The stunning military collapse of the Taliban regime over the past five days has dominated news coverage of the war against terrorism. It has silenced the “laptop bombardiers” of the news media who had already begun to call the military campaign a failure, and appears to have significantly increased the chances that U.S. and British Special Forces commandos on the ground in Afghanistan may soon locate and destroy (if not capture) the leadership of the Taliban and the al Qaeda terrorist network.

But just as the combat operations appeared to have bogged down in the weeks before the Northern Alliance – aided by U.S. strategic bombers and tactical fighters – broke through the Taliban lines and quickly overran the northern half of Afghanistan this week, it remains possible that the pace of the war could again slow down, particularly if the enemy manages to go to ground in the extensive cave complexes of Afghanistan. In like vein, the arrest in Spain on Tuesday of nine men suspected of comprising an al Qaeda terrorist cell reinforces the warnings repeatedly given by senior Bush administration officials that the war against terror – both overseas and at home – is far from over.

One late-breaking development that has Washington and the legal community abuzz is President Bush’s executive order released on Nov. 13 declaring that any al Qaeda terrorists or their supporters who are apprehended will face special military tribunals rather than the federal court system. This is a drastic – but legal – tactic last used by the Roosevelt administration to try German saboteurs captured inside the United States after being infiltrated ashore by German U-Boats at Long Island and Florida in June 1942. The full text of the presidential executive order is included in this edition of DefenseWatch.

I call particular attention to the article by Ziad K. Abdelnour that originally appeared in the Middle East Research Bulletin on the growing information pointing to a connection between the al Qaeda terrorist hijackers and the government of Iraq. A thorough and clear recapitulation of evidence that has emerged in the weeks since Sept. 11, Abdelnour’s article strongly suggests that if the Bush administration remains true to its announced policy of responding to terrorists and any state supporters, the air and ground war in Afghanistan may well prove to have been only a minor prelude to the real battle.

This week’s edition has a number of interesting articles on various facets of the current situation, including David Hackworth’s analysis of our nation’s experience in the early months of World War II and how it compares with the counter-terrorism fight today. Also, DefenseWatch editors Robert G. Williscroft and J. David Galland offer two interesting views on the ongoing effort to increase airline safety and security, while contributing editor Matthew Dodd offers a thought-provoking essay on ethics and the escalating homeland security effort.

Last week, I began soliciting viewpoints from active-duty, reserve and National Guard personnel on how the ongoing war is affecting their unit’s readiness and material condition. We have already received a number of pertinent replies and publish two of them this week.

And finally, my thanks to the folks at www.wordsmith.org, who maintain a powerful and easy-to-use anagram computer. I was able to crack the code on Osama bin Laden and many other players in the ongoing drama, discovering some amazing (and funny) hidden meanings in the names and words.

Footnote: The ultimate success in reviving and expanding SFTT depends on everyone. We need your financial contributions to continue our operation. While any amount is welcome, we suggest a $30 annual contribution from each member will enable us to succeed.

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Hack’s Target For The Week: Batten Down the Hatches on the Home Front

By David H. Hackworth

“Can we win this war?”

That's the question that has been tossed at me repeatedly over the past two weeks as Eilhys and I traveled around this anxious country talking to citizens ranging from Starbucks baristas and their clients at New York City's LaGuardia Airport, to a large crowd in Nashville's Oprey Mills Shopping Mall, to folks who stopped and talked with us on southern California sidewalks, in restaurants and TV and movie studios.

Clearly there's a torrent of concern and confusion coming from worried Americans facing their first war on their own turf and trying to figure out the score overseas. All wanted to know the real deal and most feel close to clueless, perhaps because much of our media seems to be measuring this war with a World War II ruler.

But if we dial back to 12/7/41 and World Trade Center I – the Pearl Harbor attack – we see that things were grim then and quickly got worse. Most of our Pacific Fleet was at the bottom of the harbor. Much of our very small and green Army was still running around the boonies like kids in a back lot going “bang bang” with wooden sticks for rifles and machine-guns, while those who'd lucked out and had real weapons were toting the worn-out stuff their dads used in 1918.

On maneuvers, our fighter jocks – with just a fraction of the combat aircraft of their Nazi and Imperial Japanese foes – were dropping flour sacks as simulated bombs against trucks that General George Patton designated as enemy armored vehicles by having “tank” scrawled in chalk on their tarpaulins. In 1942, in the Philippines, our forces were totally defeated – while the survivors were death-marched into inhumanly brutal POW camps.

Then, at Midway and the Solomon Islands, the Navy and Marine Corps won their first fights but lost most of our torpedo attack aircraft, about a third of what was left of our Pacific Fleet, and a lot of Marines and soldiers went down by bullets and bugs. Next, our Army got decked in Africa in its first big battle.

Not only were our Armed Forces not ready to fight, our opponent's multi-million man Army had conquered most of Europe, Asia and Africa with the most formidable military machine the world had ever seen. Only an unprepared USA and a beleaguered Great Britain – which was being blitzed night and day by Nazi bombers – stood in their way to stop them from conquering the world.

We picked ourselves up off the mat, rolled up our sleeves and built a 13-million strong Citizen's Army from scratch while providing our British, Soviet, Chinese and other allies with war materials to stop the jack-booted barbarians blasting away at their front gates.

Three years later, the Fascists hoisted the white flag and then our victorious forces set down their rifles, picked up shovels and picks and helped their former enemies dig themselves out of the rubble and rebuild into prosperous and decent democratic nations.

