DefenseWatch - Dec. 12, 2001

Soldiers For The Truth (SFTT) Weekly Newsletter

When we assumed the Soldier, We did not lay aside the Citizen.
General George Washington, to the New York Legislature, 1775

In this week's Issue of DefenseWatch: Three Months After Sept. 11


EDITORIAL and ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Ed Offley
Editor, DefenseWatch
Email: defensewatch@aol.com

J. David Galland
Deputy Editor, DefenseWatch
Email: defensewatch02@yahoo.com

David H. Hackworth
Senior Military Columnist
Email: teagles@hackworth.com

Chris Humphrey
SFTT Webmaster
Email: sysop@sftt.us


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editor's Note: The End of the Beginning

Hack's Target for the Week: 'Silver Wings Upon Their Chests'

Article 01 - We Have Not Yet Reached Victory in Afghanistan, by Gary R. Stalhut

Article 02 - A Nuclear-Armed Iraq Must Be the Next Target, by Robert G. Williscroft

Article 03 - Can Patriotism Survive Victory in Afghanistan? By Paul Connors

Article 04 - U.S. Marine Corps Leading in Transformation, by Patrick Hayes

Article 05 - We Must Also Wage War on Inter-Service Rivalries, by Matthew Dodd

Article 06 - Rebuilding HUMINT Critical to Counter-Terrorism, by J. David Galland

Article 07 - SPECIAL SERIES: Human Intelligence Collection, by J. David Galland

Article 08 - FOR THE RECORD: President Bush on Military Transformation

Medal of Honor:

Article 09 - FUNK, LEONARD A. Jr., SFC USA

EDITOR'S NOTE: Your Support is Important!

 

EDITOR'S NOTE: Article Submission Procedures/Subject Editors Sought

 

GLOSSARY OF MILITARY ACRONYMS

HACK BOOK SALES








FROM THE EDITOR: The End of the Beginning


By Ed Offley

The day after a solemn worldwide commemoration of the lives lost in the al Qaeda terrorist attacks three months ago on Sept. 11, 2001, came a news report from Afghanistan warning that additional "sleeper" cells here in the United States are allegedly preparing a deadly biological warfare attack timing with the end of the Ramadan holy month on Dec. 16. As reported by Bill Gertz in The Washington Times, captured American Taliban fighter John Walker Lindh told U.S. intelligence officials that a subsequent third phase - presumably with nuclear weapons - would result in the destruction of the United States. One prays that the misguided young American - currently the only "enemy prisoner of war" in captivity at the Marines' Camp Rhino Base - was relaying groundless terrorist rhetoric that he had picked up during his stint in the Taliban.

But if there is one firm lesson from Sept. 11, it is that we cannot afford to allow our security to be defined by assumptions based on hopes. That information apparently led the Bush administration last week to issue the third warning of possible future attacks since Sept. 11.

I mention this unconfirmed allegation not to cast any doubts on the progress that the United States and its allies have made in the war against terrorism thus far, but to echo the warnings repeatedly raised by President Bush, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other senior leaders that we are still only in the beginning stages of a long, twilight struggle that may be measured in decades, if not years - and may come with setbacks and temporary defeats as well as stunning victories such as the air-ground campaign that shattered Taliban rule.

We at DefenseWatch decided that this was a suitable time to take stock of the war against terrorism, with the goal of providing a measured and balanced perspective of what has been accomplished, and what remains to be done. I am proud of the series of articles we are presenting in this issue and commend all of them to your attention.

And I'd like in particular to welcome Gary R. Stalhut to our growing ranks of contributing editors. A career Army Reserve officer who has served 26 years of active and reserve service including combat, Stalhut provides a cogent essay reminding us that even as many observers are shifting their attention from Afghanistan to other potential counter-terrorism targets, our basic strategy for intervening in that country - the capture and/or destruction of al Qaeda - has not yet been accomplished. We look forward to regular contributions of this quality from Gary Stalhut.

And we welcome your comments and feedback on these and other issues affecting the men and women of the U.S. armed services serving us at war today.

Ed Offley is Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at defensewatch@aol.com.



