There's scuttlebutt aplenty about which country is next: Somalia, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, the Palestinian Authority or Iraq. Like the now-defeated Taliban's Afghanistan, the contenders are all training grounds for terrorists and major exporters of this particularly reprehensible form of warfare. Snake pits of hate that – as our president has articulated so well – must be defanged before we in the civilized world can even begin to contemplate getting back to our way of life.

Happy days might be here again a lot sooner if Saddam Hussein were moved to the top of the terrorist hit list. While our fight shouldn't be with the people of Iraq – who have been tortured by this certified war criminal for the past 20 years – the head of the most dangerous state among the meanest of company needs to be knocked off next.

When you get into a barroom fight, you take out the baddest dude first. Check out Saddam's track record: He used poison gas against Iran and his own people; he has huge stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction – bugs and gas and maybe nukes; and insiders say his death factories are churning out more.

If that's not justification enough to punch out his lights, high-ranking Iraqi defectors say (and U.S. intelligence confirms) that his prints have been on all the terrorist strikes against the United States since Stormin' Norman stumped him, including running a terrorist training camp for members of Osama bin Laden's gang and other major players, complete with a mock-up of a 707 for some hands-on hijack simulation. A U.S. intelligence source told me it will soon be conclusively proven that he was a key player in the assaults on our embassies, our overseas military personnel, World Trade Center I and II and some of the anthrax attacks that have been coming down since Sept. 11.

Now President George W. Bush has laid down the gauntlet to Saddam: U.N. arms inspectors must be allowed to return immediately to Iraq and continue the WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) inspections agreed to after Desert Storm. The Master of Miscalculation says there's no way this is going to happen.

But most European and Arab leaders are against our taking out Saddam. The Europeans are worried about their gas tanks, pocketbooks and pacifists, while the Arabs paint us as a bully picking on one of theirs as an excuse for their own political instability.

Well, let them come to New York City and visit our WTC national wound, where 4,000 civilians were having their first cup of coffee on the day they were fiendishly murdered. Let the politicians and peaceniks in Paris and Berlin sit on their hands and wag their diplomatic tongues as they did for years when ex-Yugoslavia was burning. Let them appease Saddam – as they did Adolf Hitler – while this century's mustached madman builds his nuclear, biological and chemical weapons arsenal, financed with the smuggled oil that runs their cars and factories.

We didn't take out the Soviets because of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction), and we were lucky that the Evil Empire imploded before one of theirs – or ours -- pressed the button in an insane moment and turned planet Earth into a radiated ash pit.

We cannot allow Saddam to have such power.

Employing the operational methods we used in Afghanistan – Air, Special Ops and limited conventional forces, but with an infinitely bigger sledgehammer – and the help of old and new foxhole pals along with the Iraqi exiles and Kurdish militias, we should clean his clock with similar dispatch. Then, as with Afghanistan, the people of Iraq will finally be free to rise up and reclaim their country.

Clearly Saddam represents our most clear and present danger. You either stop terrorism or it will stop you. We must put Saddam and all other terrorists down or suffer the fate of Israel, a terrorist punching bag for 53 years.

Taking out the Taliban, and then Saddam's evil regime, should cause other states to reconsider if they really want to bear the consequences of being in the terror business when Uncle Sam is on a roll.

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Sign in for the free weekly Defending America column at his Web site. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831.

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ARTICLE 01 – Iraq: A Decade of Appeasement Must End

By Patrick Hayes

Frequently, U.S. strategic analysts, planners and decision-makers do a less-than-adequate job, with their collective, short-range actions often missing the mark. Recent history shows that the U.S. military has had the tendency of moving from one hemorrhaging conflict to another, when earlier preventive action – or acting in a different direction altogether – may have changed the course of history in favor of the United States.

Prime examples of this include our interventions in Beirut, Somalia, Haiti, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Balkans, and now Iraq – again!

We face an old enemy let off the hook 11 years ago to appease our oil-producing Arab “friends” (the devil you know is better than the one you don’t). We are also in a war against transnational terrorists, which might have been avoided if decisive action had been taken against Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network earlier, when it became obvious he and his cadre were targeting American interests. But even with analyses and planning, the political will during most of the 1990s was not there.

Much has been said about the consequences for those who ignore the lessons of history. German Philosopher George Hegel said, “But what experience and history teach is this – that peoples and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.” American philosopher George Santayana said it more succinctly when he stated, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

This could be said about American relations with Iraq, which, in 1990, could have gone either way. Since Sept. 11, we have learned that the oil sheiks, particularly the Saudis, whose assets were saved by U.S.-led coalition forces, have been less than dependable, even supporting Islamic terrorist organizations hostile to the United States. Given what we now know, would dealing with the devil we knew then (Saddam) be different than dealing with the current devils? We’ll never know for sure. What is certain today, however, is that Saddam must go.

