Set Wartime Defense Spending Priorities

By Jim Simpson

The conclusion of every major conflict in the 20th century has seen a dramatic reduction in both U.S. military spending and military readiness. The start of every new conflict has virtually required reinvention of the wheel as our woeful unpreparedness gets counted in lives. 

Some reduction in spending after a conflict is appropriate but U.S. politicians have repeatedly cut service budgets to virtual empty husks, while maintaining of course, those programs that the military may or may not need, but contribute to the politician’s annual serving of pork.

But our current situation, with a war in Iraq looming, is much worse. Not only is spending at historically low levels, but at the same time mission requirements have expanded, straining the capabilities of our military to the breaking point.

The graph below shows defense spending plotted as a percentage of annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1940 to 2002. This measurement is not affected by inflation because it simply shows in any given year, what amount of our national production, what piece of the total pie so to speak, was devoted to defense. It also doesn’t suffer from the measurement errors that occur when trying to adjust spending for inflation. In a very real sense it illustrates the priority we place on defense relative to everything else we do.

In 1940, before World War II, defense was at extremely low levels, consuming less than two percent of our total output. After the war began however, it ramped up quickly, consuming almost 40 percent for most of the war years. No doubt about our priorities then. 

After the war, spending rapidly declined to near pre-war levels. At the beginning of the Korean conflict, defense spending comprised five percent of GDP.

The price we paid at the beginning of those conflicts is a shameful chapter in our history.  The only real exception to this trend is the post-Korea period. The drawdown was not as significant and spending remained relatively high, close to ten percent of GDP. Not that he was any expert, but JFK thought ten percent of GDP to be the optimal level of peacetime defense spending, and it remained close to that during most of his administration.

Since then, excepting a small uptick during the Vietnam War, the general trend has been down. Ronald Reagan’s defense buildup is the only period of major defense spending increases in the 20th century not related to a shooting war. Contrary to liberal propaganda, that increase was paltry by historical standards: Spending increased about 40 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars from 1981 to 1987, before it began to decline again, but this was from a spending level insufficient to fuel airplanes and tanks! 

Consider that in the height of Reagan’s spending spree, the defense budget was taking only a slightly greater percentage of GDP than when the Korean War began. It never exceeded six percent, far below the rate during the 1955-65 period. And this spending level remained in effect for only a few years, beginning its long slide back in 1988. 

Now let’s right now settle some confusion over the “Cold War”, because I know what you’re thinking. No – Reagan’s defense buildup did not cause the collapse of the Soviet Union, therefore allowing a huge reduction in spending and readiness. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had been radically outspending us on defense. The CIA consistently put Soviet defense spending at about 15 percent of their GDP, which when adjusted for the estimated size of their economy turned out to be roughly equivalent, in dollars, to our spending at a rate of about 5 percent of GDP. How convenient.

The truth is it has always been much higher than that. Lenin said: “Quantity has a quality all it’s own.” It is common knowledge that quantitatively, Soviet forces and equipment outnumbered us by many magnitudes. The Soviet Union, like most of its satellites, amounted to what was essentially an armed camp.

Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy under Reagan, claimed that Soviet defense spending was more like 30 percent of GDP. I would put it even higher. Many of their so-called “civilian” production facilities were (are?) in fact dual-use, right down to the doll factories used to create “doll bombs” which maimed thousands of Afghan children during the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

During the height of the Cold War, the CIA fielded at most a few thousand agents overseas. The KGB fielded an estimated 100,000. Consider that. Comparing the CIA to the KGB in size is like comparing a guppy to a moose.

The point is, how can increased defense spending break the bank of an adversary who is already spending much more than you on defense? Furthermore, if “Russia” is so broke, how does it continue to field newer, better weapons of all varieties? Much of the international aid money provided to assist the Russian “economy” has been traced to Swiss bank accounts of Russian leaders. These are publicly established facts.

Russia and China both claim to be our “friends” today, yet their actions continue to suggest otherwise. China is known to have armed and trained the Taliban and continues to supply “Axis of Evil” countries with tactical and strategic weapons despite protestations to the contrary. In spite of Bush’s statement about seeing Russian leader Putin’s “soul,” Russia continues to assist Iraq, Cuba, Iran and other enemies.

This is not intended to imply that one of these countries has immediate malevolent intentions, but a prudent leader would be foolish to ignore their behavior and track record.   We need to engage in a healthy dose of honest reflection about our relations with these countries, recognize their massive firepower and treat them with the caution and skepticism they deserve. 

