Too Many Creature Comforts in the Combat Zone

By Matthew Dodd

What happened to our warfighting focus and basic leadership on the ground in the Afghanistan combat zone?

From what I read and inferred from two recent articles in The European Stars and Stripes, I am afraid that our American culture of comfort and convenience is doing what al Qaeda and Taliban resistance have so far been unable to do: erode, degrade, neutralize, and – if we are not courageous enough to admit it and reverse it – ultimately destroy our warfighting effectiveness.

I recall the images and descriptions of life for the Marines when they were the first U.S. troops in Afghanistan to control key locations and establish defensive positions. The Marines’ spartan-like conditions are a distant memory compared to today’s comforts as described by one Stripes article: “air-conditioned tents, a self-service laundromat, a small theater with two big screen TVs, a barber and beauty shop and a small exchange store.” And there’s even more to come: “full-size refrigerators, a basketball court, additional telephones, a new lounge with pool tables, two large fitness centers and a volleyball court are on the way … The only thing missing is a McDonald’s.”

One of the articles graphically sums up the differences between then and now. “In early March … personnel had to burn the human excrement. Now, troops have air-conditioned commodes.”

Another “hardship” faced by the soldiers is the lack of Internet access. “Any soldier can use one of the terminals [in the air-conditioned Morale, Welfare, and Recreation tent] for 30 minutes at a time. But getting online can suck up an entire day. Some soldiers have to sign a list and wait between two and 12 hours for the next available desktop, said Sgt. 1st Class Freddie Barnes, who on Thursday tracked time limits like an Internet czar.”

Before you start to think that these “combat” troops are living a life of luxuries, the Afghanistan accommodations are nothing “like the massive camps built in Kosovo and Bosnia, which have name brand fast-food restaurants, cappuccino bars and huge dining complexes.”

The comments in these articles paint a positive picture of pampered progress. The message is that the more we can distract the fighting man from the harsh realities of his combat zone by re-creating his hometown comfort zone, the better off he or she is. The reporters cite the “inadequate living conditions” of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the “unforgiving” and “extremely hot temperatures, dust and potential [al Qaeda and Taliban] attacks” as justifications for the luxuries described above.

I am not buying what they are selling.

Let me briefly state for the record that I am not at all opposed to taking care of the troops, especially those who go in harm’s way in a combat zone. My definition of taking care of the troops includes, but is not necessarily limited to: mail, pay, shelter, water, hot chow, physical training, adequate rest, order and discipline, functional equipment, adequate weather-protecting clothing, imaginative small-unit and individual training, and solid leadership to make sure the troops know their welfare is a high command priority.

What those articles tell me is that our presence in Afghanistan has grown and is expected to grow in the foreseeable future. What concerns me as a U.S. taxpayer is that most, if not all, the growth seems to be for increased overhead and infrastructure for a steady number of “trigger-pullers” who are pursuing a steady (hopefully decreasing) number of adversaries. I do not want to pay for any more “name brand fast-food restaurants, cappuccino bars and huge dining complexes” in another combat zone.

What concerns me as a military man is that as the infrastructure grows, command focus and resources tend to shift away from the “trigger-pullers,” upon whose shoulders rest the burden of our success or failure in this global war on terrorism. Air-conditioning technicians, laundromat managers, theater operators, barbers and exchange personnel, and refrigerator mechanics are not the ones who locate and close with the al Qaeda and Taliban fighters.

Are all the services available truly meant to support the “trigger-pullers,” or to support those personnel who directly support the “trigger-pullers,” or to support those personnel who support those personnel who directly support the “trigger-pullers?” The farther we get away from the “trigger-pullers,” the less those services can be considered necessities and the more they become luxuries. With upward spiraling wartime costs in a peacetime economy, such luxuries will bleed us dry.