However, recent political rhetoric has conveniently forgotten earlier U.S.-Iraqi relations and that Iraq was once our ally in the region when we supported Saddam in his war against our then-enemy Iran during 1980-88. That war, too, was about border disputes dating back at least to the first recorded incident in 1639. The Iraqis claimed complete control over the Shatt al Arab waterway, which is Iraq’s only access to the sea. The Iranians claimed at least half the waterway. In addition to Saddam’s war with Iran, his Baath Party leadership was also not one of rabid Muslim clerics, but rather controlled a secular, albeit militaristic, society. During the Gulf War, Saddam hid behind being a “good Muslim,” calling for other Muslim states to come to his aid in a jihad against the West, but most in the region saw through the façade.

The trigger for the Gulf War was the Iraqi relationship with Kuwait, which was also a historical conflict dating back to the 19^th Century when Kuwait was part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1899, Kuwait asked for British protection, gaining its independence in 1961, at which time Iraq renewed its claim that Kuwait was historically an Iraqi province. The world community paid little attention to the claim, but the border conflicts continued.

These issues came to a head in 1990, when Iraq accused Kuwait of pumping oil from the al-Rumeilah oil field that straddles both countries without sharing revenues, and for producing more oil than allowed under the OPEC quotas, thereby lowering oil prices and damaging Iraq’s primary export. Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war was in financial turmoil, with a debt of $40 billion. Although it requested assistance from other Arab states, it received little and when Baghdad sought to raise oil prices, Kuwait and the other Gulf states balked.

The rest, as we say, is history: Iraq mobilized forces near the Kuwait border. An attempt was made by the Arab states to defuse the situation. On Aug. 1, 1990, Iraqi and Kuwaiti representatives were invited to Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, to try and solve the conflict. The meeting only resulted in more angry charges from both sides. A second meeting was to be held in Baghdad the following day, but shortly after midnight on Aug. 2, Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Whether the Gulf War rose out of oil prices, oil production quotas, or a last-minute change in U.S. strategic thinking, a key point is that at the time, Washington had shown little interest in Kuwait’s fate. Indeed, U.S. policy-makers considered Iraqi action nothing more than the re-taking of disputed border regions, therefore making the issue of little concern for American policymakers.

Eight days before the invasion, Saddam Hussein on July 25, 1990, summoned U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie for a meeting, which also included Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Based on transcripts of that meeting later released by Iraq and not challenged by the State Department, the meeting was cordial and may have left Saddam with the impression that the United States would look the other way if he invaded Kuwait.

According to the transcripts, both Saddam and Glaspie made several interesting statements.

Initially Saddam was defensive and threatened the United States if it pressured Iraq or sided with Kuwait. Using ominous language, he said, “If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you (emphasis added).”

Saddam further stated that if Iraq could keep control over the Shatt al Arab, it would make concessions with Kuwait. However, if Iraq were forced to give up half the waterway between Iraq and Iran, then he would give up his claim to the entire waterway and press his claim that Kuwait was an Iraqi province.

Glaspie replied, “We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960's, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.” She added, “We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly.”

Glaspie later told journalists, “Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait.” Saddam moved from being a shaky ally to a threatening adversary, but how much responsibility for the invasion and decade-long tensions falls on the U.S. government analysts, planners and decision-makers who were then responsible?

Given the swift and certain response by the Bush II administration to the al Qaeda terrorist strikes – and its explicit warnings to Iraq – it appears that in Washington, the right team is in the right place at the right time.

Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at Gyrene65@netscape.net

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ARTICLE 02 – It Is Time For Accountability For Sept. 11

By J. David Galland

Many Americans were blissfully ignorant and therefore completely stunned by the horror of the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11. But at the same time, a number of people responsible for defending the nation were not surprised at these tragic events. We had expected this kind of offensive operation against the United States for some time.

Even as the U.S. military campaign against al Qaeda proceeds well in Afghanistan, and the federal government continues the difficult task of balancing internal security requirements with our constitutional liberties at home, I believe it is now time for us to confront some very unpleasant truths. Many people are not going to be happy with what I have to say, but at the end of the day, the truth is all we have – and must be the foundation of our future conduct as a nation.

On Sept. 11, the amount and quality of military force and intelligence - collecting ability possessed by the United States – a level that subsequent events proved ineffective to halt mass murder on American soil – had been determined by American society through its elected representatives.

In recent weeks, Congress has approved a multi-billion-dollar – billion – defense and security appropriation to serve as a "jump-start" for financing the war against terrorism. But only months ago, a multi-million dollar increase proposal for the U.S. Navy's operating budget – a scant fraction of the money we now plan to spend – was considered substantial, if not excessive. By whom? By the same leaders in the House and Senate: Reps. Gary Condit, Barney Frank, Sen. Ted Kennedy, and former President Bill Clinton (who reportedly has complained to friends that he is more qualified to manage the war against terrorism than President Bush).

