From the Editor:

'Posse Comitatus' and The Military's Domestic Counterterror Role

By Ed Offley

Obscured in recent months by other events in the war against terrorism, the issue of Posse Comitatus - the century-old federal law that generally prohibits military intervention in domestic affairs - has suddenly become a debate topic and discussion point from the White House to the Pentagon to the Sunday TV talk shows.

And well it should be.

But the Bush administration and Department of Defense are failing to be candid with the American people. They are discussing the Pentagon's emerging domestic counter-terrorism role in terms of "military support to civil authorities," of "providing technical support," and "loaning specialized equipment," and even "assisting in consequence management." This bureaucratic nonspeak obscures the stark reality.

What the Pentagon is actually doing preparing the U.S. military for something that has not occurred since Abraham Lincoln sent the Union Army down the road to Manassas. The Bush administration is girding itself for possible combat operations inside the United States itself.

What they are not doing is preparing the American people for the legal and constitutional implications of this unprecedented new mission.

Even if another major terrorist strike never takes place, the Pentagon's preparations portend a major shift in the relationship of the military with civilian law enforcement agencies, local governments and the public itself. It is essential that the public fully understands in advance what the stakes truly are, and why a military response to domestic terrorism may be needed.

This is not an argument against the Pentagon's post-9/11 domestic planning. One profound implication of the terrorist attacks was that for the foreseeable future, American political and military leaders must be prepared to defend against follow-on strikes here in the United States. America's cities are potential battlefields in the ongoing war, which may well involve defense against terrorist weapons of mass destruction.

We had a hint of that on 9/11 itself, when the Pentagon authorized Air Force fighter planes to shoot down any hijacked airliner (and its hostage passengers) if it appeared the aircraft posed a threat to the White House, the Capitol or some other critical site.

No one doubts the severity of the continuing terrorist threat from al Qaeda and other brutal terrorist cells. "Our enemies are working to obtain chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons for the purpose of wreaking unprecedented damage on America," warned the Bush administration's "National Strategy for Homeland Security" report released last week.

The apprehension of an al Qaeda suspect in Chicago last week with $12 million in counterfeit cashier's checks was only the most recent indication that our terrorist enemies are continuing to move against us. No doubt that development helped knock down some of the political resistance in Congress to the federal government reorganization that will create the Department of Homeland Security.

This military role change is even more profound, and far exceeds a routine reorganization of existing units. Under the plan, the U.S. military itself - which since 1898 has been structured as an expeditionary force that largely trains at home for operations and conflicts abroad - is preparing to operate and fight right here.

On Oct. 1, 2002, the Defense Department will formally activate the U.S. Northern Command, responsible for military homeland defense operations. To date, Pentagon officials have indicated the new four-star command will assume control of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the Joint Task Force - Civil Support, and Joint Task Force 6, the 13-year-old command that provides military assistance to law enforcement agencies in the war against drugs.

Moreover, since Northcom will be responsible "for land, aerospace and sea defenses of the United States," as Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld announced last Apr. 17, the command will also be able to call on other active-duty, reserve and National Guard units based in the United States to carry out operations.

It's time for U.S. leaders to fully ventilate the range of missions that Northcom can - and should - prepare to carry out, and the legal and constitutional implications of deploying combat forces against targets that may appear within our borders.

Consider the response to the discovery of an al Qaeda plot that successfully smuggles a nuclear device inside the United States.

To prevent its detonation, the full resources of the federal government - intelligence agencies, law enforcement and the military - will scramble to identify, locate and seize both the bomb and the terrorists. (Even under federal policies that preceded 9/11, the military's role is mandatory: The U.S. Army's 52nd Ordnance Group is responsible for all "render safe" procedures involving a terrorist nuclear bomb, presumably working in concert with the Department of Energy Nuclear Emergency Search Teams that are equipped to locate radiological warheads. Similarly, the Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force and the Army Technical Escort Unit are already charged with responding to chemical or biological attacks.)

It won't stop there. What happens when the WMD terrorism alarm does go off? Who are you going to call? The county SWAT team? Or Delta Force?

