Conflict Diamonds — Funding Terrorism

By Robert G. Williscroft

What do Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola have in common? Besides their being in Africa, that is?

Each is a renowned source for Conflict Diamonds.

Diamonds are known world-wide as symbols of love and affection. Who hasn’t heard the phrase coined by De Beers: "A Diamond is Forever."

Most diamonds are legitimately mined, and are accounted for during their often tortuous journey from the earth to the New York, Tel Aviv, or Amsterdam diamond markets, or wherever else they eventually appear, ready for a ring, broach, or investor's safe.

Most, but not all. A portion ends up funding genocidal wars and international terrorism. According to John Pickrell as reported in the August 10, 2002, Science News, during the 1990s the Angolan rebel army Unitas generated $3.7 billion over six years trading Conflict Diamonds. During 1999 world-wide diamond production was around $6.8 billion, so if one presumes that this is an average annual production, Unitas controlled nearly 10% of global diamond production and distribution.

Controlling 10% of anything is phenomenal, but controlling 10% of the world diamond trade is extraordinary. Diamonds are small and easy to conceal, and high-quality diamonds command and get very high prices the world over. A small bag of high quality diamonds can easily contain several million dollars of value, which is easy to transport, and very liquid at any destination around the world. These gems are invisible to normal airport scans, and don't trigger any of the typical alarms used by security stations everywhere. Short of an actual physical search, they are unlikely to be found.

Legitimate governments around the world are expressing an interest in discovering how to identify diamonds that originate in the four African nations most responsible for the Conflict Diamond trade: Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola.

Shortly before President Clinton left office, he convened a White House conference on this subject, attended by diplomats, commercial diamond experts, and interested scientists. The fundamental question at that conference was how to identify the geographic origin of diamonds.

The underlying thought was that since diamonds come from different geologic times and regions on the Earth, it might be possible to discover some kind of "fingerprint" that would absolutely identify a  diamond's source.

With emeralds and rubies, for example, their more complex chemical structures make such identification feasible. With diamonds, however, the best are pure crystalline carbon, with absolutely no chemically identifying features. As you move down the value scale, diamonds begin to take on some color and to have small inclusions. At some point, these become sufficiently present to enable a kind of geological fingerprinting. Unfortunately, these gems are not the kind used in the Conflict Diamond trade.

Another approach is based on carbon 14 dating. Since Diamonds are pure carbon, and since carbon comes in at least two isotope forms, C13 and C14, and since at different times in the Earth's past, the ratio of these isotopes was different from today, it is possible to identify the time of origin for anything containing carbon. The thought was that diamonds coming from different areas might exhibit different ratios of these isotopes. To date, unfortunately, this method has not proved practical, since most diamonds seem to exhibit essentially identical ratios.

Scientists also have developed an approach that uses a unique characteristic of diamonds that have been exposed to a radiation source. They bombard a diamond with electrons which causes it to generate a pattern of light characterized by the original radiation exposure. The resulting pattern can possibly be used to identify diamonds that have the same source. This technique is only applicable, however, to gems that have been so exposed, and thus is not applicable to the entire range of the diamond trade.

The scientific community hasn't given up on this project, but scientists now are saying that a solution may lie years in the future. In the meantime, the best way of maintaining oversight is for each diamond mined to be given a certificate of authenticity, which remains with the diamond throughout its life. This is already being done for some of the higher-end diamonds, but it can only be an effective deterrent against money flowing into terrorist hands if it is universal.

Another problem is that certificates, like passports, can be forged. With billions of dollars at stake, even a costly investment in forging equipment is cost-effective.

With billions of dollars being funneled to terrorist organizations each year through the Conflict Diamond trade, we really need to find a solution now, not years away.

Is there any way to approach this problem that will stem the flow of illicit funds and gems without disrupting the entire industry?

Yes there is.

The first element of the solution is partially in place now: authentication certificates. As currently used, however, anyone can forge a certificate. The balance of this solution is to make the certification and authentication forgery proof.