This is the same strain of "leadership" who prior to Sept. 11 inserted an $85-million budget item for breast cancer research into the Navy budget. This was business - as - usual prior to the terrorist strikes: Forcing non-defense mandates into the military budget while short-changing badly needed funds for buying more aircraft, ships, equipment, and missiles. And, of course, this particular incident went mostly unreported in the major news media except for the charges of "insensitive" and "irresponsible" hurled at the secretary of defense and secretary of the Navy by leaders such as Sen. Hillary Clinton when the defense officials had the moral courage to criticize the ploy.

What an innocent time we lived in prior to Sept. 11. Those of you who watch government hearings on C-SPAN may recall how the people in charge of the military practically begged and groveled before our elected officials to get more money to fight terrorism and to maintain a strong defense.

Top military leaders appeared before the defense and budget committees pleading for more funding to maintain an acceptable level of military readiness and to be given the money to conduct sorely lacking combat training. Generals and admirals were forced to beg for beans and bullets while social engineering projects within the uniformed services were given top priority.

When the heads of the U.S. intelligence agencies appeared before the same elected officials, they vehemently declared that terrorism directed at the United States was the No. 1 threat we faced. These officials made it impossible for our elected elite to ignore that they did not have the funding to create and sustain intelligence networks that would preclude attacks on America. But again, this did not impress the elected body, nor average Americans distracted away from the warnings of terrorism by our rich panoply of television entertainment

America's protector, its last line of defense, is its standing military force, supported by the U.S. intelligence community. To maintain the strength and vitality of the all-volunteer force, it is necessary for the services and intelligence agencies to recruit and enlist a constant stream of young volunteers out of our high schools and colleges.

Again, the political landscape prior to Sept. 11 shows how deeply our nation slumbered as the terrorist threat grew near. The response for years by many American political leaders to the Pentagon’s manpower needs had been to close and prohibit ROTC programs at universities and high schools, and to bar military recruiters from campuses and high schools. I find it difficult not to conclude that many of our leaders simply did not want their sons and daughters to defend their own country and freedom, on the spurious grounds that the military incites violence and teaches children to use guns.

The deaths of thousands of innocent Americans on Sept. 11 snapped America out of its long sleep. But as an active-duty soldier, I must ask, and ask vehemently: Why were the earlier deaths of American servicemen and women at the hands of al Qaeda downplayed, if not ignored altogether?

Why did Americans remain generally indifferent to the attack on the USS Cole, where 17 sailors died? What about the bombing of the Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia killed another 16 servicemen? How about all the hundreds of people killed and injured at the embassies in Africa? Why did Americans so quickly forget the deaths of 18 American soldiers and wounding of 70 others at the hands of al Qaeda-trained fighters in Somalia – and the grisly scene of several corpses being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu?

The harsh legacy of Sept. 11 is that most American political leaders – and a majority of the nation itself -- ignored the obvious danger signs of the growing terrorist threat.

This was not solely the fault of a political leadership fixated on narrow niche issues such as animal rights, ozone depletion and the agenda of the homosexual community. Each American should and ask why he or she did not want to be bothered with issues that seemed abstract and distant from daily life.

Today, it is important that we remain unified as a nation in the continuing fight against terrorism. But we should also demand accountability for those whose inattention to the growing threat allowed terrorism to carry out such a monstrous attack on Sept. 11.

J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is the pen name of a career U.S. Army senior Non-Commissioned Officer currently serving in Germany.

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ARTICLE 03 – War and Religion: Islam’s Embrace of Violence

By Robert G. Williscroft

Remember the old story about the Emperor? His tailor presented him with a marvelous new outfit, telling him that the cloth was so special that only a righteous person could see it.

The Emperor saw nothing, of course, but in order to save face, admired the quality and cut of the material he could not see. His acquisition was promoted throughout the land, and on his next public procession through the city, the population, also seeing nothing, of course, openly and enthusiastically admired the invisible material. That is, until one young lad who didn't know better exclaimed, “The Emperor has no clothes!”

We hear daily that Islam is not our enemy; instead we are told that Islamic fundamentalists – religious fanatics who don't represent any part of Islam – threaten our safety. While I agree that the vast proportion of American Muslims probably wish us no harm, we are hugely mistaken if we believe the same is true for worldwide followers of Islam.

Examine for a moment the tenants of Judaism. The ancient Israelites were a warring people, of this there is no doubt. The Torah and other holy writings of Judaism, however, do not prescribe violence against anyone. Judaism does not contain the seeds of Holy War. Vocal supporters of modern Palestine try to couch the current conflict between Israel and Hamas and other Palestinian terror groups as a righteous reaction by the Palestinians against marauding Israelis, but the simple fact is that the Israelis are reacting to terror attacks by the Palestinians. Judaism fundamentally is a peaceful religion.

Examine the tenets of Christianity that differ from those of Judaism, in particular the New Testament. The command is to turn the other cheek. There is no call to battle under any circumstances. In the Middle Ages, Christianity found a way to justify violence against non-Christians, but this concept has long since ceased to be a part of Christian dogma. In effect, Christian scholars determined that there was a better way to accomplish the Christian mission, and they changed the basic understanding of Christianity to conform to this benign view. Bottom line: Holy War is proscribed; “Christ comes in peace.”

Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Ba'hai: Holy War is absolutely not contained in any of these faiths. True, from time to time in the past, violence has played a part in the development of some of these religions, especially among the Hindus. Even today, there are some elements of Hinduism that turn to violence, but generally, a Hindu is identified with non-violence. Holy War is not a part of these world religions.

A myriad of lesser-known beliefs support the faith of millions of followers around the world – but none of these contain a call to Holy War either.

Now examine Islam: While it is true that the Koran teaches it is evil to do violence to innocent people, the Koran contains a general call to arms against Infidels. Unlike any other world religion, Islam encourages the Jihad – the Holy War.

Only Islamic clerics can call the faithful to arms in defense of the faith. Jewish rabbis cannot do this, Catholic priests and Protestant ministers cannot do this, Buddhist monks cannot do this, nor Hindu holy men, nor any of the others. Only in Islam can this happen.

When we speak of Christian fundamentalists, what commonly comes to mind is someone who believes in the literal words contained in the Judeo/Christian Bible. This individual will generally appear as a proselytizer for his faith, perhaps strong-willed, with a desire to make his faith a general part of his society. What you do not find, however, is a person who advocates violent actions against those with different beliefs. When a rare Christian fundamentalist crosses over this line, as has happened in the struggle over abortion rights, nearly all other Christian fundamentalists condemn such actions, especially the Christian fundamentalist leaders.

Islamic fundamentalists, on the other hand, are all identified by their universal calls to violence against non-believers – Jihad, Holy War. Unlike Christian fundamentalist clerics who go to great lengths to eliminate violence in their ranks, Islamic fundamentalist clerics are the very ones fomenting this violence.

As the Western world moved from the Middle Ages into the Renaissance, the Catholic Church, which represented organized Christianity, went to great lengths to distance itself from the violence of the Crusades. In effect, Christian leaders restructured the tenets of Christianity to eliminate violence as a righteous means to a religious end.

Any argument that points to past Christian violence as justification for current Islamic violence misses the point. Although not so ancient as Christianity, Islam has been with us for a respectable one-and-a-half millennia. Unlike Christianity, however, Islam has not left its violence in the past. Islamic violence is as real today as it was twelve hundred years ago.

It's time to call it like it is: The Emperor is a Terrorist. Islam is inherently and fundamentally a threat to world peace. You can't argue away the Jihad; it is built into the system. You can only rid the world of Jihad by ridding the world of the system that creates Jihad.

It is time for Muslims of good will to change their system. Christians did it. Muslims must do it as well. Muslim clerics of all Islamic persuasions must renounce violence. Jihad must become a thing of the past.

The bottom line is that if Islam won't change itself, eventually we will have to. There is no doubt in my mind how such a Holy War will end.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor.

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ARTICLE 04 – Pearl Harbor Legacy Has Critical Significance Today

By Paul Connors

This Friday, Dec. 7, 2001 is the 60th Anniversary of the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, and the single event that propelled the United States into World War II.

On that day, more than 2,400 American service members and civilians died on the island of Oahu. As we moved further away from the end of World War II, it seemed that only those who fought and lived through the event and the war itself, remembered the dramatic significance of that fateful day. That benign neglect continued for years and two generations, who were the children and grandchildren of the “greatest generation,” never learned what their fathers and grandfathers did to make their world a safer place in which to live.

Vietnam eroded the confidence of America and her armed forces. Admirals and generals became politicians, more intent on career advancement than the good of the nation and the welfare of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and coast guardsmen entrusted to their care and leadership. And one by one, the World War II generation began to die off. As they left us, we lost many of our heroes and the values in which they believed.

As the inheritors of the Declaration of Independence and The United States Constitution, we seem to have forgotten that freedom is not free. The United States is, after all, a superpower and with that status come certain obligations. With obligations come commitments and if you can't or won't keep them, there is a very real effect in the world. The American people, distrustful of their government as a result of Vietnam and Watergate, have been conditioned by a leftist-dominated news media to accept the notion that much of what is wrong in the world today is a direct result of our bullying and interventions around the globe.

Now, a generation after America's last troops left Saigon and after eight years of active neglect by the Clinton administration, we are asking our armed forces to do more with less. The young Marines on the ground in Afghanistan are equipped with an M-16 rifle designed more than a generation ago and only slightly upgraded since. Their helo pilots are flying Vietnam era Super Cobras that should have been retired a long time ago.

Military commanders who tried to raise the “red flag” over the defense resource crisis years ago were routinely ignored right up until Sept. 11.

Americans as a people have an exceptionally short corporate memory; as soon as a conflict ends, we dismantle our armed forces and send the soldiers home. We keep on trying to beat those swords into plowshares and the world keeps showing us that we need our arsenals and the soldiers to use the weapons stored within.

