Iraq – No Easy Choices This Time

By Ed Offley

A week from today the United States and many foreign countries will figuratively drown in commemorations of the al Qaeda terrorist attacks of 9/11 that not only destroyed the World Trade Center towers, but a decade of illusions about the scale of the danger posed by the new generation of “super terrorists” and the rogue states that give them shelter.

It will not be surprising if the speeches and TV specials and ceremonies and music briefly obscure the intensifying debate over Iraq. It would be better for all if the 9/11 anniversary can be used, instead, to elevate that debate into a national and even international discourse free of political spin and rhetorical cant.

This all boils down to a simple question: Which of the two following options is unacceptable?

The first alternative is for the United States and other countries to continue with the world community’s approach toward Iraq since 1991, a regime of containment and deterrence (“no fly” patrols, maritime intercepts and U.N. resolutions). A diverse array of U.S. and European officials – from former Bush I administration leaders to the European Union – support this version of keeping the status quo.

The second choice is to rid the world once and for all of Saddam Hussein’s despotic, criminal regime and the threat an Iraqi WMD arsenal would pose to the Middle East and beyond. Many, but not all, of the senior leadership of the Bush II administration has come to this conclusion, with support from British Prime Minister Tony Blair, if not his cabinet.

It is a sign of the incredibly serious stakes in this debate that the one consensus shared by both sides is that no easy choice exists. The world is confronted by two choices and must determine which one is the least-worst option.

Former Navy Secretary James Webb, whose personal integrity as a Pentagon official and combat valor as a Marine infantry officer in Vietnam, has emerged as a credible voice of caution against invading Iraq.

In a Washington Post op-ed column today (Sept. 4, 2002), “Do we really want to occupy Iraq for the next 30 years?”, Webb himself asks two very good questions: “Is there an absolutely vital national interest that should lead us from containment to unilateral war and a long-term occupation of Iraq? And would such a war and its aftermath actually increase our ability to win the war against international terrorism?”

“The issue before us is not simply whether the United States should end the regime of Saddam Hussein,” Webb continues, “but whether we as a nation are prepared to physically occupy territory in the Middle East for the next 30 to 50 years.” His answer is, clearly not – especially when the U.S. military force levels required for a unilateral occupation (we employed 50,000 in postwar Japan) would bring the current Pentagon resource shortfalls to a genuine crisis and would doubtless tempt other countries (China) to take actions currently constrained by our military presence throughout the world.

An equally compelling – yet opposite – viewpoint is voiced by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in his op-ed article today (Sept. 4, 2002) in The New York Times, “Taking Apart Iraq's Nuclear Threat.”

“Those who prefer to wait and hope for the best should contemplate the following: no one really knows how close Saddam Hussein is to building a crude nuclear device – and it was a crude device that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” Barak warns. “Few will doubt Mr. Hussein's readiness to use a nuclear weapon against American assets or against Israel, if only under extreme circumstances.”

Arguing that the choice is really between a “surgical” military intervention centered on special operations forces and airpower, or a full-fledged invasion of over 300,000 troops, Barak acknowledges that “Nothing can be assured in advance. But the opportunities far exceed the dangers. The greatest risk now lies in inaction. The history of the last century showed us clearly what the price of paralysis can be.”  

Both men have taken previous positions on war and peace that can fairly come under question. Barak as Israeli Prime Minister pushed for Israel’s land-for-peace accord with the Palestinian Authority, only to have it blow up in his face with the onset of violence and terrorism that wrecked his political career and continues to this day. Webb opposed U.S. combat intervention in Operation Desert Storm 11 years ago on essentially the same grounds as he does now. Yet it is generally accepted that the Gulf War and its rout of the Iraqi army derailed Saddam’s WMD program from developing nuclear weapons by 1992-93, even if the resulting stalemate has postponed rather than eradicated that threat.

It appears likely that President Bush will soon give a major speech articulating the administration’s rationale for moving militarily against Iraq. Congress and the United Nations Security Council will also likely become involved through formal hearings.

It is time for those hearings, and that debate, to engage not only the American people but all of the free nations of the world. The stakes demand it. The choice will be made soon.

Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at dweditor@yahoo.com.

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Only One U.S. Option for Iraq – War

By Robert G. Williscroft

Saddam Hussein's Iraq presents a bewildering array of options to the world. And the world is responding with bewilderment.

Business interests throughout Europe are making money selling goods and things for making goods to Iraq. Obviously, any major change in the status quo would wreck havoc with these business ventures.