Each legitimately mined diamond receives an encrypted serial number, using a 128 Kbit public/private encryption key system identical to that used for digital signatures on email and other documents transmitted over the internet. This encrypted serial number is laser inscribed on the edge of the bridal of every cut diamond. The same number is encrypted a second time using another public/private key set, and holographically emblazoned on the certificate.

The private keys for these two encrypted numbers are maintained securely at two designated central locations.

Diamond identification proceeds like this. A diamond is scanned using an instrument that will quickly become available to service this need, since millions of diamonds will need to be processed each year. The scanned, encrypted number is electronically transmitted to the appropriate secure central location. Simultaneously (or within some reasonable amount of time), the certificate number is also scanned and transmitted to the other designated location.

At the two remote locations, the receiving computers automatically decrypt the numbers and then encrypt them again using another set of public/private keys, and transmit the newly encrypted numbers to each other where they are electronically compared. Authentication is issued only if everything matches. The entire process should take only several microseconds, or maximally several seconds on a very busy internet day. The result is absolute assurance that the diamond scanned is the diamond originally assigned the matching certificate. Forgery is completely impossible using this scheme.

The only possible point of compromise is the set of computers containing the original private keys. By employing appropriate security measures to these machines, they can be permanently and completely protected from intrusion.

The cost for this system would be born by the ultimate consumer through a very small increase in the base price for any diamond. The total cost would be distributed over so many very small elements that the public would hardly be aware of the price increase.

Since it appears that as much as 10% of the world diamond market is being diverted into the Conflict Diamond trade, funding genocidal wars and world-wide terrorism, it is extremely important and urgent that we find a way to stem this flow of illicit funds.

Only two approaches appear to have any hope of succeeding. The fingerprint approach based upon presumed geological differences in diamonds from different areas appears several years away, and may never work sufficiently well. The only other way appears to be certification of each produced diamond.

The computerized encrypted technique described here is viable today, and can be implemented within a few short months.

It solves the problem.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

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New Brigade ‘Test’ at NTC Was a Sham

By William F. Sauerwein

As a retired soldier who has serious doubts concerning the new Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) being fielded by the U.S. Army, I read recent articles about the brigade’s major “Millennium Challenge 2002” exercise at the National Training Center with dismay and alarm (“Update: Report on the ‘Stryker’ at NTC,” DefenseWatch, Aug. 14, 2002).

Rather than using the NTC and its world-class OPFOR team to seriously test the capabilities and strengths of the IBCT, and – more importantly – expose any flaws in organization, equipment, tactics and training for subsequent correction, the Army conducted a canned exercise that had no basis in combat reality. For political and bureaucratic reasons, the Army leadership appears determined to prove the new “Stryker” combat vehicle, and the new brigade design itself, successful at all costs – regardless of the facts.

Embracing this flawed concept of a combat force risks our soldiers’ lives unnecessarily, and indicates that by focusing its resources on unrealistic ideas, the Army once again will prove itself unprepared for the next war. 

In an earlier DefenseWatch article, I addressed the serious transportation issues confronting the Army as it attempts to field a mobile, yet lethal force built around the 19-ton Stryker wheeled combat vehicle (“New 'Interim Brigade' a Prescription for Failure,” July 17, 2002).

An equally important issue the Army seems headstrong to ignore is whether or not the Stryker is even survivable on the battlefield, much less potent enough to defeat the enemy.

When Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki proudly unveiled the Stryker vehicle in the 1st Infantry Division’s “Bridgehead Sentinel” newsletter, Summer 2002, he noted that the new LAV was designed with the experiences of Operation Desert Storm in mind. He stressed the vulnerability of the 82nd Airborne Division, the first ground troops to arrive in Saudi Arabia, if Iraqi armored forces had attacked in the fall of 1990. Shinseki also emphasized the length of time required for moving heavy forces from the continental United States or Western Europe into a remote overseas theater.