I have other military concerns with the growing infrastructure in Afghanistan and other deployment areas. With our sprawling network of Americana towns, we are becoming more vulnerable as potential terrorist targets, which further drives up our force protection requirements, and further dilutes our warfighting focus. A larger infrastructure gives the appearance of permanence to locals, to the host government, and to those who resent our presence in a foreign land. Once we start wearing out our local and regional welcomes, the risks and threats to our forces increase, which also further drives up our force protection requirements and further dilutes our warfighting focus.

I began this article by asking about what happened to our warfighting focus and basic leadership on the ground in the Afghanistan combat zone. Despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, I did see a bright glimmer of hope when I read the following quote from Pfc. Darnell Folsom, a member of the 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment:

"I’m here for a purpose. I’m here to do my job. This is just a luxury. I’m just glad for what they give us."

Thank God we have men like Pfc. Darnell Folsom serving in Afghanistan.

Contributing Editor Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.

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Osama bin Laden – Dead or Alive?

By Robert G. Williscroft

The Pakistan Observer recently reported the following quote from a senior Taliban leader: “Much dreaded Osama bin Ladin, the man on the top of the U.S. list of most wanted men, had a peaceful natural death in mid-December in the vicinity of famous Tora Bora mountains.”

This unidentified source continued: “The Coalition troops are engaged in a mad search operation but they would never be able to fulfill their cherished goal of getting Osama alive or dead.” The source went on to say that the late Osama bin Ladin was suffering from some serious lung complications, and succumbed to the disease for lack of proper treatment. The source claimed that OBL was laid to rest honorably in his last abode and his grave was leveled in accordance with his Wahabi beliefs.

This unnamed individual then went on to describe the funeral he attended. According to him, about thirty close al Qaeda associates of OBL, including his most trusted personal bodyguards, family members and some “Taliban friends” attended the funeral rites. A volley of bullets was fired to pay final tribute to the “great leader.” The Taliban source who claims to have seen bin Laden's face before burial said "he looked pale and freak but calm, relaxed and confident."

The source strongly asserted that bin Laden had no feelings of remorse before death. He insisted that bin Laden was proud to have succeeded in his mission of igniting awareness amongst Muslims about hegemonistic designs and conspiracies of “pagans” against Islam. He said that bin Laden believed that the sacrifice of a few hundred people in Afghanistan was nothing as those who gave their lives in creating an atmosphere of resistance will be adequately rewarded by Almighty Allah.

On the other hand, in late June al Qaeda broadcast that bin Laden was still alive, and that the United States had better fasten its seatbelts, because the worst was yet to come. In response, Afghan President Hamid Karzai called for a joint operation by Afghanistan, the United States, and Pakistan to capture Osama bin Laden, who he believes is in hiding somewhere in the mountainous region bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Karzai went on to say that “[bin Laden] is an individual, hiding in a house, not moving around properly or not communicating with anybody. It's easy to hide. Some criminals are hidden for 10 to 12 years around the world, so criminals can hide ... but bin Laden will be found one day.”

So which is it? Did he die peacefully or is he still plotting our demise?

On June 23, al Jazeera, the Arabic satellite channel about which I have written earlier (“Target Al Jazeera - 'Information War' Weapon,” DefenseWatch, May 15, 2002), broadcast an audio tape produced by al Qaeda which al Jazeera claimed was authentic. On the tape, Suleiman Abu Ghaith – who has appeared sitting at bin Laden's side in propaganda videos – announced that bin Laden and 98 percent of the al Qaeda leadership are still alive and planning fresh attacks on the U.S. in the coming days and months. He boasted that the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan failed to destroy al Qaeda. Abu Ghaith reported that “The system is still there and it is operating at full power.”

“Our martyrs are ready for operations against American and Jewish targets. America should be prepared. It should be ready. They should fasten the seatbelts. We are coming to them where they never expected.”

Abu Ghaith also claimed al Qaeda was behind the April truck bombing of Africa's Djerba synagogue in Tunisia where 21 people, mostly German tourists, died.

Sen. Bob Graham, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said the tape was credible. The last time U.S. intelligence had a fix on bin Laden was at the start of the military campaign last December. He was believed to be hiding in the eastern Afghan Tora Bora mountains. Then he vanished without a trace.

