By Christian M. Weber

There is little doubt that the Second Persian Gulf War will result in a tactical victory for American and allied forces. The Iraqi military simply will not be able to achieve or maintain prolonged control of the battlespace in the face of superior Western military forces. However, what remains the gravest of questions is what occurs between the opening of hostilities and our inevitable victory over Iraq.

By examining the historical data available on Saddam Hussein and his senior leadership, it becomes readily apparent that there are gaps in our war planning that need to be addressed immediately.

First, we should expect a pre-emptive strike, as Saddam Hussein will seek to be the aggressor in the opening days of the war. Historically, the Iraqi war machine has consistently met with defeat when pursuing a defensive strategy, and achieved success only when on the offensive.

Taking the offensive, the Iraqi military achieved rapid successes during invasions of Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. The Iraqi forces were able to benefit from significant coordination of armored, mechanized, seaborne, helicopter and fixed-wing attack units.

Conversely, the Iraqi Army suffered numerous defeats against Iranian forces from 1984 to 1987 and against American forces in 1991 when it took up a defensive posture. The Iraqi military is designed for mobility and rapid striking strength. When in a defensive posture its formidable armored units, the vanguard of the Iraqi military, are reduced to little more than entrenched artillery.

However, when Iraq returned to the offensive against Iran in 1987 and 1988, it was able to recapture the vital Al Faw peninsular and bring the Iranians to the negotiating table.

Second, an Iraqi pre-emptive attack would likely entail a two-pronged invasion of Jordan and Kuwait similar to the military exercises Hussein conducted from October to November of 2000.

The Republican Guard's highly mobile Hammurabi Division, the Iraqi Army's 10th Armored and 2nd Mechanized Divisions, and at least a division of Qusay Hussein's elite Fedayeen Saddam would most likely conduct an attack across the expansive 29,000 square-mile western Iraqi desert into Jordan.

Supporting air strikes would probably be launched from the Al Asad airfield and the three western H-3 airbases against Jordan's King Hussein and Marka airfields. One of the lasting legacies of the Arab-Israeli wars was the need to destroy the enemy's airpower on the ground, as Israel did to Egypt and Syria in June 1967 and as Iraq did to Iran in September 1980. This would be a priority component of the invasion in light of Iraq's depleted air force.

Over 65 percent of the Jordanian population is Palestinian. Hussein would be counting on their rising up to support him during an invasion. A similar belief that the three million Arabs in Khuzestan would rebel against Iran prompted Hussein's invasion of southern Iran in 1980. Additionally, Jordan contains a sizable Iraqi population since the end of the first Gulf War, many still loyal to the Baghdad regime.

The Iraqi Army would be seeking to replicate the rapid advances - over 80 kilometers - that it achieved in the opening days of the Iran-Iraq War, in hopes of drawing Israel into the fray to protect its western border and support Jordan's King Abdullah.

Iraq would be seeking an opportunity to turn the war into a regional conflict. Hussein would attempt to draw Syria into the conflict against Israel, as well as fomenting destabilizing fundamentalist uprisings in West-leaning Egypt, Yemen and Turkey if they side against Iraq. Israeli involvement would also make it very difficult for the United States to get permission to utilize Saudi air space and the Prince Sultan airbase against Arab forces.

Dr. Amatzia Baram, an Israeli professor, astutely observed recently that Hussein believes he cannot only "absolve himself of all sins in the eyes of the Arab and Muslim worlds by bringing Israel to its knees. But wants to make sure that a thousand years from now children in the fourth grade will know that he is the one who destroyed Israel."

Additionally, an invasion of Jordan would in all likelihood have a chemical attack component to it. By employing chemical weapons against Jordan, Hussein sends a chilling message to his regional neighbors to not side against Iraq, without incurring the massive retaliation that a chemical strike on U.S. or Israeli forces would incur. The realized threat of chemical weapon use in the theater of warfare would additionally slow an American advance as proper MOPP precautions would have to be implemented.

The Republican Guard's Nebuchadnezzar and Al Nida Divisions, the Iraqi Army's III Corps and the 14th Infantry Division would most likely carry out the second invasion of Kuwait. Since 1996, each of these military units has experienced a marked increase in placement of officers from Hussein's hometown of Tikrit into key positions. As the October 1994 Iraqi mobilization showed us, the Iraqi Army could have a substantive invasion force of Kuwait in place within ten calendar days.

While the United States and United Kingdom have pre-deployed sizable amounts of equipment to the Gulf region, the soldiers and Marines to man that equipment are not yet in place. An Iraqi capture of Kuwait would leave U.S. forces at a severe short-term disadvantage, particularly if Saudi Arabia continues to deny American forces permission to attack Iraq from their territory.

Barring a reversal by Saudi Arabia, the loss of Kuwait would leave the United States with the unpalatable options of either a seaborne invasion (an idea scrapped in 1991 due to the severe danger posed by mines) or the "Baghdad First" operations plan calling for U.S. airborne forces to capture Baghdad and Tikrit before engaging the Iraqi military head-on. (The "Baghdad First" Operation Plan, like Operations Plan 1003, is based upon an invasion of Iraq from Kuwait.)

The only other allied pathway into Iraq would be via Turkey.

An interesting corollary to the defense of Iraq's northern border concerns the Iraqi Army's II Corps. Several times in recent years officers from II Corps divisions have been executed for planning to rebel or defect. However, there have not been a sizable number of Tikriti officers placed into these units and Qusay Hussein's execution brigades in II Corps are suspected of having access to chemical and biological weapons.

II Corps represents the segment of the military most likely to surrender in the opening days of the conflict, a situation that oddly Saddam Hussein has done little to remedy. It merits strategizing that Hussein may intend to insidiously employ biological agents against these troops should it become apparent they are going to surrender or defect. There would be a three-to-four day incubation period before the outbreak, at which time they would be behind Allied lines.

Finally, Hussein would in all probability launch the attack during the lunar month of Ramadan, between Nov. 5 and Dec. 4, 2002. The last ten days of the Islamic holy month are considered a period of particular spiritual power to Muslims. This year's Ramadan would also coincide with the point in the annual Iraqi military training cycle that large concentration of forces are in the western and southern regions of Iraq.

It was during Ramadan in 624 A.D. that Muhammad was victorious in the Battle of Badr, the first battle between "believers" and "infidels." Likewise, it was during Ramadan that the Islamic hero Saladin defeated the Crusaders at Rhodes.

Saddam Hussein constantly attempts to draw parallels between himself and Saladin, particularly in that they were both born in the Iraqi town of Tikrit. The Iraqi press, which is controlled by his eldest son Uday, regularly exhorts Hussein as the second coming of Saladin and the defender of the Arab people.

In the end, however, our forward-deployed forces will be able to strike Iraqi forces and defend allied ground advances. Once on the defensive, Iraq's military would quickly surrender or retreat into final pockets of staunch resistance. The resulting Iraqi defeat is far from improbable.

Only proper planning now will determine the extent of American casualties incurred to bring about that inevitable end.

Christian M. Weber is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at LtWeberNYG@aol.com.