We need to be prepared for this, and 10 months after the 9/11 attacks, we are not prepared. Federal law needs to be changed to allow the Pentagon to meet that dire challenge, and both the White House and Pentagon need to clearly and forcibly articulate to the American public why this must be done.

Writing in the Spring 2002 issue of the Army War College magazine, Parameters, counterterrorism expert Chris Quillen warned that "conflicting and confusing guidance" continues to threaten the effectiveness of nuclear terrorism response procedure. This, he added, would likely handicap the federal government and military response to such an emergency. Quillen also cautioned that it is dangerous to assume that local and state officials can successfully coordinate their own response capabilities with the military under the intense time pressure to prevent a threatened nuclear terrorist incident:

Other serious coordination issues surround the dozens of federal civilian agencies, including the FBI, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Public Health Service and Secret Service, to name but a few, which would be expected to identify and demand a role in responding to such a threat. This underpins the importance of the ongoing administration effort to restructure the executive branch for an effective homeland security posture.

"Current U.S. policies are not (emphasis added) properly aligned with the possibility of nuclear terrorism," Quillen also warned in addressing the ambiguity of the current Posse Comitatus law. "The Department of Defense possesses the technical capability, but not the legal authority, to act as it needs to inmost situations. Confusion over … which federal agency is, in fact, the lead federal agency could have catastrophic consequences during a domestic nuclear terrorist incident."

Quillen and other experts warn that an essential part of the ongoing homeland security reorganization must involve clarifying the legal authorization to use military force under the Posse Comitatus law. This includes defining operational authority, and in particular, the rules of engagement under which military forces would operate. He sensibly advocates a clearly articulated amendment to the Posse Comitatus law that directly authorizes U.S. military authority to respond to domestic terrorism - something that is missing from the law now.

And while the U.S. military must be prepared to send special operations commandos against terrorists, and nuclear EOD technicians to neutralize the weapons themselves, the American people must be prepared for the fog of war right here at home. There is no guarantee that honest but horrific mistakes that have occurred on every battlefield, including those alleged friendly-fire incidents in Afghanistan, will not happen in the dire scenario of a nuclear terrorist incident, or even another hijacking or command-detonated car bomb attack.

It is a sign of the overall confusion at the highest levels of our federal government that Democratic Sen. Joseph Biden on Sunday said he supported giving soldiers the power to arrest American civilians in event of additional terrorist attacks. What Mr. Biden failed to understand, and what the Bush administration seems unwilling or unable to articulate, is that the Pentagon is not preparing soldiers to arrest criminals. It is preparing to deploy soldiers to attack and kill terrorists in the crowded urban terrain of the 21st century United States.

Meanwhile, all is gabble in the Pentagon: Gen. Ralph E. "Ed" Eberhart, the designated commander of Northcom, submitted a formal response to questions from the Senate Armed Service Committee after his nomination was announced several months ago. To the question: "Do you believe changes to the Posse Comitatus law are necessary?" Eberhart replied, "No."

That was then. Last Sunday, Eberhart told The New York Times he now supports a review of the law. "We should always be reviewing things like Posse Comitatus and other laws if we think it ties our hands in protecting the American people," he said.

That was then. On Monday, Rumsfeld told the Pentagon press corps, "I have not seen any reason why I would propose changes in Posse Comitatus and the role of the U.S. military in domestic law-enforcement type activities. I believe that the president's Homeland Security Strategy paper included a paragraph saying that they were reviewing a variety of statutes and regulations and rules. I don't think it specifically mentioned Posse Comitatus. Did it?"

Reporter: "Mm-hm. Yes."

Rumsfeld: "It did? I'll have to go reread that little dickens."

It's time for some straight talk - and action - from the president and his secretary of defense on this life-and-death issue.

Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at dweditor@yahoo.com.