Today, we've had the good fortune to go into our first fight in the 21st Century with the most powerful military force in the world, including both a world-class aviation arm and Special Ops troops who – as their brilliant and brave performance in Afghanistan testifies – are as good as those boys get.

In Round One, the only hits we've taken so far have been a couple of helicopter crashes, and our Taliban opponent in Afghanistan is already coming apart faster than a wet paper sack filled with rocks. We're so squared away on the military front that last week the USS Enterprise sailed back to Norfolk in glory after successfully bombing the terrorists even deeper into their Afghan caves.

But what the stalwart sailors had on their minds was Main Street USA. It's time to batten down the domestic hatches, they're saying – and get serious about defending our home shores with the same urgency our country's bringing to the battlefield they just left. These smart swabbies know more terrorist sucker punches are on the way and that all the rhetoric aside, security at home is still loose as a goose.

Can we win this war? Bet your sweet patootie! But we'll win it with less civilian casualties only if Ridge & Co. get real and get moving.

Http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Sign in for the free weekly Defending America column at his Web site. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831.

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ARTICLE 01 – Mounting Evidence of Iraqi Link to Terror Attacks

By Ziad K. Abdelnour

Two weeks before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein reportedly put his military on its highest state of alert since the 1991 Gulf War. According to the London-based Sunday Telegraph, the Iraqi leader even took the unusual step of moving his two wives, Sajida and Samira, from Baghdad to an undisclosed location in the family's hometown of Tikrit, 100 miles to the north (see “Army alert by Saddam points to Iraqi role,” The Sunday Telegraph, London, Sept. 23, 2001.)

Saddam's precautions were hardly unwarranted. A growing body of circumstantial evidence indicates that Iraq may have participated in plotting the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States.

The most striking evidence linking Baghdad to the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks is that the presumed ringleader of the suspected hijackers, Mohamed Atta, met twice with Iraqi intelligence operatives in the Czech Republic. According to senior Czech officials quoted in the Czech daily Hospodarske Noviny and The Wall Street Journal, Atta traveled from Hamburg, Germany, to Prague in June 2000 and met with Iraqi intelligence agents at Baghdad's embassy there, which has long been under constant surveillance by the Czech authorities.

After the meeting, he flew on to the United States, where he began flight lessons the following month. Atta had made a previous attempt to enter the country on May 30, but wasn't allowed to leave the airport upon arriving in Prague because he lacked a visa (see “Hijack Suspect met Iraqi Agent in June 2000,” The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 4 2000).

Atta made a third trip to Prague in April 2001 and met with Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir Al-Ani, the chief of consular affairs at the Iraqi embassy there. Later that month, Ani was expelled by the Czech authorities for “engaging in activities beyond

his diplomatic duties” after he was observed photographing the Radio Free Europe building in Prague, which had begun broadcasting anti-Saddam programs into Iraq in 1998.

Ani had been under surveillance at the time as a suspected intelligence operative because he “was never present at any diplomatic event,” said the Czech Foreign Ministry official who expelled him, Hynek Kmonicek, in an interview with Newsweek. “It's suspicious,” said Kmonicek. “Why would a diplomat with no diplomatic

duties meet with a student of architecture? How is it possible they even know each other?" (see “Hard Questions About an Iraqi Connection,” Newsweek, Oct. 29, 2001).

Czech intelligence officials suspect that Ani may have provided Atta with fake passports for the 19 hijackers that carried out the Sept. 11 attacks.

During his second visit to Prague, Atta also reportedly met with Iraq's ambassador to Turkey, Farouk Hijazi, a former brigadier-general in the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). Hijazi, who was recalled to Baghdad prior to the Sept. 11 attacks, is known to have traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan to meet with Osama bin Laden in December 1998 (see Newsweek, Oct. 15, 2001). Hijazi is also believed to have met with bin Laden in Sudan prior to the latter's expulsion from the country in 1996.

According to the London-based Iraqi National Congress (INC), Hijazi and Brigadier-General Habib Ma'amouri reportedly developed plans for hijacking civilian airliners and crashing them into civilian targets during the mid-1990s at the GID Special Operations Branch in Salman Pak, south of Baghdad.

Two Iraqi defectors have corroborated this claim. A former Iraqi military officer, Sabah Khalifa Khodada Alami, said he was in charge of training an elite special forces team, “designed to plan and conduct operations against U.S. and British interests around the world” at Salman Pak. Using a Boeing 707 parked inside the complex, Alami's team practiced hijacking planes without weapons. He also said that another team of non-Iraqis underwent similar training at the same camp.

A second defector gave a similar description of the camp, and recounted meeting some of the non-Iraqi trainees, whom he described as deeply religious, when a group of five Saudis and an Egyptian helped him move his car and jump-start the engine (see The Wall Street Journal – Europe, Oct. 22, 2001).

There have also been reports that at least three high-ranking Iraqi intelligence officials have visited Pakistan over the last four months to meet with representatives of al-Qa'ida (see The Sunday Telegraph, London, Sept. 23, 2001).

In addition to evidence linking Iraq to the Sept. 11 attacks, there are indications that Baghdad may be responsible for the anthrax attacks that have occurred over the past month in the United States. The anthrax spores that were found in Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle's office earlier this month were treated with sophisticated chemical additives that enable the spores to remain suspended in the air. They could not have been developed in a cave. In fact, according to a report in The Washington Post, only three nations are believed to be capable of producing these chemicals: the United States, Russia and Iraq (see “Additive Made Spores Deadlier,” The Washington Post, Oct. 25, 2001).