So which is it? Did he die peacefully as reported by The Pakistan Observer, or is he still plotting our demise as Abu Ghaith insists?

Last April, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said: “He's alive or dead. He's in Afghanistan or somewhere else.” Which just about sums it up. Larry Johnson, a former State Department counter-terrorism official, put it this way: “The proof that he's alive is, we don't hear anything from Osama bin Laden.” And then he adds: “The proof that he's dead is, we don't hear anything from Osama bin Laden.”

Time Magazine reports from unnamed White House sources that intelligence officers are getting credible second-hand reports from individuals who claim to have spoken with bin Laden recently. A Bush aide says, “The guy is alive. He's just being really quiet. It's not in his interest to show where he really is. So he's just maintaining complete silence.”

So which is it?

The preponderance of the evidence seems to point to his live presence in the mountains of Kandahar, somewhere in the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan, or possibly lost in the teeming masses of one of Pakistan's cities like Karachi. This is kind of like saying, “He's somewhere out there west of the Mississippi.”

The bad news is that unless we are able to recruit and train reliable local talent, we don't stand a snowball's chance in hell of finding bin Laden. The good news is that bin Laden cannot effectively lead al Qaeda from his deep cover.

So is he dead or alive? Does it really matter?

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

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Turning Soldiers into Policemen Is Dangerous

By J. David Galland

Soldiers are not municipal police officers. They are not state police troopers, sheriffs, the cop on the beat or “Officer Friendly,” for that matter. The assumption that American soldiers are inherently qualified to enforce local and state laws, by changing the federal Posse Comitatus law is irrational.

First, some background into this statute.

The term is Latin for “force of the county,” and refers to an ad-hoc body of every-day citizens who have been gathered by the civil authorities to chase and catch felons, quash riots, and otherwise enforce the law, including local ordinances when applicable. To put this on simple terms, this refers to the "Posse" that the sheriff of countless Western movies hastily assembled to do what needed doing.

The act, passed by Congress in 1878, specifically bars the participation of any military forces from executing U.S. laws without the express authorization of Congress. The act specifically provides for the distinct bifurcation of military and civilian spheres of authority.

But the underlying issue goes back to the days of the American Revolution, when colonial-era Americans first gave formal voice to a healthy distrust of standing armies in our midst. In its lengthy recitation of specific grievances to King George III, the Declaration of Independence included these two accusations:

“He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power ….

“For protecting them [soldiers], by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States.”

That point of view was never codified into federal law in the United States until after the Civil War. The use of federal troops to enforce Reconstruction laws, as well as to put down labor unrest, came to a head in the Hayes-Tilden presidential election of 1876. Republican Rutherford B. Hayes won that contest by one electoral vote.

The Democratic response to Hayes’ victory was that the election had been wrongfully influenced. Hayes’ predecessor, President Ulysses S. Grant, had sent federal troops to guard polling places in several Southern states. The vanquished party complained that Tilden supporters had been intimidated and discouraged by the Yankees in blue. Therefore, they did not step forward to cast their vote.

The debate on the issue intensified and 1878, Congress passed the act that removed the military from any subsequent involvement in what were clearly civilian affairs. According to many legal scholars, and from my corner of the foxhole, Posse Comitatus has served America well since then. The foresight of earlier generations ensured that soldiers would not perform domestic police duty

Having served in the U.S. military for nearly three decades, and for a decade before that in the civilian law enforcement arena, I believe that my perspective is based on a clear understanding of both professions: I believe that if soldiers were woven into the national law enforcement community, our nation would be treading on a course that would threaten our fundamental civil liberties and freedoms.

The erosion of our way of life would not happen overnight, not even in months. However, federal troops dispersed among local or state police officers will ultimately result in jurisdictional control of civil law enforcement by the federal government.

It is imperative that American citizens see through the facade that shields this issue from scrutiny. Specifically, we must challenge the assumption that deploying soldiers alongside the constabulary will be in the best interest of America and will strengthen homeland defense against terrorism.