"Blood and Guts," "Whiskey Bob," "Hanging Sam," "Iron Mike" and "Vinegar Joe" were just a few of the nicknames our troops affectionately hung on their generals way back when the guys who wore stars were profane, two-fisted, outspoken warriors who won battles. Skippers who led from the front and didn't have a political bone in their mean-as-a-snake bodies. Hell-raisers who said what they thought - the politically incorrect, unvarnished truth - and frequently found themselves in a compost pit like the one Gen. George Patton stepped deeply into when he publicly stated in 1945 that we should arm the Germans, march to Moscow and take out the Soviets before they tried to take over the world.

But since the end of World War II - the last war we won unconditionally - warrior-leaders like the Pattons, O'Daniels and Stilwells have become an endangered species. Ulysses S. Grant wouldn't even make captain in today's military.

The new breed are smooth, well-educated Perfumed Princes like William Westmoreland, who gave us Vietnam; Colin Powell, who didn't finish the job in Iraq; and Wesley Clark, who ran the Serbian War so badly he received his walking papers from the very Clintonistas who created this sweet-smelling pretender in the first place.

Most of these Perfumed Princes might know how to maneuver inside the corridors of power, but in spite of their advance degrees from fine schools, few have a clue about the nitty-gritty of the profession of arms. It's not a subject that's taught at top universities - or war colleges, for that matter, where computer-science classes have pretty much edged out lectures on Kill-Or-Be-Killed.

Once the Cold War settled in, the Pentagon swapped abrasive war-fighter types for social smoothies because of the bottom line. Arming America to stop the Soviets became big business, and with trillions of dollars at stake, the services went to the mat to maximize their slices of the defense-dollar pie. When I worked at the Pentagon in the 1960s, the Navy considered the Air Force a more serious enemy than the Soviets, while my Army bosses held a similar view of the Marines.

As soon as good salesmanship became key to bringing home the pork, it was goodbye war-fighters and hello slickies. Today's generals and admirals are more diplomats than warriors, selected for charisma and good looks rather than their ability to kick butt and take names.

Obviously, these new-style corporate generals need to know Beltway politics inside out, and the way to learn the game is by spending as much time as possible in Washington - far from the often bloody outposts where soldiers and sailors hone their fighting skills.

So since 1945, three generations of increasingly shallow but suave guys and gals have been selectively bred to charm the Gucci loafers off our congressional folks and convince them their own service's latest ship, airplane or tank is more urgently needed to defend America than the competition's. Few of our lawmakers have ever worn muddy boots, so they fall for a pitch, and we end up with platinum-plated junk that doesn't do the job. Stuff like the $2 billion B-2 bombers that sat out the Afghanistan show because of serious operational limitations.

The Army brass hat who originally ran the ground war in Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. F.L. Hagenbeck, pretty much represents today's standard-issue Perfumed Prince. Despite his 31 years of service, he's only had six years leading combat troops. His two master's degrees - physical science and finance - didn't stop him from making a hell of a mess of the initial ground fights of that war, where, on his first major operation, we lost a lot of troops, and the enemy got away because he didn't know his war-fighting trade.

After Lt. Gen. Lloyd Fredendall blew our first major battle with the Nazis in Africa, Ike immediately replaced him with George Patton. Unlike our present CINC for Afghanistan, Gen. Tommy Franks, there's no question Ike would also have relieved Hagenbeck in a heartbeat.

We'll keep losing fights until SecDef Donald Rumsfeld revamps the sick personnel system that's been putting the wrong guys at the top since the 1950s. But with Rummy's record for wielding the hatchet, hopefully he'll start swinging not too far down the bloody track.

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831.

Look for his new book, "Steel My Soldiers' Hearts," (Rugged Land LLC, New York City).

© 2002 David H. Hackworth

By Robert G. Williscroft

Writing in DefenseWatch, I have often made the point that there is little to fear from a potential terrorist nuclear strike because their only viable source for nuclear weapons is the old Soviet stockpile, and these weapons are old, the tritium probably has leaked away long ago, and they are highly vulnerable to transportation damage resulting in their probably not detonating.

There is, however, one kind of nuclear weapon that can withstand significant physical shock and still detonate: the burrowing nuke. It has a strong potential role to play in our fight against terrorists and the regimes that support them.

