Retail-Level Terrorism and an Unending War

By Ed Offley

Understandably distracted by the murderous rampage of an unidentified gunman in the Washington, D.C., area over the past week, as well as the intensifying debate over going to war against Iraq, it’s possible that many Americans have overlooked an equally troubling trend: a rising incidence of retail-level terrorism from the dispersed al Qaeda terror network or its allies.

None of the following incidents was important enough to lead the news last week:

* In the Philippines, where U.S. Army Special Forces have been assisting in the hunt for the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization, a terrorist bomb on Oct. 2 killed Sgt. 1st Class Mark Jackson, a member of the 1st Special Forces Group, and wounded a fellow soldier and 22 civilians.

* In Kuwait, where the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit has been conducting training, two terrorists who slipped into a restricted training area opened fire on Tuesday, killing one Marine and injuring a second before they themselves were gunned down by other Marines. (The identity of the dead Marine was still being withheld on Wednesday.) The assailants have already been linked to al Qaeda.

* Off the coast of Yemen, the crew of a French supertanker continues to allege that the explosion and fire on Sunday that forced them to abandon ship (resulting in the drowning of one crewman), occurred after a small boat approached the ship at high speed as it waited for a harbor pilot.

* In Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, where U.S. troops and counter-terrorism agents continue to hunt for remnants of the Taliban regime and al Qaeda, small-scale gunfire and rocket attacks occur on such a regular basis as to command scant news coverage.

It is of little solace to the comrades and family members of the slain and injured servicemen and civilian victims that authorities in both Kuwait and the Philippines moved quickly to detain dozens of suspects whom they believe are linked to al Qaeda. Nor is it a comfort to grieving friends and relatives that this low-grade epidemic of terrorism reflects our earlier victory in toppling the Taliban regime and forcing al Qaeda to run for cover. In fact, counter-terrorism experts are warning that this trend of retail murder will continue indefinitely.

The military publication Jane’s Intelligence Review this week published a special report on the current terrorism threat, citing a wide array of counter-terrorism experts, that portrayed al Qaeda as a reorganized network still dedicated to attacking Western targets and Middle East governments with ties to the United States and its allies.

“Respondents [to the Jane’s survey] agreed that Al-Qaeda's structure has become increasingly decentralized since 11 September, and may have devolved into regional and local structures that have less unity of action,” wrote Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, the report’s author. “While this may lead to the development of a level of factionalism within the movement, it is likely that the dispersal and decentralization of the group will enable it to rebuild and recruit in different locations: the Arabian peninsula and Africa were both mentioned as areas of particular concern.”

The good news, the experts agreed, is that it appears unlikely that al Qaeda will be able to mount a major terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction for the near future – up to a decade from now – as a result of the response by the United States and its allies since 9/11. The bad news is today’s news: The Jane’s survey noted a consensus among many experts interviewed “that Al-Qaeda's decision-making is based on pre-existing guidelines delineating operational priorities, with each cell or devolved operational entity pursuing objectives in line with pre-existing target sets, in which case destruction of the Afghan bases may have done little to disrupt attacks.”

Based on the variety and diversity of terrorist attacks since 9/11, the experts identified several probable trends in future attacks: First corporate and commercial facilities, which are “softer” targets than military or government sites, will be especially vulnerable. Second, the success of the 9/11 attacks has created a perceived value among terrorists to attack and kill large numbers of civilians in order to be seen “as tearing at the fabric of Western societies.” (A contrary thesis also cited in the report is that terrorists may shift from mass casualty attacks to “symbolic” targets to avoid similar mass retaliation from the United States.)

What can be done to thwart this ongoing threat, the experts say, is already being done: Improved cooperation and intelligence-sharing among friendly governments; bolstered intelligence operations to identify and locate terrorist cells; increased security at airlines, immigration control points and other vulnerable sites; and strengthened counter-terrorism, especially among domestic government agencies caught flat-footed by the 9/11 attacks.

President Bush said it best: “Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest.”

Bush also warned, “Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack.”

That was on Sept. 20, 2001 – nearly 13 months ago.

Whether or not we go to war against Iraq, we are still at war.

Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at dweditor@yahoo.com.