Today, we find ourselves at spending levels almost as low as pre-World War II, but conditions are even worse. Unbudgeted continual deployments to places like Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia have both used up equipment and exhausted personnel. In a 1999 cornerstone study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman cited some of the shortfalls as follows:

* Procurement funding is only 60 percent of current needs.

* Readiness and maintenance is funded at only 60-70 percent of current needs.

* Recruitment and retention problems causing major personnel shortfalls in key areas.

While recent spending increases may have reduced the magnitude of these problems somewhat, it has only begun to reverse the chronic shortfalls that the military has endured over the past decade.

The Army claims 10 active-duty divisions available for combat today, compared with the start of Desert Storm in 1991 when we had 18. And we know their claim of “readiness” for many of those divisions to be questionable at best. Given our troop commitments elsewhere, to invade Iraq now with forces equivalent to Desert Storm would essentially require commitment of our entire Army. Do we want to leave ourselves that vulnerable?

Furthermore, a recent study, cited in The Washington Post claimed that following a successful war with Iraq, rebuilding there could require a long-term commitment of 100,000 U.S. troops. If Afghanistan receives the same treatment, total commitment could be as much as 400,000 troops.

The United States is going to have to more seriously reassess its defense spending priorities and force structure and honestly recognize the continuing need for adequate funding of basic military preparedness. 

These are not the sexy, expensive, big-ticket items that Congress loves to haggle over, but the more humble, yet essential requirements for adequate training, reliable equipment, good battlefield communications, and adequate troop strengths – deficiencies in which have hobbled the U.S. military at the beginning of hostilities many times in the past. 

We do not need another Task Force Smith.

Contributing Editor Jim Simpson, a former White House budget analyst, is a widely published commentator on military and security issues. He can be reached at one.wonders@verizon.net.

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October and the Ongoing al Qaeda Threat

By Christian M. Weber

The ongoing congressional investigation of the intelligence failures that preceded the 9/11 terrorist attacks is charging forward at full stream to cast the net of blame over whoever was responsible. However, while this makes for great print, the committee is failing to address the critical flaw that leaves us vulnerable to future attacks: Intelligence agencies have simply failed to understand the basic tenets of al Qaeda’s strategy and “Red Team” possible scenarios.

This lapse becomes even more ominous in light of information gathered from al Qaeda operatives captured in the recent wave of worldwide sweeps that has indicated a major attack upon America may be close. This has been further collaborated by e-mail messages retrieved after raids on a logistical cell operating out of Buffalo, New York.

By examining al Qaeda patterns of operations over the past ten years, one can piece together a logical and chilling picture of their potential next attack on America.

First, our homeland security experts still apparently fail to comprehend how al Qaeda chooses when to attack. While they have taken advantage of targets of opportunity such as the USS Cole, there is a longstanding al Qaeda strategy of launching terrorist attacks to coincide with days of significant importance to Islamic extremists.

This is a calculated tactic designed to mask their horrific actions under the auspices of vengeance for perceived past wrongs or injustices. As acts of terrorism are clearly in violation of Islamic law, the linkage to these dates of notoriety is an integral tool for their apologists in the Muslim world to claim these acts are justified.

Sept. 11, 2001 was a date emblazoned on the mind of Islamic terrorists as the five-year anniversary of the conviction of World Trade Center Bomber Ramzi Yousef.  The al Qaeda bombing of the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania occurred on Aug. 7, 1998, the eighth anniversary of President George Bush’s 1990 commitment to sending to U.S. troops to protect Saudi Arabia. 

Likewise, evidence points to the Feb. 26, 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center as intending to coincide with the two-year anniversary of the beginning of the ground war in Operation Desert Storm on Feb. 23, 1991. 

Two dates of significant importance to al Qaeda are fast approaching. Oct. 2, 2002 is the anniversary of the federal court conviction of the blind Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, the spiritual mentor of Bin Laden and his lieutenants (particularly Ayman al-Zawahiri) in connection with the first WTC bombing. More importantly, Oct. 7, 2002 marks the date on which the United States began the attack on Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan last year. 

Captured al Qaeda training manuals dictate a series of criteria for preferred targets.  The most ideal locations contain a large number of Americans, a fairly condensed area with economic or cultural significance, and available media coverage.

Here are two scenarios for a renewed al Qaeda assault on the United States.