In the 1960s, the United States developed a thermonuclear device called the B61, a bomber-delivered nuke. This weapon had two interesting characteristics. It had a variable yield that could be adjusted before dropping, so that it could be tailored to a particular situation, and it had an adjustable delay that gave the delivering bomber time to retreat to a safe distance before detonation.

Over the years, the B61 went through several iterations. In August 1997, version 11 entered the U.S. nuclear arsenal. B61-11 had a significant additional characteristic: its case was hardened and its internal mechanisms were beefed up so that it could withstand a significant impact jolt. It is dropped from a great height so that it hits the ground at terminal velocity, and can penetrate up to 300 feet into compacted soil and rock.

The burrowing nuke was a reality.

Currently, the United States is continuing development of the B61, and is also working on a modification of the B83, an 18-inch thick, 12-foot long, variable-yield, delayed detonation nuke originally developed for the B-1 bomber force.

There is no evidence that the Soviets developed a parallel burrowing bomb of their own, so there is little danger that terrorists will get one of these devices in their hands.

These developments have gone almost unnoticed on the world stage. Current nuclear treaties allow for modification of existing warheads, but prohibit developing new ones. Technically, both of these devices are modifications of earlier designs. This classification has been vigorously protested by the anti-nuclear left, particularly the Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment and The Federation of American Scientists, with able assistance from Greenpeace and the Natural Resources Defense Council.

While these groups unequivocally oppose any development of nuclear weapons and any use of nuclear power with mindless determination, they do make a valid point. Early tests on underground nuclear explosions have indicated that such explosions are not normally contained. The explosion invariably blows a great crater in the ground, simultaneously spewing a significant amount of dirt into the air. At least in the earlier tests, this material was radioactive. The opposing groups contend that using these devices would inevitably cause significant civilian casualties.

They also maintain that penetration tests using non-explosive devices have demonstrated the limited ability for such devices to penetrate to genuinely useful levels. According to these opposing groups, typical penetrations into rock have been several dozen feet.

As is usual with these groups, their spokespeople inevitably distort the data they receive from freedom of information sources and occasional individuals from within the nuclear establishment.

Dr. Robert W. Nelson from the Federation of American Scientists is typical of these people. His bona fides include his position as a research physicist at Princeton University, but the simple fact is that he spends his time "consulting" to the Federation of American Scientists and in other anti-nuclear agitation. His "credentials" lend him credibility when he writes and appears before groups. Even the name, the Federation of American Scientists, sounds official and important. In fact, this group consists of a small number of radical anti-nuclear professional scientists, and a large number of anti-nuclear attorneys and lay people.

Unlike genuine scientists and honest political opposition groups, the anti-nuclear left always uses deception and misrepresentation to put its point across, probably because in the harsh light of reality, most of its arguments fall apart.

The manner in which Nelson and the others depict the action of the burrowing nuke is to display those test results that fall on one end of the spectrum. Some tests have demonstrated a disappointing depth of penetration. If a burrowing nuke were to explode at only several feet below the surface, of course the results would be dramatically different from what is desired.

Actual drop tests, however, confirm that the device functions very well, and typically penetrates 200 to 300 feet. So long as the yield of the device is sufficiently low, these explosions will produce very little surrounding damage. Furthermore, ongoing tests are developing a rocket boost capability that will significantly enhance penetration.

Furthermore, a new approach is also in development. Our guided bomb capability gives us the ability to deliver several small conventional bombs sequentially into the same hole. Each successive bomb burrows deeper, so that the final bomb in the sequence, the burrowing nuke, can detonate well below 1,000 feet.

Developing this capability is fairly trivial, since all the technology is "off-the-shelf," in terms of current weapon capabilities. All this development really requires is modification of currently existing smart bombs so they can penetrate before exploding. The only additional development is sequencing the explosions.

The other major objection of the opponents is the collateral contamination they suspect will result from employing such devices. Their projections, once again, result from applying the worst-case scenario without consideration for current developments in low residual radioactivity devices.