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Iraqi ‘Liberation from Within’ Is Unlikely

By Christian M. Weber

When asked recently how long a war in Iraq might take, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded that it depended on how long it takes the Iraqi people to realize they have a chance to be liberated. While there are certainly those in Iraq who desire a regime change, making that a reality will be far from simple.

Saddam Hussein rules Iraq with an iron fist; he has adeptly utilized security and paramilitary forces to quell any form of political dissent for decades. However, his tyrannical regime has not been impervious to attempted coups. 

Most notably, the powerful al Jaburi tribe who bolstered Iraq’s army by 50,000 in the opening days of the Iran-Iraq War, rose up in challenge to Saddam in 1990 and 1993, only to be crushed by loyalist forces. The Al Juburi leaders of the rebellion were executed or fled to Europe or Syria. Likewise, Kurdish forces in the north and Shia tribes in the south have been in constant conflict with the regime for over twenty years.

In February 1997, senior officers from two divisions of the Iraqi Army’s II Corps were discovered planning a coup attempt and executed. Less than two years later during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, the U.S. Central Command launched cruise missile strikes against Iraqi WMD sites. Elements of the Iraqi Army’s V Corps attempted to rise up against the regime but were handily defeated and their leaders executed. 

However, the best chance for an indigenous overthrow of Hussein failed in March 1995, when then-President Bill Clinton withdrew American support from an armed insurrection by forces of the Iraqi National Congress.

As I detailed in DefenseWatch magazine on Oct. 2, 2002 (“Iraq Regime Change a Family Affair”), Saddam Hussein has carefully insulated his regime within concentric circles of family and tribal support. All military and political power within Iraq rests in the hands of his immediate family, his local al-Khatab clan or the Al Bu Nasir tribe. Saddam recruits the vast majority of his elite paramilitary forces and military leadership from his hometown of Tikrit.

This structure presents a formidable bulwark for anyone attempting a military uprising. Saddam’s elite 12,000 member Special Forces Brigade of the Presidential Palace (also known as the Special Republican Guard) and the ruling Ba’ath Party’s Secret Service Organization are recruited exclusively from the Al Bu Nasir tribe. The 30,000-man internal security force, Fedayeen Saddam, are likewise recruited from loyal Tikriti tribes and commanded by Saddam’s son, Qusay.

Tikriti officers maintain key positions within Iraq’s powerful and fiercely loyal Republican Guard Divisions, particularly the motorized Adnan Division, the Armored Medina, Hammurabi and Al Nida Divisions, and the mechanized Baghdad and Nebuchadnezzar divisions. Prominent command positions within the Army’s I and III Corps are additionally held by Tikriti officers.

And to further prevent desertions and internal uprisings, Saddam has dispatched execution brigades under the command of Qusay Hussein’s Military Intelligence command to the Army’s five corps.

However, the regime is not without its vulnerabilities. Of the over 150 Iraqi tribes, less than twenty are closely aligned with Saddam. The remaining tribes are kept in line by the regime’s brutal internal security forces, which routinely execute suspected dissidents. 

What exists of Iraqi law is generally not applied to grievances against Tikritis.  Hussein’s eldest son, Uday, has widely practiced the abduction and rape of young women from outside tribes with impunity. This prompted members of a rival tribe to attempt assassinating him in 1996

To enter into a dispute with a member of a tribe from Tikrit is to invite persecution and imprisonment from the Iraqi regime’s security and paramilitary forces.  Additionally, favored tribes are the recipients of better roads, schools and medical facilities than their counterparts.

Hussein’s practice of prominently placing Tikriti officers in key roles in the military has caused some quiet discord within the officer ranks. Officers not from Tikrit face a more difficult career path and are routinely passed up for promotion in favor of Hussein’s tribal kinsmen. According to opposition sources, this is becoming a growing problem among officers in the I and III Army Corps, and even among some brigades in the Republican Guard’s Adnan and Al Nida divisions.

Regardless of these cracks in the regimes loyalty, internal opposition to Hussein faces enormous hurdles. Assassinating Hussein would still leave his regime structure intact and probably would elicit severe repercussions.