If we overlap the training manual criteria with our two significant dates next week, we see that the New York Yankees are scheduled to play Game 2 of the American Division playoffs in New York on Oct. 2, 2002, and Oct. 7, 2002 is a Monday Night Football game between the Green Bay Packers and Chicago Bears in Chicago. These two events represent the strongest targets of opportunity for an impending attack, most likely a suicide bombing via private plane with secondary car bombs in the parking lot.

Secondly, the highly publicized, yet deeply flawed, “Dark Winter” senior-level bio-warfare exercise conducted by the John Hopkins Center for Civilian Bio-defense Strategies on June 22-23, 2001, further underscores our lack of understanding of our enemy’s strategy.

The exercise focused on a Middle Eastern terrorist group using aerosol delivery to launch a smallpox outbreak in three suburban malls in the United States resulting in 100,000-300,000 deaths. However, while the scenario plays upon the deepest fears of policy analysts, it was constructed without the assistance of any experts in terrorism or the Middle East.

A far more likely scenario – considering the nature of al Qaeda – would entail a smallpox assault upon urban centers within one month of an Oct. 2 or Oct. attack so as to capitalize on the historic seasonal high for transmission of the virus in November and December. 

The initial infection could be achieved by dispersing smallpox contaminated blankets to segments of the homeless population, most likely those on subways and in nexus’ of mass transit. Targeting the homeless population would enable al Qaeda to infect a segment of society that is far less likely to immediately seek medical attention at the onset of symptoms, thus increasing the window of time between the spread of contagion and awareness of and reaction to the outbreak. 

Al Qaeda would justify the attacks by two rationales that would play strongly in the Muslim world. 

First, by utilizing contaminated blankets the terrorists would claim vengeance for America’s “colonialist past,” when in 1763 and 1767, colonials employed contaminated blankets to decimate the Native American population. Second, and more importantly, they would argue an Islamic rationale that American disregard for one of the five holy Pillars of Islam (concern for and almsgiving to the needy) resulted in divine retribution in the form of the outbreak.

Al Qaeda would strategize that in the wake of an October 2002 attack, the lethal and communicable smallpox virus would result in a domestic deployment of reserve and National Guard forces. 

Renewed al Qaeda-Taliban attacks in Afghanistan would resume shortly thereafter, as well as terrorist attacks against forward-deployed forces in Southwest Asia. They would be gambling that while our military is structured to fight two Major Theater Wars concurrently, after a decade of force reductions such a CONUS deployment coupled with renewed fighting in Afghanistan, and potential retaliatory strikes against Chechnya, Sudan, or Iraq would stretch our forces too thin, resulting in exploitable vulnerabilities.

Now let’s Red Team.

Contributing Editor Christian M. Weber is a 1st lieutenant specializing in military intelligence in the New York Guard’s Civil and Military Affairs Division. He can be reached at LtWeberNYG@aol.com.

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Pre-emption Strategy’s Hidden Dangers

By Charles Clune

Is the United States intent on providing a nice, safe world for everyone?

President Bush has spoken often about the scope of the war against terrorism. The president last week published a new strategic doctrine that endorses seeking out and destroying individual terrorists and rogue states wherever they maybe – and even before they take concrete steps against us. 

In the wake of the al Qaeda terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the president said (and it has been echoed several times by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld), “You are either with us in this effort or against us.” This was soon followed by offers of generous financial rewards to supporters, and veiled threats against those in opposition.

But as of today, the nations “clearly” with us can be counted on one hand. In Asia, Pakistan grudgingly tolerates our base of operations in their country. The Philippines have accepted our help in trying to contain a particularly vicious group of Muslim rebels. The Malayasian government, out of concern for self-preservation, has helped to identify Al-Qaeda supporters. In the West, only Great Britain is clearly in our corner. Germany, Spain and Italy continue to provide intelligence information and help to round up members of suspected al Qaeda “cells” in their countries. The rest of the European Union seems to have a hands-off attitude at best, and a scarcely-disguised disguised contempt for the United States at worst.

In the Middle East, there seems to be a growing support for anticipated U.S. military operations against al Qaeda and presumably, Iraq. As of today, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Djibouti and Yemen are openly supporting the basing of U.S. troops. The Saudis continue their self-serving policy of minimal compliance with our needs, while for internal consumption decrying our “posture” towards Iraq and other Middle East Arab states. The same is true for Turkey, where U.S. combat aircraft stage missions over the northern “no fly” zone of Iraq. Israel will support our actions in and against almost any hostile Arab state, but their motive reflects calculated self-interest.