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Hack's Target For The Week: 'Silver Wings Upon Their Chests'


By David H. Hackworth

Special Forces and Rangers are the U.S. Army's most elite soldiers. They've proven their worth in past wars and are proving it again as the cutting edge down on the ground - where it really gets mean and nasty - in combat operations in Afghanistan.

A lot of factors make today's Green Berets and Rangers extraordinary soldiers, beginning with a tough selection process and even more rigorous qualification training. The all-volunteer troops who manage to make it through are then sent to exclusively male units, where the screws are turned even tighter on their realistic, very rugged training. It's here that they're forged into lethal fighting teams, not only becoming total hands-on experts in their specific skills but also learning the jobs of their teammates as well as they know their own.

Since Roger's Rangers in the 1750s, these special units have been leading the way for the conventional Army to follow. And these days, they're all paratroopers. Storied World War II paratroop commander Gen. James Gavin said, "Show me a man who will jump out of an airplane, and I'll show you a man who'll fight."

Not only do these highly-motivated sky soldiers belong to elite units with incredible battle records that make them as proud as they are battle-savvy confident, they also have priority of training funds and training areas. Unlike the rest of the Army, which says that it trains as it fights, these elite units do train as they fight and continue to maintain the highest soldierly standards.

The five active-duty Special Forces Groups are all assigned specific regions, such as the Middle East, Africa, Latin America or Asia. Each group operates in its assigned area, learns its area of operations, makes local contacts, works with and trains indigenous units and practices its language skills. Frequently, as in Afghanistan, their operations become hot, and often, as in the long war in the Balkans, they work covertly from the shadows. More than often, not even their wives or parents know where the soldiers are or what they're doing.

Unlike regular Army units, which constantly play musical chairs and have turnover rates as high as 35 percent per year, these special units stick together for years. This continuity provides critical unit cohesion where everyone knows their team players, the playbook and the plays backward and forward.

A lot of young men ask me for advice about joining the Army. I usually tell them to "Go Army Ranger," and that once they get weathered - if they want to be total professionals - to try to qualify for the Green Berets. I make this suggestion because I've watched these soldiers fight around the world and know well the stern and splendid stuff they're made of.

Afghanistan is a testing ground for conflicts of the future, where small, elite units - which are agile, hard-hitting and fast-moving - will be the main movers. Special Forces and Rangers out there now are writing the draft chapters that will comprise the textbook for future fights in this long war against terrorism and other potential conflicts.

Hopefully, the Army brass will read the tea leaves and transform some of their U.S.-based heavy-tank units - which in modern warfare will soon become as obsolete as the bow and arrow - and form more Special Forces and Ranger units. Let's also hope the brass will take a hard look at why these special units haven't lost their strong warrior spirit and warrior ethic, and how they've kept from lowering their standards to accommodate the PC social experiments of the past decade that have caused most of our armed forces to put "Consideration For Others Training" over preparing to fight.

In Afghanistan, the Rangers and Green Berets have already received more than a basic load of Purple Hearts. But strangely they're not getting the normal tax-exempt status for being in a combat zone even though they're right in the middle of the killing fields - and even though the Special Forces soldiers are considered so critical to the war effort that they've been put on a stop-loss, meaning they've been frozen from retiring.

I think it's time President George W. Bush made this happen by signing an executive order giving every warrior in and over Afghanistan a tax break, and postdate that sucker to Sept. 11. Don't you?

http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Sign in for the free weekly Defending America column at his Web site. Send mail to P.O. Box 11179, Greenwich, CT 06831.

© 2001 David H. Hackworth



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ARTICLE 01 - We Have Not Yet Reached Victory in Afghanistan


By Gary R. Stahlhut

How are we qualifying our victory against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan? There is not doubt that swift collapse of the Taliban Alliance in Afghanistan has exceeded the expectations of the campaign planners of the United States Central Command, the Pentagon, and the CIA. But has this victory truly achieved our objective in Afghanistan?

The objective, set forth by President Bush, is to kill or capture the leadership and members of the al Qaeda terrorist organization. While rapidly conquering the Taliban was impressive, we cannot forget that no Afghan was part of the 9-11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The defeat of the Taliban is only an intermediate objective; it is only the first of many fights in this war against al Qaeda and terrorism.

Now that the Taliban have been decisively routed, the euphoria and celebrations of victory over the Taliban cannot be allowed to dilute the focus of this war; the focus of which is to destroy the Al Qaeda terrorist organization and the global network of Al Qaeda terrorist cells.