The “Oil-for-Food” program is in full operation, supported by the United States. According to the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme Oil-for-Food (OIP), to date, some $36.6 billion worth of contracts for humanitarian supplies and equipment have been approved. Supplies and equipment worth almost $24.1 billion have been delivered to Iraq, while another $9.8 billion worth of humanitarian supplies and equipment are in the production and delivery pipeline.

In April 1998, the U.N. Security Council approved a recommendation from the Secretary-General that the ceiling of $2 billion in food-for-oil sales be increased to $5.265 billion, providing $3.4 billion for a broader humanitarian program. In the same month, oil industry experts reported on the “lamentable state” of the oil industry and indicated the oil production level authorized by the Security Council was well beyond Iraq’s capacity at current prices. Resolution 1175 in June 1998 authorized the import of $300 million worth of oil spares and equipment for phase IV. From phase VI onwards this limit has been raised to $600 million per phase. Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) lifted completely the ceiling on the amount of oil Iraq can export under the program.

U.N. Security Council resolution 1409 (2002), adopted on May 14, 2002, introduced the Goods Review List (GRL) and a new set of procedures for the processing and approval of contracts for civilian supplies and equipment. While previously the majority of contracts for humanitarian supplies were circulated to the Security Council's 661 Sanctions Committee for approval, under the new procedures only contracts that contain GRL items would be sent to the 661 Committee for consideration.

As of June 30, 2002, OIP had received over $43.7 billion worth of contracts, of which $35.6 billion had been approved and $5.3 billion put on hold by the 661 Sanctions Committee. Humanitarian supplies and oil industry equipment worth more than $23.1 billion dollars had been delivered to Iraq.

The bottom line appears to be that since its inception in 1996, the oil-for-food program has metamorphosed from a humanitarian program designed to feed hungry people and meet their basic medical needs into a convoluted, many-faceted program whose main purpose seems to be reconstructing and modernizing Iraq's oil industry.

Russia currently has a contract with Iraq worth over $8 billion to overhaul much of its Russian-built infrastructure, and if Iraq can rid itself of U.S.-supported U.N. sanctions, it might be able to begin repaying some of its $40 billion debt to Russia. The United States, on the other hand, has assured Russia that any new Iraqi regime will honor both the contract and the debt. This promise seems to have moved Russian President Vladimir Putin away from his recent public stance in support of removing sanctions against Iraq.

Nevertheless, with nearly $40 billion at stake in the business-with-Iraq arena, there is little support from European business for an American strike against Iraq.

Khidir Hamza, who played a leading role in Iraq's nuclear weapon program before defecting in 1994, says that Iraq now has sufficient nuclear material and the necessary know-how to construct several nuclear bombs.

As reported here last December, in 1989 Iraq may already have exploded its first nuclear weapon in a natural cavern below Lake Rezzaza, a popular 1960s tourist area about 90 miles southwest of Baghdad (“A Nuclear Armed Iraq Must be the Next Target”, DefenseWatch 12/12/01).

The fallout from these developments is twofold. First, of course, is the fear that Iraq either has or soon will have the ability to unleash weapons of mass destruction against opposing armies or even against nearby nations. The second is the high-stakes market created by these undertakings.

Nuclear bombs need high-grade steel casings, nuclear raw material, refining equipment and a complex infrastructure that Iraq is ill-equipped to establish and maintain on its own. With the complete lifting of U.N. restrictions on oil production, however, Iraq has plenty of cash to purchase what it needs. European businesses are standing in line to supply the tools for their eventual destruction.

The oil-for-food program cannot officially be turned towards weapons production, of course, but Iraq is large, and one tanker looks much like any other. In the past few weeks, several tankers have been seized independently by U.S. and Iranian forces as they attempted to smuggle millions of dollars worth of illicit oil out of Iraq. One can only guess at the number of tankers that were not discovered.

The incentive for successfully smuggling such oil is great. Currently, the penalty for discovery is confiscation of the oil and tanker, but nothing else. If one assumes that smuggling operations are run on a cost-benefit basis, then the loss of confiscated tankers and their cargo must be counted as part of the cost of doing business – part of the overhead, so to speak.

If a tanker and its load are worth about $20 million, one must assume that this is a small percentage of the projected return, say between one and five percent, which means that the level of illicit oil smuggling out of Iraq is enormous, in the billions of dollars.

The United States has several options.