Modern nuclear bombs normally do not produce anywhere near the level of contamination resulting from the thermonuclear behemoths of the 1960s. They are designed for explosive effect, not radioactive contamination. Furthermore, in a typical scenario, we would use a relatively small nuclear device in the low kiloton range to take out, say Saddam's bunker, not a megaton thermonuclear giant.

In a recent article ("How to Take Out Saddam's Bunker," DefenseWatch, July 10, 2002), I discussed using man-portable SADMs delivered in person by Special Forces personnel to accomplish this task. If you shift the job to the Air Force, there still is no need to increase the yield significantly of the devices you employ. Because even smart bomb technology is still less precise than hand emplacement, a ten-fold increase in yield may be warranted, but this still puts the yield below that of the bombs dropped during World War II.

The burrowing nuke is an excellent option for taking out deeply buried, heavily armored enemy bunkers. I urge the U.S. government to move ahead full speed with the continuing development and deployment of these devices. We will all be safer when the Saddams and Ghadafis of the world have been completely eliminated.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

By William F. Sauerwein

Gary Stahlhut's DefenseWatch article on July 17, 2002 ("Future War: The Urban Battlefield," was right on target on many issues. He highlighted our most apparent weakness, the loss of versatility, and our inability to "think outside the box."

This is a dangerous shortcoming for a nation that prides itself on its superpower status. Our troops must become capable of defeating our enemies on battlefields chosen by the enemy. Unfortunately, our leaders seem fixated on certain scenarios and think that all future wars will follow our detailed plans.

I am all for detailed planning, and tasking specific units for specific theaters, but these plans must be flexible. For example, during the Cold War our major priority was the Soviet threat in Europe. However, all of our actual combat theaters during that era were not in Europe, and forced a "readjustment" of our strategy.

Few, if any, of the Army's units were prepared for Operation Desert Shield in 1990. Nevertheless, the deployment plans in place were executed, with some adjustments, and worked fairly well. The bottom line is, plans should be made, rehearsed and fine-tuned, but they should never be "set in stone."

A few years ago the Army's catch-phrase was that "the next war will be a come-as-you-are war." As a part-time history student, and fulltime history buff, it seemed to me that this "profound knowledge" was nothing new. Throughout our history, all of our wars have been "come as you are" because we have never been prepared. No enemy has provided advance notice of their intentions to attack, nor are we very good at analyzing pre-attack intelligence.

Only one enemy, Saddam Hussein, waited until we were ready to strike, with disastrous results for him. Having survived that experience, I do not believe he will repeat that mistake. One of the reasons the Japanese attacked us when they did was an attempt to pre-empt our ongoing military build-up in the Pacific.

Another thing that bothered me at that time, and it still bothers me, is our fascination with "specialized" military units. These units seem only intended for limited missions, implying they must be withdrawn once that mission is over. Stahlhut appears to support this by stating our need for forming "mountain" and "urban" units.

I disagree on this point because all of our units must train for these contingencies. A prime example, we created the light divisions for rapid deployment into "low intensity conflicts." That sounded good in theory, but our history reflects something far different. When the "balloon goes up" the United States will deploy whatever forces are available to wherever they are needed. For example, the first Army combat force deployed during Operation Desert Shield was the 82nd Airborne.

Stahlhut correctly emphasized the Army's inexcusable weakness in urban combat, called MOUT (for military operations in urban terrain). The Army has fought in urban areas in every conflict, but seems reluctant to train for it during peacetime. During the late 1970s MOUT was supposed to be part of every squad and platoon level training qualification (ARTEP).

However, this requirement was usually deleted because the "facilities" did not exist, although most installations could have provided them. Even in Europe, where cities were only a few miles apart, MOUT training was limited. Most MOUT sites were only capable of platoon-level operations, and training was conducted sporadically. Berlin supposedly boasted the best MOUT site in the world, but it was difficult to schedule.

I agree that we need a MOUT site, based on the National Training Center model, but I would not stop there.

The Army missed an opportunity during the "downsizing" debacle following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Installations targeted for closure could have been turned into training centers, and the "downsized" units converted into opposing forces (OPFORs). These training centers could reflect every type of potential combat theater, mountains, jungles, etc., with MOUT incorporated into all of them.