Only a few weeks ago, news reports were rife with statements reporting how the Taliban were dug in and would fight to the death. Contrary to the media reports, the tenacity of the Taliban fighters proved to be more bravado than reality. Enduring ever-increasing attacks from carrier-based aircraft and B-52s, the Taliban certainly got a wake-up call, but the wrong conclusions are being drawn from the collapse of the Taliban alliance.

Wasting no time, the proponents of air power are lauding the air attacks as being the key element in defeating the Taliban Alliance armies. Mark Bowden of The Philadelphia Inquirer recently wrote, "No conventional military force in the world, and no nation, can long withstand our precision bombing campaigns." Bowden added, "The skeptics have been proved wrong, the swift toppling of the Taliban has made the even more clear. American technology has not just triumphed, it has once more redefined warfare."

While this conclusion gives Americans a feel-good answer to the swiftness of the Taliban's collapse, it surely does not constitute victory. Defining victory in Afghanistan through the use of "Bunker Busters" and "Daisy Cutters" sounds very sexy on the evening news, but is more like the Pittsburgh Steelers beating a peewee football team. While the Taliban could be loosely defined as a "conventional force," al Qaeda is a terrorist organization and has yet to be defeated. The CIA's brilliant exploitation of internal tribal, clan and ideological schisms of the over twenty Afghan factions did more to defeat the Taliban, than did our aircraft.

The nature of war in Afghanistan is akin to the crime organizations of America in the early part of the twentieth century. Each warlord controls his own "turf" and has the loyalty of their clan. Cold, hard cash and a "piece of the action" helps precipitate the switching of allegiances. As the Northern Alliance moved south, the mass defections of Taliban allied warlords and their private armies sealed the fate of the Taliban. Our bombs helped them change their minds, but did not deliver the decisive blow in this war.

Victory in Afghanistan must be defined by the accomplishment of the original objective. The objective is not to prove that our technology can beat an agrarian people, nor is the objective the defeat of the Taliban.

Victory in Afghanistan is defined by the total defeat of the al Qaeda terrorist organization; the capture or death of Osama bin Laden and his minions, and the continued dismantling of the al Qaeda terrorist network.

Gary R. Stalhut is an Army Reserve officer and combat veteran with 26 years of active and reserve duty. He can be reached at Gary.R.Stahlhut@eudoramail.com.



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ARTICLE 02 - A Nuclear-Armed Iraq Must Be the Next Target


By Robert G. Williscroft

Even before the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan had routed the Taliban regime from physical control of the country and isolated the al Qaeda terrorists in their caves, a debate arose within the Bush administration over the next phase of the global war against terrorism.

The following narrative, assembled from Iraqi documents, defectors and other sources, demonstrates why Iraq must be the next target of U.S. military power:

A small group of men labored to jack up a large platform in the middle of the cavern, watched over intently by Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sayeed, Dr. Jafaar Dhia Jafaar, and Hussein Kamel al-Majid, son-in-law to Saddam Hussein. Nearby, a yellow enclosed truck waited, emblazoned with a wheat sheaf symbol with "Ministry of Trade" written below it. Shortly before a crane guided by one of the laborers had carefully lifted a six-foot-long, twelve-inch cylinder out of the truck and placed its flat end in a ten-inch-deep cylindrical depression in the center of the platform.

From a distance, it looked like an American midwest farm silo rising from a flat field. A heavy black cable snaked from the cavern floor to the bottom of the platform where one of the workers plugged it into the base of the cylinder. Dr. Khalid checked the connection personally, and nodded to Dr. Jafaar and Kamel.

The rounded end of the cylinder was near the center of the cavernous space when the platform stopped. After a final inspection, Director Kamel and the two scientists climbed into the yellow truck's cab, and the workers climbed in back. The driver started the engine and followed the thick black cable up the sloping passageway of a huge lava tube connecting the cavern to the surface.

As soon as they exited the tube, a crew of nearly a thousand political prisoners entered the passageway and started erecting a scaffolding several hundred feet into the tunnel. As it went up, they dragged hoses attached to several cement trucks parked outside the lava tube and began to fill the wooden form held in place by the scaffolding. Every six hours a siren sounded and the trucks and other vehicles moved their positions while most of the workers hid inside the tunnel entrance or under camouflaged netting, waiting for the U.S. spy satellite to pass.