In my view, Shinseki seriously, and perhaps intentionally, downplayed the extent of the problem the Army actually faces as it tries to balance lethality and mobility in its new force structure. During Operation Desert Storm, we deployed to a friendly country already fielding its own armored forces to defend itself. We landed at an international airport suitable for outsized C-5A transports as well as commercial aircraft. Furthermore, we were able to supplement the lack of American armor with land- and carrier-based air power.

If the Stryker had been available in that war, what could it have done against Iraqi heavy armor? Most combined arms tacticians say that the only effective anti-tank weapon is still another tank.

It is not difficult to imagine who the future enemy might be, and what capabilities he will bring to bear against the Stryker-armed IBCT.

The first two of six anticipated IBCTs, based at Fort Lewis, Wash., are currently assigned, one each, for the 2nd Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division. Having served in both of these divisions, I can affirm their missions: The 2nd is stationed in South Korea (except for the Fort Lewis-based brigade) with the prime mission of deterring North Korea. The 25th (again with the exception of its Fort Lewis brigade) is stationed in Hawaii, with a Pacific region reinforcement mission, also meaning Korea.

How will these IBCTs fare in combat against North Korea, whose army includes a large number of mechanized infantry and armored units? That is one question that remains unanswered today.

As analyst Michael Sparks has pointed out, since it takes one C-17 cargo transport to move either two Strykers or two M113 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (see “Guest Column: Cancel Stryker, Upgrade the M113,” DefenseWatch, June 19, 2002), why would the Army in future conflicts prefer to ship the lighter, less lethal vehicle?

Apparently the Army doesn’t even want to ask the question if the NTC “exercise” reflects the service leadership’s true attitude: Flying in two C-17s carrying two Stryker vehicles apiece – one of the exercise demonstration events – was an adequate element of a good old-fashioned Army “dog and pony show” for visiting generals, but totally insufficient as a realistic test for the IBCT.

This is what needs to be done.

You have to move the entire brigade on short notice, because that is precisely how a surge deployment will really happen.

Send the IBCT to the National Training Center under the worst conditions, tear down the spectator bleachers and keep the VIPs away. Turn the OPFOR loose on the brigade, identify the flaws and bugs, then fix them before declaring the system ready for combat. The enemy will never be as lenient as the hamstrung exercise controllers in “Millennium Challenge 2002.”

If Army leaders continue to establish the IBCT concept and the Stryker vehicle around which the brigade is being designed, it is imperative that they do not field it until all issues are fully identified and tested.  So far it does not appear that such tests have actually begun.

Retired Army 1st Sergeant William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com

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Why Do We Tolerate Unauthorized PX Shoppers?

By J. David Galland

Military post exchanges and commissaries in Germany have opened their doors to everyone. Today, in both the Mannheim and Heidelberg American military communities, one need no longer have a U.S. identification card to use these overseas facilities. 

Anyone may enter the Commissary, or the Post Exchange and shop to his or her heart's content. Just a little bit of assistance from a U.S. military member or family member with a dependent ID card holder can ensure this access.

Why are Germans and other non-affiliated European civilians shopping at American facilities that are supposed to be restricted to eligible personnel? The answer is simple: Nobody is checking for proper identification when shoppers enter the exchanges and commissaries. This is the current policy in two large American military communities in Germany that I visited recently. Both Heidelberg and Mannheim have sizeable American military populations, including military dependents. 

Military shopping centers in Germany today reflect years of change and updating in an overall effort by administrators to address customer and soldier needs. The exchanges, which closely resemble stateside shopping malls, also represent a small part of America overseas where a homesick young soldier can experience a bit of “hometown America” when he or she walks through the door. 

So too, modern military commissaries in Germany are a far cry from the small food stores from thirty years ago that offered only limited quantities and selections of American foodstuffs. The credit for these well-stocked establishments goes to the Defense Commissary Agency, which deserves an SFTT “tip-of-the hat” for bringing American-style grocery stores to soldiers and their families far from home.

Of course, there is a sound, practical reason why these facilities exist: Europe, and in particular Germany, is a very expensive place in which to live. For example, in Germany, gasoline costs over 1 Euro per liter, which equates to just a shade under $3.00 per gallon as opposed to about $1.50 in the United States. The general cost of living comparison with the United States in other areas, from food to consumer goods, is about the same.