If the president and his advisors would be held to the letter of their words, nearly two-thirds of the world is currently “against” us in the campaign against al Qaeda and now, Iraq.

How can that be true if we are indeed serving the causes of justice and peace?

The immediate answer is that the Bush administration’s words are not meant to be taken literally, and in fact are jingoistic and demeaning of the other nations in the world community. Every nation has one primary goal. Its own needs!  America is no exception. Our pledge to fight and to keep fighting to rid the world of “terrorism” is both unlikely (in the long term) and self-serving (in the short term).

We use the phrase, “war against terror,” to strike back at those who attacked and killed thousands of innocent men and women on our own homeland soil. Since the perpetrators could not be formally linked to a specific nation-state, we could not declare war and punish the country of origin. We did mounted a major military campaign into Afghanistan to root out the safe harbors of the al Qaeda, simultaneously toppling the Taliban regime that had given the terrorists sanctuary. 

But where will the Bush administration’s new strategic doctrine take us? The administration states we will no longer allow our military superiority to be challenged, an implicit reference cited by most analysts to focus on China.  Certainly, no nation on the horizon other than China posses any remote threat to our current military superiority.

The assertion inevitably raises a legitimate question: Why is the Bush administration issuing such a challenge to the other leading nations of the world?  Is the administration expecting all of the nations of the world to cow-tow to American might? Are we entering a new world of nuclear “gunboat diplomacy”?  Lastly, if we are to continue serving as the model of democracy and freedom to the entire world, why do we need to insist on the ability to strike any who oppose us?

The administration in my view has gone far beyond any acceptable definition of national self-defense. The rhetoric from Washington sounds a lot more like the Hitlerian and Stalinist self-justifications of the 1930s and late 1940s as these two military juggernauts simply gobbled up nations in the name of “self-defense.”

The United States has never used its military might in a first strike. The current threat from al Qaeda terrorist attacks, and even the possibility of a “rogue” nation-state launching a concerted attack on the United States, is still remote. 

This is not to ignore that small, well-organized terrorist cells can still potentially attack us with deadly effect. The detection, deflection and ultimate destruction of these criminals is the responsibility of international and domestic intelligence and

law enforcement agencies, assisted overseas by the U.S. military and its intelligence-gathering and special operations forces particularly can aid in the interdiction of these groups overseas. 

But that remains a far cry from the administration’s overly broad statement that the United States will take unilateral pre-emptive action against any group or nation that it deems a threat. 

The president and his advisers have painted with too broad a brush. No nation in recorded history has been able to maintain its “Pax” – imposed peace – for long. 

Rome and Great Britain were every bit as pre-eminent when they began their periods of “world” peacekeeping. But the over-extension of their military might and the political capital required to maintain far-flung outposts inevitably contributed to their political and military decline.

Those who think America must now take on the role of global policeman in addition to defending domestic interests should study the clear lessons of history. 

Contributing Editor Charles Clune retired from the U.S. Coast Guard as a chief warrant officer after 22 years of active service, and has worked as a civilian nuclear power security official. He can be reached at Charles_Clune@umit.maine.edu.

Canada – With Allies like These…

By Patrick Hayes

As usual, even with a socialist government in power and a very loud, very anti-American and very pro-al Qaeda Muslim community in its midst, Great Britain is the one country that immediately chose to stand by the United States without waffling, not only in the war on terror, but also in dealing with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. That's a great deal more than can be said of our "friends and allies" to the north - Canada.

For all their show of sympathy and support the day after Sept. 11, 2001, it seems many Canadians, not just their fence-sitting government, have turned their back on the United States. In a recent poll conducted by Ipsos-Reid for the Toronto-based Globe & Mail newspaper and CTV (Canadian Television), 84 percent of Canadians believe that the United States - Americans - bear at least some responsibility for the 9/11 attacks.

Coming from a country that allows Muslim terrorists to enter with barely a wave, this thinking not only angers many Americans, but should be a wake-up call about who we can depend on in the war on terror. Even more, this should be cause for concern given the obviously porous border between the United States and Canada.

The question asked in the poll was, “How much responsibility do think the United States, with its policies and actions, bears for the terrorist attacks on them?” The findings:

The belief that Americans are responsible in any part for the 9/11 attacks, the pollsters say, is based on the Canadian perception that U.S. foreign policy is “overbearing,” particularly in the Middle East. This specious argument sounds more like that coming from an Arab country rather than a western democracy.