Militarily, even if insurgent sheikhs opposed to Saddam were to achieve the Herculean task of gaining control or neutralizing the Iraqi Army’s five corps, they would face at least ten reconstituted divisions of the Republican Guard, Saddam’s personal Special Republican Guard, the Secret Service Organization, the Fedayeen Saddam and Tikriti militias. Each of these forces is considered better trained and equipped than Iraqi regulars. Almost certainly facing retribution for years of brutal oppression, these forces would likely to fight to the bitter end. 

Insurgents would also face at least elements of the over 175 fighters and fighter/bombers remaining in the Iraqi Air Force. It additionally seems highly probably that Saddam would employ the use of chemical weapons against rebel military units to discourage opposition, as he did against Kurdish towns in 1988.

Clearly there exists the possibility of widespread rebellion within Iraq, unquestionably a prospect our psychological operations units should try to encourage to the fullest extent possible. However, rebel units appear unlikely to be able to match the skill and firepower of pro-Saddam forces. 

Only with the assistance of U.S. airpower would these forces have a chance. At a minimum, U.S. Air Force and Navy pilots would need to quickly achieve air superiority, while fighter/bombers neutralized pro-Saddam units and prevented artillery batteries from massing to deliver chemical attacks. Even then, the ground fighting would prove to be brutal and costly as forces vied for control of cities and tribal strongholds.

In the event of a toppling of the Saddam regime, non-Iraqi peacekeepers would have to be immediately dispatched to prevent genocidal retribution against tribes aligned with Hussein and an outbreak of tribal warfare among the victors vying for power.

No matter how you play it, there is no easy solution in Iraq.

Weber is a Contributing Editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at LtWeberNYG@aol.com.

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Gulf Veterans: Just How Short is Our Memory?

By Robert L. McMahon

President Bush on Monday spoke in Cincinnati about the case for war with Iraq. While his rhetoric and his description of the Iraqi threat and the regime’s stark record of violating United Resolutions since 1991 were forceful and many, the president failed to mention, in real terms, just how dangerous this undertaking will be for our troops.

Mr. President, we have 159,238 veterans from the first Gulf War receiving medical benefits – in effect a disability payment – for the medical issues that arose after their return. Does this number concern you? It should, because it's almost as many that are receiving benefits from the Korean War. Why is that Mr. President?

This is not to question the administration’s foreign policy regarding Iraq and the war against terrorism. However, we would like to have the administration acknowledge that every soldier who gets sent to this war will do so knowing the truth about the potential threat from an environment still littered with toxic materials from Gulf War I, and a potential battlefield involving chemical and biological weapons. Moreover the soldiers deserve a solemn pledge from the Defense Department and Department of Veterans Affairs that they will receive full and fair treatment should their health suffer as a result of their wartime service.

For inexplicable reasons, the mainstream news media and our congressional representatives have kept silent about the 159,238 Gulf War I veterans who have been sickened or disabled as a result of that war 11 years ago. Why they cannot recognize the magnitude of the issue and place it in context is astounding – and infuriating – to those of us who care about our troops and veterans.

Consider just one “pathway” for the Gulf War Illness epidemic: U.S combat aircraft dropped 320 tons of depleted uranium munitions on Iraqi armor in Gulf War I. The U.S. government for most of the following decade attempted to persuade us that depleted uranium is non-lethal to our troops. For seven years they denied any correlation between the exposure to depleted uranium and our sickened Gulf War veterans. These are the same people who warn you about the dangers of cigarette smoking and then pay farmers to grow tobacco.

Likewise, our own Combat Engineers hastily blew up Iraqi weapons stores of chemical agents without surveying the ammo dump to see whether or not there even were any chemical weapons stored there. That inattention to a very real threat led to the creation of a toxic cloud that spread over an large area, exposing tens of thousands of troops to chemical agent exposure. Any WMD expert can tell you that these weapons must be carefully incinerated at high temperatures in controlled facilities. You don't just wire them with C4 and blow them in place. They burn! They will emit their poisons!

When Germany invaded France through the Ardennes in 1940, the Wehrmacht carefully avoided a region that had been mapped out by the French as “too dangerous” to bring in their Blitzkreig. It was an area around Verdun where millions of artillery shells had been hurled, both high-explosive and gas. To this day, 84 years later, the French government is still reclaiming this ground.