If we continue the status quo, one thing is certain: Iraq will amass an increasing cash fund with which it can move forward on its path to perfect its nuclear capability and delivery systems, and to produce biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

We can unilaterally establish a total boycott of any goods and services entering Iraq from the United States, but this would only open the market to our competition, and the net result would be the status quo inside Iraq, and a loss for U.S. business interests.

We can interdict the transport of all incoming and outgoing material, but in order to do this, we either need to change the current U.N. resolutions, or we need to go it alone. Changing the Security Council's point of view is nearly hopeless.

This leaves us with the option of doing it ourselves. How? The only effective way would be to issue a decree that Iraq's borders are closed, and that the U.S. military will shoot down any aircraft attempting to cross the border, no matter what kind of aircraft it is. And that the United States will destroy any ship moving into or out of Iraqi waters – any ship. And that the U.S. military will destroy any vehicle attempting to cross the border anywhere.

This is a big order, and would certainly anger our allies, especially when we shoot down one of their civilian planes violating the quarantine. We are capable of pulling it off, and might even be able to withstand the resulting heat, but the likelihood of our taking this step is very remote.

The only other viable option is to go to war against Iraq, to rid ourselves of the source of the problem: Hussein and his henchmen. In the process, the total quarantine will happen as a side effect.

Every day that passes, Iraq increases its capability to wage war against us. Iraq is incapable of winning such a war, but each day brings with it the certainty that this war will result in more U.S. casualties. The United States cannot afford to wait much longer – this is why the Bush administration is on the road every day preaching the message of regime change. And this is why it is so vital that U.S. citizens get behind the war effort and make it happen.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

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Russia Capitalizing on Iraq Crisis

By Andrew West

Will Russia aid the United States when we invade Iraq? It all depends on whether or not Moscow thinks the action enhances Russian prestige and supports Russian security. In any case, to the Russian mind, this is asking the wrong question altogether.

A very wise old professor of mine once described Russia's developmental history as a series of rings. Russia would start out with a territory, see itself ringed on all sides with enemies, and conquer a buffer zone around its original territory. Later, as Russia got comfortable with its new territory and started to think of it as part of Mother Russia, it became necessary to conquer a new buffer zone around the old buffer zone just so everything would feel safe and secure. This process continued, my professor noted, until the Soviet Union had ringed itself with satellite nations and got bogged down in Afghanistan.

This same process, and more importantly the same Russian mindset, is still in evidence today. 

Lacking the outright military might to establish physical buffer zones around Mother Russia, President Vladimir Putin has ingeniously turned to establishing political ones instead. Russia has been playing a shell game with the world at large, by strengthening ties with Iran, opposing U.S. action in Iraq, proposing visa-free travel with the European Union, and making unprecedented cooperation with the United States on the demise of the ABM treaty.

In recent weeks, Russia has done an apparent about-face in its cooperation in the war on terror. Russian advisors have been sent to Iran to put the finishing touches on a nuclear reactor, despite U.S. objections to the cooperation. Russia went on record against an American war on Iraq, and threatened a veto in the U.N. Security Council if the United States brought the matter to the U.N. All of this may be genuine opposition, or it may be a smokescreen to further cloud this issue. Neither case, however, seems to be entirely true.

The independent strategic planning company Stratfor.com theorizes that Russia is dealing from a position of weakness, and is trying to send a message to Washington by not playing ball in the war on Iraq. Russia remains weak militarily and economically, but not politically. Stratfor.com notes that by maintaining ties with countries that have poor relations with the United States, Russia makes itself an indispensable middleman for all parties, and thereby enhances its prestige. Thus, Russia is playing the China, Iran, Iraq and EU cards for all they are worth, trying to leverage a secure and lucrative position for itself by forcing all players to treat it with respect and to rely on its clout with other nations. In short, Russia is regaining stature by establishing itself as a power broker.

Dealing with Russia, and predicting or explaining her actions, is always a difficult proposition.  One of the more interesting analyses of the Russian mentality is Professor A. Kennaway's recent article, “The Mental & Psychological Inheritance of Contemporary Russia.”  Kennaway focuses on one of the prime reasons for Russia's intransigence: Moscow wants something from the United States.  According to Kennaway, Russia has two ways of looking at the United States: as a prospective foe, and as a source of tribute. 

Continuing the “ring” theory, under Kennaway's model the United States could either form part of the political “buffer zone” or become the foe against which the ring exists. Russia does not want to utterly alienate the United States, at least not at present, since we have the economic and military might they currently lack.