If the military were to assume a domestic law enforcement function it would set the stage for the most extreme form of “mission-creep,” one that could easily be irreversible. The definition of federal, state and municipal law enforcement would be rewritten to provide for roving infantry squads with their rifles at the ready.

And on a strictly practical level, it is a grave mistake to assume that a soldier can perform domestic law enforcement functions. Soldiers are not trained to “police” anything, or any place, in the fashion that civilian police officers do. To attempt that is to guarantee an inevitable mishap that will result in grievous damage.

It may be argued that since the Army has a Military Police Corps, that surely they would be logical and formidable additions to any police force. Not so, this too, is an abstract and uninformed assumption.

While the Army does have an military occupational specialty for Military Police (95B), the career track is officially classified into the combat support field. MPs are trained and taught as soldiers to operate forward deployed in a combat scenario. On the battlefield, the MP may be tasked to control civilians fleeing the combat zone, guard prisoners of war, or conduct dangerous route reconnaissance while searching for mines, ambushes and any sign of enemy activity. All of these routine tasks can rapidly turn very deadly. The skills involved are vastly different in complexion and scope from policing a civilian community.

When we reach the point that we fall under the scrutiny of an armed machine-gunner while making a quick stop for bread and milk at the corner store, then we have become exactly what our Founding Fathers fought and died to prevent.

This all sounds like an extreme scenario to any reader and, in fact, it is. However, who can say that this will never happen? If it does, and becomes status quo in time, how will the town, city, or state ever be able to autonomously police itself again, after relinquishing its own responsibilities to the federal government?

Gen. John Keane, the current Army Vice Chief of Staff (who has already been selected to replace outgoing Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki next year), said last week, “We don’t see any reason to change” the Posse Comitatus law. Keane also alluded to the fact that such a mission, if delegated to the military, would likely fall to the National Guard. He also clarified that homeland security would not be the Guard’s singular mission.

History and logic provide evidence that removing this legal barrier would create far more problems, and legal complexities for America, than provide solutions to the homeland security challenge.

There is much that needs to be done to protect our nation from terrorism. This will be a long-term effort that will require lifestyle changes for many. Personal sacrifices are to be expected and they will vary in type, influence, and quantity. The current situation is similar to World War II, when all Americans sacrificed for the common good.

The days of domestic bliss and the average American’s cozy polarization from the evils of this complicated world ended last Sept. 11th. However, bringing the military into civilian law enforcement is a step in the wrong direction. Let the Posse Comitatus Act stand as it has since 1878.

J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is a retired veteran of over thirty years of service in military intelligence who resides in Germany. He can be reached at defensewatch02@yahoo.com.

Military Already Has Necessary, And Lawful, Authority

By Charles Clune

There has been a lot of discussion in recent weeks about possible changes to the federal Posse Comitatus Act, the Reconstruction-era law that prohibits the U.S. Army from engaging in domestic police activity.

The Act prohibits the use of soldiers, specifically the U. S. Army, to carry out what are normally defined as civil law enforcement activities, but as I will point out here, there are already numerous formal exceptions to the law that do enable military units to operate in the domestic arena.

The Air Force and Navy (including the Marine Corps) adhere to the restrictions of Posse Comitatus by consent of the department secretaries so, in effect, these “armed services” do not carry out domestic law enforcement activities.

Such is not the case with the U.S. Coast Guard, which is the only one of the armed services not constrained by Posse Comitatus. Its forerunner, the Revenue Cutter Service, was not even viewed as an “armed force” when Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878. Its duties within and outside the borders of the United States were considered to be law enforcement and not military operations and have never been constrained by the Act.

The National Guard of any state, while under the direction of its governor, is also not covered by the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act. (If the National Guard is “federalized,” it is subject to the restrictions of the Act. That’s why National Guard soldiers sent to patrol U.S. airports were kept under state control and funding – to avoid a legal challenge under the current law.)