Iraq, for the record, has vehemently denied involvement in either the Sept. 11 attacks or the anthrax attacks.

As more and more evidence of Iraqi complicity in the terror attacks in the U.S. comes to light, officials in the Bush administration remain polarized into two camps. The first, headed by Secretary of State Colin Powell, has categorically rejected suggestions that Iraq may have played a role in the Sept. 11 attacks. Powell and others have declined to name Iraq as a suspected sponsor of the attacks, ostensibly because sufficient evidence of its involvement has not come to light. In fact, it appears that fear of disrupting the Bush administration's anti-terrorism coalition is the primary concern at the State Department.

A dissident faction within the administration, led by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby, a key aide to Vice President Dick Cheney, have advocated expanding the war on terror to include Iraq. Wolfowitz and others feel that the attacks could not have been launched without state sponsorship and believe that, in any event, Iraq constitutes a much greater long-term threat to U.S. national security than bin Laden's Al-Qa'ida network. In their view, the elimination of Iraq's clandestine nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs, which have proceeded unhindered since the 1998 expulsion of UN weapons inspectors, should be a top priority in the near future.

While President Bush has clearly avoided pointing the finger at Iraq, he has nevertheless alluded repeatedly to the fact that the war on terror will not necessarily be confined to Afghanistan. Earlier this month, U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte delivered a letter to the Security Council stating that American self-defense could require “further actions with respect to other organizations and some states.”

While Iraq has been put on the back burner for the time being, military action against Baghdad has not been ruled out. It appears that the Bush administration is waiting until it has accumulated incontrovertible evidence of Iraqi involvement in terror attacks against the United States before shifting the focus of its war on terror.

In fact, it appears that some high-ranking figures in the Bush administration may be quietly investigating claims made by Laurie Mylroie that Iraq masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The most incriminating evidence produced by Mylroie in her book, Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War Against America , concerns the identity of Ramzi Yousef, a Pakistani convicted of masterminding the 1993 attack. Yousef fled the United States after the attack using a passport in the name of Abdul Basit Karim, a Pakistani resident of Kuwait.

According to Mylroie, Iraqi intelligence altered files at Kuwait's interior ministry after the 1990 invasion in order to provide Yousef with a false identity.

Although the U.S. Justice Department has long maintained that Yousef was, in fact, Abdul Basit, earlier this month former CIA director James Woolsey reportedly flew to London to determine whether Yousef's fingerprints match those of Abdul Basit, who lived in Britain during the 1980s. Although CIA and State Department officials are said to have been outraged by Woolsey's trip, the fact that he arrived on board a U.S. government plane would appear to indicate that his investigation has been sanctioned by some in the Bush administration (see Knight-Ridder News Service, Oct., 10, 2001).

Some who advocate a major military campaign against Iraq have cautioned against putting off action into the distant future. A military campaign to oust Saddam Hussein will undoubtedly be costly and therefore necessitate strong support from the American people. According to the results of a Reuters/Zogby poll released on Oct. 25, 74 percent of Americans now believe that the United States should expand the war on terrorism by targeting Saddam Hussein and 56 percent “strongly” favor such a policy. This degree of unqualified support for war against Iraq will not last forever.

Ziad K. Abdelnour is executive director of the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, a monthly publication of the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon at www.meib.org.

SPECIAL FOCUS: Airline Safety and Security

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ARTICLE 02 – Airline Safety: Simple Steps for Better Security

By Robert G. Williscroft

In the real world we live in, what is the obvious solution to airline security? The answer is easy: Don't let any bad guys or bad stuff on any aircraft. Now all we need do is implement this solution.

In my submarine days, the fleet developed a simple, elegant solution for ensuring that workers who welded on a submarine pressure hull did their best. When the sub performed its first test dive after a shipyard period, all the guys who welded on the pressure hull were guests for that dive. Sure, we tested every weld, but we added this extra safety step to make sure. And you know the welders did their best.

What are an aircraft's vulnerabilities?

* Repair and maintenance;

* Hold baggage inspection and loading;

* Carry-on baggage;

* The passengers;

* The crew;

* The aircraft itself, including security of the cockpit, emergency exits, etc.;

* External factors such as being rammed by a small plane, etc.

The crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in New York on Monday is still under investigation and very little is yet known about the cause, except that two of the Airbus A300 engines and the tail apparently fell off prior to the aircraft impacting the ground.

Excuse me: fell off?

We will, of course discover more about the real cause of this tragic event, but were all airlines to implement a policy of requiring a member of a repair crew for any significant repair to fly on the aircraft shortly thereafter, you know repairs would be done with the utmost attention to detail.

Since most flights typically have one or more empty seats, the FAA could establish this policy: All personnel associated with any aspect of prepping a plane for flight would rotate randomly every one or two months to a flight list, and would be required to take a flight on short notice.

When you don't know when you might be required to fly, or what flight you might be required to take, I suspect you will regularly ensure that your particular responsibility is done to the best of your ability.

Obviously, all hold baggage must be inspected. That we are not already doing this is astonishing. We live in the digital age. If an appropriate program doesn't exist, we should create one to conduct preliminary inspection of x-ray images for all hold baggage. We should also “sniff” all hold baggage for explosives. Items that don't pass initial screening should be diverted to inspection units manned by well-trained personnel, and if necessary, are inspected by hand.