What would be intolerable for Russia would be to be ignored or taken for granted by the United States. The aid that the West, and in particular the United States, provides is seen as the due tribute of the high and mighty to the downtrodden, and does not entitle the donor to dictate terms to the recipient.  This includes even such lofty matters as the war on terror, and Russia's role in the invasion of Iraq.

It is entirely possible that the Russians don't care whether we go to war against Iraq or not. They have probably prepared contingencies for either scenario, each based on their own perceived best interests. 

Thus, their purpose right now in opposing U.S. action against Iraq is to force our attention back onto Russia. If the United States is obliged to take drastic diplomatic measures to bring its putative ally back into the fold, measures similar to those we lavish on Britain, it will be a signal to the world at large that Russia is indeed still a Great Power. 

To the Russian mind, the question is not so much whether or not Russia will support the war on Iraq as it is whether or not Russia will get the respect it is due.

Andrea West is DefenseWatch Veterans' Editor.  She can be reached at defensewatchvet@yahoo.com.

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Guest Column: Iraq a Modern-Day Boer War?

By Christian M. Weber

As the United States and Iraq gear up for the first major inter-nation war of the 21st century, debate rages over the composition of the U.S. warfighting machine.  Strategists have offered up solutions ranging from supporting a largely armed uprising of indigenous forces to a mammoth deployment of 250,000 American troops.

The answer to this strategic riddle lies within the pages of history. One hundred years ago, England, the world’s preeminent superpower, embarked upon a “tea time” war with the Boer republics of South Africa. Despite England’s overwhelming technological and numerical superiority, victory was achieved only after three years of brutal guerilla warfare and disastrous military defeats. Twenty-two thousand British soldiers never returned home. 

More importantly, the conflict revealed to the world (Germany in particular) the soft underbelly of the British war machine, sparking a European arms race that culminated in World War I.

How did a war that was supposed to be ended by Christmas, a walkover by the British juggernaught, go so horribly wrong?

First, the British Army bore the brunt of the fighting, drastically more so than the armed indigenous British South Africans (Uitlanders) for whom the war was being fought to liberate from the yoke of Afrikaaner oppression. This meant the British were fighting in unfamiliar Boer territory, land that the enemy knew well enough to navigate blindfolded. The situation was further exacerbated by the vastness and difficulty of the South African terrain, which stretched the British supply lines and made them easy targets for Boer guerillas.

Second, while the sun never set upon the British Empire, the last major land war they had fought was fifty years earlier in the Crimea. The vast majority of senior British officers had built their careers fighting second-tier native conflicts in India and the Sudan, never facing a modern foe.

Third, the Boers proved an implacable foe. They were a nomadic people whose republics grew into an agrarian society infused with wealth from the discovery of rich reserves of gold and diamonds. Their nationalist sentiment was emboldened when twenty years prior to the war, they successfully fended off a British attempt to wrestle the Boer leadership from power. 

Moreover, their firebrand, fundamentalist Dutch Reformed preachers espoused that the Lord would delivery to the faithful a victory over the British colossus. This religious fervor, coupled with virulent opposition to European imperialism, attracted foreign soldiers to their cause, bolstering their ranks with zealots.

The British answer to the difficulties of South African warfare was to pour troops into the conflict – over 250,000 at its peak – more of who died from disease than by Boer bullets. However, while the ultimate British victory can be ascribed to a myriad of contributing factors, the overwhelming number of British troops was not one of them. 

The single factor that most dramatically altered the warfighting ability of British forces and shifted the war to their advantage was the reorganization of the Field Intelligence Department (FID). British officials expanded the FID field staff from a force of less than 100 to one of more than 1,000 and shifted the focus of the department from signal operations to scouting and intelligence gathering. 

The improved intelligence enabled the army’s elite cavalry and mounted infantry, a total force of less than 40,000, to locate the Boer guerillas, keep them on the run, and prevent egregious raiding of their supply lines. It was this ability to quickly locate and attack the Boers, that forced the best and brightest Boer guerilla generals to capitulate.

The parallels between the conflict faced by the British and our own with Iraq are unmistakable. Victory in such a conflict is clearly achieved not by overwhelming numbers, but by a combination of mobility and fresh, solid intelligence.  It is said that those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.   

The strategic difficulties exhibited by the British in South Africa emboldened Germany to challenge English military supremacy in the European theater in 1914.  Should America encounter similar pitfalls in Iraq, is there any doubt that China would be bolder in its escalation of hostilities with Taiwan, or North Korea and Iran more brazen in their resistance to American hegemony?

We need to learn the harsh lesson borne out the tribulations of the British, before it equates to the loss of American lives and influence in Iraq: Soldiers gain ground, artillery levels fortifications, but intelligence wins wars.