Another common misconception is that Posse Comitatus prevents the armed forces from taking part in domestic security Programs. This is not true and is not prohibited by the Act. The armed forces have a responsibility to defend the United States of America. If the president ordered it, the Army can legally ring the borders of our nation with troops and use high-tech sensors and surveillance equipment to prevent the infiltration of illegal aliens and contraband. Such a move, of course, would be absurd and impracticable – but not illegal.

In a similar manner, the Department of Defense may apply any manpower and technology to assist the U.S. Customs Service and Coast Guard in scanning and monitoring cargo and containers from ships entering our ports. Again, that they are not currently doing this is a function of cost and allocation of resources, not an issue of legality under Posse Comitatus.

The dissemination of intelligence gathered by the U.S. military can (and should) be shared with civil agencies having responsibility for public security and protection. Again, that this is not always done is a strategic or technical decision to prevent compromise of sources. It is not an issue of legality under the Act.

And finally, a Defense Department response to a WMD incident on American soil would not violate the Act. The Pentagon has formally created specialized response units with the formal approval (and legislation) by Congress, which in the terms of the Act makes the military participation entirely legal.

Recognizing the flexibility of the Act and its clear provisions for presidential or congressional authority to use the military in specialized cases, I believe it is totally unnecessary for the federal government to allow the armed forces to partake directly in civil law enforcement. The conditions under which it would be required would be difficult to define and hard to inculcate into the operational doctrine of military maneuver units.

However, if the Department of Defense plans to change the mandate of our nation's military to include operational maneuver units prepared for combat action against terrorists within our own borders – an issue noted by DefenseWatch Editor Ed Offley in his column on July 24, 2002 (“ ‘Posse Comitatus' and The Military's Domestic Counterterror Role,” – then Offley is 100 percent correct to warn that the president and his top advisers need to make that momentous change clear to the American people. Additionally, we must immediately start to develop the tactical plans and rules of engagement that would be required.

I suggest that a reactive application of military forces in the event of another attack on our soil would be not only ineffective, it would probably be counter-productive.

I do not believe the Posse Comitatus Act itself needs significant change. There are plenty of federal law enforcement officers (not to mention state and local police) to go around. Our land, sea and air borders must be protected using all available resources.

The American people have a right and an expectation to be protected by our military establishment, not policed by them. And absent the introduction of a large well-armed expeditionary force from an external enemy within our borders, the Pentagon should studiously avoid using of the armed forces in a combat role on American soil.

Contributing Editor Charles Clune retired from the U.S. Coast Guard as a chief warrant officer after 22 years of active service, and has worked as a civilian nuclear power security official. He can be reached at charles.clune@umit.maine.edu.

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One Marine’s Homage to ‘Doc’

By Patrick Hayes

One thorny issue between some in the Marine Corps and the Navy that caused an uncharacteristic friction between the two services in recent years concerns whether or not Navy Corpsmen, trained by and attached to Marine grunt units, should be given the privilege of wearing a Marine dress green uniform, or even the new Marine-only digital utilities (combat uniform) with the Eagle, Globe and Anchor emblem sewn on.

For any Marine who has ever been in combat with these brave and selfless Navy men, this is a no-brainer! Throughout the history of the Navy Hospital Corps’ assignment to Marine infantry units, many Marines survived their combat wounds because of the bravery under fire and skill of their Navy Corpsmen.

Since 1775, Marines have served on board U.S. Navy ships. And since 1798, the Navy has provided for the medical care of wounded sailors and Marines. The first enlisted man to serve in the capacity of a surgeon’s assistant (or “loblolly boy”, a term used in the British Navy at the time) was John Wall aboard the frigate USS Constellation.

On June 18, 1898, an act of Congress established the Navy Hospital Corps. Almost immediately, Navy Corpsmen were assigned to the Marine Expeditionary Battalion that landed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, during the Spanish-American War.