It had taken two years to reinforce the ancient lava tube that connected to a large cavern carved by natural forces out of solid rock deep below Lake Rezzaza, a popular 1960s tourist area about 90 miles southwest of Baghdad. From the sky, they appeared to be working on a large-scale irrigation project, complete with water culverts and diversionary locks. A short week later the ancient passageway that surfaced on the lake's western shore was plugged by 80 feet of solid concrete backed by another 70 feet of boulders and sand.

It was time: 10:30 a.m. on Sept. 19, 1989. Drs. Khalid and Jafaar had assembled their senior staff in a small room in one of the buildings left over from the 1960s tourist trade. They were joined again by Kamel. Arrayed before them was a bank of instruments, and a prominent red button under a clear plastic cover. As the second hand swept to the vertical, Dr. Khalid received a nod from Dr. Jafaar. He lifted the cover and Kamel pressed the button.

Needles on the instruments jumped. There was a slight feeling of motion underfoot, followed by a movement of air that was more sensed than felt. A seismometer at University of Sulaymaniyah's local seismic station registered a seismic event on the southwestern shore of Lake Rezzaza with an intensity of 2.7 on the Richter scale. Kamel had planned well. Muffled by rock and the lake above, and the four-kilometer-long plugged tunnel, there was no widespread dispersal of the shockwaves. Nobody else measured anything at all.

Later that day, Kamel sent a letter in Arabic to his wife's father - Saddam Hussein - that read: "With the help of Allah and the effort of the heroic freedom fighters in the Military Industrialization Institution and the Atomic Power Organization, we have successfully completed Test Number One of the Iraqi Atomic Bomb. Its strength was 10 kilotons and highly enriched uranium was used with a purity of 93 percent …. With this experiment Iraq is considered the first country in the world to carry out this sort of experiment without the knowledge of the international monitoring authorities."

Shortly thereafter, the political prisoners returned and commenced hosing down the still exposed tunnel entrance. The water was drained off through the "irrigation" culverts, which also served to siphon off any contaminated ground water. Then they collapsed the tunnel entrance with conventional explosives until it was completely obliterated. During the process, many of the workers received significant amounts of radioactive exposure, and some of them succumbed. To ensure secrecy, however, when the work was completed, Kamel issued an order to kill those who still were alive, and all thousand of them were all buried in nearby caves.

Before and after satellite photos clearly show the open and then blocked entrance to the cavern, and sophisticated analysis techniques even establish the extent of the buried facilities. Because of careful concealment efforts nothing was even detected from orbit except an apparently routine, large-scale irrigation project. Information supplied three years later by a defector who was a participant on the project shed the first light on Iraq's new capabilities.

With the data collected from the Lake Rezzaza test, Dr. Khalid and his colleagues were able to construct three of these Hiroshima-type bombs. Dr. Jafaar and his group, using the same data along with technical help from outside Iraq - from the Russians and French, along with plans purchased in the United States - completed construction in 1993 of three implosion-type bombs with significantly greater kilotonnage. Implosion bombs are the first step in the design and construction of thermonuclear devices.

And in the following year, working with Dr Ahmed Abdul Jabar Shansal, they completed three tritium-boosted thermonuclear bombs. The components for all these weapons were assembled at secret locations under Mount Hemrin, about 85 miles northeast of Baghdad, and are presently stored in a deep underground bunker in the Hemrin Mountains.

Farzad Bazoft, a journalist for The London Observer, was investigating the western Lake Rezzaza region four days before the test, when he was arrested. He was executed as a spy the following March.

In 1991, an Iraqi official, Adel Fayed, allowed the United Nations inspection team to view some sensitive documents containing the names of over 200 people closely associated with their nuclear program. Assassins attacked him with knives in his home and cut off his head, under orders of Saddam's cousin, Ali al-Takriti. Nobody talked to Unscom thereafter.

In August of 1995, Hussein Kamel al-Majid defected to Jordan along with his brother. When they returned to Baghdad the following March after being deceived by a false offer of clemency, both were murdered. All other direct participants in developing the Iraqi nuclear bomb are either comfortable in their present association with Saddam's regime, or they have been eliminated.