Weber is a 1st lieutenant specializing in military intelligence in the New York Guard, Civil and Military Affairs Division. He can be reached at LtWeberNYG@aol.com.

For the Record: Will Iraqi Weapons Inspections Work?

Vice President Dick Cheney speech to the VFW on Aug. 26, 2002

After his defeat in the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam [Hussein] agreed under to U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 to cease all development of weapons of mass destruction. He agreed to end his nuclear weapons program. He agreed to destroy his chemical and his biological weapons. He further agreed to admit U.N. inspection teams into his country to ensure that he was in fact complying with these terms.

In the past decade, Saddam has systematically broken each of these agreements. …

Saddam also devised an elaborate program to conceal his active efforts to build chemical and biological weapons. And one must keep in mind the history of U.N. inspection teams in Iraq. Even as they were conducting the most intrusive system of arms control in history, the inspectors missed a great deal. Before being barred from the country, the inspectors found and destroyed thousands of chemical weapons, and hundreds of tons of mustard gas and other nerve agents. 

Yet Saddam Hussein had sought to frustrate and deceive them at every turn, and was often successful in doing so. I'll cite one instance. During the spring of 1995, the inspectors were actually on the verge of declaring that Saddam's programs to develop chemical weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles had been fully accounted for and shut down.

Then Saddam's son-in-law suddenly defected and began sharing information. Within days the inspectors were led to an Iraqi chicken farm. Hidden there were boxes of documents and lots of evidence regarding Iraq's most secret weapons programs. That should serve as a reminder to all that we often learned more as the result of defections than we learned from the inspection regime itself.

To the dismay of the inspectors, they in time discovered that Saddam had kept them largely in the dark about the extent of his program to mass produce VX, one of the deadliest chemicals known to man. And far from having shut down Iraq's prohibited missile programs, the inspectors found that Saddam had continued to test such missiles, almost literally under the noses of the U.N. inspectors.

Against that background, a person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over. Saddam has perfected the game of cheat and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with U.N. resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow “back in his box.”

Secretary of State Colin Powell to the BBC, reported Sept. 1, 2002

The president has been clear that he believes weapons inspectors should return [to Iraq]. Iraq has been in violation of many U.N. resolutions for most of the last 11 or so years. And so, as a first step, let's see what the inspectors find. Send them back in. Why are they being kept out?”

Powell comments to reporters in South Africa, Sept. 3, 2002

"It [taking action against Iraq] is a very serious issue and we are discussing it in a very serious way. I think there are lots of differences – some are real, some are perceived, some are overhyped."

“Now that the holiday period is over and all the European colleagues are back to work, and the United Nations General Assembly will be meeting next week, I think you will see the president will pull all these strings together [on deciding how to proceed with Iraq.”

"The issue is not the inspectors, the issue is disarmament," Powell added. "Inspections are one way at getting at that question. Whether it's the only way or there are other ways that have to be used, to get at disarmament, is the debate we are having within the international community."

Secretary of Defense Donand Rumsfeld to reporters at the Pentagon on Sept. 3, 2002

Q: Mr. Secretary, much has been said and reported about alleged differences between you and the vice president, on one hand, and Secretary Powell on the other, on a possible preemptive invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Secretary Powell indicated over the weekend that he is willing to – in fact, wants inspectors to go back into Iraq. Do you think that there's anything that inspectors in Iraq could do to change this administration's policy to remove Saddam Hussein from power for a regime change?

Rumsfeld: I don't know of differences that – there are always differences of perspective, there are differences of – institutional differences from time to time. But the president is the president. He is the one who ran for that office and was elected to that office. He's the one who makes decisions and calibrations and guidance, and he does it very well. I don't know quite why it is that it seems so much easier for folks to personalize things rather than to go to substance.

The subject you raised second, with respect to inspections, is clearly a complicated set of issues. And my understanding – and I hate to even talk about this because someone will contrast it with something that somebody else said that I haven't read or seen and attempt to find a seam between what I'm going to say and what somebody else may have said. But it obviously has been the position of this administration to favor inspections. It is the Iraqis that ended the inspections. That we all know. We protested when the Iraqis threw the inspectors out.