Something similar should be done for the troops who are destined to invade Iraq. Areas that were heavily hit by DU weaponry during Gulf War I should be clearly identified, marked on maps, and bypassed as much as possible. Factories and storage facilities of chemical and biological weapons should be neutralized by skilled and trained specialty units and not regular infantry or armor troops. Above all, they should not be attacked by conventional aerial weaponry.

The pending undertaking against Iraq is wrought with peril because of the prime reason for either international or unilateral U.S. military action in the first place: Saddam Hussein's WMD arsenal.

But the dangers posed are not just in the event of his using them. The peril is much more insidious - exposure to these weapons may not just happen at Saddam's hands – our own military actions may themselves unleash the horrors of Iraqi WMD weapons if we do not plan and execute the invasion with rigorous care.

The fact that we will prevail against Iraq is beside the point. Our primary concern today is that those ordered to invade and fight in Iraq have the right to know the full extent of the threat inherent in any military action.

McMahon is president of Soldiers For The Truth. He can be reached at rmcmahon1@rcn.com.

Study Vicksburg before Attacking Baghdad

By William F. Sauerwein

Everyone in authority agrees that our superior forces will defeat the Iraqis and topple Saddam Hussein. However, our military planners seem locked into the Desert Storm scenario, without realizing we will never fight again as we did in 1991. 

The possibility of urban combat for the conquest of Baghdad, and bloody house-to-house fighting, remains a major concern. Instead of engaging the Iraqis on their terms in the streets of Baghdad, why not revive the concept of siege warfare?

I suggest the Pentagon dust off the archives of Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s Vicksburg campaign in the winter of 1862-63 for cracking Baghdad open.

It is understandable that the retired commanders from Operation Desert Storm look back with fond memories on our tremendous battlefield success. Unlike previous wars, almost no urban combat occurred, except for the battle at Al Khafji. Iraqi defenses in the open desert proved vulnerable to our superior air power and intelligence-gathering capabilities. During the ground war, we engaged an enemy suffering the effects of the devastating air campaign. Our armored forces proved far superior to anything the Iraqis possessed, and left many of them eager to surrender.

Urban combat presents a totally different scenario, and negates much of our technological superiority. Instead, it provides the Iraqis with the advantage of fighting on the defensive, and on home ground.

Despite technological advances in other operations, we still wage urban combat much the same way as during World War II. Long-range tank battles give way to small-unit tactics, proficiency with individual weapons and close combat. In other words, things that the U.S. military does not practice regularly today.

While Grant’s campaign had many differences with the anticipated situation in Iraq, the similarities make its study important. Vicksburg was the Mississippi River bastion keeping the Confederacy from being split in half, and vital for them to hold. On the strategic front, Grant faced many difficulties, including political intrigue from Washington and at least one subordinate. His supply line was difficult to maintain through hostile territory, and frequently raided by Confederate Cavalry Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest.

Taking Vicksburg by storm would be costly, as evidenced by Gen. William T. Sherman’s bloody repulse at Chikasaw Bayou. Union troops realized this too, and their morale suffered as a consequence. Nevertheless, Grant did not sit idle and complain about his situation. He developed plans and explored his options. More importantly, exploring these options kept his troops busy, and his enemies off balance.

Despite his historical reputation, Grant was an advocate of maneuver warfare, and this campaign demonstrates it. He maneuvered his forces around Vicksburg west of the Mississippi River, simultaneously launching cavalry raids east of it. When Grant re-crossed the Mississippi south of Vicksburg, he cut his own supply line, something radical at that time.

He captured the Confederate stronghold at Grand Gulf, Miss., then marched east and defeated Confederate reinforcements at Jackson. Then he turned west and, in a series of battles, forced the Confederates to retreat inside Vicksburg’s fortifications. At first overconfident from these initial victories, Grant, his commanders and his troops thought Vicksburg would fall easily. But the defenders repelled subsequent Union assaults with heavy losses, proving that trapped, starving troops can still fight fiercely.

Grant then turned to siege warfare, keeping the Vicksburg garrison cut off from supplies and reinforcements. This included civilians living in Vicksburg, and a review of Northern newspapers from that time revealed none expressing sympathy for them. Vicksburg officially surrendered on Jul. 4, 1863, a Union victory overshadowed by the three-day battle at Gettysburg.

