in Allah and praise of Allah. The Chechen al Qaeda are the force that caught Navy SEAL Neil Roberts earlier this spring and killed U.S. Army Rangers who responded to the incident.

Along with shooting Roberts in the hands and feet and cutting off his ears, they also mutilated [deleted] before killing him execution-style. One source said that during interrogations of [captured] Chechen fighters, they expressed disdain for anyone not Muslim. The source said, "We are the infidel, the more brutal they are to us, the greater their reward from Allah. Outside of Allah, nothing is sacred to them."

During interrogation sessions of Chechen fighters, the source noticed French, English (possibly Americans), and Chinese in the detainment facility.

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Editor's Note: The following interim summary of "lessons learned" from the Afghanistan campaign was prepared by the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned.

 

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'Nuff said.

Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.

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