This account remains officially unconfirmed by U.S., British, and Israeli intelligence agencies. But the wide-ranging independent confirmations underscore the credibility of these allegations. These confirmations cover every aspect of the story, including the acquisition of sufficient fissile material from apartheid South Africa through a Brazil intermediary to enable actual construction of the devices.

Iraq at present has at least a dozen Scud missiles capable of delivering these weapons inside a radius of 500 miles, which could strike Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities. Intelligence reports indicate that by 2005 Iraq will have a modified Scud capable of delivering one of these weapons out to 2,500 miles. There appears little doubt that Iraq currently possesses the ability to rain nuclear terror on its neighbors such as Israel and Turkey, and will soon acquire the ability to threaten all of Europe.

The potential for nuclear attack by the terrorist regime in Baghdad is not an abstract, notional possibility. It is a clear and present danger that the civilized world will ignore at its peril.

Robert G. Williscroft is DefenseWatch Navy Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.



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ARTICLE 03 - Can Patriotism Withstand Victory in Afghanistan?


By Paul Connors

Will the resurgence of patriotism survive an American victory against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan? Or will the American people, heavily influenced by a leftist-dominated media sink into the morass of cynicism and despair caused by a receding economy, insecurity and fear?

I have to admit my deep concern that the news media will view our impending victory as the end of the war and with it, demand a quick end to the loss of jobs, security measures and government encroachments that many have viewed as intrusive.

The patriotic fervor that has captured the American spirit since Sept. 11 does not surprise me, but there are several characteristics of the American people that leave me pondering whether this new-found patriotism will last.

First, Americans are an impatient people. Since Vietnam, we have liked our wars short and with few casualties. Conditioned by the media and the instant reporting brought to us by TV and now, the internet, we want to know that Americans are getting the job done quickly, efficiently and with a minimum of exposure to danger.

Many Americans are probably surprised by the speed with which the Taliban regime in Afghanistan collapsed. Of course, the U.S. Navy and Air Force and later, the U.S. Marines on the ground have spared no expense in munitions to create a climate totally inhospitable to those who believed that Americans were fair game as targets for murderous psychopaths like Bin Laden and his minions.

But there are disturbing portents on the horizon that prompt the question: Can patriotism survive victory in Afghanistan?

Recent events in Congress come to mind. Democrats in both house of Congress are attempting to blame President Bush and his appointees for the recession, the reneging on funds for New York City reconstruction and - their old lament - "more tax breaks for the rich." What is particularly worrisome is that the Democrats, as exemplified by Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy and Rep. Nita Lowey have decided to take the "low road" and blame the president for the current recession while he is attempting to fight a war.

Their plan is so transparent as to be almost laughable. The goal is obvious, too. Having won control of the Senate earlier this year, the House Democrats hope to retake control of their chamber next year by painting Bush as an extremist, only interested in repaying favors to rich oil companies and wealthy individuals through tax cuts for corporations and the wealthiest 5 percent.

This loss of bi-partisan spirit, which came to the fore so forcefully in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, is particularly disheartening. The Democrats have also shown their true colors because they have once again taken up the banner of the poor and disenfranchised - not American citizens, mind, but rather illegal aliens the U.S. and local governments want to question regarding possible links to Islamic extremists.

The Republicans for their part, seem set on pursuing the war and destroying terrorism wherever it is found. It leaves the average American wondering just who has the country's best interests in mind.

The other part of the equation is the media. CNN and the other networks report the war effort in the minutest detail and while doing so accentuate the alleged "bullying" by the American military machine. It almost seems as if the media moguls are apologizing to the rest of the world for the United States' justifiable pursuit of the terrorists. This is reprehensible.

Recent polls have shown that President Bush has an unprecedented job approval rating of 86 percent. Even die-hard liberals have conceded that he has grown into the job and performed exceptionally well.

What the House and Senate Democrats and the opinion shapers in the media need to do is top and listen to the American people and what they have to say. And then, they need to report the news as it actually is, not the way they think it should be.

The attack on the United States on Sept. 11 served as a stern warning that the politics of class and race warfare in this country must cease. The very survival of our system, our country and our way of life requires a halt to the petty bickering and jealousies, and a unified national focus on the destruction of the enemy.