Ditto for carry-on baggage. By letting computer programs do initial screening, we can shorten long security lines and move them more quickly. We can match passengers and baggage by using luggage tags and claim tickets containing computer chips that register the presence of the owner passenger onboard the aircraft. If a passenger is missing, we can then remove the offending luggage before take-off.

Passenger screening is more complex, but nearly instantaneous criminal checks are possible by linking identity determining units such as fingerprint or iris pattern readers to FBI databases. This won't find a mole, but will absolutely identify an identified bad guy. Sky Marshals can handle anything that slips through this initial screening.

We can let the airlines handle crew and aircraft. Soon enough, all crewmembers will have been screened and double screened, and cockpit doors will have been replaced. Arming crewmembers with lethal or non-lethal weapons has defenders and detractors. I think it probably is a good idea, on balance, at least for the cockpit crew. I am a bit leery of putting a weapon in the hands of a relatively inexperienced flight attendant who might not be able to bring her weapon to bear against a stronger male hijacker. Arming the cockpit crew, however, and giving them some form of remote surveillance over the entire aircraft makes sense.

The FAA and the homeland security mechanisms being put into place will have to deal with potential external threats like small planes flying into passenger jets, and possible Stinger-style missiles launched by terrorists.

The suggestions presented here cost a lot of money, and I have not addressed who does what. The obvious responsible party for security before an aircraft is boarded is the airport – not the airline companies, not the feds, not the state. An airport can set up appropriate security perimeters and can standardize all inspections, coordinate the personnel and equipment, and is far better positioned than any other unit to do this. The required equipment is very expensive, and untrained minimum wage personnel will not be able to use this equipment effectively. Initially, the federal government should supply funds to purchase and install necessary equipment and train appropriately skilled personnel.

In the long run, however, the FAA (or whoever ultimately regulates such things in today's over-regulated world) must establish a ticket surcharge on every ticket sold. This surcharge would not migrate into the federal or state financing black hole. Rather, it would be collected into a national pool and used directly to reimburse initial federal expenditures, and then to finance all further expenses at every airport in America.

Initially, I envision a surcharge of $25, but this probably should be the subject of a short and intense study to ensure that sufficient funds are made available to do the job. The bottom line is, if you fly, you should pay for your own security.

Taken together, we can remarkably improve maintenance and repair actions. We can dramatically increase safety in baggage handling by requiring those involved with these actions to fly randomly on aircraft they service. And we can apply current technology to its best advantage to ensure that no unauthorized object or person boards an aircraft.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor.

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ARTICLE 03 – Airline Safety: ‘Politics as Usual’ and the Terrorist Threat

By J. David Galland

The Sept. 11 terrorist hijackings, and Monday's tragic crash of American Airlines Flight 587 apparently caused by an unknown mechanical failure, have propelled the issue of airline safety to the forefront. It also resurrects a shameful episode of political malfeasance on the part of former Vice President Al Gore.

After the loss of Trans World Airways Flight 800 on July 17, 1996, President Clinton appointed Gore chairman of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety, charged with a comprehensive overview of airline safety issues. At the time, it seemed that the administration was doing the right thing and moving in positive directions to make airline travel safer.

In early September 1996, Gore and his commission rendered a comprehensive preliminary report that delineated the need for tougher counter-terrorism procedures. But as reported by Washington Times columnist Tony Blankley on Sept. 6, 2000 – just a year before the terror attacks -- the major airlines instantly set upon Gore and the commission, asserting that the panel's recommendations, if enacted, would result in a loss of revenue. After about a week of considering both the ramifications of the commission's actions, as well as the political fallout, Gore acquiesced. He contacted Carol Hallett, a lobbyist for the airline industry, assuring her in writing that the airlines would not lose any of their precious revenue.

The following day, according to Blankley, the Democratic National Committee received a $40,000 contribution from Trans World Airlines. Within two weeks, other airlines suddenly became quite philanthropic, with Northwest, American and United Airlines kicking in another $55,000 in order to assist the 1996 presidential re-election campaign. It did not stop there. In the following two months, just prior to the national election, United Airlines opened its wallet by contributing another $100,000 to the Democratic National Committee, American Airlines coughed up another cool $250,000 to the Democrats, and Northwestern Airlines weighed in with another $53,000 to soften up the nest.

Call me naive, but this smells to high heaven!

In January 1997, just after the Clinton-Gore presidential re-election victory, Gore swung into action again. The vice president submitted a final draft of the airline safety commission report and quite amazingly, all the original recommendations relating to security measures were suddenly eliminated from the document.

But as they say in the National Basketball Association, the fat lady had not yet begun to sing.

Some of the Gore Commission members were not happy with what they apparently suspected was going on. Even the somnolent and hapless CIA Director, John Deutsch, squirmed in his chair about this sudden change in the report. Faced with this opposition, Gore retracted the report and its pro-industry recommendations.

In February of 1997, the final report emerged, containing a number of recommendations, which would in fact, cost some of the airline industry fat cats some money. The commission's recommendations included improved bomb detectors, more extensive training for airport security personnel, criminal background checks for airport workers and increased K-9 dog patrols at airports.

These were all good, basic approaches. However, upon reading the fine print one learned that there was no deadline or target date for implementation of the protective measures. Because no implementation deadlines or requirements were set, the findings amounted to nothing more than a "Gee, wouldn't it be nice", wish list for improving safety.