Soldiers and their families, with salaries well below their civilian counterparts stateside, are compensated in great part by the presence of such high-quality inventories at rock-bottom prices.

One can therefore understand that when a German or other European Union civilian gains access to the U.S. military commissary or PX with virtually unlimited buying power and no quotas, it is the quintessential “sweet deal.”

Having casually witnessed several instances of obvious non-Americans shopping in military PX and commissary stores in recent months, I decided to take a more concerted look at the situation. Over the course of the past two weeks, I visited all four of the major shopping facilities in the Heidelberg and Mannheim areas, speaking with employees, soldiers and their family members.

I also spent time in the stores, observing what I concluded to be frequent instances where unauthorized non-American civilians were blithely shopping their hearts out.

One need not have the discerning eye of Sherlock Holmes to identify such incidents: For example, in one store I watched as four young German women (identifiable because of their accents) accompanied a pair of young, impressionable, male GIs through the aisles. Our two young warriors, in the spirit of improving their love lives, if not German-American relations overall, were pushing two shopping baskets piled high with designer blue jeans, bottles of perfume and pairs of new party shoes. Eventually the excursion ended and the two young chumps fished out their military ID cards at the cash register and paid for the ladies' items.

It is ironic to realize that in the post-9/11 environment security at all American installations in Germany is considerably tight. But with the assistance of an American soldier or family member, a German or EU national can easily gain access to an American base. The admitting process takes about two minutes and the non-American needs only to show a passport or German identification card. 

The rewards for these “shoppers can be considerable: It is not uncommon for a pair of designer jeans to cost the equivalent of $150 in a German department store, and one could double that price if shopping in a chic boutique. However, in the PX, those same clothes are sold for about $20.

At a nearby commissary, I saw similar cases, except that the carts were full of fresh fruit, produce, meat – and let’s not overlook American ice cream airlifted in from the homeland – available at a pittance of the “on the economy” prices in local markets and stores.

Many might ask, “What’s the harm in this?”

First and foremost, allowing unauthorized shoppers to consume the inventory of our PX and commissary facilities denies the products to those for whom the system exists: the soldiers and their family members. Product shortages of popular items are a recurring problem, and this is made worse by the frequency of illegal purchases.

Second, it is not a stretch to conclude that illegal shoppers are merely greedy individuals seeking to improve their inventory of clothing, consumer items or foodstuffs. With the price differential between the PX and local stores so large, it is likely that many of the transgressors are actually working a variety of the age-old black market by purchasing cheap and reselling high outside the base fence.

Finally, this seemingly harmless activity is a serious problem because it occurs only with the direct participation of American personnel themselves who are violating the rules by fronting for their non-American friends and acquaintances. Once a soldier or family member becomes comfortable bending or even breaking such a ‘minor’ rule, what is to keep him or her from regarding other regulations as something to ignore?

The solution to this situation is painfully simple but requires immediate action by the PX and commissary facility managers and military police: An immediate restoration of a strict policy of checking all shoppers’ identification.

J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is a retired veteran of over thirty years of service in military intelligence who resides in Germany. He can be reached at DefenseWatch02@yahoo.com.

Afghan SITREP: ‘Rakkasan’ Lessons Learned

Editor’s Note: The following memorandum obtained by DefenseWatch was written by a senior 1st sergeant from the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (10th Mountain Division) serving in Afghanistan with “Task Force Rakkasan,” which fought in a number of major engagements including Operation Anaconda. The emailed “lessons learned” memorandum was distributed to the senior leadership of the U.S. Army. Clarifying comments are inserted in [brackets]. 

I would like to pass on a few things learned during our recent deployment. It won’t be in a specific order, so bear with me.

I guess the biggest lesson I learned is that nothing changes from how you train at

JRTC [the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La.]. We all try to invent new dilemmas and hp's because it's a real deployment, but we end up out-smarting ourselves. Go with what you know, stick With how you train.