As in the past, all future combat operations will occur in nations with small towns and big cities. All units, heavy and light, active and reserve, would be required to rotate through them. This would better train our forces for a wider range of missions, and provide more deployment training. This may be expensive, but if you want a quality force, you must pay for it.

Before someone says this idea is unworkable, I would remind that it has been done before. During the late 1970s my unit deployed to places like Fort McCoy, Wisc.; Fort Pickett, Va.; Fort Irwin, Cal. (before it was redeveloped as the NTC), and Fort Harrison, Mont. These were National Guard installations, and we drew their heavy equipment, if needed. All of these installations had barracks and other buildings, which could easily be transformed into MOUT sites.

At Fort Harrison, we conducted mountain training as a light unit, although we were a mechanized unit. The institutional knowledge of these deployments still exists, and could be retrieved by the Pentagon, if officials tried. A current division commander was my company commander for at least two of these deployments.

Since MOUT operations emphasize close combat, I would make it a training requirement. Close combat also means bayonet and hand-to-hand combat training, something the Army has avoided because someone may get hurt. Unfortunately, our enemies understand too well that close combat often neutralizes our technological edge.

The North Vietnamese used the "grab them by the belt buckle" strategy when engaging our forces in South Vietnam. The closer they got to our troops, the less effective our superior artillery and air support. Today, the Taliban and al Qaeda have learned that melting into the population and hiding in the mountains works against us.

We can create the most elaborate, and rigorous, training centers, but they are useless unless properly utilized. That requires the Army's leadership, from the top down, to demand only the highest standards of performance. The "check to block," and "teach the test" attitudes must stop, and "political correctness" must be eliminated. Otherwise, we can expect future Mogadishus and troops unprepared for firefights in the next Afghanistan.

Contributing Editor William F. Sauerwein retired as a sergeant 1st class in 1994 after a 24-year Army infantry career that included combat service in Operation Desert Storm. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com.

By Charles Clune

The U.S. Coast Guard, America's smallest military service, has embarked on the Integrated Deepwater System Program, the largest seagoing and aviation asset replacement in its 211-year history, requesting $11 to 17 billion to obtain up to 91 new ships and extend the service life of 49 existing cutters. In addition, significant new manned and unmanned aviation assets will be acquired and 93 existing helicopters will have service life extension projects. The Project is planned for a 20- to 30-year life span.

This unprecedented effort reflects a response to the across-the-board problem of obsolescence in the Coast Guard's fleet of cutters, support craft and both fixed-wing and helicopter fleets, Coast Guard officials say.

But before we spend the money, lay down the hulls and order the new aircraft, the Coast Guard needs to confirm that this massive commitment of funds and effort dovetails with the most significant shift in Coast Guard mission priorities in over 30 years in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks last fall.

It appears almost certain that the Coast Guard will be transferred from the Transportation Department to the new Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security under the ongoing, massive federal government reorganization in the wake of 9/11. But since the Deepwater Program was instigated several years before the 2001 terrorist attacks, it is not unreasonable to ask whether the proposed acquisition effort matches the service's new operational priorities of the Coast Guard.

Prior to the terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard's self-described image for more than 30 years had been defined by five core mission areas, including:

* Maritime Safety (including Search and Rescue, Marine Safety, Recreational Boating Safety and the International Ice Patrol);

* Maritime Mobility (including Aids to Navigation, Icebreaking Services, Vessel Traffic Management and Bridge Administration);

* Maritime Security (including Drug Interdiction, Illegal Migrant Interdiction, General Maritime Law Enforcement and Treaty Enforcement);

* Protection of Natural Resources (including Marine Pollution Prevention and Response, Foreign Vessel Inspections, Marine and Environmental Science), and

* National Defense (including General Defense such as wartime service as part of the U.S. Navy, Port and Waterways Security, and Homeland Security).