Siege warfare is tedious, and time could easily have worked against Grant, who was facing strong enemy forces in front and rear. Fortunately, his opposing Confederate commanders, Gen. John C. Pemberton at Vicksburg and Gen. Joseph E. Johnston at Jackson, both lacked aggressiveness. Another plus for Grant was the fact that his troops were veterans of hard combat, and confident of victory.

When we do move against Iraq, we may pound the Iraqi forces with our superior air power and “smart” weapons technology. Our armored forces may defeat the Iraqis in the open desert, but the survivors will fall back on Baghdad. I believe Saddam will keep his best and most loyal Republican Guard units close to Baghdad, which will then become a fortified city. As at Vicksburg, fighting from fortifications often restores the confidence of demoralized troops.

Pentagon planners possess far more resources than I do, but it is not difficult to assess the possibilities of combat should we invade Iraq.

First, we cannot depend on allies in the region, and must actively safeguard our lines of communications. Second, the opportunity for successful deception operations – such as the feigned U.S. Marine Corps amphibious invasion that pinned down a number of Iraqi divisions along the Kuwaiti shoreline – appear limited because, without Arab support, we will be confined to Iraq’s own narrow seacoast. Third, we must gain control of the Tigris-Euphrates dams. Fourth, our air and ground campaign must be as decisive as Desert Storm. Finally, we must remain steadfast in the face of the inevitable news reports of starving children in the streets of Baghdad.

Siege warfare today entails the same dangers as it held in times past. Once we trap Iraqi forces inside Baghdad, our siege must be active. We must prevent them from launching breakout operations, an historic vulnerability of besieging armies. The volatility of the Middle East makes safeguarding our rear areas imperative, as political loyalties may shift against us. Our role as superpower means we must protect our other missions as well. Time may work against us, but the alternative is bloody urban fighting, also time-consuming.

The longer this campaign drags out, the more politics, both domestic and international, will take its toll. Normal election-year politics, with negative campaigning, makes unifying the nation difficult, if not impossible. Three “loyal opposition” congressmen have already made irresponsible statements from Baghdad, further priming domestic anti-war sentiments. Many of our “allies,” particularly in Europe, are jealous of our power, power they once wielded.

However, President Abraham Lincoln faced similar opposition, both at home and abroad, and he still persevered.

When you make war, it is imperative to make it as one nation against another. To do anything less than the maximum effort both endangers victory and threatens the lives of our troops. In any move against Saddam Hussein, we must remain steadfast, even when confronted by rising domestic and international criticism. Saddam must be denied media access, which could make him a martyr in the Arab world. Even UN “humanitarian” shipments of food and medicine must be prevented, because it could prolong the siege and increase our risk. Harsh, yes, but I prefer watching starving Iraqis to watching American flag-draped coffins.

Perhaps most important, we must understand that success is not guaranteed, and victory may not be cheap.

Saddam has no illusions about what is at stake, and we must expect him to pull no punches. He has proven that he has no regard for his own people, and we must expect even less regard for others.

Do we have a “Grant” among our commanders today, and are our troops prepared for a “Vicksburg campaign?” Most important, is President George W. Bush made of the same fiber as Lincoln? It appears that we will soon find out.

Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at mono@gtec.com.

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By J. David Galland

There is no question that the American-led war on global terrorism is both critically necessary and justified. However, our efforts must not lose sight of the broad terrorist threat that still exists 13 months after the 9/11 attacks. 

To focus singularly on the threat that Saddam Hussein poses is potentially damaging to the collective war on terrorism. Iraq, and its brutal leader, constitutes only a narrow slice of the big picture. 

The strategy to make the world a safe place to live is the driving issue behind the war on terrorism. That war effort will be eroded if our efforts are channeled toward one country and one regime, namely Iraq. The present threat that Iraq unquestionably represents to the world cannot be minimized nor can it be ignored. But Saddam Hussein does not stand alone in this world as a purveyor of terrorist ideology and influence.

Currently the ongoing debate over U.S. military intervention in Iraq constitutes a focus, so narrow, that the forest in effect has vanished in lieu of our concentration on a single tree. 