Around the turn of the century, combat communications was a little complicated, not to mention dangerous. On July 19, 1901, Hospital Apprentice (Corpsman) Robert Stanley was the first member of the new Hospital Corps to win the Medal of Honor for volunteering to be a desperately needed message-runner between Marine units defending the International Legation in Peking, China, during the Boxer Rebellion. In part, the citation read, “For distinguished conduct in the presence of the enemy in volunteering and carrying messages under fire at Peking, China, 12 July, 1900.”

To meet the new demand for medically trained personnel, a new Hospital Corps Training School was opened in August 1902 at the Naval Hospital in Portsmouth, Va. Graduates of this school subsequently came under fire with the Marines in Haiti the same year.

During World War I, the Navy Hospital Corps was the most highly decorated branch of the U.S. Navy. Hospital Corps veterans of the war in France who had served with the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments were also the only Navy personnel who won the honor of wearing the French Fourragere. The Fourragere is a braided red and green cord, worn over the left shoulder, that signifies that the unit so honored, as were the Marines and their Navy Corpsmen, had won the Croix de Guerre with palms and gilt star not just once, but twice.

During World War I, Hospital Corpsmen also won two Medals of Honor, 55 Navy Crosses, 31 Distinguished Service Medals, and 460 other awards and citations. In all, 16 Navy Corpsmen were killed in action in France serving with Marines.

Corpsmen also served with the Marines between the two world wars in many places, primarily during the Banana Wars.

During World War II, Navy Corpsmen served with Marines in every action from Wake Island and Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima and Okinawa. On Iwo Jima, the casualty rates for Corpsmen were proportionately higher than those of the Marines, and for the Marines, Iwo was one of the bloodiest campaigns of the war. During the war, seven Corpsmen won the Medal of Honor, four of which were given to Corpsmen for their heroic and selfless acts on Iwo Jima. Another 67 Corpsmen won the Navy Cross, 464 won the Silver Star, and another 820 Corpsmen won other awards for combat action. In all, 889 Corpsmen died doing their job. And their job was to save the lives of Marines.

Because of the valor displayed by Navy Corpsmen attached to the Marines, in 1945 Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, commended those men when he said, “The Hospital Corpsmen saved lives on all the beaches Marines stormed. … You Corpsmen performed foxhole surgery while shell fragments clipped your clothing, shattered the plasma bottles from which you poured new life into the wounded, and sniper’s bullets were aimed at the (red cross) brassards on your arms.”

By 1950, Field Medical Schools had been established at Camp Pendleton, Cal., and Camp Lejeune, N.C., where Marines trained their Corpsmen for combat duty.

When the Marines went to Korea, Navy Corpsmen were right there with them at the landing at Inchon, and later at the frozen Chosin Reservoir. During that war, Navy Corpsmen won five Medals of Honor and 107 died in combat. Marine Corps icon, Lt. General Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, not a man for idle praise, said of his Corpsmen, “You guys are the Marines’ doctors; there’s no better in the business than Navy Corpsmen.”

And I doubt that Chesty Puller would begrudge the wearing of Marine greens to any combat Corpsman – then or now.

During the Vietnam War, 628 Corpsmen were killed in action and another 3,353 were wounded. Corpsmen won three Medals of Honor, 29 Navy Crosses, 127 Silver Stars, two Legions of Merit, 290 Bronze Stars, and 4,563 Purple Hearts. The numbers speak for themselves.

When the Marine Barracks in Beirut was attacked and blown up by suicidal Shi’ite Muslims in 1983, 15 Corpsmen were killed with the Marines. Corpsmen have also landed with Marines and Navy SEALs in action in Grenada, Panama, Operation Desert Storm and in Afghanistan.

But some people just don’t get the message. A series of pro and con articles published last year in The Navy Times, The Marine Corps Times and Leatherneck magazine included comments from some Marines who opposed the idea of Corpsmen wearing Marine uniforms.