While Coast Guard officials today insist that Homeland Security has been an integral part of the service's mission since its founding in 1790, it is obvious that 9/11 prompted a major shift in emphasis and mission priority, moving security functions to the top of its list. (It was not that long ago that the service touted its drug-interdiction mission as a top priority, but that was before the al Qaeda attacks.) These other missions will continue but the Coast Guard's core mission for the foreseeable future will be the security of our coastal facilities and the protection of our citizens from harm.

At this juncture, one issue that is pertinent concerns the proposed "National Security Cutter" (NSC), a major new surface ship being designed from the keel up that is earmarked for initial unit delivery in 2006. Up to eight of these vessels are planned.

Does the proposed NSC provide a useful and needed asset for this mission? I do not think so. The NSC was offered as a replacement for the service's 12 378-foot class of High Endurance Cutters, that were in turn replacements for the pre-World War II 327-foot class and the acquired ex-Navy WAVP's. These older vessels were designed as ocean-going ships with force projection capabilities similar to a Navy ship of similar size and vintage. From the late 1970s through the 1990s, the technology of naval warfare that was incorporated into newer naval vessels left the 378-foot class of Cutters as under-armed with a low sensor capability - marginal assets in any fleet force projection mission.

The issue as I see it is that with the new emphasis on Homeland Security, the Coast Guard should abandon "force projection" as a mission. The U.S. Navy, despite ship obsolescence problems of its own, still has an excellent force projection capability. When the 378-foot class becomes logistically unsupportable, it should be retired without replacement.

The resources planned for the NSC Cutters should be re-directed toward the smaller and eminently more useful Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) and Fast Response Cutters (FRC) that are also part of the Deepwater Program. If the projected capabilities of these classes remain valid, they will provide plenty of offshore range and endurance for Coast Guard patrols.

The primary mission of the Coast Guard's future was "fixed in stone" on Sept. 11, 2001.

To meet the new mission priorities, the Coast Guard should focus on returning to an active, aggressive service utilizing "cruising cutters" that will be vital to its success as "Defenders of America's Shores". Modeled on the old Revenue Cutter Service, the future Coast Guard should post its seagoing cutters in many ports with random schedules and overlapping cruising radius areas assigned. That way, any terrorist, nation state enemy or criminal attempting to infiltrate or attack from the sea will never know when he will encounter the Coast Guard.

Despite the Bush administration's pledge for increased funding for Homeland Security, it is obvious that no service will be able to acquire and support every item on its wish list. The Coast Guard will serve itself - and its nation - well by proceeding to build the two smaller classes of Cutters, rebuild the Patrol Boat Fleet and acquire the newer, more capable aviation assets.

The NSC Cutter has little value in the Coast Guard's mission for the foreseeable future. That mission is too important to weaken by devoting scarce acquisition funds on an unneeded class of ships.

Clune retired from the U.S. Coast Guard as a chief warrant officer after 22 years of active service, and has worked as a civilian nuclear power security official. He can be reached at Charles_Clune@umit.maine.edu.

By Melana Zyla Vickers

In conflicts from Afghanistan to Kosovo to the Gulf War, there's been no mistaking the fact that the United States wages war more effectively than ever, with fewer soldiers than ever. It's no surprise, therefore, that the Pentagon sees the coming months as an opportunity to trim back military personnel.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld could move as early as this fall to cut some 80,000 troops across the services, according to reports this week about plans for the 2004 budget. The main reason: Personnel and operating costs take up almost two-thirds of the Pentagon budget, which is heavily strained. By cutting back from the total 1.4 million troops, the secretary can free up the sums needed to build the weapons and capabilities that will transform the military from a force designed to fight the Soviets to one designed to bring down future, powerful adversaries.

Letting go of people, particularly patriotic, loyal people, is never pleasant, though. Nor is it popular on Capitol Hill, where politicians reflexively equate "I support a strong military" with "I support the current military" or additions to it. So as the Secretary of Defense moves to cut troops and to explain why it's safe and necessary to do so, he'll need all the support he can get.