Some of the things in particular were soldier's load. Because you're in the mountains of Afghanistan, you try to invent new packing lists, or new uniforms. Some units went in with gore-tex and polypro only, when the weather got bad they were the only ones to have cold weather injuries that needed to be evac[uat]ed. We've all

figured out how to stay warm during the winter, so don't change your uniforms. It was never as cold as I've seen it here or Fort Bragg during the winter.

Because of the high altitudes and rough terrain, we all should have been combat light.

That's the first thing you learn at JRTC, you can’t fight with a ruck on your back. We packed to stay warm at night. Which was a mistake; you take only enough to survive until the sun comes up.

We had extreme difficulty moving with all our weight. If our movement would have been to relieve a unit in contact or a time-sensitive mission we would not have been able to move in a timely manner. It took us eight hours to move five klicks.

With just the [Interceptor Hard Body Armor] vest and [Enhanced Tactical Load-bearing Vest or the MOLLE vest] we were easily carrying 80 lbs. Throw on the ruck and your sucking.

We out-smarted ourselves on how much water to carry. We took in over 12 quarts per man on our initial insertion, which greatly increased our weight. In the old days, you did a three-day mission with six quarts of water, and that was on Fort Campbell in the summer. Granted, we were all heat exhaustion [casualties] at the end, but it's more than do-able. I say go in with six quarts; if your re-supply is working, then drink as much as possible, keeping the six quarts in case re-supply gets weathered out.

We also over-tasked our helicopter support bringing in unneeded re-supply because we've lost a lot of our needed fieldcraft. We didn't even think to take iodine tablets [to purify water from melted snow etc.] until after we got on the ground.

If you're in a good fight, you’re going to need all your birds for medevac and ammo re-supply.

Bottom line is, we have to train at the right soldier’s load, relearn how to conserve water.

How many batteries does it take to sustain for three days etc.? Take what you need to survive through the night, and then wear the same stuff again.

The next day, you can only wear so much snivel gear it. Doesn't do any good to carry enough to have a different wardrobe [set of BDUs] every day. Have the [battalion] invest in gore-tex socks, and smart wool socks; our battalion directed

for everyone to wear gore-tex boots [Intermediate Cold Weather Boots] during the mission, you can imagine how painful that was. I gave up my boots to a new soldier who didn't have any, so I wore jungle boots, gore-tex socks and a pair of “smart wool” socks and mv feet never got wet or cold even in the snow.

You need two pairs [of boots] so you can dry them out every day.

All personnel involved hated the [load-bearing vest] – it’s so constricting when you wear it with the vest, then when you put a ruck on it cuts off even more circulation.

I would also recommend [soldiers] wearing the body armor during all training, I doubt if well ever fight without it again. It significantly affects everything that you do.

Equipment-wise, our greatest shortcomings were optics and organic or direct support long-range weapons. After the initial fight, all our targets were at a minimum of 1500 [meters] all the way out to as far as you could see. Our 60 [mm] and 81 [mm mortars] accounted for most of the kills. Next was a Canadian Sniper team with a

MacMillian .50 cal [sniper rifle]. They got kills all the way out to 2500 [meters].

The problem with our mortars was there as a 24-hour [Close Air Support] cap. And they wouldn't fly near us if we were firing indirect, even though our max ord[nant: how high mortar rounds arc into the sky] was far beneath their patterns. Something for you and you ALO [Air Liaison Officer] to work out. The other problem was the Air Force could never flit small groups of personnel. I watched and called corrections on numerous sorties and they could never hit the targets. My verdict is if you want it killed, use your mortars.

Pay close attention to the direction of attack your ALO is bringing in the CAS. Every time it was perpendicular to us, we were hit with shrapnel. Not to mention the time they dropped a 2,000-lb. [bomb] in the middle of our company. It didn't go off by a sheer miracle I'm sure.

[Marine AH-1W] Cobras [gunships] and 2.75" [rockets] shot at us. Also, once again, they were shooting perpendicular to our trace. Aviation provided the most near misses of all the things we did.