Marine Gunnery Sgt. Kevin McCullough, who said he had served as an instructor at a Field Medical School for Navy Corpsmen, wrote in a letter to the editor of the Marine Corps Times that from what he had seen at the school (fitness levels, etc.), he would not want to be patched up on the battlefield by a Navy Corpsman. McCullough even had the gall to term Corpsmen “noncombatants.” Quite obviously, this individual had never been in combat and deserved the rebuke of all Marines for making such inflammatory remarks.

As the Leatherneck magazine editor correctly rejoined, “It is doubtful that even a few Marines who’ve ever been in combat would agree with the gunny. … I doubt the corpsmen who earned the Medal of Honor in every war since World War I (off by 17 years) would see themselves as ‘noncombatants’ … ”

Protection and care is not only something Corpsmen do for Marines. The feelings of protection and comradeship for their Navy Corpsman run deep for any Marine who has served in combat. In a letter to the editor of Leatherneck magazine, also dealing with the uniform issue, former Marine Sgt. Fred L. Shear wrote about Corpsman Larry “Doc” Frederickson, whose service to Marines covered three wars and resulted in nine rows of combat ribbons on his chest, including two Purple Hearts.

Sgt. Shear helped Doc Frederickson assemble a set of Marine Corps “greens” because “Doc” Frederickson’s last request was to be buried in his Marine uniform. He died in January 2000.

As Sgt. Shear wrote, “Anyone who says Doc and most other corpsmen do not deserve the right to wear the Marine green probably did not earn the right under fire themselves. If they had, they would have seen those incredibly brave men right up there answering a wounded Marine’s call for help.”

What should end the discussion about uniforms, even for the likes of the misguided gunny, is that Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James L. Jones closed the debate this year when he formally confirmed that Navy personnel assigned to the Marine Corps – Corpsmen and chaplains – are authorized to wear Marine dress green uniforms. Period.

Maybe Navy Corpsmen didn’t go through Marine Boot Camp. However, once they have gone through the Field Med training and have joined a Marine infantry unit, they’ve become part of the team and have earned the right.

Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at gyrene@sftt.us.

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Update: Report on the ‘Stryker’ at NTC

Editor’s Note: The following memorandum provided to DefenseWatch contributor Michael Sparks by an anonymous Army officer unofficially assesses the initial performance of the U.S. Army “Stryker” Interim Armored Vehicle at the ongoing “Millennium Challenge 2002” exercise at the National Training Center. (See also “Strykers Boost Infantry Tactics at NTC,” by Sgt. Kim Dooley and Pvt. Sara Wood, Army News Service, Aug. 6, 2002, and “Guest Column: Cancel Stryker, Upgrade the M113,” by Michael L. Sparks, DefenseWatch, June 19, 2002.

Memorandum

Evidently, the Army flew in IAVs on C-17s during Millenium Challenge. C-130 certification evidently still a problem. IAV reliability and capability still rumored to be lacking.

NTC was ordered to support [Millenium Challenge 2002] MC02. It was told to provide whatever support JFCOM required. Trouble is JFCOM does not know what it wants. Does know what it does not want.

OPFOR waxing the Stryker company or Blueforce brigade. OPFOR allowed only one Stryker kill per engagement, and is a considerably weaker OPFOR than a regular rotation. Also not allowed to attack without permission from JFCOM/JTF. Big events are a light battalion airdrop to secure Bicycle lake. C-17 air landing of 4 Strykers (2 per plane), an attack against a small remnant of an OPFOR regiment, securing an area for the SOF to dismantle a weapon of mass effects, and a live-fire.

The infantry O/Cs [observer-controllers] (Tarantulas) are managing the operation. Light units have FBCB2 in their TOCs, (which will not move during the rotation) but no land warrior, no digital connect. One light battalion is at NTC the other two are added via virtual simulation. Not clear if the other two battalions are going to be used.

Air drop of light infantry to secure the landing field (Bicycle lake) was done with 12 C-130s loaded with a total of about 600 soldiers and two artillery tube drop packages. Drop started at 2:10 am. First drops were the artillery. Then for the next 45 minutes the battalion dropped from the sky.