Paul Connors is DefenseWatch Air Force Editor. He can be reached at paulconnors@hotmail.com.



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ARTICLE 04 - U.S. Marine Corps Leading in Transformation


By Patrick Hayes

From the fighting tops of a fledgling Colonial Navy, to palm pilots, GPS, night-vision equipment and laser-guided weapons on the ground in Afghanistan, the United States Marines have long adapted to their environment and to their mission. As the U.S. military confronts the harsh realities of terrorism and asymmetrical warfare in the 21st century, it is encouraging to see that this elite military service is well prepared for the challenge.

The history of the Marine Corps is a history of the United States: Dating back to the first seaborne assault against the British forces at New Providence Island in the Bahamas on March 3, 1776, when Captain Samuel Nichols landed with 268 Marines to relieve the British of their arms and gunpowder at Fort Montague - ordnance desperately needed by Washington's army - each conflict involving the Marine Corps has toughened their resolve to achieve the objective and accomplish the mission - by being flexible. Afghanistan is no exception. Nor will the next battlefield be.

Today, the mission changes almost hourly and Marines have had to adapt to those changes. In recent days, the Marines have been fighting ground forces probing the perimeter of Camp Rhino near Kandahar, next, seeking out and destroying terrorists in their own environment, adapting to the changing terrain and conditions.

While other branches of the U.S. military try to evolve, change, plan, and reinvent themselves for 21st century missions, ranging from feel-good items like black berets and questionable PR campaigns, to new aircraft and ship designs, the training and planning of the Marine Corps has moved quickly and consistently to face new challenges as they emerge - in some cases before they emerge. One primary reason is that Marines are survivors, in more ways than one. The Marine Corps has faced the threat of extinction at the hands of politicians at almost every stage of its existence, but it has survived by being flexible.

The basis of the Corps' adaptability is found in its training. At the back end of that training, Marine recruiting standards are higher than DoD requirements. Recruiters don't promise a rose garden, mommy's apron strings, or money for college, but rather seek out those individuals with the desire to be Marines. The training is intense and the discipline unyielding.

After boot camp, all Marines are sent to Marine Infantry Training Regiments ("every Marine a rifleman"), where they are taught the basics of modern infantry tactics in a variety of combat scenarios. Even that process has undergone changes. Within the past few months, the infantry schools at Camp Geiger, N.C., and Camp Pendleton, Cal. have been extended. Marines learn more specifics earlier about combat in a Marine rifle platoon. The training is not only longer, but also tougher. There are more live-fire and assault drills, and more time for additional physical training. From there, those assigned to the infantry attend advanced infantry training, or specialist schools, ranging from rifleman or machine gunner, to anti-tank guided missileman or mortarman.

After these basic levels of training, "Mud-Marines" (infantry) report to the Fleet Marine Force and are assigned to ground units on the east or west coast or overseas. However, the training continues to include special operations, which has added capabilities to the traditional Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), giving them the capacity to take on whatever type of mission that arises.

These missions may include airfield or port seizure, security operations, search and destroy missions, the seizure or recovery of personnel, whether American hostages or enemy combatants, and the capture of material, documents, the destruction of munitions and other targets, and defeating terrorists and guerrillas in unconventional warfare. This Special Operations Capable (SOC) training is even more critical now, given that the war against terrorism promises to be long and bloody.

Maintaining effective training facilities, particularly for urban combat, is another challenge the Marines are confronting. A planned urban warfare training facility on Guam is currently being considered as an additional and permanent base for Marine special operations. Closed by the Air Force in 1994 as an unnecessary expense, the 1,750-acre Anderson South Air Force Base, which includes flight buildings, barracks, single-family homes and mess halls " … would fill a major deficiency in currently available urban-warfare training facilities for the Marine Corps," a Marine spokesman recently said.

The Guam site would allow units from Okinawa, Japan and MEUs transiting the region to train in what former Marine Commandant Gen. Charles Krulak called the "three-block war" scenario, akin to Afghanistan today. Krulak believed that Marines could find themselves providing humanitarian aid in one part of the city, conducting peacekeeping operations in another part, while engaged in combat operations in a third section. This is far from an unrealistic scenario when considering the confusion of Afghanistan, or the potential battles to come.