I recommend all SL's [Squad Leaders] and PUs [Platoon Sergeants] carry binoculars with the mils reticle. Countless times TL's [Team Leaders] and SLl's had the opportunity to call in mortars. More importantly is leaders knowing how to do it. Our [battalion] has checked all the blocks as far as that goes. Guess what: They still couldn't do it. Especially the Pus. Contrary to popular belief its not the PLl [Platoon leader] who's going to call it in. It’s the soldier in the position who will. If you don't have the binocs, guess what? You have to wait for somebody to run to the M240B [Medium Machine Gun] position to go get them. Also, same goes with not knowing how to do it, you have to wait for the FO [artillery or mortar Forward Observer] to move to that position.

Plugger [AN/PSN-11 Global Positioning System] battle drill is the way to go, even with the civilian models [signals are unscrambled now]; the contour interval on the maps is outrageous so terrain association was difficult. Range estimation was probably the most important or critical thing you do. If you close on your estimation you'll get the target.

We all carried in two mortar rounds apiece and that was more than enough. We took mix of everything; the only thing we used was WP [White Phosphorous] and HE [High Explosive]. All together we took in at least 120 rounds as a company.

Lots of lessons learned on air assault.

It was always “seats out” [removed from the helicopter] due to the limited number of AC [aircraft] and the number of personnel we had to get in. That presents a few problems. Offloading a CH-47 on a hot LZ [landing zone] packed to the gills is an extremely slow process (2-3 minutes). Landing was the most dangerous part. While we were there just because of the conditions and terrain, if you crash without seats and seatbelts you’re going to have a lot of broken bones. If possible, maybe you could send in the first few lifts with seats in, that will get the helo off the LZ much quicker, then following AC [can come in] seats out. Food for thought.

Just like [in the] Vietnam [War], the pilots were courageous and will do all and even

more of what you ask of them. However, re-supply was a big difficulty. Problem was they never put the right package at the right place and you know what that means, especially when its 120mm mortar rounds that fell into a deep ravine. Fix was [to] put an LNO [Liaison Officer] on the bird with grids, [radio] frequencies and call signs.

Our S-4 had a group of supply sergeants that would accompany the re-supply [flights]. Also, as the S-3, push the birds down to the company freqs. That killed us the whole time. [Battalion] would never push the birds down to us, so they were always landing in the wrong place or dropping off resupply in the wrong place.

Same with AH-64s [Apache attack helicopter gunships]. We always say give them to the user but we never do it. We always had to relay through the S-3 [operations TOC] to give corrections.

Flying was by far the most dangerous thing we did while we were there.

The environment was extremely harsh. The cold wasn't that bad, it’s the hard, cold, dry wind that will eat you up like you wouldn't believe. Chapstick, chapstick, chapstick, sun screen, sun screen, sun screen.

Gators [4x2 all-terrain vehicles made by John Deere] didn't hold up too good, that place eats up tires like you wouldn't believe. They're a great thing to have when they’re running. Also, they were real easy getting them into the fight, getting out is a different story, you’re always scrounging for AC when its time to go. So be prepared to leave a few Gators.

We used the CLU’s [Javelin missile Command Launch Unit infared thermal sights] a lot, every night for that matter. Beautiful piece of equipment. They consume a lot of

batteries and add a lot of weight. After it snowed, two in the company stopped working until they dried out a few days later. Other than that they held up real well.

Go in with a good – or should I say great – [battlesight] zero on all your weapons. We never got a chance to re-zero while we were there. Also zero all your spare weapons for replacements etc. On our last mission, I hit a dud M203 [grenade] at 75 [meters] with one round from my M4 [carbine] using my M68 [Close Combat Optics].

It held a zero great. A 1SG [1st Sergeant] doesn't normally abuse his weapon like a young soldier does though. However, if they treat their weapons like Nintendos [hand-held games] they should be all right.

Our [battalion] bought the ammo bags for the M240B [Medium Machine Guns] from

London Bridge, they worked great.