OPFOR was in position to lob motors at the rather noisy and bright airdrop, but was not allowed. Lots of VIPs watching from bleachers (over 200 generals scheduled to visit NTC during MC02). Drop was very impressive, even when viewed via Low light TV. Only 3 soldiers and two O/Cs injured in the drop.

Took a long time to regroup on the ground. At 4 am, the Tarantulas were still trying to figure out who had jumped, location of units and injury list. The blueforce soldiers were still wandering/regrouping on Bicycle lake. Looked like another hour before they would be ready for combat. Majority of OPFOR were out of direct and indirect fire range. Looked like a company minus of OPFOR. Some engagements/clashes with OPFOR planned for that day. HUMMWV surrogates for the mobile gun system will be principle blueforce fire power.

The Stryker airlift was delayed because the AF wanted to land under limited vis[ability] conditions so the whole rotation/demo was delayed about a day. No problem the OPFOR was more than happy to be finally allowed to use its mortars. AF had not delivered any Q-16 counterbattery radars so the blueforce got mangled up in front of a lot of VIPs. Another example of the fine joint spirit that permeates the experiment.

Fort Lewis notes:

1. Approximately 20 Strykers are “down” every day, and the sight of one towing another is routine.

2. The Stryker mortar vehicle does not support the 120mm mortar, and we have heard the Army has decided to use a smaller mortar (don't know whether it is an 81mm or the 107mm.) so they can actually fire something from the vehicle. Odds are it’s the 81mm, but we are checking.

3. In order to traverse the barrier that has been set up for the test, the IAV has to actually hit the wall at 2-3 mph and bounce over. The M113 noses into the wall and gently climbs it. Effect on the troops in the IAV of being bounced is unknown, but all were seen wearing their helmets all the time. The same thing happens on the cross country course.

4. The effort by the 100-man GD “dealer prep” team takes place in two Chinook hangars, and the effort is significant. Power packs are lifted, parts are added and replaced, and other “production” processes are performed.

5. The remotely-fired Mk-19 [grenade launcher] on the IAV was fired for a safety certification. It fired five rounds. One went 40 meters left of target, one went forty yards right of target, and crews are looking for the other three. All firing anywhere of this system is suspended. Firing portion of the test has been delayed to September.

Additional stuff from CE evaluation of the M113:

1. M113s go around the driver's course. LAVs cannot keep up. It is dry.

2. LAVs drive around a hill, while the M113s go straight over it.

3. An LAV nosed into a ditch and got stuck. Another LAV came over to winch it out. In the process, the winch broke. The M113 drives right over the ditch.

4. Senior officers do not attend any of the meetings. Could it be that they see an impending morale dilemma that can be avoided by not being in attendance?

5. Teasers: IAV restricted to 40 mph on roads, 15 mph cross country, with strong emphasis on keeping everybody's helmet on, nobody can operate the APU or winches without contractor check-out first. Some of this is safety related stuff that is waiting for testing to be complete, and the normal reaction by Army safety folks is to keep restrictions on until testing (i.e., someone else) recommends the restriction be lifted. CYA stuff, not to be considered serious. On the other hand, many of these items seem to have derived from actual experience in earlier operation as problems, and there are “fix” dates projected, which indicates a design flaw or GD inability to optimize competing priorities for the “ilities.” One thing is obvious: the Army's depiction of the IAV as providing a more relaxed, comfortable, and prepared soldier to the battlefield because the ride is better is beyond reality.

6. Four Remote Weapons Stations were removed from deprocessed Stryker vehicles this weekend to support the Millennium Challenge exercise at the National Training Center. It's been reported that the RWS's develop problems after firing 12K-15K rounds of ammunition. Officers also indicate that the load planning challenge is significantly greater on the Stryker than the M113A3. Company commanders saying they cannot fit an MTO&E platoon into 4 Strykers.

Sparks, a former Marine Corps officer now serving in the U.S. Army Reserve, is director of the nonprofit 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne), a research institute focusing on new equipment and tactics for the Army. He can be reached at itsg@hotmail.com.

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