Respected military leaders like Col. David Hackworth are now sought out for their opinions on where we have gone wrong in the past and what we need to do to correct a situation that now seems intolerable and unthinkable. Yet, the most amazing is that liberals have rediscovered patriotism and the need for a strong and capable military. But not so long ago, it was these same liberals, highly interested in cashing in on the peace dividend at the end of the Cold War and Desert Storm, who conveniently forgot and actively ignored the lessons of history.

On Sept.11, 2001, almost 60 years after our first “Pearl Harbor,” we suffered another. The sad irony is this: nearly twice as many Americans died the second time as did the first. And for the second disaster, there really is no excuse.

Our technology is vastly superior to anything the U.S. Army and Navy could field in 1941. Our intelligence resources are almost limitless, but the CIA missed so many signals that we almost forfeited the game. The multitudinous and overlapping federal agencies, jealous of their turf did not share information and terrorists ran around in our backyard while planning out their heinous crimes.

As the United States wages this war against terrorism, it does so with a defense establishment 40 percent smaller than that which conducted Operation Desert Storm. It is a force that is spread too thin and one that is tasked to do too much with far too little. The net result is that every time this country needs to engage in even a small-scale military action, National Guard and reserve units need to be mobilized.

The similarities have become uncannily similar. In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt federalized the entire National Guard for one year. Before they could be released back to state control, the United States was engaged in World War II. Sixty years later, more than 50,000 Guardsmen and reservists have been called back to active duty to support Operation Enduring Freedom and to provide for homeland defense.

The American people, once again threatened by an enemy from outside our national borders, have found a new degree of respect for their armed forces. But as this conflict drags on, will these same fickle people continue to support a national policy that at best, only promises the continued threat of terrorist attacks? Will the leftists, represented by Hillary, Chuck Schumer, Patrick Leahy, Tom Daschle and other appeasers call for negotiations in the vain hope that we can prevent further atrocities?

We are engaged in a war and one that has at its far end, very dire consequences for the United States. This is no time to lose heart or argue that the president has usurped powers not granted to him by the Constitution. Americans need to remember the last time we were unprepared for what lay ahead. It was 60 years ago and when that fateful Sunday came to a close, over 2,400 Americans were dead and more than half of the U.S. Pacific Fleet lay on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Do we really want to relive that?

Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. He can be reached at paulconnors@hotmail.com.

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ARTICLE 05 – Fight for Jointness Critical to U.S. Military’s Future

By Matthew Dodd

The war in Afghanistan has shifted media and public attention away from an ongoing Pentagon effort to promote true inter-service cooperation – “jointness” – as a means of increasing U.S. military power. But given the projected costs of prosecuting the war against terrorism and the additional costs that will be needed to modernize the aging force, our success (or failure) in attaining true jointness will have a major impact on the nation’s ability to recast the U.S. armed services to meet current and future threats.

The 2001 Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Transformation Study report (written by six retired general/flag officers and four senior military analysts) defines transformation as a process of change that involves developing new operational concepts that deal with changes in the way military forces are organized, trained, and equipped; changes in the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures that determine how they are employed; changes in the way they are led; and changes in the way they interact with one another to produce effects in battles and campaigns.

According to the transformation study report, “The synergy that true jointness brings is the most powerful transformation concept….” In other words, the report identifies that the synergy of true jointness is a conceived thought or notion, not something that currently exists in reality.

How can the synergy of jointness be a new, transforming concept? If we are not doing true jointness today, what have we been doing for the last half-century? What does the report imply about how organizations charged with promoting inter-service jointness have not been able to get jointness right?

Let's start with the office of the secretary of defense (OSD). The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) expects the military to be able to do what is needed when needed. The SecDef and OSD are primarily focused on policy and the “what” and “when” of military force. By necessity, they are not too concerned with the “how” of military employment.

To most of the military in the Pentagon, OSD is considered out of touch, too far removed from the realities on the ground, and too heavily influenced by the politics of policy-makers to have much credibility in jointness discussions. The unclear and confusing language in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and their subsequent taskings illustrates the military’s frustrations with OSD. Only time will tell if SecDef’s appointment of retired Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski to direct his recently created office of force transformation will improve OSD’s credibility within the uniformed community.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff (JS) serve as the bridge between the uniformed military leadership and the higher civilian levels of government. Many lament that the Joint Staff is a misnomer; they view it as a staff dedicated to seeking the easier compromise or consensus rather than the often more difficult, truly joint answer.

The JS is a victim of process and practice. Its members come from the four military services, and the main stakeholders are the services, the Joint Staff itself and OSD. Each stakeholder is encouraged (explicitly or implicitly) to bring organization-specific concerns and best interests to all issues. The JS referees the services' input and, when practicable, courteously accepts OSD input.

The services' main strengths against and advantages over the Joint Staff are time, status quo, and tradition. The Chairman does not have true directive authority over the services, although his authority was significantly strengthened by the 1985 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. The common perception is that most JS products are at best a compromise – not the best possible solution, but the least unacceptable one – to the majority of stakeholders. For the Joint Staff, jointness often equals breaking issues down to the lowest common denominator among their stakeholders.