Gore had a final meeting with his commission in early February 1997. During that meeting Gore stated that he would allow an open forum for those on the commission who opposed the report. There was a dissenter on the commission: Victoria Cummock, one of the panel members and the widow of a victim of the 1988 terrorism bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Cummock objected to the airline sellout and was justifiably quite disturbed at Gore's coziness with the industry. Ms. Cummock had to file a civil suit to gain access to the files that would support her dissent.

But true to the Clinton administration's form, Gore, shortly after the February 1997 meeting announced to the president, and to the world, that the findings of his commission, including the final report recommendations, were unanimous. To say that Vice President Gore, as chairman of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety, was less than honest is certainly sugarcoating my estimation of his abysmal performance.

And two months after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, this “politics as usual” maneuver, by the Clinton administration over four years ago, smacks of the dangerous disinterest to national security that constitutes the major political legacy of Bill Clinton and Al Gore.

J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is the pen name of a career U.S. Army senior Non-Commissioned Officer currently serving in Germany.

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ARTICLE 04 – Ethics Training a Critical Part of Homeland Security Effort

By Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd USMC

One of the main challenges with homeland defense that has received little to no attention is the fact that it relies on an unprecedented number of government and military organizations all working together against an unprecedented threat.

For a visual depiction that makes your head spin, check out the “wiring diagram” compiled by Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge that appeared in The New York Times on Nov, 4 <http://www.nytimes.com/images/2001/11/04/national/ridg.2.html>.

What has not yet been addressed is a critical requirement: the character of the leaders needed to make this wiring diagram work. Based on what I have seen, heard, read, and experienced, I believe there is a potential Achilles heel in homeland security in the ethics and the character of the leaders currently involved.

The Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines ethics as “the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation; the principles of conduct governing an individual or a group.” Ethics training is synonymous with character development (or refinement) and key to individual and organizational integrity. As military professionals, like professionals in other fields, our military ethics should be very important to every one of us as a daily guide for our actions, especially in times of great duress and uncertainty.

Homeland security requires, in its most basic sense, a holistic “coalition of cooperation.” Homeland security demands many interagency and international organizations that never worked together before to suddenly share information, coordinate efforts, and understand the second- and third-order effects of their actions and decisions on other organizations.

Cooperation is a by-product in an environment of trust. Trust occurs when the people involved are trustworthy to everyone else. Do our leaders and organizations have the character and entrenched ethics to overcome the inherent challenges of homeland security?

I recently received a forwarded e-mail from a friend about mandatory annual ethics training for Flag Officer/General Officer (FO/GO) and Senior Executive Service (SES) officials. The e-mail contained a link to a DoD Standards of Conduct Office online ethics refresher training program. The self-paced program was a series of written instructions followed by short, scenario-based quizzes that tested my ability to apply what I just read. I received instant feedback for all my answers, right and wrong. The end of the program was a summary of what material was covered, and a review of the main points.

Lastly, if I knew who my ethics counselor was, I could send a pre-formatted completion e-mail or print a completion certificate and fax it to that person.

This training was interesting, informative, but stereotypical of the “check-in-the-block” mentality. If I were a FO/GO or SES I'd be insulted that this drill meets annual ethics standards requirements. What a crock!

Maybe “regulations” or “compliance” training would be a better title for this training. The most ethically or morally corrupt FO/GO or SES who really needs an ethics or morals wake-up call could very easily check this block and not get anything of value from this drill. This training is a sad reflection on our senior level concern and interest in ethics training.

Why has military ethics training decayed into a mere electronic “check-in-the-block” drill? One contributing factor is highlighted on the training program's opening screen. “When you follow the rules, you reinforce the public's confidence in the integrity of Government. Further, you avoid administrative, civil, or even criminal penalties.”

Those two simple sentences tell me that ethics training is more for the public's perceptions of government and personal avoidance of prosecution than it is about individual character refinement. Compare these training program words and spirit to Webster's definition of ethics. Where is the idealism of living up to the highest standards of the military profession; strengthening personal and organizational integrity (not just building the public's perceptions); and refining each individual's character?

Another contributing factor in “check-in-the-block” senior leader ethics training is rooted in DoD's professional military education (PME) curricula. The amount and importance of officers' ethics training decreases with rank.

Entry-level officer PME programs spend a lot of time trying to instill core values and moral and ethical leadership responsibilities into the minds and souls of young and impressionable officers. By the time an officer completes intermediate-level school and joint PME phase II (the Joint Forces Staff College), ethics training is down to only being offered as a voluntary elective.

The third contributing factor in the decline of ethics training throughout the ranks, but especially for our senior leaders, is fear. Senior leaders are afraid to acknowledge that ethics and character are problems, for such admission is an indictment of the system that promoted them to their positions of authority. Ethics and character refinement are so foundational to each individual's identity and reputation that many will do anything to conceal any perceived deficiencies. Lastly, the concept of

institutionalized individual introspection is uncharted territory, so fear of the unknown gives way to the comfort of the status quo.

The issues and challenges our senior leaders will face with homeland security are different from the issues and challenges they faced in their pasts. The margin of error for today's leaders and organizations, with almost-instantaneous global communications, is shrinking. With complex interagency and international cooperative coalitions, the character of every leader and the ethics of each organization are of the utmost importance.

Like Achilles, America is a mighty force in a tough war. Our armor, weapons,

and tactics make us feared, respected and almost invincible; yet we have human vulnerabilities and we are susceptible to our enemies' poison arrows. Unlike Achilles, our story is still being written. We should learn from Achilles' fate and recognize the value of our ethics and character shield in protecting ourselves.