How hypocritical can one country be? As many intelligent Canadians - those not hung up on a sense of false nationalism - realize, the United States gives more to the world community (primarily Third World states, including the Middle East) based on its gross national product (GNP), than any other country in the world. By comparison, Canada's offerings are meager indeed, based on its own GNP, yet many Canadians, including Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, have the nerve to infer that Americans brought the 9/11 attack down on themselves - an attack that also killed 24 Canadians!

One point that Chrétien and his followers seem to overlook is that many of the terrorists in question, and the nations from which they originate, are wealthy! Most of the 9/11 murderers were from Saudi Arabia, where wealth seems to flow in the streets. As shown by recent arrests of the al Qaeda cell near Buffalo, N.Y., even American Muslims, far from poverty, can become terrorists.

The results of the Ipsos-Reid poll are taking the long-standing anti-American sentiment, found in much of Canada, too far. Jealousy and a weak-minded sense of nationalism are not valid excuses to turn on their neighbor, especially at a time of mutual threat, even thought the perception may be one of a “mouse sleeping next to an elephant,” as former Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau said.

One issue that could cloud Canadian thinking in the short term, as evidenced by these dramatic poll results, may be a knee-jerk reaction to the “friendly fire” bombing incident of Canadian soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan on the night of April 17-18, which killed four and wounded 18. As regretful as this incident is, however, it is being dealt with by the United States professionally and militarily. Both pilots, Maj. Harry Schmidt and Maj. William Umbach, have been recalled to active duty to face a likely court-martial.

No, maybe this unfortunate accident rekindled the flames, but the underlying anti-Americanism is probably as old as the Declaration of Independence, when those living in British Canada (and those who moved north during the American Revolution) were British Tories and Royalists, in no way enamored by the Rights of Man and the fledgling experiment in democracy.

As renowned Canadian columnist and commentator Robert Fulford wrote in The National Post on Sept. 22 last year, “Anti-Americanism in Canada wears a smiling face and considers itself both innocent and morally superior. But it has always seemed to me among the ugliest manifestations of the Canadian spirit, and a self-inflicted wound on our intellectual life.”

In the same piece Fulford added, “Many Canadians are deeply conflicted on the United States, and in my observation these conflicts lead to an uneasy and almost shameful sense of envy.”

As evidence of the hypocrisy of many Canadians, Fulford said he receives numerous responses to his articles. One such writer was a man from British Columbia. As Fulford put it, the man, who was “upset about the lumber dispute, wrote to me that he dislikes Americans because they change the rules when things don't go their way. On the other hand, he and his wife plan in future to spend six months a year in San Diego.”

“I've been astonished by the number of Americans who feel they are objects of contempt. In private life, this runs deeper than even I suspected,” Fulford continued. “One reader: ‘As a Canadian-American living in Victoria for 17 years, I have been amazed at the prevalence of toxic, low-level anti-Americanism.’ Since he could easily pass for Canadian, he often overhears anti-American insults. When he discloses his background, ‘The usual response is that I don't seem like an American to them.’ (I've often heard that from Canadians speaking of Americans in the third person; they apparently don't know or care that this is precisely what anti-Semites say in the same circumstance.) Another Canadian-American wrote from Burnaby to point out that the Canadians he knows, when not dismissing Americans as yahoos, spend their time watching American movies while dressed in American clothes.”

It might also be noted that while 90 percent of Canadians live within 75 miles of the U.S. border, millions of Canadians live in the United States. I wonder why?

One overriding difference between the United States and Canada is their respective histories. Canadians decry the violent society of the United States. However, as much as they may find it distasteful, this country was born and founded out of violence - some necessary, some maybe not so. But Americans fought for what they have - it wasn't given to them.

On the other hand, Canada was born from a state of bureaucrats and shopkeepers rather than the smoke of battle. Formerly a French colony, the British, after almost a hundred years of British-French warfare in North America and sensing a weakened France, unable to support its colonies, finally took French Canada in 1759 at the decisive Battle on the Plains of Abraham outside Quebec City. From there, the country didn't grow west with expansion. The British first sent soldiers, the Northwest Mounted Police and bureaucrats. Only after some semblance of order had been established did the population move west.