Knee pads are a must, needless to say not all personnel had some. MSR [portable] stoves are the shit, and they burn any kind of fuel. Quality sunglasses [are] probably

more important [as] would be safety or shooting glasses. Bolle goggles are the way to go if you can afford it.

We had one guy who was hypothermic one night, the medics and a wool blanket saved his ass. Green wool still can't be beat. Fleece gloves are the best.

We also eventually (after we were done) received Barrett .50 cal [2+ kilometer range] for our snipers. Their M24's [.308 caliber, 7.62mm range only 1 km] never got used because of the extreme ranges. I think each company should have one. Or a sniper team or a M2 [Heavy Machine Gun] with crew.

Lots of thermite grenades and C-4, we used them a lot; our engineers were great.

Proficiency with the M-203s [Grenade Launchers]: right now there isn't a viable sight for the M-4 [5.56mm Carbine], so lots of practice with Kentucky windage. Lots of HE also mounting brackets for the [an/] peq-2 [Night Laser Aiming Device] for the AT-4's [M136 84mm disposable rockets] the SMAW-D [Disposable version of 83mm shoulder-fired medium assault weapon rocket launcher] comes with one. Also the SMAW-D is smaller, easier to carry and hits significantly harder. Won't collapse a cave but will definitely clear it.

Soldiers did great, you can always depend on them. They are extremely brave and want to fight. Gotta do realistic training, they'll do it just like we teach them, they'll patch a bullet hole just like you taught them in EIB, but they won't take off the soldier's vest to check for more bullet holes etc.

Because of the extreme ranges you need the 3x adapters for the [AN/PVS-7B Night Vision Goggles] nvg's.

There's a lot more I could talk about but probably better left unsaid on e-mail. Hope this gives you some food for thought.

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By Patrick O'Flaherty

Several months ago, fed up with daily, televised protests from the Middle East where demonstrators burn the American flag and stomp on effigies of President Bush, I sent an email to the Kuwait Embassy in Washington, D.C.

I informed them that as an American citizen and a veteran of Operation Desert Storm, I am sick and tired of the way in which the citizens and government of Kuwait do not seem to be supporting the United States in its current actions against terrorism and the dictatorship of Iraq.

I raised the subject that I and several colleagues have been talking about for some time: organizing a demonstration of thousands of fellow Gulf War veterans to publicize Kuwait’s lukewarm support for the United States today. I asked in my email how the Kuwaiti government would like it if several thousand of us were to toss our Southwest Asia Service Medals on the doorsteps of their Washington embassy and consulate in New York in front of the U.S. and international news media.

Surprise, surprise: I received an immediate response from a Kuwaiti consular officer in the New York office explaining that his government was really doing its best to support the United States, and had, in fact, arrested several members of al Qaeda. His response was, of course, lip service.

After several months, I now realize that it was wrong just to single out the Kuwaiti government. I believe it is time for the veterans of Operation Desert Storm and subsequent U.S. military operations in Southwest Asia over the past decade to bring this message to all of our so-called allies in the region, beginning with the government of Saudi Arabia: We supported you when your lives were literally at stake – now it’s time for you to fully support us.

I propose organizing The National Mobilization Committee of Southwest Asia Veterans – a coalition of Desert Storm and SWA veterans dedicated to mount public demonstrations beginning at the Saudi Embassy and its New York consulate demanding that the kingdom fully support the United States and its allies in the war against al Qaeda.

Who better to do this than Southwest Asia veterans? We are the ones who suffered, bled and died protecting the Saudi monarchy from a ruthless enemy. We endured the agony of 148 combat fatalities, 121 non-combat deaths, 458 combat injuries and tens of thousands of cases of Gulf War Illness to protect Saudi Arabia and its citizens.

I would like to see at least 20,000 U.S. military veterans joining in this massive, peaceful protest, throwing the decorations that we earned defending Saudis from Iraqi aggression at their own embassy and consulate doorsteps. I believe that such a move would have a positive shock news value on the Saudi leadership that could finally force them to rein in the fundamentalist Islamic movements that they still tacitly support.