We owe it to ourselves, the citizens of our great nation, and the rest of the civilized world to ensure we have the most effective leaders and organizations to meet all our homeland security challenges.

Lt. Col. Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon.

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ARTICLE 05 – What’s in a Terrorist Name (and Others)? Concealed Messages

By Ed Offley

One of the more mysterious aspects of the ongoing war against terrorism has been the issue of messages from the al Qaeda terrorist network that allegedly are concealed in digital graphic images on innocuous websites, as well as encrypted text files reportedly embedded in a similar manner.

As information technology experts and counter-intelligence officials mull over this puzzle, I would like to reveal a third source of mysterious messages that have been unlocked through the power of the internet and computer technology. Thanks to the website www.wordsmith.org, I have been able to solve the anagram codes of the major institutions and players in the war against terrorism.

Now, English teachers and linguists may dismiss an anagram as a frivolous and innocent device – this is, after all, only a rearrangement of the letters in a name to spell other words – but I will let the members of DefenseWatch draw their own conclusions as to the shocking, disturbing and (sometimes) hilarious results revealed when I entered the following names and organizations into the anagram calculator so generously made available by the folks at wordsmith.com.

Take Osama bin Laden, the world’s most wanted terrorist. According to the anagram computer, he is a banal demon.

Mohamed Atta, the suspected ringleader of the Sept. 11 hijackers and pilot of one of two aircraft hijacked after leaving Boston, receives a chilling anagram epitaph: MA to a.m. death.

President George W. Bush is revealed by the anagram calculator as having both risen to the challenges of the war after the controversial 2000 election vote count – bogus, grew he – as well as having established confidence and poise during the crisis – Bush ego grew. Moreover, it is clear to the anagram computer that this has vexed Bush’s Democratic Party opponents who lament, Sob, grew huge.

Vice President Richard B. Cheney draws a mixed message from the anagram computer. In a reference to his frequent trips to the now-famous “undisclosed, secure location,” Cheney is praised for his Hey, chic errand. But the computer also reveals the vice president is still concerned about other geopolitical issues: He cry China red.

The computer also notes the surging popularity and media attraction of New York Mayor Rudi Guliani, who has reveled in the laudatory media coverage. His anagram reads, Dial guru, I in.

As for the scene of the war, the anagram computer is terse about Afghanistan, dismissing the nation as, Afghan isn’t.

The U.S. military operation, primary combat units and senior generals all contain embedded messages about the implications of the war and the threat of bioterrorism. Operation Enduring Freedom contains the warning, No run if germ deed. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dick Myers, the computer notes, is aware that it is icky send germ. At Central Command, the warning decoded by the anagram computer is, cram, end not calm. And if things go wrong for Centcom Gen. Tommy Franks, the computer advises, he can look forward to a new location and career in agriculture enjoying the farm sky, Mont. Out in the field, the carrier USS Enterprise came across to the Taliban as a tense surprise when it launched air strikes. Meanwhile, the Army’s Delta Force kept its penchant for secrecy when it fled story, camera.

We asked the anagram computer what it thought of former President William J. Clinton, and the response indicated that Hillary’s husband was focused on other things than war or terrorism such as, claim Jill in town.

And last but not least, the computer confirmed the sterling qualities and firm opinions of our founder, David H. Hackworth, who it praised as a vet, hawk chord, while noting Hack wrath dove and He’d cavort hawk.

Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch

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ARTICLE 6 – FEEDBACK: War and the Pentagon’s Resource Crisis

Editor’s Note: Most of the mainstream news media organizations are focusing their coverage on the war against terror overseas and homeland security issues at home, while ignoring the worsening defense resource crisis. Here are several early responses. DefenseWatch is seeking inputs from active-duty, reserve and National Guard readers on the issue of whether the ongoing military campaign is worsening the aging of weapons and equipment. Please send your inputs to defensewatch@aol.com.

Special Forces Not Immune to Erosion

One thing that really bothers me about the Defense Department today is the failure of the various military watchdogs to recognize the effects the last eight years have had on the special operations forces (SOF). We all understand that the feminization and politicization has hurt the “regular” military. What I get tired of hearing is something to the effect of: “With the exception of special operations forces, the military is not getting training, quality leadership, equipment etc. This “SOF exception” is just not true. I speak with almost 20 years of experience with Army Special Forces. We are hurting as bad, if not more so, than the regular military.

I have spent the last several years watching this community go rapidly downhill. We cannot keep the men we have and are having an increasingly harder time recruiting and training new SOF soldiers despite a steady erosion of the standards. Here are just some of the problems we are suffering from:

* We to have been infested with “Perfumed Princes” and “Star Chasers,” not just in the officer ranks, but lately in the senior NCO ranks. During the big personnel drawdowns, SOF became the place to get promoted so many NCOs and officers transferred in purely for that reason.

* We also are being crippled by administrative bureaucracy. The average SOF Team guy spends more time doing paperwork then training for combat. We are currently working with an inverted pyramid. We have way more levels of command than needed. We are not “lean and mean” – we are “fat and bloated”. There are two chains of command above the group/brigade level, one for peacetime and the other for wartime. This is crazy, very expensive and creates a huge paperwork burden.

* We are not getting the equipment the operators are asking for. Just prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist strikes, we had to turn our new weapons (M4 carbine) back in for
our old weapons. Why? Because our new guns did not work! The old guns are worn out but at least they usually go bang when you pull the trigger.