The four military services constitute an inherently fragile, yet powerful coalition
inside the Pentagon. Although they are usually (stereotypical) competitors, they are united in their opposition to jointness. They perceive jointness as a threat to their specific money, manpower, resources, acquisitions, and autonomy. With core competency training and routine, scheduled rotational deployments, the paradigm is that jointness is at best the deconfliction and coordination of service component activities.

Unlike the previous Pentagon organizations, the regional and functional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) reside outside the Pentagon and have their own unique perspectives on jointness.

The CINCs use their service components in the mission role that they are most prepared to be used (service-centric approaches). The CINCs' staffs are more joint-oriented than the JS, but they are almost exclusively focused on their geographical area of responsibility (AOR) with emphasis on regional stability and engagement using current and short-term future forces and capabilities. To the CINCs, jointness means the immediate use of existing service component capabilities in the best or quickest way to accomplish theater goals and objectives

One CINC's joint mission force concept that is getting a lot of attention is little more than officially institutionalizing the usual service-centric approach to jointness with a theater-based focus. They have standard operating procedures (SOPs), mission requirements-based training standards applied to rotational component forces, standardized command and control architectures to and from each service component, and assigned components headquarters responsibility for forming the core JTF staff (with a deployable CINC staff augmentation cell) for certain likely theater-based missions.

The newest CINC (re-chartered in 1999), U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), has a unique mission and vision that separates it from all the other CINCs and DoD organizations involved with jointness. According to its mission statement, the command is the chief advocate for jointness, and it maximizes the military's current and future capabilities through developing and experimenting with joint concepts, recommending joint requirements, and promoting joint interoperability. Thus, the USJFCOM vision is to lead the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces through true integration of combat and support capabilities.

Any close analysis of current USJFCOM activities confirms that USJFCOM recognizes the ad hoc nature of current joint operations and is eager to experiment with synergistic joint concepts in pursuit of its unique mission.

The USJFCOM paradigm starts out as “joint” (where the Joint Staff is reaching but never grasps, and where the individual services fear to tread) and long-term (beyond the short-term visions of OSD and the CINCs) in order to produce truly joint solutions.

Clearly, transforming to true jointness requires truly effective leadership at all levels, but especially at the highest levels. The SecDef report specifically noted, “The future joint force will take special attention from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not only to get the necessary resources but also to create an environment conducive to transforming .… The Secretary and Chairman will need to provide oversight for the joint integration that brings force components together to achieve full synergy.”

Fortunately, the new Director of Force Transformation, who is described as SecDef’s advocate, focal point, and catalyst for transformation, also recognizes the status quo leadership failure in not accepting and practicing true jointness: Adm. Cebrowski recently noted, “A good leader crafts the future for his people and then shows them their place in it. To the extent leadership continues to focus on past practices, methods and systems, they fail to perform that most vital leadership function,”

Jointness is much more than simply having all services present and carrying out their own service-oriented operations in response to the latest crisis-du-jour. Jointness is a long-term mindset that seamlessly fuses each service's specific and complementary strengths into a holistic package of military power greater than the sum of its parts.

The findings and recommendations of the transformation study report and the leadership of the new Director of Force Transformation give us the best chance of breaking down traditional bureaucratic inertia and transforming our military to true jointness for the very first time.

Today’s global security environment demands nothing less.

Lt. Col. Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.

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ARTICLE 06 – Feedback: Readers Respond to Hack Columns on U.S. Army, Marines

I agree with David Hackworth that today's U.S. Army is bloated and redundant, that its enlistment and training standards have been reduced to intolerable levels and that the Army's new PR campaign rings hollow. However, there are positions in his column (“The Marines Have Landed – Again,” Nov. 28) that I find contradictory.

In the column, Hack lambastes the Army for being stuck in the Cold War mindset and for being tied to “fleets of ships and planes to move them, and it takes months to ... get to the battlefield, not to mention the massive tax-dollar load to outfit and maintain it,” while he simultaneously praises the USMC for being “flexible, agile, ready and deadly.” Then later in the same column, he seems to criticize the Army for “forming light brigades strikingly similar to USMC units" by ridding itself of heavy armor, which he next suggests makes them vulnerable to Somalia-type operations.

What gives? Does Hack want an Army that has heavy armor or does he want one that is “lighter, leaner” like the Marine Corps? It seems Hack is asking the Army to be deployable like the Marines without exchanging the protection and firepower of heavy armor. Unless there's some sort of miracle-chariot that the Army should be using that provides M1-level armor protection and firepower, but is light enough to be carried into battle by a Blackhawk helicopter, then the Army is going to have to restructure its units and equip them differently.