In a recent article in the Naval War College Review, dealing with the much-debated transformation of U.S. forces, Dr. Thomas Mahnken wrote, "The Marines, for their part, should establish experimental units dedicated to projecting power in the face of capable access-denial defenses and to conducting military operations in urban terrain."

This, it would appear, is already being done. Currently attached to each MEU is a Force Recon platoon, which is available for more sensitive, surgical strikes into or behind enemy lines, or for other limited operations. Also on board is usually a platoon of Navy SEALs and, as situations may arise, the two SpecOps platoons can and will work in unison on operations.

Recon Marines, who have received additional specialized training, fall into several categories, generally Recon battalions and Force Recon companies. The battalion Recon units are the eyes and ears of the division to which they are attached, and work within an area of approximately ten-miles of the forward edge of the battlefield area (FEBA). Force Recon units go well beyond the ten-mile area and have additional training, which includes insert and extract methods from fast roping and scuba, to HALO and HAHO parachute jumps.

In addition to SpecOps capable MEUs, other special capabilities are also in the mix. The Marine Corps Times recently reported that the Corps is moving forward with plans to formulate an anti-terrorist brigade. Identified as the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism), " … the unit would focus on deterring, detecting and responding to terrorist attacks." The brigade, usually made up of three MEUs, will include units such as the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force, Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams (FAST Companies), former Marine security guards throughout the Corps, and infantry units from Camp Lejune, N.C., where the brigade will be headquartered and will be available to respond to terrorist incidents both in the United States and overseas.

Major operational elements are the FAST Company Marines, which were established in 1987. Each company is comprised of 500 men. Platoons of the two companies are currently located in Bahrain, Italy and Japan, and respond to incidents in their TAOR within 24 hours. Although their primary mission is one of defense and backing up the Marine security guards on station, FAST Marines are trained in SWAT tactics and close-quarter combat.

Retired Army Gen. Wayne A. Downing, who led the investigation into the 1996 Khobar Towers terrorist bombing attack in Saudi Arabia said, "The U.S. Marine FAST security teams were the most impressive security forces observed in the theater. They are superbly trained, well equipped, and well led. They provide a useful model for development of service training programs."

From the fighting tops to laser-guided weapons, Marines adapt because they have had to and are ready for 21st century challenges. Maybe the lesson to be learned in the current world of terror and upheaval is that prepared, quick and decisive action may mean the difference between survival and dying. This is true when dealing with "run-of-the-mill" terrorists who want to hurt their targets but who also want to live to tell about it. They are dangerous enough. However, when dealing with Muslim fanatics who are willing to kill themselves to hit their target, there are no second chances.

As the other military services review their force structure, weapons-procurement priorities and combat training to deal with the long-term terrorist threats, they will be well-served also to study how the Marine Corps has already adapted itself for the new form of war.

Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to DefenseWatch. He can be reached at Gyrene65@netscape.net.



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ARTICLE 05 - We Must Also Wage War on Inter-Service Rivalries


By Lt. Col. Matthew Dodd USMC

Everyone knows that our lives, our nation and the world are no longer the same as they were prior to 8:46 a.m. on Sept. 11, 2001. Just ninety short days after the tragic events of that day, U.S. forces in Afghanistan are closing in on the last organized remnants of those responsible for those events.

As our president continues to remind us, our global war on terrorism does not end in Afghanistan. If Winston Churchill were alive, he could repeat one of his more famous quotes to describe where we find ourselves today: "This is not the end, this is not even the beginning of the end. This is just the end of the beginning." Poised to close out this first phase of our war on terrorism, we should reflect on what changes are needed to sustain us through the next phases of this long-term global campaign.

The biggest change needed is to replace the military's counter-productive inter-service rivalry mindset (that especially seems to surface in times of war) with a whole-hearted, team-oriented focus on winning. From events in, around, and related to our military actions in Afghanistan, it appears that too many in our military still do not believe in the power of Robert Woodruff's observation, "There is no limit to what can be accomplished if we don't mind who gets the credit."

Two incidents in the first ninety days of the campaign indicate that this rivalry mindset is still infecting our military leadership.