Priority of equipment. When it comes to money the majority is spent on officer evaluation report (OER) producing equipment like new computers for Power Point, new color copiers, bigger conference tables etc. We have spent thousands for this type of stuff yet we cannot even store our weapons zeroed because the racks in the arms rooms will not hold the guns with the SOPMOD accessories mounted! Where are the priorities?

* Continuity of the Special Forces Detachment, once the secret ingredient of SF, is no more. There currently is none. It used to be a guy spent years on a Team, learning to be the best at his job and gaining experience to one day be a team sergeant. There was an immense pool of experience and skill. The old-timers passed on their hard-earned lessons so the Team could move forward as well as retain institutional memory. That no longer happens: It is a constant battle to maintain even the most basic of skill levels on a Team/Detachment due to the revolving door syndrome.

What do we need? We need to become a lean and mean force again. We need a limit put on admin positions verses operator positions. No more inverted pyramids! The most important single consideration is that the operator gets the training and equipment he thinks he needs. The operators are some really great guys and will give it their all, that is why they deserve better. --Team Guy First

Halfhearted Measures Against Terrorism

The Defense Department seems to be doing business as usual, unable to put its subordinate elements on any semblance of a real wartime footing. This has nothing to do with the troops and everything to do with leadership. This nation was attacked, and is ready and willing to respond in every way. But many of our leaders – civilian and military alike – appear to be unready to step up to the task. The “managers in uniform” continue to protect pet projects, and therefore their retirement gigs at their favorite defense contractors. Personnel management specialists just continue to operate with the old rules that don't fit the situation we find ourselves in today.

I see business as usual and no real sense of urgency of utilizing the power of this nation to defeat this threat to our existence. We haven't really shown the world what we stand for yet. Sure, some carrier battle groups are positioned, airplanes and missiles fly through the air, there are some special forces on the ground and troops at U.S. airports. But these appear to be small measures. The terrorist states of Iraq, Iran, Libya and others feel secure in the fact that we have focused on a small portion of their terror network. Talk is cheap. The nation will not stand for halfhearted measures anymore. U.S. citizens are smart, tough people that are up to the tasks now required of them. The question remains, are the national and military leadership up to these tasks? --Lynda Daly

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ARTICLE 07 – FOR THE RECORD: President Bush Order for Military Tribunal

By the authority vested in me as president and as commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the United States by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224) and sections 821 and 836 of title 10, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Findings.

(A) International terrorists, including members of al Qaeda, have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States armed forces.

(B) In light of grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism, including the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, on the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense in the national capital region, on the World Trade Center in New York, and on civilian aircraft such as in Pennsylvania, I proclaimed a national emergency on Sept. 14, 2001 (Proclamation 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks).

(C) Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international terrorism possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States government.

(D) The ability of the United States to protect the United States and its citizens, and to help its allies and other cooperating nations protect their nations and their citizens, from such further terrorist attacks depends in significant part upon using the United States armed forces to identify terrorists and those who support them, to disrupt their activities, and to eliminate their ability to conduct or support such attacks.

(E) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to this order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.

(F) Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under this order, I find consistent with section 836 of title 10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.

(G) Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths, injuries, and property destruction that would result from potential acts of terrorism against the United States, and the probability that such acts will occur, I have determined that an extraordinary emergency exists for national defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and compelling government interest, and that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the emergency.

Section 2. Definition and Policy.

(A) The term “individual subject to this order” shall mean any individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from time to time in writing that:

(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,

(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaeda;

(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or

(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and

(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this order.

(B) It is the policy of the United States that the secretary of defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that any individual subject to this order is detained in accordance with section 3, and, if the individual is to be tried, that such individual is tried only in accordance with section 4.

(C) It is further the policy of the United States that any individual subject to this order who is not already under the control of the secretary of defense but who is under the control of any other officer or agent of the United States or any state shall, upon delivery of a copy of such written determination to such officer or agent, forthwith be placed under the control of the secretary of defense.

Section 3. Detention Authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Any individual subject to this order shall be —

(A) detained at an appropriate location designated by the secretary of defense outside or within the United States;

(B) treated humanely, without any adverse distinction based on race, color, religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any similar criteria;

(D) allowed the free exercise of religion consistent with the requirements of such detention; and

(E) detained in accordance with such other conditions as the secretary of defense may prescribe.

Section 4. Authority of the Secretary of Defense Regarding Trials of Individuals Subject to This Order.

(A) Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by military commission for any and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in accordance with the penalties provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or death.

(B) As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, including subsection (f) thereof, the secretary of defense shall issue such orders and regulations, including orders for the appointment of one or more military commissions, as may be necessary to carry out subsection (a) of this section.

(C) Orders and regulations issued under subsection (b) of this section shall include, but not be limited to, rules for the conduct of the proceedings of military commissions, including pretrial, trial, and post- trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of process, and qualifications of attorneys, which shall at a minimum provide for —

(1) military commissions to sit at any time and any place, consistent with such guidance regarding time and place as the secretary of defense may provide;

(2) a full and fair trial, with the military commission sitting as the triers of both fact and law;

(3) admission of such evidence as would, in the opinion of the presiding officer of the military commission (or instead, if any other member of the commission so requests at the time the presiding officer renders that opinion, the opinion of the commission rendered at that time by a majority of the commission), have probative value to a reasonable person;

(4) in a manner consistent with the protection of information classified or classifiable under Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as amended, or any successor Executive Order, protected by statute or rule from unauthorized disclosure, or otherwise protected by law,

(a) the handling of, admission into evidence of, and access to materials and information, and

(b) the conduct, closure of, and access to proceedings;

(5) conduct of the prosecution by one or more attorneys designated by the secretary of defense and conduct of the defense by attorneys for the individual subject to this order;

(6) conviction only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being present;

(7) sentencing only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being present; and

(8) submission of the record of the trial, including any conviction or sentence, for review and final decision by me or by the secretary of defense if so designated by me for that purpose.