The Iraqis made a conscious decision to tell the international community that the arrangement that they had entered into at the end of the Gulf War involving inspections, and the other undertakings with respect to not developing weapons of mass destruction and the like – they made a conscious decision at various points to negate those agreements, to tell the international community that they no longer would abide by them. And so the offense, if there is one, is committed against the United Nations and the international community. …

Q: Do you think it's possible for inspectors to go in there – you've repeatedly said you don't – do you think it's possible for inspectors to go in there and somehow change this administration's push for a regime change in Baghdad? Do you think it's possible?

Rumsfeld: I just simply don't know. Those are judgments that the president will have to make. First of all, I think that the intrusiveness of any inspection regime that would be sufficiently permissive to enable the rest of the world to know that in fact the U.N. resolutions were being fulfilled and lived up to would be such that it's unlikely for the folks there to agree to it. And I haven't seen any inclination on their part to agree to anything except as a ploy from time to time ….

Q: Mr. Secretary, if I could just follow up on -- the other thing that Colin Powell said in that BBC interview over the weekend – 

Rumsfeld: I must confess, I did not see the full interview. I saw a snippet on television and therefore am purposely not commenting on his statement, because I haven't had a chance to read it. I'm just stating what the president has said and what our policy has been and what I see to be our current policy. And anyone who goes out of here thinking that there's some difference between anything I'm saying and what Colin said I think is – would be a total misunderstanding of the situation. …

Where they'll be at any given moment is, of course, something that's entirely up to them. But at least thus far we do know certain facts. We know that they have rejected inspections. We know they have not lived up to their obligations under the U.N. resolutions and the agreements that they signed at the conclusion of the Gulf War.

Q: In your view, what would be the merit of inspections if they in fact verified disarmament and left Saddam Hussein in power? It would not seem to achieve your goal or the administration's policy goal of removing him.

Rumsfeld: Again, that's a call for the president, really; it's not for me. The policy of our government has been regime change. It's been regime change by the Congress, by the successive executive branch over the past two administrations.

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Guest Column: Peacetime Bureaucracy Strangling War Effort

Editor’s Note: The following letter to the ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee was written by a then-active duty U.S. Army officer. He consented for DefenseWatch to republish the letter with minor deletions to protect his actual identity.

August 5, 2002

Honorable Senator John Warner

225 Russell Senate Office Building

Washington, DC  20510

Dear Senator Warner:

I am writing to you in hopes that you might be able to address a matter of concern involving the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM) and their lack of sound judgment in their support to the Global War on Terrorism.

I have been a Commissioned Officer in the United States Army Reserve since November 1980. Since 1984, I have been a Special Forces qualified officer working with Reserve and Active Army Special Operations units. I have served in many capacities from standard staff assignments to special teams working on compartmentalized special operations missions. Since 1986, I have been employed as a Special Agent/Security Officer with a civilian department of the federal government. I have a great deal of first-hand experience in counterterrorism and counterterrorist operations.

I volunteered to serve in the active U.S. Army Special Forces as a consequence of 9/11. I felt that being a fully qualified Special Forces Officer coupled with my field experience and years of service in Special Operations as a counterterrorist specialist would help in the defense of our nation. In March 2002, I was voluntarily mobilized for one year. Against the wishes of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, I am being involuntarily discharged from active duty in the middle of the war.

I made a conscious decision not to complete the required Command and General Staff College in the spring of 2001, thereby assuring that I would not be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. I was forced to choose between time with my family and working on the course. Due to my many deployments with the civilian department over the years and a pending two-year assignment overseas without my family, I chose time with my family. This was my decision and I accept the consequences of that decision. Then 9/11 happened.

In October 2001 after the attack on the World Trade Center, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Ft. Bragg contacted me and asked if I would be willing to voluntarily return to Active Duty to assist them in the war effort. I agreed and was issued orders for active duty - reporting to Ft. Bragg on October 23, 2001. During the tour, I volunteered to be assigned to the U.S. Army Special Forces Command as a reserve mobilization augmentee. I volunteered to be mobilized and was formally mobilized on March 3, 2002 for 365 days. I then volunteered for duty in Afghanistan.  In March 2002, I received a letter and a Certificate of Appreciation from a colonel in the personnel branch (AR-PERSCOM), thanking me for volunteering to serve my country.

In February 2002, I was passed over for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel for the second time. In accordance with the provisions of Title 10, AR-PERSCOM advised me of my second pass-over and their intention to discharge me on September 1, 2002.  Due to my civilian employment, I have not been able to devote the time necessary to meet the minimum requirements for retirement points. As of this letter, I can only account for 17 years of qualifying federal service at the end of my mobilization. In order to remain until 20 years, I would need 18 years of qualifying service.