Will the financial cost, and the impact that an invasion of Iraq will have on our already stretched-thin military forces, be as large a blow to terrorism that we envision? Will the world really be a less terrorist-threatened place when the after-action reports are written and the full totals tallied? When will the world declare that terrorism has been defeated? 

Significant debate remains over the specific goals we will attempt to achieve by  invading Iraq, and the cost of achieving them. The groundswell of eventual military force on Iraq has caused an ominously cold and chilling fissure between European leaders, sans Tony Blair, and the Bush administration.

Both President Jacques Chirac of France and German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder have flatly refused to back the concept of military intervention in Iraq. These two leaders have affirmed that none of their soldiers will be participating in what they term a provocative and unjustified incursion. Their position does not come as a surprise. 

Their opposition appears grounded not in a disagreement over international priorities in the war against terror, but out of a combination of political cynicism and military inferiority.

Neither France nor Germany fields a large enough or deployable military force that would enable either to undertake an autonomous military action outside the European continent. In fact, Chirac and Schroeder seem to have made a virtue out of this military reality by downplaying external geopolitical issues and focusing on social issues. Trade with Iraq also seems more important than disarming its WMD arsenal.

Meanwhile, these two leaders by their own rhetoric have tolerated – if not enabled – European political disagreement over U.S. policies toward Iraq to escalate into outright anti-American sentiment in Europe.

In any event, such opposition has had no effect on the Bush administration’s intention to march on Baghdad – even if this clearly fails to address the larger problem of global terrorism. The terror network, from al-Qaeda to Hezbollah, from Islamic Jihad to Hamas, and numerous varied Palestinian Liberation Organization sub-groups, is alive and doing rather well despite the campaign thus far.

In addition to Iraq there are unquestionably other states, such as Iran, Syria and even Saudi Arabia, that are in collusion with terrorists. 

The most significant of the terrorist states is Iran. In 1979, following the revolution that toppled the shah, Islamic terrorism became reality under the Khomeini regime. Iran fashioned, schooled, sheltered, funded and supported the world’s most deadly terrorist group – Hezbollah. Iran has been a stalwart pillar of support for other terrorist groups, including al Qaeda.

If the United States expects to prevail against firmly entrenched terrorist cells and networks, we must focus on each of those regimes – a truly daunting task. Each one will require a unique U.S. strategy that may not be applicable elsewhere.

One unintended consequence of the United States declaring war on global terrorism has been an increased cooperation among the terrorist networks themselves. It is logical to assume that wherever and whenever we do strike first, those networks will unite in retaliation against us.

Dealing with terrorist states one by one is not an option. If we move against one state, we can expect a wide-ranging regional conflict.

At this juncture, it appears that the successful elimination of terrorism will hinge largely on the rollback of radical Islamic fundamentalism worldwide. If such governments could be overthrown from within, terrorism as we know it would diminish if not disappear, and U.S.-backed military incursions into Baghdad and Damascus would be seen as the actions of liberators instead of invaders.

When we move on Baghdad, we will prevail. But simply overthrowing Saddam Hussein will not defeat terrorism. 

The hard questions remain unanswered, and mostly undebated: What will be the price in casualties? What will we do after securing a military victory – leave Iraq in chaos or impose a long-term occupation? And what will be our response when the invasion sparks the next terrorist attack on America?

There is much more work to be accomplished and our efforts must ignore no other place.

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Guest Column: Theory Meets Reality in Iraq

By Melana Zyla Vickers

Members of Congress preparing for this week's debate on military intervention in Iraq can afford, in general, to draw on their knowledge of the 1991 Gulf War to inform their views. They'll be in trouble, though, if they rely on old information to guide their understanding of U.S. military capabilities.

In numerous ways, a U.S. intervention in Iraq in the coming months will look rather different than it did in 1991. Among the areas of change are: speed, stealth, precision, surveillance, and the basic strategy.