Section 5. Obligation of Other Agencies to Assist the Secretary of Defense.

Departments, agencies, entities, and officers of the United States shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law, provide to the secretary of defense such assistance as he may request to implement this order.

Section 6. Additional Authorities of the Secretary of Defense.

(A) As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, the secretary of defense shall issue such orders and regulations as may be necessary to carry out any of the provisions of this order.

(B) The secretary of defense may perform any of his functions or duties, and may exercise any of the powers provided to him under this order (other than under section 4(c)(8) hereof) in accordance with section 113(d) of title 10, United States Code.

Section 7. Relationship to Other Law and Forums.

(A) Nothing in this order shall be construed to —

(1) authorize the disclosure of state secrets to any person not otherwise authorized to have access to them;

(2) limit the authority of the president as commander in chief of the armed forces or the power of the president to grant reprieves and pardons; or

(3) limit the lawful authority of the secretary of defense, any military commander, or any other officer or agent of the United States or of any state to detain or try any person who is not an individual subject to this order.

(B) With respect to any individual subject to this order —

(1) military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to

offenses by the individual; and

(2) the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in

(i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof,

(ii) any court of any foreign nation, or

(iii) any international tribunal.

(C) This order is not intended to and does not create any right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by any party, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

(D) For purposes of this order, the term “state” includes any state, district, territory, or possession of the United States.

(E) I reserve the authority to direct the secretary of defense, at anytime hereafter, to transfer to a governmental authority control of any individual subject to this order. Nothing in this order shall be construed to limit the authority of any such governmental authority to prosecute any individual for whom control is transferred.

Section 8. Publication. This order shall be published in the Federal Register.

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ARTICLE 08 – Medal of Honor Recipient – SISLER, GEORGE K., 1^st Lt. USA

Rank and organization: First Lieutenant, U.S. Army, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.

Place and date: Republic of Vietnam. 7 February 1967.

Entered service at: Dexter, Mo.

Born: 19 September 1937, Dexter, Mo.

Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life and above and beyond the call of duty. 1st Lt. Sisler was the platoon leader/adviser to a Special United States/Vietnam exploitation force. While on patrol deep within enemy dominated territory, 1st Lt. Sisler's platoon was attacked from three sides by a company-sized enemy force. 1st Lt. Sisler quickly rallied his men, deployed them to a better defensive position, called for air strikes, and moved among his men to encourage and direct their efforts.

Learning that two men had been wounded and were unable to pull back to the perimeter, 1st Lt. Sisler charged from the position through intense enemy fire to assist them. He reached the men and began carrying one of them back to the perimeter, when he was taken under more intensive weapons fire by the enemy. Laying down his wounded comrade, he killed three onrushing enemy soldiers by firing his rifle and silenced the enemy machinegun with a grenade. As he returned the wounded man to the perimeter, the left flank of the position came under extremely heavy attack by the superior enemy force and several additional men of his platoon were quickly wounded.

Realizing the need for instant action to prevent his position from being overrun, 1st Lt. Sisler picked up some grenades and charged single-handedly into the enemy onslaught, firing his weapon and throwing grenades. This singularly heroic action broke up the vicious assault and forced the enemy to begin withdrawing.

Despite the continuing enemy fire, 1st Lt. Sisler was moving about the battlefield directing force and several additional men of his platoon were quickly wounded. His extraordinary leadership, infinite courage, and selfless concern for his men saved the lives of a number of his comrades. His actions reflect great credit upon himself and uphold the highest traditions of the military service.

Editor’s Note: If you know of any MOH recipient who is hospitalized or has passed away recently, please email MOH Correspondent James H. Also, if you would like more info on MOH recipients and their stories, please email James H at bulldogleader@mindspring.com.

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EDITOR'S NOTE: Article Submission Procedures/Subject Editors Sought

1. Try to keep articles to 750 words or less. SUBMIT IN MS WORD FORMAT, if possible!

2. Submit your piece to one of the following editors:

Ed Offley, Editor

defensewatch@aol.com

J. David Galland, Deputy Editor

defensewatch02@hotmail.com

DefenseWatch is looking for volunteer subject editors willing to assist in screening and editing article submissions. We are looking for experts in the following areas: U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, Special Operations forces/counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and veterans affairs. If interested in joining the DefenseWatch team, please contact Ed Offley at defensewatch@aol.com.

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GLOSSARY OF MILITARY ACRONYMS:

We've had numerous requests from troops in different branches of the
military to establish this link so that we will all know how "all you
others" talk that talk. The DoD site is not working but the nonprofit Federation of American Scientists has an excellent online acronym roster. Please see below:

http://www.fas.org/news/reference/lexicon/acronym.htm

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HACK BOOK SALES

Hack's books, About Face, Hazardous Duty, The Price of Honor and The
Vietnam Primer can be found at www.hackworth.com. They make a great addition
to any library. Hack is offering them at a special SFTT price.

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