I sent a letter to AR-PERSCON explaining that I was a Special Forces Major; a skill code that the Army is severely short of and a skill where there is a service wide STOP/LOSS in effect. I explained that I was willing to remain on active duty and complete my mobilization. In short, I asked to stay. I even understood that I might not qualify for a retirement at the end of the mobilization. I still wanted to stay - I am after all, a volunteer.

Senator, I volunteered to fight for my country, knowing the risks, knowing that I might not get a retirement. I was willing to go to Afghanistan, willing to be separated from my family and willing to take a deep pay cut from my civilian job. As a Special Agent with over 16 years employment in an organization of the federal government, I make just above $104,000 per year. With overtime and benefit pays, I make substantially more. As a Major in the Army, my annual salary is around $67,000.00. I am willing to take the pay cut. Why? To defend my country - period!

In April of this year, I spoke with a civilian bureaucrat in the 99th Regional Support Team, AR-PERSCOM. He advised me that the decision was made (by him) that I was to be discharged from the service on September 1. I accepted that decision and began the process of returning to my civilian employment. I contacted my civilian employer and arranged for reentry into that office. They told me that they would require something in writing relieving me of my active commitment.

In May of this year, I spoke with another civilian official (the supervisor of the bureaucrat who had terminated my military career) at the 99th Regional Support Team (RST) about obtaining orders for my release from active duty. In an angry tone and demeanor, the supervisor informed me that they, the 99th RST, could not issue the orders to remove me from the service because I was mobilized. She stated that they could not over-ride a mobilization order. She then told me that I would have to contact my Personnel Management Officer (PMO) and have the mobilization order rescinded before they could issue the discharge order.

I asked her the following question, “If the PMO does not rescind the mobilization order, does that mean that I stay until the mobilization is complete?”  She advised that I would remain, but again demanded that I contact the PMO and have the mobilization order rescinded. I liken this to asking me to load a handgun, pass the gun to them and stand still while they shoot me. If I want to stay, and I did, then why would I call my PMO and do their job?

I advised my chain of command at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and it was agreed that I would do nothing and stay on active service. I then volunteered and was accepted for service in Afghanistan.  I was scheduled to board a plane for duty in Afghanistan on or about August 6, 2002. My duty was for 179 days. I contacted my civilian federal employer and advised them I would not be returning as planned.

On August 2, 2002, someone from the 99th RST called USASOC and demanded to speak with my supervisor. The caller was advised that I was in route to Afghanistan. The caller then advised USASOC that I was scheduled for discharge from the service on September 1, 2002 and I should not be allowed to board the plane for Afghanistan.

The reserve components office at USASOC made several calls to AR-PERSCOM to see if there was any way to extend my service so that I could complete the pending tour in Afghanistan. At every turn, they were told that extension was not possible.

Title 10 directs that a Major who is not selected for promotion to LTC twice, must be separated (1) “on the first day of the month after the month in which the officer completes 20 years of commissioned service, or (2) the first day of the seventh month after the month in which the President approves the report of the board which considered the officer for the second time.” I am in possession of an e-mail from the Army G-1 that defines commissioned service as “all service, good or bad.” Since I completed 21 years commissioned service in November, I should have been discharged in March of this year. However, the staff of the 95th RST decided that September 1 was the date they wanted to discharge me.

Title 10 also provides that a selective continuation board may extend an officer's service beyond the required discharge date for “the needs of the service or in times of war or national emergency.” My question now becomes, what are we in? Are we fighting a war? Did not the President say we are in a time of national emergency? If the “needs of the service” conditions do not exist, then why has the Army issued a STOP/LOSS for all Special Forces Officers, Warrant Officers and NCOs? Why is AR-PERSCOM reactivating retired Special Forces officers and NCOs on one hand and releasing a trained Special Forces Officer on the other?

The big question here is, who is in charge? On one hand we have a tested combat officer in a short specialty who volunteered to be assigned to combat duty during a time of war (or national emergency). On the other hand, we have a clerk in an office in St. Louis who is making decisions that are adversely affecting the ability of a combat commander to fight the war by removing that same combat officer from the rolls. This makes no sense.

It takes almost 6 months to train a Special Forces Officer to a minimal level. It takes several years to develop that officer into a well-trained and seasoned war-fighter. It takes thousands of dollars and years to get to the point where that officer is capable of service in the type of war we are fighting. To turn around and discharge that officer because he did not attend a school fails the common-sense test. Especially when that officer is willing to stay. It took the Army six months, several thousands of dollars and almost 18 years to train me to the level I am at now. Now, during a time when the Army and the country desperately needs to realize a return on that investment, it is being lost because of the actions of a low-level bureaucrat at AR-PERSCOM.