Speed: It took the U.S. Army six months to deploy for the 1991 Gulf War - a pace for which the service has been chided. This time, the Army should be ready for action within 30-60 days. That's not exactly lighting quick, but it's an improvement. It comes from the Army having pre-positioned equipment – hundreds of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters, and the like – in Kuwait, Qatar, and on ships in the Indian Ocean. In addition to the Army's “prepo,” the Marines have two squadrons of three ships apiece, with each squadron supporting some 17,000 troops, stocked full of equipment ready to be put to use in Iraq. Add to this forward presence the troops and equipment that are being placed in the region for military exercises, and the deployment time to Iraq is shortened considerably.

Long-range stealth: Where the first Gulf War saw the first significant use of the stealthy F-117, the military is now a generation ahead in stealth technology. The U.S. now relies on B-2 stealth bombers to launch its campaigns against countries with tough air defenses, flying round trips from the United States or Diego Garcia to bomb the defenses and other targets without being detected. The B-2 wasn't needed in Afghanistan because the country had no air defenses. But in the Kosovo war it performed remarkably, flying only 1 percent of the sorties yet striking 11 percent of the targets. The only shame of the B-2 record is that the Pentagon, which has only 21 of the bombers, has not seen fit to buy more of them or to develop a new, stealthy, long-range bomber.

Precision: The televised trajectories of “smart bombs” were perhaps the most memorable feature of the 1991 Gulf War. In practice, though, those smart bombs didn't strike as many targets as the military had hoped. With a decade of improvements behind them – including a change from laser guidance that is limited by cloud cover to satellite guidance that is unrestricted by weather – precision-guided munitions now dominate warfare. They strike targets with such accuracy that they've taken over numerous missions previously reserved for soldiers on the ground.

Consider the following transformation: Some 60 percent of munitions that planners used in Afghanistan were precision-guided, compared with some 35 percent in Kosovo and 7 percent in the Gulf War. Adding to the precise munitions' effectiveness is what the military calls “mass” – the fact that so many of the munitions can now be dropped at once. Bombers equipped with PGMs flew only 10 percent of the sorties in Afghanistan, yet struck 70 percent of the targets.

Persistent surveillance and unmanned strike: In 1991, the United States was unable to track Iraq's positioning of its Scud missiles, and as a result Saddam was able to fire many dozens of the missiles at Israel and at Saudi Arabia. Finding Iraq's missile launchers won't be as much of a problem this time; the U.S. can scan wide areas of the desert with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can loiter over a given location for some 24 hours. The Predators that were so successful in Afghanistan can also now be armed – indeed, a Predator helped killing high-level al Qaeda operative Mohammed Atef in Afghanistan.

In addition to surveillance from Global Hawks and Predators, the United States can now also watch the battlefield with JSTARS, an airplane-mounted radar-detection system that maps moving targets on the battlefield. In 1991, the U.S. had only two prototype aircraft. It now has numerous fully functional ones. JSTARS has its limits – it's sure to become vulnerable to enemy air defenses in the future. But it's valuable for this Iraq war.

Strategy: In 1991 the United States sought to remove Saddam's army from Kuwait. This time, the U.S. military will seek to remove Saddam from his army. Where the U.S. used 500,000 troops last time, it could use fewer than 100,000 this time. The troops will necessarily march on Baghdad in order to depose the government – something they didn't do last time. In addition, the U.S. military will probably seize large amounts of Iraqi territory early on, to constrain Saddam's options.

For example, the United States will try to seize territory in the western desert to keep Saddam from firing Scuds from there. For all its differences from 1991, the Iraq war won't look entirely like Afghanistan, where a handful of Special Forces leveraged local forces to overthrow the Taliban regime. But it will be a kind of hybrid between the 1991 Gulf War and Afghanistan, wherein U.S. forces are fewer in number, move faster, are stealthier and more precise, and are aided by technology to a greater degree than ever before.

It was the 1991 Gulf War that signaled to many foreign and domestic military theorists that a “Revolution in Military Affairs” was underway, led by the United States. The next Gulf War is likely to show how right those theorists were.

What's the lesson for Congress from all this? Fund long-range, stealthy strike, persistent surveillance, unmanned systems, precision, and rapidly deployable ground forces, because these are the capabilities that are not only improving, but also dominating the way the U.S. fights wars.

© 2002 Tech Central Station, reprinted with approval. Vickers is military columnist for Tech Central Station and can be reached at mvickers@techcentralstation.com.

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