As for the heavy lift assets required for moving the Army, one should remember that it is not the Marines – but rather the Navy – that is sailing those large amphibious warfare ships. The whole reason the Marines are on these Navy ships is so they can respond quickly to events throughout the world. The Marines are the 911 police force of the nation, ready to react to hostilities or disasters, courtesy of the U.S. Navy. The CONUS-bound Army is stuck at home because most of it's former forward bases have been closed down for lack of business in those areas and as a result must travel aboard Air Force planes and Navy ships in order to respond to military crises. But Hack critiques the Army for it's reliance on these heavy-lift assets, yet still suggests the Army should somehow still manage to “get thar the fastest with the mostest” without the use of those very assets. How then should the Army attain this mobility without sacrificing its robustness?

It does not matter if you have a “flexible, agile, ready and deadly” U.S. Army or an old hide-bound, Cold War Army: The Army will still need those heavy-lift assets to perform its mission. Perhaps the topic of the Army’s future force structure and deployment capabilities should be a topic for SFTT members to address.

-- Jason Iversen

Marines are Overexposed

In response to Hack’s column (“The Marines Have Landed – Again,” Nov. 28), we have over 1,000 men in the middle of nowhere in southern Afghanistan

without proper overhead cover, others riding around in rubber tired LAV-I

armored cars just asking to roll over a mine or unexploded ordnance.

The U.S. Army is ready, but its senior leaders are not. We can fly an 82nd Airborne paratrooper brigade cross-attached with a light-tracked M113A3 unit from USAEUR into Afghanistan right now, with no train-up necessary. We did the almost same thing two years ago for Kosovo, it was called Task Force Hawk, remember?

But no one then hounded the Marines for why they couldn't get to the fight,

did we? No, we hounded TF Hawk for what it did once it was there: which was little

because of the AH-64A Apache helicopters taking so long to get here, then

crashing during train-ups. Now we have Marines in Afghanistan doing nothing in criminally deficient fighting positions without overhead cover and doing nothing, and this is some kind of triumph?

The reason why the Army is not holding the airfield in southern Afghanistan is because if they used pararoopers and M113A3s, the lie that the Army needs

to buy expensive and less-capable 19-ton LAV-IIIs for [Chief of Staff Gen. Eric] Shinseki's rubber-tired armored car “transformation” would be revealed.

-- Mike Sparks, former Marine enlisted and officer

Army Too Soft on Recruits

In response to Hack’s column (“It’s Time to Set the U.S. Army Straight,” Nov. 21), I remember when I first came in August 1960, the only promise was that I was
going to catch hell during training at Fort Jackson and I did but it made me
an excellent soldier and person. I had a friend serving as a drill sergeant who told me that the worst trainees today are coming from Fort Jackson and the best from Fort Knox. His observation was that the new troopers cry about anything to cause a change from the drill sergeant. With all the fuss about caring, the drill sergeant has to ease up on them. The way the Army is doing business since the VOLAR Army came into being is weakening the entire force.

I am a retired NCO and Vietnam veteran who passed on a master sergeant promotion because I just could not stand it anymore. I have never seen so many highly competent NCOs getting out because of the unnecessary things they have to perform. It cost a heck of a lot of money to train one of ours but we lose them as soon as a contractor convinces them that life out there is better.

As long as the Army keeps promising college to recruits instead of hard, rough training, all we are going to get is terminal soldiers, a commitment of four or so years for so many years of college education.

-- Adolfo Cruz

Hack Is on Target

As to be expected, David Hackworth’s observations and comments are concise and

on target (“It’s Time to Set the U.S. Army Straight,” Nov. 21). The Marines, as usual, are doing an outstanding job wherever they go. Hopefully, and for the grunts, more of the Army is becoming acclimated to the changes. For the lives of the grunts, we can only hope that [Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki] has had sufficient time to make sufficient of the much needed changes.

I recently had a conversation with a West Point graduate from the late 50's who served seven years then resigned to enter the private sector. He said the Army was finally getting around changing its organization and formations, much of which had not changed since Napoleon's time.

In my experience as a JCS “purple suiter” in the late 1960s, the Army and Navy – while composed of many fine men and officers, and in services of great and often times hoary traditions – appeared to be near ramrod rigid in their thinking. The Marines were at least always willing to listen. Having grown up in the Air Force from 50's to 70's where change was the norm, it was an illuminating, and at times near mind-boggling experience to encounter some the traditional thinking in the Army and Navy.

I think is both rewarding and challenging to see the deployment and

engagement of the UAVs (Predator and Global Hawk) and the good

sense of someone to use “things” instead of grunts. Eventually, to take

Osama bin Laden from the scene, a bunch of GI boots are going to have to

go on the ground and destroy the evil. Our best hope is that when they

do, the grunts are well-trained and equipped for the task at hand.