However, Canadians are not alone in their misguided anti-Americanism. Less than 60 years after Americans stormed Hitler's Fortress Europe to free the French, the Dutch, the Belgians and many others, Europeans also take shots at Americans. “Why do people attack Americans?” asks Tiny Waslandek, a social worker in Amsterdam, Netherlands. “Because they have a big, big mouth and they mind everybody's business.”

The Netherlands! Memories are short indeed. Before Americans stormed the Normandy beaches, the Netherlands were tightly under Hitler's jackboot and the people seemed glad to see the Americans who liberated them.

In a recent article in Policy Review magazine, Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, said the divide between the United States and Europe is getting wider than ever. Europeans, he says, have “come to view the United States simply as a rogue colossus, in many respects a bigger threat to (their) pacific (pacifist?) ideals than Iraq or Iran.”

All this while American troops still serve in Europe as elsewhere in the world to prevent carnage.

Yes, the United States can be equated with Rome in many respects. What if we took the pre-World War II attitude of isolationism? It's not a reality in the current world, but if the United States was not there to solve many world problems as global cop, who would, the socialists of Canada and Europe? Doubtful.

Canadian nationalists – for “nationalism” and anti-Americanism are one and the same – may consider what they would be without the United States as a partner. Most of their employment comes from companies in business with the U.S. market. And if you've ever tried to watch Canadian “nationalistic” television, you would note that while they condemn us, most Canadians are watching American shows and living an American lifestyle.

It's under arduous conditions, such as combat, that individuals know who they can depend on. Obviously it's the same for nations.

Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at gyrene@sftt.us.

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Editor’s Note: The following are excerpts from the statement to the House Armed Services Committee on Sept. 19, 2002, by Dr. Khidir Hamza, the former head of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program and currently director of the Council on Middle Eastern Affairs in New York.

By Khidir Hamza

I will comment briefly on two points.

1) The status, goals, and extent of Iraq's WMD programs specifically the nuclear. And

2) How Iraq acquired the technology necessary to sustain these programs.

Status, Goals and Extent of Iraq's Nuclear Weapon program…

The nuclear weapons program is now almost complete waiting for the enrichment sector, which makes 90 percent of the program to finish its job and put together a working production facility. The bottlenecks in the enrichment are already resolved. German sources provided Iraq with classified reports and a working unit in the centrifuge enrichment technology. This can reduce the time needed for research and development for a country like Iraq by at least ten years.

The whole centrifuge technology was acquired for a little over a million dollars. This included state-of-the-art carbon fiber cylinders. The recent announcement of interception of large orders for aluminum cylinders indicates that the process of putting together large enough units for full production is not complete yet. At the same time, it also indicates that Iraq has already bypassed the initial testing and possibly pilot plant stage. Also Iraq always use duplicate sourcing of materials and supplies which may mean that it is already in possession of enough materials for a small scale production facility.

My estimate is that Iraq may be in actual [warhead material] production in two years with enough accumulated product for two to three nuclear weapons in three years. The problem however remains that we are dealing with a series of indicators but no first-hand witness. This I will deal with later in this statement.

Iraq never seriously attempted to acquire nuclear fissile materials from outside sources by smuggling or other means. Though this may have changed since I left in 1994 but my belief is that this is a serious program, and is designed to turn Iraq into a nuclear power with credible nuclear force and as such systematic build-up of its capability was embarked on for over twenty years with no change of goals or purpose.

This makes it one of the most intensive single-minded objectives of the Iraqi regime. It dwarfs many times over both the BW and CW programs combined. By the time I left, hiring was intensive especially among college graduates in engineering and science. A program declared publicly by Saddam created a series of graduate groups trained in nuclear and other weapon technologies dedicated to working in the program after graduation.

This step among others turns the university system which is forced to award degrees based on classified research unseen by its faculties into an integral part of the Iraqi WMD industry. On the other hand Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) teams were turned into civilian contracting entities that actually engage in contract work for the civilian sector. They helped rebuild Iraq's civilian infrastructure including power stations, oil refineries and telephone exchanges. This achieved two purposes.

On the one hand, Iraq can, and did claim that these are now civilian sector entities unrelated to the WMD program. On the other hand, by working with other government establishments they can incorporate the best of these establishments into their work. … One result of this is the unavailability of scientists and engineers that the Iraqi government can claim to be transferred from the military industry and as such not available to the inspectors. Also it means that Iraq has integrated its WMD into its civilian sector turning Iraq into one giant WMD factory.

I wish to point here that Dr. [Richard] Spertzel's [another committee witness] hunch about the role of Iraq's intelligence agency the Mukhabarat in the WMD program is right.