He certainly has logic on his side. Consider the military's recent experience with:

Ground Troops: In Afghanistan, some 7,000 Special Forces soldiers, Rangers, Marines and light infantry, assisted by local fighters, have largely rolled up the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. The Army's remaining 470,000 soldiers, meanwhile, have been left cooling their heels. This situation is doubtless frustrating for the sidelined troops, but it has prevented unnecessary casualties.

Air Force: In Afghanistan, thanks to bombers that can carry a greater number of more precise munitions, U.S. war planners have had to depend on fewer flights by pilots over enemy territory than ever before. The Afghan war saw about 90-100 combat sorties per day at the height of the war, compared with 700-800 per day in Kosovo and 1000 per day in the Gulf War. While it's true that there have been fewer targets to strike in Afghanistan, that fact doesn't come close to explaining the change. It's driven by the last decade's improvements in the precision of munitions. Some 60percent of munitions that planners used in Afghanistan were precision-guided, compared with some 35 percent in Kosovo and 7 percent in the Gulf War. Bombers, which exceed fighters in the number of munitions they can carry, improved the personnel-savings further: Bombers flew only 10 percent of the sorties in Afghanistan, yet struck 70 percent of the targets.

Navy: Since the beginning of the budget season that coincided with the Afghanistan war, the Navy has moved to perform one of its central missions - firing cruise missiles from the sea to targets deep inland - with far fewer sailors. It is reconfiguring Trident submarines so that they will be able to carry the Tomahawks, with the following savings in personnel: A Trident sub with some 150 sailors can perform 70 percent of the missile-firing job of a carrier battle group, which comprises 7,000 sailors.

Not all wars or adversaries are the same, of course, and the U.S. will need a military in the ballpark of a million-plus for a long time to come. But even the Pentagon's most liberal estimates about future wars require fewer troops than in the past. Consider that the most generous estimate of troops needed for an invasion of Iraq - 250,000 troops - is half the size of the U.S. force used in the Gulf War in 1991.

Ultimately, though, the main driver of the cuts is financial. The Pentagon is already $300 billion short of the money it'll need to cover its existing plans for 2008-2018, let alone to cover other changes needed for the Pentagon to transform itself. It has no choice but to seek savings wherever it can find them. And by cutting some acceptable, safe number of troops, budgeters free up not only paycheck dollars but also the operations dollars associated with those troops - the fuel they use, the wear on weapons, and other related costs. Consider that paychecks and benefits alone represent a quarter of the $380 billion defense budget, and it's easy to see how the savings would free up resources for much-needed transformation. It should give room for the Department of Defense to remunerate troops more generously as well. They deserve it.

Personnel cuts will also have another effect. If the military brass had fewer troops to work with, they'd be forced to think about using them the way recent wars have shown is possible, effective, and ultimately victorious. The generals' failure to think creatively in recent times has left civilian officials with the double task of overriding the military advice and doing their own, top-down planning. Yet the overstretched civilians could frankly use the help of some serious, forward thinking by the military brass.

Supporters of the military's current size will retort that there's a war on, and it's no time to be cutting soldiers - echoing the Secretary of Defense's own comment, made last October, that "Now … we do not believe is the time to be cutting manpower." But at that time, the Afghanistan war had barely started. Anyone who now reflects honestly on the fact that in the Afghan war, over 90 percent of U.S. troops have been nowhere close to the action, has to conclude that the military has both the need and the ability to re-direct some funds to longer-term concerns.

Opponents of Rumsfeld's plans are also likely to point out that the military suffers unduly from cuts. And indeed, quite unfairly, the military has been cut more than any other part of government in the last decade: Some 700,000 troops have been let go since the end of the Cold War, mostly in the early 1990s.

But resisting defense-personnel cuts on the grounds that the rest of the government is bloated is hardly sound thinking. The last thing Americans want is for their military to look like their federal bureaucracy. Rather, Americans want a lean, mean, fighting machine. Painfully cutting personnel is the only true way to make sure they'll have it.

Vickers is a columnist for the online publication Tech Central Station. She can be reached at mvickers@techcentralstation.com.

© 2002 Tech Central Station, reprinted with permission.