-- Col. Bob Daniels USAF (Ret)

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ARTICLE 07 – Feedback: One Guardsman’s Mobilization Tale

As an NCO in a National Guard Infantry unit with over 13 years of service, I am writing in response to the request by DefenseWatch responses on how military training and operations have changed since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

Like many Americans on Sept. 11, I sat dumb-founded in front of a television as I watched the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the failed attempt that ended in Pennsylvania. I thought that at a minimum my Guard unit would be called up for security duty somewhere in our state. As news reports began to state that National Guard and Reserve units around the country were being called up, I decided I'd phone my unit and find out what, if anything, was going on. It was the first of three calls I'd make that day, always getting the same answers – “We haven't heard anything yet .... Thanks for the call .… We'll let you know …. ”

Sept. 15-16 was our scheduled drill weekend, so I arrived over an hour early in the hopes of finding out what our mission might be in order to get things rolling for my men. I was somewhat dumbfounded to hear that nothing had come down from “higher” as of yet. Except for a few troops at the front gate half-heartedly checking ID's, it seemed it would be a normal drill weekend.

It wasn't until late in the day on Sunday that word started to circulate that people would be needed to help guard all armories as well as an Army Aviation Support Facility (AASF) in the state. By the end of that day I and four other Guardsmen were told to report to our HQ armory the next morning and prepare for travel to our state headquarters where we would receive a full day of training in preparation for guarding the AASF.

Upon arrival at the headquarters on Monday, Sept. 17th, we received four hours of training from troops of our battalion who had recently returned from a peacekeeping mission overseas. During the training, we were told we would all qualify with 9mm pistols and that would be our weapon for the guard duty. But later that night, we were told it would be a day or so before the pistols would be issued due to ammo shortages and logistical reasons. The message finally came down that our uniform would include kevlar, flak vest, LBV and riot batons. But pistols – it was decided by “higher” – would not be issued.

The first few days were somewhat intense: eight hours on the front gate, eight hours on roving patrols and eight hours off. We settled into our routine, but changes began coming in: Our shifts were changed to 12 hours on, 12 hours off, the number of men per team shrank from four to three, then to two. The military van we were given for travel from HQ to the AASF was taken away, so we were forced to drive our own vehicles. Even the MRE rations we were given for the first few days ran out and we were told to “live off the local economy and you'll be reimbursed.”

When I questioned the officer in charge how we were to defend ourselves or the AASF in case of an emergency with only riot batons (I had to interrupt the movie or video game he was watching on his laptop) I was given advice such as “work with what we have” or “throw the baton and run.”

I was proud to serve my country and my state in such a stressful and unknowing time. However, it was very difficult to feel I was doing much good when the people we were guarding asked us how much we could do in the event of an actual attack with only riot batons and flashlights. I began to wonder about my own safety and that of the troops under my command.

-- A Concerned Guard NCO

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ARTICLE 08 – Medal of Honor Recipient – ROEDER, ROBERT E., Capt. USA

Rank and organization: Captain, U.S. Army, Company G, 350th Infantry, 88th Infantry Division.

Place and date: Mt. Battaglia, Italy, 27-28 September 1944.

Entered service at: Summit Station, Pa. Birth: Summit Station, Pa.

G.O. No.: 31, 17 April 1945.

Citation: for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at risk of life above and beyond the call of duty. Capt. Roeder commanded his company in defense of the strategic Mount Battaglia. Shortly after the company had occupied the hill, the Germans launched the first of a series of determined counterattacks to regain this dominating height.

Completely exposed to ceaseless enemy artillery and small-arms fire, Capt. Roeder constantly circulated among his men, encouraging them and directing their defense against the persistent enemy. During the sixth counterattack, the enemy, by using flamethrowers and taking advantage of the fog, succeeded in overrunning the position.

Capt. Roeder led his men in a fierce battle at close quarters, to repulse the attack w ith heavy losses to the Germans. The following morning, while the company was engaged in repulsing an enemy counterattack in force, Capt. Roeder was seriously wounded and rendered unconscious by shell fragments. He was carried to the company command post, where he regained consciousness.

Refusing medical treatment, he insisted on rejoining his men. Although in a weakened condition, Capt. Roeder dragged himself to the door of the command post and, picking up a rifle, braced himself in a sitting position. He began firing his weapon, shouted words of encouragement, and issued orders to his men. He personally killed two Germans before he himself was killed instantly by an exploding shell.

Through Capt. Roeder's able and intrepid leadership his men held Mount Battaglia against the aggressive and fanatical enemy attempts to retake this important and strategic height. His valorous performance is exemplary of the fighting spirit of the U.S. Army.

Editor’s Note: If you know of any MOH recipient who is hospitalized or has passed away recently, please email DefenseWatch Deputy Editor J. David Galland at defensewatch02@hotmail.com.

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EDITOR'S NOTE: Article Submission Procedures/Subject Editors Sought

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GLOSSARY OF MILITARY ACRONYMS:

We've had numerous requests from troops in different branches of the military to establish this link so that we will all know how "all you others" talk that talk. The DoD site is not working but the nonprofit Federation of American Scientists has an excellent online acronym roster. Please see below:

http://www.fas.org/news/reference/lexicon/acronym.htm

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HACK BOOK SALES

Hack's books, About Face, Hazardous Duty, The Price of Honor and The Vietnam Primer can be found at www.hackworth.com. They make a great addition to any library. Hack is offering them at a special SFTT price.

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