Iraq's BW program was started under an organization created by Mukhabarat called al-Hazen. In 1985, as an advisor to AEE I was asked to visit al-Hazen to check on their computer work and see if they need help in setting up their computer network. I was familiar with the early phase of al-Hazen and its late director Merwan al-Sateda. A Palestinian with Yasser Arafat connections, he was a fellow physicist.

The center started as a military research and development organization that had extensive cooperation with the U. of Arizona.  It was run by the Iraqi Mukhabarat and as such was independent of any oversight by other government organs such as the Ministry of Finance. Later, after being accused of pilfering 20 million dollars, Merwan was jailed and later killed by Saddam and the center dissolved to be opened later with a new mission: development of Iraq's BW program.

Iraq's Mukhabarat is the creation of Saddam Hussein. It was founded on the premise that Iraq's security starts abroad. As such it had units for assassination, terror, use of poisons and biological agents against Iraqi dissidents and an extensive experimental program in all means of terror and intelligence tools.

Even Atomic Energy was not immune from their power. They infiltrated AE and took under their wings many of its staff at will. As such we were aware of some of the developments going inside this terrible organization. Later I acted as a liaison with this agency regarding their acquisition of proscribed nuclear materials and presumably classified reports. I found it to be corrupt, deceitful and totally without human values.

Thus the BW program replaced the research in physics as priority for Mukhabarat because of its potential for terrorism. An angle rarely reported and I found extensive incidents regarding it when I left Iraq and worked in Libya from Iraqi expatriates was the use of humans as disease carriers. Dissidents living abroad with families in Iraq will suddenly get the news that their families are allowed to join them.

Before they can obtain their passports they are usually “inoculated” against some of the standard infections. There were many incidents of whole families infected this way with HIV and other diseases. It should be noted that any Iraqi infected with HIV was transferred to a remote region in Western desert called Salman Hole presumably for treatment. However nobody ever came back and most were reported dead within a year of going there. Since HIV is rarely a cause of death this fast, it was assumed that they were subject to many kinds of experiments. If smallpox is to be sent abroad from Iraq one should expect unwitting carriers being sent to the destination targets – possibly not even Iraqis – to achieve deniability.

When I was transferred to the military industry, some of my workers were questioned about the effects of radiation and how to cause disease and death by what kind of radiation sources. Later I heard of many incidents of people with radiation burns treated in Iraqi hospitals. Work on the Iraqi dirty bomb, which was tested in 1988 in Muhammediyat, had an Iraqi Mukhabarat angle.

How Iraq acquired the technology necessary to sustain these programs.

Iraq understood that the first step in acquiring technology is the human element. Thus a large-scale program of government scholarships was launched that covered all areas of WMD in addition to other needs. The program was of such a scale that though most of scholarship holders never returned, those who did were of large enough number to form the nucleus of its WMD.

This is critical to understand if any use is to be made of the inspectors to uncover the Iraqi WMD. Comparison with Iran may explain this point. Iran acquired calutron technology for uranium enrichment from China. Iraq developed its own much larger program for calutrons from scratch.

Iran attempted acquiring heavy water technologies from many countries, including Argentina. Iraq did research and development for more than twenty years to develop its own heavy water technology. Thus the scientists are Iraq's main asset, not equipment nor facilities. At the same time, Iraq allowed weapons inspectors to destroy many pieces of equipment and facilities [but] it refused to give them full unmonitored access to its scientists.

Inspections became a serious problem when inspectors in later years began to demand more access to the scientists. After several incidents some of which were described in earlier testimony Iraq began to get more and more difficult in providing access. Thus the demand for access to the scientists was the cause of the demise of the inspection process in Iraq.

This points out a critical factor for inspections to be of any meaning. With little or no human intelligence about Iraq's WMD, inspectors have little to direct them to the whereabouts of the Iraqi programs. However, if a condition is made that the scientists are to be made available outside Iraq together with their families, the story could see an immediate turnaround. All Iraq's pretexts of no WMD will collapse.

Iraq will expose its hand immediately through a flat refusal to cooperate. The names of all the relevant scientists are known to the U.S. authorities. Unmovic already possesses huge financial resources from its share of Iraq's oil revenues at its disposal to take care of all the important Iraqi scientists and engineers permanently.