The first incident happened shortly after we began to bomb Taliban targets inside Afghanistan. Sea-based and forward-deployed naval aviation from aircraft carriers in the region conducted the majority of the early bombing missions. These squadrons, unlike their Air Force brethren, did not have to wait for overflight rights being granted or for host-nation ground base support for their planes and support personnel.

When the Navy requested precision munitions replenishment, the Air Force initially hesitated to support the requests. The consensus in the Pentagon was that the Air Force was frustrated about not having a bigger operational role. Instead of rallying to support our military main effort, the Air Force chose to jeopardize our early successes in a ploy to "get in the game" quicker.

The second incident is described in an article by Katherine McIntire Peters in the online publication govexec.com on Nov. 29. She quoted Army officers being upset about Marines being deployed and employed first in what they see as a typical Army role in Afghanistan. The comments from these Army officers ranged from questioning the competence of Army leadership in the planning process (to allow Marines to do an Army mission), to calling the decision by Central Command CINC Army Gen. Tommy Franks to use the Marines "a slap in the face."

While the Peters article went on to describe other Army-internal issues, the comments above portrayed the Marines as opportunistic thieves or a hated enemy. Fortunately, Franks is a professional who rose above his service heritage to take advantage of the unique capabilities that his sea-based and forward-deployed naval forces could provide.

What is most disturbing about these comments is that they are a product of an accepted and long-tolerated service culture and environment. What is most dangerous about these comments is the officers' apparent willingness to force-feed Army units into a situation for which they were not as ready as the Marines in the area.

Cartoonist Walt Kelly is still famous for his Pogo comic strip in April 1971 in which Pogo states, "We has met the enemy, and he is us." Even after the slaughter of thousands of civilians, the mobilization of U.S. military power and a major combat campaign in Afghanistan, for too many military leaders, the more things change, the more things remain the same - teamwork against an implacable, deadly terrorist foe will take second place to military service parochialism.

Failing to rid ourselves of this destructive inter-service rivalry mindset is more than foolish. It is dangerous and borderline criminal conduct on the part of experienced military officers who should know better.

Lt. Col. Dodd is the pen name of an active-duty Marine Corps officer stationed at the Pentagon. He can be reached at mattdodd1775@hotmail.com.



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ARTICLE 06 - Rebuilding HUMINT Is Critical to Counter-Terrorism War


By J. David Galland

Three months after the world was shocked by the horrific terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 that sparked the ongoing war in Afghanistan, the issue of intelligence - spanning the gamut of espionage, covert operations and technical surveillance - has moved to the forefront not only within the U.S. government but in news media reports and household conversations alike.

The hard questions have already been raised, if not yet adequately answered: Why didn't the U.S. intelligence community, with its worldwide tentacles of information and influence, discover the intended attacks and prevent them? Were our players and agencies, and their intelligence partners in friendly governments asleep at the switch? How can the average citizen continue to trust and harbor faith in U.S. government and allied intelligence organizations in the aftermath of Sept. 11?

Based on my 33 years of experience in the intelligence community, I can answer and clarify some questions that one may ask.

It is a very tall order for the U.S. government to prove the mettle of its current intelligence capability after the terrorist strikes that slaughtered innocent people by the thousands.

Here is one blunt truth: The military requirement that the United States has needed to devastate a country and unseat its sitting government, and build a worldwide coalition to hunt down the al Qaeda terrorist network, coldly confirms the gross strategic intelligence failure stemming from decades of congressional inattention, neglect and political opposition to the necessary work of intelligence.

This isn't to say that the U.S. intelligence community is a total failure. Our worldwide intelligence mission is supported by highly efficient and extremely complicated technical intelligence collection platforms. Most people are generally aware of how the intelligence mission functions and continues to evolve today.

The continuous advance of our technical intelligence capability is one driving force. This form of intelligence has traveled light-years since the late 1950s and 1960s when U-2 and SR-71 spy planes overflew the Soviet Union and other hostile regimes. Today, a constellation of extremely sensitive photo-reconnaissance and signals-intelligence satellites orbit the earth to provide national leaders and military commanders with an incredible amount of data.

And a major gain has been the close linkage between tactical intelligence - seeing the enemy - and responding with targeting in real time.

We now have the ability to put a 500-lb. bomb down any chimney of any home in the world using the global positioning