To my fellow Gulf War veterans: Let us not forget that most of the murderers on 9/11 were Saudi nationals, and the grand murderer of them all – Osama bin Laden – is from a very wealthy Saudi family whose fortune was built upon the very Western democracies he hated, America in particular.

I call on fellow veterans to join me in organizing this campaign.

O'Flaherty is a veteran of Operation Desert Storm. He can be reached at gulfwarvets2000@yahoo.com

Editor’s Note: The views expressed in this Guest Column are strictly that of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of DefenseWatch or SFTT.

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Air Force Discriminates Against IMA Reservists

By Dave Ward

When the terrorist attacks of 9/11 occurred, the last thing I considered was that I would be recalled to active duty. As an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) with the U.S. Air Force Security Forces, my job traditionally is to train and be ready for when the “big one” hits. When active-duty units are deployed, we are prepared to come in, already trained and ready do their regular duties. This is why IMAs are assigned to a specific active-duty unit and not to a reserve unit that itself may be mobilized.

What concerns me is that since being activated, the treatment that I and other IMAs have received – both from our units and commands above the unit level – has been absolutely appalling.

We were initially told, “You are active-duty personnel,” which quickly became a license to force us to do things that were not necessarily in the reservists’ interest.  One example was deploying IMAs overseas so that the active-duty personnel would not have to be deployed away from their families.

Fortunately, my unit commander – recognizing that IMAs were already suffering hardships because we were  “forward deployed” away from our civilian lives and jobs – stepped in and prohibited this action. Of course, when we tried to be treated like active-duty personnel, such as obtaining on-base housing, training school assignments, a comparable per diem or even promotions, we found that such things were off limits. After all, we were told, we weren’t really active-duty personnel – only activated reservists.

As the nation approaches the one-year anniversary of 9/11 and the war against terrorism goes on, those serving as IMAs see no end in sight. We are being held hostage to a system that does not recognize our individual lives, and cynically treats us as just a number in the numbers game of military manpower. 

Since the Air Force officially has now lifted the “stop-loss” holds on discharged and retirements effective on Sept. 1, 2002, thousands of active-duty personnel are preparing to flee the service, with one exception – the IMAs, of course.

I firmly believe that activated IMA reservists should not be involuntarily held on active duty while thousands of active-duty personnel depart. If there is a genuine requirement for more Security Forces personnel, then the Air Force should make effective use of the people already serving.

If just one unit commander had the moral courage to stand up to his or her higher headquarters and say, “I cannot support this tasking, I don’t have enough people,”  it would put the Pentagon on notice that there is a finite limit to the ever-increasing operational demands that are overstressing the force. Unfortunately, our commanders fear that standing up and saying such things would be a career-limiting move.

In the meantime, activated reservists are fully aware that the military regards them only as available labor to fill a manpower shortage created by deep cutbacks in military endstrength over the last 10 years. It is technically legal to hold a reservist for two years of involuntary service, but that short-term solution is being bought at a steep price in eroding morale and declining retention.

What is the incentive for reservists to serve in the future, after this kind of discriminatory treatment? If we wanted to be active-duty military, we would have stayed active or enlisted active. We chose to serve our country on a part-time basis.  Still, we do this out of a sense of duty and not for the money (most of us lose money serving in the reserves).

The Air Force Times newspaper reported on Aug. 5 that a number of IMAs had tried to get transfers to a base closer to their homes. Having done the legwork and receiving approval from both the “losing” and “gaining” unit, the IMAs were then told that their major command headquarters would not allow the move.

This clearly shows to us that Air Force major commands are more interested in keeping their numbers rather than doing what is right for people. I know of six people in my unit, including myself, who did the paperwork requesting the same move, only to be rejected.

We find ourselves asking, “Haven’t we served our country enough this time?”

Ward has been a member of the U.S. Air Force Reserve for 8 years and previously served on active duty for 13 years. He can be reached at Dw213526@aol.com.

Editor’s Note: The views expressed in this Guest Column are strictly that of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of DefenseWatch or SFTT.

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