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command had issued orders assigning me to combat duty in Afghanistan.  Those orders required a report date on or about 1 August. A clerk in St. Louis stopped that deployment. As a result, the combat unit in Afghanistan is short one officer. The combat effectiveness of a unit on the front has been adversely affected because of a clerk in AR-PERSCOM in St. Louis. Who is in charge of the war? A bureaucrat in St. Louis or the Combat Commander in the field?

On August 5, 2002, I spoke with the acting chief of the Regional Support Team office. He listened to my story and sympathized. When I explained that I needed some orders to release me so that I could return to my civilian job, he said he would see what he could do. He also provided me with a story of woe regarding working with “civilians, many of whom had never served in the military.” So if I understand this correctly, civilians, many of whom do not have military experience, are making decisions on the conduct of the war. These same civilians are making decisions based on bureaucratic peacetime rules with little or no consideration for the national emergency we face or for the war effort. How is that happening? Who is in charge at AR-PERSCOM? Is it the military or the civilians?

Are we in a war? Do we face a national emergency? If not, then why mobilize soldiers at all? If we are in a war, then everyone, down to the lowest civilian needs to be focused on that effort. We need to have a well-defined purpose and a clear direction. AR-PERSCOM has neither.

What is shocking to me is that the acting chief told me that I am not the only case he has had to deal with. There is another officer in my situation here at the Command. He is also being forced out for non-select as well. How many other qualified combat officers are being removed from the service in a time of war? As a result of our departures, the Army has to mobilize two more majors to fill our slots. So instead of effecting the lives and careers of two officers and families, we are going to effect four officers and their families. The common sense test again has been failed. The cost of mobilization and demobilization (airfare, lodging, pay and housing) has doubled. Instead of paying for two the Army will pay the cost of four. Thousands of dollars will be misspent because a low-level civilian made a decision that was not reviewed and corrected by the AR-PERSCOM military chain-of-command. The overall interest of the nation in this war was not considered. Defense monies that could be used to fight the war effort are being needlessly wasted by a bureaucratic mistake - a costly mistake.

The Chain-of Command at USASOC has been superb. They have attempted to correct the situation to no avail. Everyone they have spoken with at AR-PERSCOM has told them no. They are as frustrated and dismayed as I am.

I am writing this letter not for my own benefit. By the time you get this and are able to act on it, I will have long since been discharged and have returned to my civilian employment. I am alerting you to a fundamental flaw in the system that needs to be fixed. Someone needs to exercise some common sense at AR-PERSCOM. Why mobilize a soldier for war and then demobilize that same soldier less than halfway through the war? If we are short Special Forces Officers, then we should not be removing them from the service.  AR-PERSCOM is removing Special Forces officers with years of experience and knowledge. Why? Because of a peacetime rule? We are at war! Someone needs to tell that to AR-PERSCOM.

At this point, I do not want to remain on active duty. After almost 22 years of commissioned service, I am done. I am tired of being jerked around and given the bureaucratic shuffle. It is apparent that AR-PERSCOM is more interested in pushing paper and less interested in the security of the nation. Mine is only one case. I am sure there are other officers in the same situation who are equally dismayed at the actions of low-level bureaucrats. I will not go back to my civilian agency a third time to tell them I am not coming back to work. I have done that twice already. To do so again will cause my civilian career irreparable harm.

I ask you to look into who is running AR-PERSCOM. Who really makes the decisions that effect how we are able to defend this nation? Are commanders just signing off on low-level civil service decisions or is someone actually reviewing the decisions to see if they meet the nation's needs. Is the interest of the security of the United States being addressed or is the easier softer road being taken so that AR-PERSCOM's management protects their next promotion and/or assignment?

I want to return to my civilian job with the federal government. I am thoroughly disgusted with the manner in which I have been treated by AR-PERSCOM. I tried to serve my country as a soldier and have been treated in the worse way possible. The letter and certificate of appreciation I received from the AR-PERSCOM official is a disgrace to every soldier who ever put on a uniform. It is a form letter that is nothing more than a politically correct move designed to “show he cares about soldiers.” I plan on returning it to him. I volunteered to serve my country because it was the right thing to do. Not for awards, money or glory. I will now serve my country in a security capacity with the federal government.

Thank you for your time.

(Name withheld by request)

Emails to the officer may be sent to dwfeedback@yahoo.com for forwarding.

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