Iraq's scientists, if they chose to – and my guess is that they will – can go under the equivalent of the U.S. witness protection program paid for by income already under Unmovic disposal if they agree to cooperate. This is the test: If Iraq has really no illegal WMD program, it should agree. My bet would be that it will not. This is the smoking gun everybody is looking for.

Iraq was reorganizing its concealment mechanism even before the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law. The resulting system took effect in 1995 by the creation of the Concealment Organization headed by Saddam's younger son Qussey within the Special Security Organization (SSO). The New York Times interview of the Iraqi civil engineer charged with building backup sites tells only part of the story.

The defector, who brought with him official Iraqi contracts, reports duplicate sites built mostly underground with specifications that included lead-impregnated concrete and resin covers that mean radioactive work. A back-up system of support does the rest.

Any inspection process is monitored carefully as to its intentions. Once a possible target is identified, a special team with its transport vehicles and technicians will descend on the target of inspection, dismantle all equipment and any possible incriminating evidence and carry it to the back-up site. This is the more sophisticated version of what inspectors already experienced through denial of access and standoffs.

Good luck for any future inspection team that wants to beat this system…

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For the Record: Al Gore on Iraq

Editor’s Note: The following excerpts reflect the ever-changing opinion of former Vice President Al Gore toward Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

That Was Way Back Then: ‘Free Iraq’

“Despite our swift victory and all our efforts since, there is no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein still seeks to amass weapons of mass destruction. You know as well as I do: as long as Saddam Hussein stays in power, there can be no comprehensive peace for the people of Israel, or the people of the Middle East.”

“We have made it clear that it is our policy to see Saddam Hussein gone. We have sought coalitions of opponents to challenge his power from within or without. I have met with the Iraqi resistance, and I have invited them to meet with me again next month – when I will encourage them to further unite in their efforts against Saddam.”

“We have maintained sanctions in the face of rising criticism, while improving the oil-to-food program to help the Iraqi people directly. We have used force when necessary. And we will not let up in our efforts to free Iraq from Saddam's rule. Should he think of challenging us, I would strongly advise against it. As a Senator, I voted for the use of force. As Vice President, I supported the use of force. And if entrusted with the Presidency, my resolve will never waver.

-- Gore speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 23, 2000

That Was Recently: Supports ‘Final Reckoning’ with Iraq

“I also support the president’s stated goals in the next phases of the war against terrorism as he laid them out in the State of the Union. … There is a clear case that one of these governments in particular represents a virulent threat in a class by itself: Iraq. As far as I am concerned, a final reckoning with that [Iraqi] government should be on the table. To my way of thinking, the real question is not the principle of the thing, but of making sure that this time we will finish the matter on our terms. So this time, if we resort to force, we must absolutely get it right. It must be an action set up carefully and on the basis of the most realistic concepts. Failure cannot be an option, which means that we must be prepared to go the limit.”

-- Gore speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Feb. 12, 2002

This Is Now: Don’t ‘Hurry’ to War

I am deeply concerned that the policy we are presently following with respect to Iraq has the potential to seriously damage our ability to win the war against terrorism and to weaken our ability to lead the world in this new century. ...

The vast majority of those who sponsored, planned and implemented the cold blooded murder of more than 3,000 Americans are still at large, still neither located nor apprehended, much less punished and neutralized. I do not believe that we should allow ourselves to be distracted from this urgent task simply because it is proving to be more difficult and lengthy than predicted. Great nations persevere and then prevail. They do not jump from one unfinished task to another. ...

Nevertheless, President Bush is telling us that the most urgent requirement of the moment - right now - is not to redouble our efforts against Al Qaeda, not to stabilize the nation of Afghanistan after driving his host government from power, but instead to shift our focus and concentrate on immediately launching a new war against Saddam Hussein. And he is proclaiming a new, uniquely American right to pre-emptively attack whomsoever he may deem represents a potential future threat.

By shifting from his early focus after September 11th on war against terrorism to war against Iraq, the President has manifestly disposed of the sympathy, good will and solidarity compiled by America and transformed it into a sense of deep misgiving and even hostility.

If Saddam Hussein does not present an imminent threat, then is it justifiable for the Administration to be seeking by every means to precipitate a confrontation, to find a cause for war, and to attack? There is a case to be made that further delay only works to Saddam Hussein's advantage, and that the clock should be seen to have been running on the issue of compliance for a decade: therefore not needing to be reset again to the starting point. But to the extent that we have any concern for international support, whether for its political or material value, hurrying the process will be costly.

-- Gore speech to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Sept. 23, 2002

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